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ABSTRACT 
 
This study aims to investigate the extent to which Islam influences Indonesian foreign 
policy in the post-Suharto era. Specifically, this research intends to examine under what 
circumstances the influence of Islam on Indonesian foreign policy will be substantial 
and under what conditions it will have less of an effect. Focusing on the era of the 
administration of President Yudhoyono, the issues covered in this study embrace 
Indonesia’s policies towards Iran’s nuclear programme, Kosovo’s independence and 
Palestinian statehood.  
 
This study puts emphasis on the interplay between Muslim groups and the government 
in relation to the conduct of the country’s foreign policy. As interest groups, Muslim 
groups in Indonesia have had significant concerns about Muslim issues in both 
Indonesia’s domestic affairs and in its foreign policy. 
 
In general, this study argues that there has been an increased role for Islam in 
Indonesia’s post-Suharto foreign policy. Islamic elements and Muslim groups’ 
aspirations have been increasingly included and accommodated in the country’s foreign 
policy. These accommodations are made to the extent that the aspirations these views 
reflect do not contradict fundamentally with Pancasila as state philosophy, the 1945 
constitution and the country’s vital national interests, mainly those related to territorial 
integrity. 
 
Specifically, the case of the Iranian nuclear programme has showed that the government 
‘bowed’ to the Muslim groups’ pressures which were backed by the parliament. The 
government changed its position from supporting UNSC resolution 1747 on sanctions 
against Iran to abstaining on the similar resolution no. 1803. In this regard, the 
influence of Muslim groups on the country’s foreign policy was important and 
substantial as Muslim groups’ interests and members of parliament’s interests did 
converge against the government’s policy on that matter.  
 
The Kosovo case has demonstrated an opposite effect. The government apparently 
firmed up its non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence and disregarded Muslim 
groups’ aspirations. Muslim groups’ aspiration to recognise Kosovo’s independence is 
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perceived to contradict the most vital of the country’s national interest, namely national 
integrity. Finally, the case of Palestinian statehood has showed that the Indonesian 
government’s policy and Muslim groups’ aspirations have been aligned (unlike their 
differences over Iran) with a similar voice being presented. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
AKP : Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and 
Development Party), founded in 2001 
DI : Darul Islam (a pro-Islamic-state rebel) 
DDII : Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Islamic 
Education Council of Indonesia), founded in 1967 
DPD : Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional 
Representative Council); the upper house of 
parliament 
DPR : Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of 
Representatives); the lower house of parliament 
FPI : Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front) 
Golkar : Golongan Karya (Functional Groups), the state 
political party under the New Order, and one of the 
major political parties in the post-Suharto era. 
Guided Democracy : The Soekarno regime, 1959-66 
HAMAS : Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah (Islamic 
Resistance Movement), founded in 1988 
HMI : Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia (Muslim Students 
Association); founded in 1947 
HTI : Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia  
IAEA : International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICMI :  Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia 
(Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectual); 
founded in 1990 
KAMMI : Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesian 
(Unity of Action of Indonesian Muslim Student), 
founded in 1998 
KH. : Kyai Haji (a much respected Islamic cleric who 
already performed Haji—annual pilgrimage to 
Mecca).  
KISDI : Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam 
(Indonesian Committee for world Islamic 
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Solidarity); formed in 1986 to promote the cause 
of overseas Muslims in conflict zones 
KISPA : Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Palestina 
(Indonesian Committee for Palestinian Solidarity)  
MFA : Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MMI : Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic 
Worrior Council) 
Muhammadiyah : Indonesia’s largest modernist Islamic organisation, 
founded in 1912 
MUI : Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of 
Ulama), founded in1975 
MPR : Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s 
Consultative Assymbly) 
NAM : Non Aligned Movement 
NATO : The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NU : Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of Muslim 
Scholars); Indonesia’s largest Muslim 
organisation, founded in 1926 
OIC : Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
PAN : Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) 
Pancasila : The five guiding principles of the Indonesian state 
(belief in God, humanitarianism, nationalism, 
democracy and social justice 
PBB : Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star party), an 
Islamic modernist political party 
PBR : Partai Bintang Reformasi (Star Reformist Party), a 
splinter of PPP 
PD : Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party), the party led 
by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
PBNU : Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama (Executive 
Board of NU) 
PDIP : Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan 
(Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), the 
x 
 
party led by former president Megawati 
Sukarnoputri 
PK : Partai Keadilan (Justice Party); formed in 1998 
and renamed Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in 
2003 
PKB : Partai Kebangkita Bangsa (National Awakening 
Party); founded in 1998, and based largely on an 
NU constituency 
PKI : Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist 
Party) 
PKS : Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice Prosperous 
Party), an Islamic modernist party 
PLO : Palestinian Liberation Front, founded in 1964 
PNI : Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist 
Party) 
Poros Tengah : Central Axis 
PPP : Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United 
Development Party), an Islamic political party 
Priyayi : the traditional aristocratic class of Java 
Reformasi : ‘Reform’; the post-new order period 
Santri : Pious Muslims 
Santrinisasi : a process to call nominal Muslims to be pious 
Muslims 
Sarekat Islam : Islamic Association; founded in 1912 
Sharia : Islamic law 
Shi’a, Shi’ism : Faction, party; the second largest branch of Islam 
after Sunni 
Sunni : Majority branch of Islam  
Syafi’i : One of the four madzhab of Sunni Islam, and the 
dominant school of Indonesia’s traditionalist 
Muslims 
UNGA : United Nations General Assembly  
UNSC : United Nations Security Council 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Background 
 
The world has seen increasing discussion regarding the relationship between Islam and 
politics, including the role of Islam in foreign policy making in Muslim majority countries. 
The 9/11 tragedy and other global terrorist phenomena have pushed Islam and Muslim 
countries into the centre of the world’s spotlight. Indonesia has also been caught up in this 
limelight. The state has frequently been portrayed as having a distinct kind of Islam 
compared to other Muslim countries. It has been described as a country where Islam and 
democracy can evolve together (Bush, 2009). 
 
Indonesia’s population is approximately 252 million, 87.2 percent of whom are Muslims 
(BPS, 2015). As a Muslim majority country, Indonesia has never formally defined itself as 
neither an Islamic nor a secular state, but rather as a Pancasila state. Having Pancasila state 
status has led to political dynamics in the relationship between Islam and politics and 
between Islam and the state since the formative era of modern Indonesia. It is important to 
study the relationship between Islam and politics in Indonesia, including aspects connected 
with foreign policy. Therefore, this thesis aims to study the role of Islam in the 
contemporary foreign policy of Indonesia, one of the world’s most important Muslim 
majority countries.  
 
This thesis is important for at least two reasons. First, it is set against a backdrop of 
existing scholarship which has suggested that, in an earlier period, Islam has not played a 
prominent role in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Second, over the last decade and a half 
Indonesia has experienced a democratic transition that since 2004 has arguably become a 
democratic consolidation (Liddle & Mujani, 2013). This can be expected to have changed 
the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy making and may have 
allowed Muslim groups in Indonesia a greater influence on foreign policy.  
 
Hence, this thesis is focused on the extent to which Muslim opinion in Indonesia on a 
series of foreign policy issues has translated into a greater say on Indonesia’s external 
stance. It does so in the context of Indonesia’s democratisation. This thesis argues that 
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Islam (analysed here more specifically in terms of the role of Muslim groups) has a bigger 
influence on Indonesia’s contemporary foreign policy than has commonly been thought. 
The increased influence of Muslim groups occurs when Muslim groups’ aspirations are in 
line with the aspirations of broader political constituencies. Likewise, this thesis argues 
that when issues of importance to Muslim groups do not threaten national strategic 
interests, their influence is more effective. This thesis examines the extent to which the 
role of Islam has influenced Indonesia’s contemporary foreign policy, particularly in the 
era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (referred to here as ‘Yudhoyono’).    
 
This thesis has investigated the interplay between Muslim groups and the government in 
the decision making process on international issues of concern to those groups. In studying 
the cases of the Iranian nuclear programme, the recognition of Kosovo’s independence and 
the Palestinian question, the thesis will employ Putnam’s approach which argues that 
governments need to strike a balance between international interests and and domestic 
aspirations. However to investigate the interplay between Muslim groups and the 
government in the broader context of the differentiation between authoritarianism and 
democratisation, this thesis will use Skidmore and Hudson’s statist-pluralist (societal) 
approach. This approach manages to capture state-societal relationships in democratic 
conditions while Putnam does not differentiate between democratic and authoritarian 
states.  
 
A literature review for this thesis needs to consider a range of issues and connections. 
First, there is the literature review on foreign policy making and the relationship between 
domestic and external political concerns. The second part of the literature review considers 
the relationship between religion and foreign policy. A particular aspect of this review 
considers the scholarship on the role of Islam in the foreign policy of Muslim majority 
countries. The fourth part of the review looks at research on the more specific question of 
the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. On the basis of this overall literature 
review, the specific contribution that this thesis makes to the scholarship will then be 
discussed by way of outlining and explaining the thesis’s research objectives. 
 
This will be followed by an explanation of the research methodology which has been 
adopted, including the use of case studies which evaluate the role of Islam in Indonesia’s 
contemporary foreign policy as it applies to three important foreign policy issues relating 
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to the interests of Muslims. The data used for this research will also be discussed, along 
with some of the limitations of the research. This will be followed by a guide to the overall 
structure of the thesis. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Foreign policy formation 
 
Foreign policy is naturally the domain of the state, meaning it is state-centric in nature 
(Webber & Smith, 2002, p. 16). Like domestic policy, foreign policy is set and formulated 
within the state, yet it is intended for and implemented in the “environment external to that 
state” (Clarke & White, 1989, p. 5). Foreign policy is, according to Wallace (1971), an 
“area of politics which bridges all the important boundaries between the nation-state and 
its international environment”  (p. 7). On the one hand, foreign policy is regarded as an 
overt plan of action set to secure a country’s specific external goals (Clarke & White, 
1989). It consists of guidelines for a state concerning its external affairs or specific 
international issues of concern (Gindarsah, 2012a). On the other hand, it is also viewed as 
a series of habitual responses by a state to affairs or events that take place in the 
international milieu. This reflects two conceptions of foreign policy. First there is the 
conception that it is related to state activism. The second is the notion that views policy as 
a substantially structured reaction to the external environment (Clarke & White, 1989). 
 
Realism has greatly influenced the study of foreign policy. Realism is the most mature and 
well-established theory in the International Relations discipline (Steans & Pettiford, 2001, 
p. 20). Within the realist tradition, neoclassical realism is a relatively recent theory. It 
combines the key features of classical realism and neorealism (Gindarsah, 2012a). It 
represents ”an imperfect transmission belt” between systemic incentives and constraints 
and unit level behaviour, namely actual foreign policy practice (Taliaferro, Lobell, & 
Ripsman, 2009, p. 4). Its foreign policy model places the domestic politics of a state as an 
intervening variable between systemic constraints and incentives and the state’s decisions 
and implementation (Gindarsah, 2012a). However, like the other variants of realism, 
neoclassical realism shares the assumption that external politics are a constant struggle 
among states to pursue material power and security in an uncertain world with scarce 
resources (Taliaferro et al., 2009). Despite its emphasis on the primacy of the international 
system, neoclassical realism acknowledges the salience of domestic political factors and 
4 
 
the perceptions of leaders concerning foreign policy responses to the external environment 
(Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2009). 
 
Neoclassical realism seemingly narrows the gap between the other variants of realism and 
liberalism particularly in relation to the importance of domestic politics in foreign policy. 
Classical and neo realists believe the domestic dynamic plays a modest role in foreign 
policy. Both focus on power politics, the state’s behaviour in the international system, the 
rationality of the state as a unitary actor, and the distribution of power. However, in 
general, due to their acknowledgement of the primacy of the international system, realists 
argue that a state’s behaviour is not determined by domestic factors such as religion, 
ideology, and culture. Instead, a state’s behaviour is shaped by its national material 
interests and power maximisation (Haque, 2003). On the other hand, the liberal approach 
acknowledges the salience of domestic politics in foreign policy. It does not consider the 
state as a rationally acting unitary actor. It stresses the importance of non-state actors in 
foreign policy. Liberals view interest groups including religious and societal groups and 
the public as important actors influencing the state’s foreign policy. Therefore, the national 
interests of states are determined by interest groups and the public, as well as by 
government authorities. Despite their acknowledgement of the salience of domestic 
politics, proponents of liberalism have different views on how much and in what ways 
domestic politics affect foreign policy (Griffiths, 1999). 
 
Hill (2003, p. 37) argues that foreign policy cannot be separated from the domestic context 
where it develops. He believes there would be no foreign policy in the absence of domestic 
society and the state. His argument does not pretend to negate the realist perception that 
international politics cannot be separated from the international system. According to Hill 
(2003), foreign policy should not be associated with “a game like chess, with rules, a 
single dominant value, and unitary, optimizing decision maker” (Hill, 2003, p. 37). 
Therefore, the framework Putnam (1988) sets out is a more realistic approach. Putnam 
proposes the two-level game approach where a government plays politics simultaneously 
on two boards, the domestic and international (Hill, 2003; Putnam, 1988). 
 
The two-level game as discussed by Moravcsik (1997) follows the notion that “the 
relationships of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are 
embedded have a fundamental impact on state behaviour in world politics” (p. 513). The 
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two-level game establishes a linkage between the domestic and international political 
dynamic (Putnam, 1988). In the domestic context, domestic constituencies put pressure on 
the government to adopt and implement policies they favour. On the other hand, the 
government also seeks power and legitimacy by making political coalitions among its 
constituencies. Meanwhile, at the international level, the government seeks to 
accommodate domestic aspirations while minimising the adverse impacts on external 
relations. In this vein, political leaders should concurrently play the game at both the 
international and the domestic levels (Putnam, 1988). The need for decision makers to 
satisfy both domestic constituencies and international players leads to constraints on 
foreign policy behaviour (Dosch, 2006; Putnam, 1988).  
 
Hagan (1995) further develops Putnam’s approach on the interaction and linkages between 
the domestic and external environment. He argues that the linkages and interaction may 
provide two types of objectives in domestic politics, namely: establishing political 
coalitions and retaining political power (Hagan, 1995). In the first objective, foreign policy 
decision makers need domestic political support to build political coalitions for the sake of 
implementing any policy initiatives. Foreign policy decisions constitute political results 
reflecting “the political strategies necessary to build agreement” with the domestic 
structure so as to support the implementation of policy initiatives (Hagan, 1995, p. 122). 
Meanwhile, the second objective requires decision makers to adjust themselves to find 
ways in order to impose fewer domestic political risks. Such action is carried out by 
political leaders or government to retain power (Hagan, 1995). In many developing 
countries, retaining political power is more prevalent than building political coalitions 
(Perwita, 2007, p. 183). 
 
Dosch (2006) argues Putnam’s two-level approach has conceptual shortcomings as it does 
not elucidate the impact of domestic factors on foreign policy in different types of regimes. 
There is no differentiation between democratic and autocratic regimes (Dosch, 2006). 
Putnam’s approach also does not touch on the potentially differing relationships between 
the state and society in weak states and strong states. The statist and pluralist approach of 
Skidmore and Hudson (1993) may address the shortcomings of Putnam’s approach by 
dealing with the relationship between the state and society in both autocratic states and 
democratic states. 
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The statist approach assumes that the state has full autonomy in conducting foreign policy. 
This condition may be found in non-democratic states, where the government formulates 
foreign policy largely autonomously from the influence of society. The state is much 
stronger than society and therefore it can neglect the role of society. Foreign policy 
formulation is determined by national interests as calculated by elites. As reflected in the 
foreign policy of some strong states, this approach assumes that national interests are 
defined either subjectively or objectively depending on the regime’s views. Meanwhile, 
the pluralist approach assumes that the society within the state has a salient role in foreign 
policy. This approach comes with the assumption that to maintain and maximise their 
influence and effectiveness in foreign policy, “the political leaders care most about 
maintaining a high level of domestic political support” (Skidmore & Hudson, 1993, p. 9). 
 
Considering the types of cases and the kind of international issues discussed in this thesis, 
it was decided to employ Putnam’s (1988) two level game approach and the statist-
pluralist approach of Skidmore and Hudson (1993). There are two reasons why these two 
theories are important and relevant to this my thesis. First, Putnam’s approach helps craft a 
framework to analyse Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour as a result of the interaction 
between the government and Muslim groups on issues which will be discussed in the 
thesis. Here, the government needs to set policies which strike a balance between the 
views of Muslim groups and international interests and pressures. Second, the Skidmore 
and Hudson approach helps investigate the importance of Muslim groups in Indonesia’s 
foreign policy making both in the pre- and post-Suharto eras. In a more general sense, 
Putnam’s approach provides the context of the interaction and linkages between the 
domestic and external environment influencing a state’s foreign policy behaviour, while 
the Skidmore and Hudson approach is aimed at capturing the interplay between state and 
societal groups. To give a clear map on foreign policy actors, especially non state actors in 
a democratic state such as Indonesia, it is first worth reviewing the work of Coplin (1971, 
p. 77). Through his work this thesis intends to discern groups competing to influence 
foreign policy formulation in a contemporary Indonesia. According to Coplin (1971), there 
are four groups that have the capability to influence foreign policy, namely government 
officials or the executive, partisan (political parties), public opinion, and interest groups 
including societal and religious organisations (Coplin, 1971, pp. 70-78).  
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This thesis will mainly focus on interest groups, and especially on Muslim groups. It will 
also give emphasis to other groups, namely partisan groups and public opinion. The term 
‘interest group’ refers to a group of individuals with common interests on economic and 
non-economic aspirations (Coplin, 1971, p. 75). In Indonesia, religious organisations such 
as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) belong to this category. Meanwhile public 
opinon consists of public discourse in the public domain. In this vein, Muslim groups’ 
aspirations may be channelled through news and articles or programmes in mass media 
(Gindarsah, 2012a, p. 419).  
 
Partisan groups, especially Islamic political parties, may also transmit the aspirations of 
Indonesian Muslim groups to become stronger voices in influencing foreign policy. 
Indeed, political parties may play a role in linking societal groups and the political 
leadership whilst also being themselves part of the government (Kaarbo, Lantis, & 
Beasley, 2002). Despite emphasising the role of Muslim groups as interest groups, this 
thesis cannot avoid also emphasising political parties, especially Islamic parties which as 
formal organisations often channel Muslim groups’ political aspirations. As Indonesian 
Muslim groups and Islamic political parties directly or indirectly associated themselves 
with religion of Islam, it follows that all Muslim groups as mentioned in this thesis have a 
religious context. For example, NU and Muhammadiyah are commonly understood as 
religious (Islamic) mass organisations. Further, this thesis defines religion in a sociological 
manner where religion and society cannot be separated. In this vein, a religion, as defined 
by  Durkheim (2001) is “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, 
that is to say, things set apart and forbidden-beliefs and practices which unite into one 
single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them” (pp. 14-15). 
Therefore the origin, function, and meaning of religion can only be comprehended and 
explained by alluding to community or social elements (Cristi, 2001). This sociological 
approach to religion is useful in understanding that religious organizations exist to 
cultivate religious interests. Religious organisations ensure “religious ideas, attitudes and 
feelings are given stable social expression” representing social relationships within the 
community (James, 1973).  
 
In the context of Indonesia, Muslim groups including Muslim political organisations may 
gain much attention from the country’s policy makers. They are more likely to pay 
attention and to respond to the aspirations of specific and organised societal groups than to 
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society at large (Kaarbo et al., 2002, p. 15). It is impossible to disregard Muslim groups as 
moral forces in Indonesian politics. However, the extent to which societal groups as 
interest groups can successfully influence foreign policy depends on the particular issues 
they take up and their relationship with the government (Kaarbo et al., 2002). Muslim 
groups are very articulate in voicing certain international issues, especially those that 
become their concerns such as Palestinian statehood.  
 
For analytical purposes, Muslim groups are categorised by this thesis into moderate and 
militant/radical Muslim groups. The moderates are classified into traditional groups, which 
are commonly associated with NU, and modernist groups which are commonly 
represented by Muhammadiyah. Meanwhile, the second group consists of militant/radical 
Muslim groups or Islamist groups. The latter has been further divided into political groups 
such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or MMI 
(Indonesian Islamic Warrior Council); dakwah (missionary) groups such as Jamaah 
Tabligh and Salafi movements; and jihadist Islamist groups such as Laskar Jihad and 
Jamaah Islamiyah (Weck, Hassan, & Abubakar, 2011). 
 
This thesis will contend that the societal factor1 is a crucial independent variable shaping 
foreign policy making and behaviour. The author works from the assumption that society 
at the domestic level gives input to the government and therefore influences its decision-
making process and implementation.  
2.2. Religion and foreign policy 
 
Religion has been marginalised in international politics since the emergence of modernity. 
The state’s supremacy under the Westphalian system led to increased religious 
marginalisation (Dark, 2000; Fox & Sandler, 2004; Hatzopoulos & Petito, 2003; Thomas, 
2005). Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, modernity made secularism relatively 
unchallenged for centuries. The most shocking challenge for modernity was the 9/11 
terrorist attacks (Philpott, 2002). Since the 1970s, there had been a re-awakening of 
religion (Swatos, 1989), but this had gone largely unnoticed in IR scholarship. The attacks 
                                                             
1 All elements of society including religious groups which have interests in international issues and which 
constitute stakeholders in foreign policy can be categorized as examples of societal factors which shape and 
influence the foreign policy of a country. In theorical terms,  the societal factor in foreign policy includes the  
political culture and the system of belief, history and social structure (Perwita, 2007).  
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in New York on 11 September (9/11) raised awareness of the important role of religion in 
international politics.  
 
The global phenomenon of the rise of religion suggests that it has survived modernity 
(Berger, 1999). This challenges the understanding of the modern world and has marked the 
return of religion to world politics. Therefore, scholars like Thomas (2005), Fox and 
Sandler (2004), Hatzopoulos and Petito (2003), and Philpott (2002) advocate bringing 
religion back into the literature on international relations. Their proposal is not to change 
the existing international political paradigm but instead to include religion as a variable.  
 
Studying religion and foreign policy leads to a series of questions; what are the 
conspicuous impacts of religion on foreign policy and what is the possible mechanism for 
the influence of religion on foreign policy? According to Warner and Walker (2011), 
studies on this subject have still left those questions unanswered. Indeed, it is a difficult  
task to answer them. The role of religion in this regard is mostly related to the function of 
religion in terms of its theological aspects, attribution to a culture, and a basis of values 
(Philpott, 2007).  
 
Philpott (2007), Warner and Walker (2011), and Manza and Wright (2003) suggest that we 
should not ignore the role of religion as an attribute of individuals and communities and its 
role in institutional relations within a state. Both religious legitimacy and religion as a 
human worldview might also need consideration (Fox & Sandler, 2004). Religious 
legitimacy relates to the function of religion in justifying politics and international 
relations. Religion’s influence on foreign policy is related to its ability to shape public 
opinion (Baumgartner, Francia, & Morris, 2008; Wuthnow & Lewis, 2008) to contain core 
elements of identity (Croft, 2009) and to generate soft power characteristics (Haynes, 
2008). 
 
The role of religion in international relations has been given relatively little attention by 
scholars as a factor shaping attitudes towards foreign policy. Scholars have focused more 
on the role of religion in domestic politics (Cahill, 2009; Jones-Correa & Leal, 2001; 
Patrikios, 2008; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Shankland, 2007; Wald & Brown, 2011; 
Wilcox, 1990), especially in electoral behaviour in the US and other countries (Bélanger & 
Eagles, 2006; Don‐Yehiya, 1997; Green, 2007; Haqqani, 2004; Manza & Brooks, 1997; 
Minkenberg, 2010; Stan & Turcescu, 2005).  
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The imperative role of religion in domestic politics is found not only in non-Western 
countries but also in the West. This review on religion and foreign policy will draw 
heavily from the US literature. The US provides a political laboratory on religion and 
politics including foreign policy, as religious groups play a distinctive role in US politics. 
Despite the US political and legal traditions separating church and state, the US has strong 
religious elements compared to other Western countries. Only 6.3 percent  of Americans 
regard themselves as ‘secular’ and unaffiliated with any religion (Cahill, 2009). Religious 
leaders and religious groups actively engage in political life. US elections have been 
influenced by religious factors since at least 1896 (Gentile, 2008). The religious 
affiliations of political candidates are often scrutinised (Cahill, 2009). 
 
Studies by Minkenberg (2010) and Dalton ( 2008. ) investigate the declining importance of 
religiosity in politics among Western democracies, including the US. However, 
Minkenberg (2010) acknowledges that religion, and religious groups, have remained a 
political force in Western democracies. Religious factors have been largely neglected as a 
dimension in analysing foreign policy. Religion was not considered salient in this field 
before 9/11 (Marsden, 2011). Jelen (1994) and Ribuffo (1998) for example, suggest that 
religion had an insignificant effect on US foreign policy. Jelen (1994) observed the effects 
of religious belief on the orientation of foreign policy and on people’s attitudes towards the 
Gulf War, but concluded that the role of religion in decision making was limited. There 
was “little evidence that religion affects foreign policy in a systematic manner” (Jelen, 
1994, p. 392). This would suggest that there is no need to assume the importance of 
religion in the foreign policy making process. Meanwhile, Ribuffo (1998) was unable to 
find any major US diplomatic decision that was motivated only by religious issues. He 
argues that religious issues are far less important than strategic, economic, and political 
considerations.  
 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the close association of President George W. Bush with 
Evangelical Protestantism forced commentators to reconsider religion as a significant 
contribution to international politics (Marsden, 2011). Bush’s genuine personal religiosity 
greatly affected US foreign policy. Bush’s religious beliefs combined with a secular neo-
conservative ideology dominated the attitudes of US foreign policy from 2001-2008. In the 
aftermath of 9/11, religion served as an instrument which provided moral justification and 
legitimisation for US foreign policy (Bacevich & Prodromou, 2004). Although Bush’s 
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religious influence on foreign policy was considered dangerous by some scholars such as 
Wallis (2004), Bush gained support from religious domestic constituents (Baumgartner et 
al., 2008; Friedman, 2009; Froese & Mencken, 2009; Haynes, 2008; Smidt, 2005). 
 
In the post-Bush era, religion has still had a significant role. Marsden (2011) argues that 
President Barack Obama has also employed religion to optimise domestic support for 
foreign policy initiatives such as on Middle Eastern issues, seeking to maintain US global 
supremacy through more consensual and multilateral approaches than those of President 
Bush. The Obama administration has provided an opportunity for religious actors to 
continuously play a pivotal role in pushing US interests abroad.  
 
Religion has a potent power in foreign policy. Religion indeed contains many core 
elements of identity. Such elements of identity are not only seen prominently in Islamic 
countries such as Iran and Pakistan but also in Western countries such as the US (Croft, 
2009). However, the discourse on religious identity and foreign policy has gained little 
attention from scholars.  
 
In general, the above studies demonstrate the importance of religion in domestic politics, 
mostly related to electoral attitudes and US foreign policy, particularly in the aftermath of 
the 9/11 attacks. Religious issues have also been utilised by the government of the US to 
serve domestic constituencies. Religion clearly plays a role in US foreign policy toward 
the Middle East, particularly in relation to Israel (Guth, 2012; Miller, 2014). Religion has 
also been utilised by the US government for power legitimacy and justification. President 
Bush successfully used religious ideology to justify and to gain support for his foreign 
policy in the Middle East, particularly the invasion of Iraq (Silk, 2012). However, much of 
the scholarship does not provide elaborate accounts as to exactly how religion influences 
US foreign policy. 
 
It is not only in the US that religion influences foreign policy but also in other Western 
secular states such as Russia. Russian foreign policy has also been influenced by domestic 
interest groups including the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) (Blitt, 2010; Curanovic, 
2014; Lomagin, 2012). As Russia’s majority religious group, the ROC has influenced the 
government to reassess the state’s secular constitutional status and state-church relations. 
The growing influence of the church becomes obvious as it goes beyond the realm of 
domestic policies. The state and the church have supported one another in terms of foreign 
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policy goals. The church has the ear of the government in the foreign policy making 
process (Blitt, 2010). The past Medvedev-Putin government established an open-ended 
concept of spirituality in its policies, including its national security policy. This policy is 
embodied by its exclusive espousal of Russian Orthodox values. Rhetorically, this 
espousal of ROC values aims to cement Russian nationalism. The Russian government 
followed this with practical steps in the field of foreign policy. The views of the Moscow 
patriarchate have been integrated into the formulation and implementation of Russia’s 
foreign affairs (Blitt, 2010). The ROC’s most important role is its support for the rise of a 
new Russian nationalist identity underlying the country’s foreign policy (Lomagin, 2012). 
In short, religion is an important factor in Russia’s foreign policy, even if, as Curanovic 
notes, the importance of the religious factor has been neglected in the literature on the 
country’s standpoint on international issues (Curanovic, 2014). 
 
The literature on the US and Russia, at least to some extent, illustrates the relationship 
between the state and religious organizations with the latter acting as interest groups on 
foreign policy issues in both countries. In the US, for example, religious organizations 
have played an important role in relation to humanitarian aid with regard to USAID. The 
literature provides us with insights into how to study the influence of religious 
organizations on foreign policy. Although not specifically elaborated in this Russia-US 
literature, it is useful for this thesis to look further at the influence of Muslim groups on 
Indonesian foreign policy. 
2.3. Islam and foreign policy of Muslim states 
 
Studies of Islam and foreign policy in predominantly Muslim countries have commonly 
focussed on the cases of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and other countries in the Middle East and 
the Caspian region. We can divide these countries into two general categories. The first are 
Islamic states and the second are Muslim secular states. Islamic states depart from the 
concept that there is no separation between religion (ad din) and the state (ad dawlah). 
Islam is believed to contain the comprehensive holistic manner (kaffah) teachings (Azra, 
2006, p. 7) which can be applied in all aspects of life, including in the political field. Thus, 
Islam in its entirety offers a solution to all problems, including familial, socio-cultural, 
economic, and political matters (Effendy, 2003, p. 34). In this regard, Islamic states are 
rooted in Islamic law which they claim to uphold (An Na’im, 2008). Some Islamic states at 
present have also adopted modern political institutions such as elections and popular 
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sovereignty. On the other hand, secular Muslim states adopt an institutional separation 
between Islam and the state. This separation will not necessarily sever the connection 
between Islam and politics; such states may still allow the implementation of Islamic 
principles in their policies and legislation. Theoretically, however, there should be no 
favouritism to any religious doctrine and principles. The state’s religious neutrality is 
essential. By following these principles, Muslim secular states will not forcefully 
implement Islamic law (An Na’im, 2008). 
 
The extent to which Islam influences foreign policy is subject to debate. It is said by some 
scholars such as Shaffer (2006a) and Cornell (2006) that religion has no clout in shaping 
foreign policy. Even in Islamic countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, religion is 
not the sole influence on foreign policy decision making. Instead, foreign policy has 
generally been subject to pragmatism based on domestic needs and national interests. 
Those countries often show discrepancies between their official ideology and their foreign 
policy (Cornell, 2006; Flanagan, 2009; Piscatori, 1983; Shaffer, 2002, 2006b). 
 
Iran, for example, has preferred security and economic considerations to religious 
considerations in its foreign policy toward Caspian countries (Shaffer, 2002, 2006b). Like 
Shaffer (2006b), Flanagan (2009) argues that Iran’s foreign policy emphasises realist 
principles, power politics and the country’s survival at the expense of Islam and religious 
principles. Iran’s foreign policy works at both the domestic and international systemic 
levels. President Ahmadinejad’s radical foreign policy towards the West had also 
developed because of Iran’s realist nature and pragmatism, i.e. pursuing political power 
and enhancing the state’s economic power. Consequently, Iran often embraces religious 
rhetoric to balance domestic aspirations and its real interests (Flanagan, 2009; Shaffer, 
2002, 2006b).  
 
Iran’s pragmatic foreign policy has been more evident under President Hassan Rouhani. 
His reputation as a pragmatic and moderate figure has greatly shaped Iran’s new 
diplomatic posture (Sherrill, 2014; Terhallea, 2015; Zarif, 2014). This diplomatic posture 
has achieved remarkable progress in Iran’s nuclear negotiations, in which Iran and the 
P5+1 reached a nuclear agreement in July 2015 (Katzman & Kerr, 2015). 
 
Some scholars disagree with the argument that Islam has an insignificant role in Iran’s 
foreign policy. Nia (2010), Anshari (2006) and Monshipouri (2013) argue that Islamic 
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ideology constitutes a salient factor in Iranian foreign policy as Iran has a commitment to 
promoting Shiite ideology and at the same pursuing its pragmatic national interests. Iran’s 
Islamic ideology and material national interests are interlinked with its foreign policy. 
Other states tend to view Iran’s Islamic orientation and its national interests as 
synonymous. Countries like the US have had a tendency to view Iran in religious and 
revolutionary terms, and set up their foreign policies toward the state accordingly 
(Anshari, 2006).  
 
The projection of Iran’s pragmatic and moderate foreign policy by the Rouhani 
administration—aiming to restore its relations with the world—has not meant that Iran has 
avoided the use of its cultural identity (originating from the blend of Iranian and Islamic 
culture) in seeking its national interest. Iran has utilised its cultural identity to promote “its 
mission and message throughout the entire Islamic world” (Zarif, 2014, p. 3). Moreover, 
the final authority of Iran’s foreign policy is still under the hand of the Iranian Supreme 
Leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (Sherrill, 2014), meaning that Iran’s foreign policy 
under Rouhani is always intertwined with Islamic ideology. The Supreme Leader has a 
primary interest in maintaining the existence of the Islamic system of Iran (Sherrill, 2014).  
 
Similar observations of Islam’s role in the foreign policy of an Islamic state can be seen in 
Pakistan. According to Cornell (2006), Pakistan’s foreign policy has largely been 
motivated by pragmatic considerations. Islamic ideology as the basis of Pakistan’s policies 
such as its support for Islamic causes has been partly done for the sake of serving the 
country’s material national interests. The country has often mixed genuine solidarity with 
pragmatic ends with regard to Islamic causes. Islam is a salient factor as it provides a basis 
for the cohesive identity of the Pakistani people. Therefore, the foremost challenge for 
Pakistan’s foreign policy is to maintain a delicate balance between Islamic ideology and 
practical considerations (A. S. Khan, 2006). 
 
Cornell (2006) states that the establishment of Pakistan as an Islamic state as enshrined in 
its 1956 constitution might be based on material and ideological desires. Despite being 
encouraged mostly by pragmatic ideas, the Pakistani leaders avoid contradictory actions 
against the Islamic orientation of the state. Contradictions in this matter could lead to 
domestic political risks. In other words, cultural (Islamic) factors become constraints for 
foreign policy choices. In cases in which the costs are not politically high, Pakistan utilises 
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opportunities to prove its Islamic identity. In terms of alliances, Pakistan has no 
preferences as long as it gains benefits from its partners. It disregards the cultural basis or 
ideological alignment of potential partners. 
 
Nevertheless, religion’s role in Pakistan’s foreign policy cannot be ignored. An earlier 
study by Delvoie (1996) shows that the ‘Islamization’ of Pakistan’s foreign policy 
occurred as soon as President Ali Bhutto came into power in 1971 and Pakistan tried to 
take a lead in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Pakistan’s efforts culminated 
in the hosting of the OIC Summit for the first time in 1974. The country also increasingly 
cemented its relations with Arab countries and other Muslim states. Even in the era of 
Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan took a lead in the UN peacekeeping force in Somalia and Bosnia in 
the name of Muslim solidarity. Pakistan has also continued to place the Kashmir issue in 
the central agenda of its foreign policy. Previously characterised as a mere territorial 
conflict (since the 1990s), Pakistan now attributes the conflict to religious affiliations. By 
doing so, Pakistan wants to show its inclination “to rest at least one major part of their 
foreign policy on Islamic ideology and Muslim solidarity” (Delvoie, 1996, p. 141). 
Another important role of the religious element in Pakistan’s foreign policy might be seen 
in the background of crafting an ideology based on Islamic Pakistani identity. This has 
been intended to counteract the perceived  threat from India and to separate it from “an 
Indian South Asian identity” (Pande, 2010, p. xi).  
 
Based on earlier discussions, we might conclude that religion has far less influence in the 
foreign policy of Muslim secular states than of Islamic states. In fact, most Muslim states 
are secular states. Turkey and Indonesia are among the Muslim secular states that often 
receive attention from scholars of foreign policy. 
 
Turkey’s politics have attracted the attention of scholars as they highlight the tension 
between ‘secularism and Islam’ or ‘Eastern versus Western’ perspectives (Taspinar, 2011). 
Secularist or Kemalist thinking has sought to control religion (Islam) without demolishing 
it. Religious ideology was excluded from the nation building process in Turkey. The 
secularists commonly imposed their identity and ideology on Islamists. The successive 
victories of the AKP Islamist party in the 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015 elections have made 
secularists feel threatened. They think that the AKP leaders have begun to establish a non-
secular, or theocratic state (BBC, 2015; Toprak, Uslu, & Yilmaz, 2011). This concern of 
16 
 
the secularists is not baseless. Since the AKP took power in 2002, debates about 
Islamization have become much more prominent among people and political leaders 
(Bilgin, 2008). 
 
Jung (2011) and Bilgin (2008) deny that Turkey’s foreign policy has changed substantially 
under the AKP. Turkish foreign policy under the AKP party is still within the confines of 
historical patterns of foreign policy under previous administrations in the Turkish Republic 
(Dalay & Friedman, 2013). Islam has been used as a symbolic resource by various 
governments. Hence, the AKP administration policy is also in line with the notion of the 
instrumental use of religion (Jung, 2011). The AKP does not stress Islam and persistently 
denies its status as an Islamist political party (Bilgin, 2008; Cornell, 2012). 
 
However, some scholars argue that Turkey’s foreign policy has undergone a 
transformation during the AKP government. Its foreign policy has promoted soft power 
that might intend to decrease the influence of its armed forces, domestically and 
internationally (Jung, 2011). The transformation has been more concerned about the 
foreign policy decision making process and democratisation. It has had less to do with the 
ideological reorientation, and de-Europeanisation or Middle-Easternisation of foreign 
policy (Kanat, 2010). In Turkey’s foreign policy, Islam has a limited role. Its functions are 
only to justify and conceal the real motives of the country’s foreign policy. Islamic 
motivations provide only an insignificant part of Turkey’s foreign policy toward the 
Middle East. Political interests in thesecases supersede ideological considerations (Bilgin, 
2008). 
 
Cornell (2012) and Onis (2009) argue that the AKP’s first period (2002-07) under Prime 
Minister Abdullah Gul put an emphasis on EU harmonisation as a vehicle to join the EU. 
Starting in the second period of the AKP administration under Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, there has been a substantial shift from this course. Ankara reoriented its 
focus from the West to the East, emphasising its more immediate neighbourhood under the 
slogan: ‘zero-problems with neighbours’ (M. S. Khan, 2015). This notion has been 
espoused by Warning and Kardas (2011), who conclude that Turkey’s identity has moved 
from a Western secular one to a Turkish Islamic one. The shift of Turkey’s identity has 
affected all aspects of the country’s social and political life including its foreign policy. 
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Originally Western-oriented, Turkish foreign policy has paid more attention to the Middle 
East and other Islamic states including those in the Balkans since the AKP in power. 
 
The AKP leaders’ Islamic worldview has contributed to the shape of Turkey’s current 
foreign policy, which shows increasing interest in Islamic matters. Turkey’s gradual shift 
away from the West to the East, its hard-line stance against Israel, its support for Hamas, 
and other similar policies show us the noticeable influence of the AKP leadership’s Islamic 
ideology and of Muslim constituents on recent Turkish foreign policy (Aghsan, 2011; 
Aras, 2009, 2014; Cornell, 2012). 
 
Another secular Muslim country is Malaysia, a neighbour of Indonesia. Islam, as the 
official religion of Malaysia, has greatly influenced the country’s political landscape. Islam 
has been a part of Malay political culture and a component of its identity since the 
independence of Malaysia (Nair, 1997; Robani, 2010). It has become a symbol of 
legitimacy in Malaysian politics. Malaysia has demonstrated its concern for and solidarity 
with Muslim causes to the entire world, especially on the Palestinian issue. However, 
Malaysian government policy on the Palestinian issue was largely driven by pragmatic 
considerations as a result of the interplay between political, economic, religious, and 
humanitarian factors (Robani, 2010). On the other hand, Kutaisha (2006) argues that Islam 
is a salient factor in Malaysia’s foreign policy. This was especially so during the 
premiership of Dr Mahathir Mohamad. Islam was not only a crucial driving force in 
foreign policy but also an important factor in enhancing economic relations. Kutaisha 
(2006) observes the role of Mahathir Mohammad who promoted Islam as one of the 
elements of Malaysian foreign policy. However, Saravanamutu (2010) argues that despite 
its presence since independence, Islam played a salient role only since the last decades of 
Mahathir’s rule. This important role of Islam has seemed to continue in the post Mahathir 
era. In response to the World’s misperception after the 9/11 tragedy, Malaysia came up 
with the concept of Islam Hadhari (civilised Islam) which has placed Islam in the center of 
its public diplomacy.  
 
Having observed both Islamic states and secular Muslim ones, it generally appears that 
religious ideology and religious groups are not the sole motivating force behind foreign 
policy. However, religion is undeniably one of the elements shaping foreign policy in 
Muslim countries of both an Islamic and secular variety. The degree to which religion 
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influences foreign policy in every country is varied, and can only be analysed on a case-
by-case basis. 
 
The literature on Turkey, Iran, and Malaysia, to some extent, generally describes the state 
as a monolithic actor. It barely discusses how Muslim groups or organisations influence 
foreign policies. The way domestic politics shape the degree to which religion influences 
foreign policy is not particularly elaborated on. As the state, comprised mainly of the 
government, is seen as a monolithic actor, the discussion on the role of religion is placed in 
the context of elite policy making. These studies hardly mention the state-society 
relationship. This thesis will seek to fill that gap in the literature by focusing on the 
relationship between the state (the government of Indonesia) and Muslim groups in the 
context of Indonesia’s foreign policy. In going beyond treatment of the state as a single 
actor, this thesis recognises the interplay between the state and non-state domestic actors, 
particularly Muslim groups, in foreign policy formulation. As interest groups, Muslim 
groups in Indonesia are greatly concerned about Muslim issues in both domestic and 
foreign contexts. 
 
The above literature also demonstrates how religion has been utilised by Muslim states’ 
governments for power legitimacy and justification. This features prominently in Turkish 
and Iranian foreign policies. Unlike in the US, religious solidarity and sentiments are more 
prevalent in Islamic literature and the foreign policies of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and 
Malaysia. This might be related to the concept of the Muslim ummah. The term "Ummah" 
is generally understood as the community of believers in the religion of Islam. The ummah 
encompasses the entire Muslim world. Thus Islamic sentiments or solidarity are part of 
Islamic life. However, the degree of Islamic solidarity varies among Muslim countries in 
the state sphere. Islamic states such as Iran and Pakistan might have a stronger sense of 
Islamic solidarity than secular Muslim states such as Turkey, Indonesia, and Malaysia.  
 
Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy might be expected, to some extent, to share a similar 
pattern with other Muslim secular states, particularly Turkey and Malaysia. Muslim 
secular states, compared to Islamic states, often face challenges on how to set up balanced 
policies within the delicate relationship between Islamic ideas, Muslim groups, and the 
state. The state must balance how to attain national material interest, how to maintain a 
status of secular identity, and how to accommodate Muslim people’s aspirations. In this 
19 
 
regard, questions are frequently raised as to what degree the policies of Muslim secular 
states’ governments accommodate Muslim people’s aspirations. Are these policies rhetoric 
or substantial? Another question may emerge with regard to the function of religion for 
power legitimacy and justification in the context of Indonesia. Is Islam used to legitimise 
and justify Indonesian foreign policy? Another related question is: Does Indonesia share 
the same phenomenon with other Muslim countries, particularly Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan 
in terms of using Islam as a political instrument? If we look at domestic politics in the 
Suharto era, we can see that Suharto utilised Islam as a tool for his domestic political 
purposes (Liddle, 1996; Tirtosudarmo, 1992a). In the last years of Suharto’s 
administration, the relationship between Islam and the state became closer. Suharto’s 
increasing closeness to Muslims at that time was perceived to balance his influence among 
military and Indonesian Muslim groups. The subsequent portion of this chapter will review 
the existing literature on the role of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy which focuses 
mainly on the Suharto era.  
2.4. Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy 
 
Generally, scholars have focused on Islam and democracy in Indonesia (Azra, 2006; 
Hefner, 2000; Hilmy, 2010) and the influence of democratisation in Indonesian political 
life, including foreign policy (Anwar, 2010a, 2010b; Dosch, 2006; Gindarsah, 2012a). 
Only a few studies solely address the relationship between Islam and foreign policy. Islam 
and Indonesia’s domestic politics are inseparable. Given the extent to which the 
relationship between Islam and the state has greatly coloured the dynamic, internal politics 
of Indonesia, it is not surprising that many works are mainly devoted to studying Islam and 
domestic politics in Indonesia. 
 
Scholars generally agree that democratisation has substantially impacted on Indonesian 
politics, including foreign policy. Its status as a democratic country has prompted the 
country to project its identity as the biggest Muslim democracy (Anwar, 2010b) and to 
define Indonesia’s role in the Muslim world. Indonesia aspires to be a bridge builder 
between the West and the Muslim world. Indonesia also likes to project itself as a role 
model for other Muslim countries. However, according to Anwar (2010a), Indonesia 
should substantiate its claim. It has a long way to go. Indonesia still faces challenges 
regarding how to realise its projected identity. 
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Indonesia’s foreign policy has mainly been influenced by external and internal factors such 
as international pressure and the internal political legitimacy of successive governments, 
among others (He, 2008). Since democratisation, political legitimacy has become a crucial 
issue in Indonesian politics. Democratisation has impacted on foreign policy making, 
structurally and institutionally. It has changed the decision-making process in foreign 
policy by involving more stakeholders. The regime’s accountability has increased, 
consolidating the government’s decision-making power. Democratisation has also 
enhanced state autonomy and protects it from such forces as the military and cronyism. 
The way democratic regimes shape their foreign policy, be it the structural or institutional 
framework, is fundamentally different from that of authoritarian regimes (Dosch, 2006). 
Structurally or institutionally, Indonesia’s autocratic regimes have been shaped by the 
1945 Constitution’s institutionalisation of a structural framework that gave a very strong 
role to the president and government agencies in the foreign policy making process. 
Government agencies, including the military, took the maximum benefits from this 
structural framework. Meanwhile, democratic regimes open greater opportunities for other 
foreign policy stakeholders outside the government. The increasing role of non-state 
domestic actors is also related to “the way in which regime accountability constrains the 
government’s latitude of decision making in foreign affairs” (Dosch, 2006, pp. 46-49). 
 
Taking into account the fact that Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country, a study of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy in the context of democracy should not neglect Islam as an 
increasingly important factor. Anwar (2010a) tries to address this concern, however she 
does not provide details on how Islam influences Indonesia’s foreign policy. A study by 
Gindarsah (2012a) shows us how democratisation offers more opportunity for the public in 
the foreign policy decision-making process. Focusing on the Iranian nuclear issue, when 
Indonesia assumed a non-permanent seat on the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) 
in the period 2007-2008, Gindarsah (2012a) analyses the interplay among various 
domestic factors, mainly Muslim groups and the parliament. His study provides a good 
account of the relationship between the state and domestic actors. He mentions that foreign 
policy making which is against the aspirations of mainstream domestic groups will lead to 
political risks. Muslim groups and members of parliaments had a significant influence on 
the Indonesian government’s policy change regarding Iran’s nuclear policy. However, 
Gindarsah’s study does not specifically discuss the role of Muslim groups including their 
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engagement in attempts to influence the government’s position on the Iranian nuclear 
programme.  
 
Generally, the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy is under-studied. Studies of Islam 
in Indonesia’s foreign policy, both under Sukarno and beyond have been conducted by 
Leifer (1983b) Suryadinata (1995), Sukma (2003), Perwita (2007) and Wicaksana (2012). 
We may divide these studies into two broad categories. The first are those that provide a 
comprehensive discussion without necessarily referring to any specific cases. The second 
are those which offer case study discussions in explaining the role of Islam in Indonesia’s 
foreign policy. The works of Leifer (1983b), Sukma (2003) and Anwar (2010a) are 
included in the first category while the rest are in the second category. 
 
Leifer (1983b) and Sukma’s (2003) studies touch on the problem of a state’s ambiguous 
identity. The role of Islam in this regard was in a matter of functional ambiguity. This 
ambiguity is a result of the state’s identity, which is neither Islamic nor secular. This 
ambiguity has led to a ‘non-religious identity’ of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Unlike Leifer 
(1983b), who only examined the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy during the 
Sukarno and the early Suharto eras, Sukma (2003) provides a broader account. He 
examines the role of Islam from the Sukarno era up to the early period of the Megawati 
presidency.  
 
Suryadinata (1995) and Perwita (2007) focus on Islam and Suharto’s foreign policy, using 
a case study approach. Suryadinata utilises case studies of Indonesia’s policy towards the 
Middle-East and Bosnia. Meanwhile, Perwita (2007) uses four different cases occurring 
during the Suharto era, namely: Indonesia’s relations with the OIC; the Middle-East issue; 
the Moro problem; and the Bosnia-Herzegovina war. In addition, as a postscript, Perwita 
(2007) also provides an overview on Islam and Indonesia’s foreign policy beyond Suharto, 
employing the state-society relations approach proposed by Skidmore and Hudson (1993). 
Having examined the above cases, both Suryadinata (1995) and Perwita (2007) conclude 
that Indonesia’s participation and position in the Muslim world were not driven by Islamic 
sentiments or Islamic solidarity. Instead, Indonesia’s foreign policy was based on 
pragmatic objectives in relation to the domestic and international agenda. For example, 
Indonesia’s role in the Southern Philippines was not based on Islamic solidarity, but on a 
desire for regional cohesiveness. Regional security and stability was much more important 
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than Islamic sentiments (Perwita, 2007). The general conclusion which is presented by 
Suryadinata (1995) and Perwita (2007) on the marginality of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign 
policy is supported by a recent study by Wicaksana (2012). He reached this conclusion 
after studying the place of Islam in Indonesia’s relations with Pakistan. However, 
Wicaksana’s focus on bilateral relations highlights the role of state or government actors 
without paying sufficient attention to the interplay between the state and Muslim groups.  
 
Generally, these scholars conclude that Indonesia’s foreign policy has rarely been shaped 
by Islamic considerations. However the non-Islamic character of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy is not necessarily contradictory to Islamic interests. Indonesian foreign policy has 
not fully served Islamic aspirations, but nor has it produced a predicament for Muslim 
groups. This policy has been adopted to avoid offence to Muslim society. Foreign policy 
has entertained Islamic aspirations not in substance but in form (Leifer, 1983b; Perwita, 
2007; Sukma, 2003; Suryadinata, 1995). 
 
In addition, domestic pragmatism has required Indonesia to make good relations with non-
Islamic states (the West) for the sake of meeting domestic needs, politically and 
economically (Perwita, 2007; Sukma, 2003). This power structure also led to the low 
profile of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy, especially in the Suharto era before the 
1990s when Suharto relied on the secular Golkar Party and the military to maintain his grip 
on power. At that time, Islam was often accused of being anti-Pancasila. The military’s 
fear of Islamic fundamentalists was one of the primary explanations for Indonesia’s non-
Islamic foreign policy (Sukma, 2003; Suryadinata, 1995). 
 
The state’s dual identity and domestic constraints in the form of internal weaknesses in the 
post-Suharto era continued to be a barrier to the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
The primacy of domestic pragmatic factors remained an important element determining 
Indonesia’s foreign policy orientation (Sukma, 2003). On the other hand, Perwita (2007) 
believed that Indonesia’s foreign policy would become more influenced by Islamic factors 
in the years to come, considering the changing political landscape, domestically and 
internationally. In his more recent study on soft power and public diplomacy, Sukma 
(2011) suggests that the coming of democracy and the growing importance of Islam have 
had substantial impacts on Indonesia’s foreign policy. However, Indonesia has faced 
challenges in the way it has incorporated Islam and democracy into its foreign policy.  
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Although there is no change in the sense of state dual-identity status in the post Suharto 
era, this thesis canvasses the possibility that Islam has played a more important role as a 
result of the advent of democracy in Indonesia. There seems to be a paradigm shift 
regarding the role of Islam at present and in the future. Unlike previous studies, this thesis 
argues that post-Suharto political developments have transformed the role of Muslim 
groups and Islamic political parties. Their role is becoming more evident in Indonesia’s 
foreign policy. Islam might have more substantial influence than it has had in the past. 
However, that is not to suggest that Islam is the sole factor behind Indonesia’s foreign 
policy. 
 
This thesis focuses on the role of Muslim groups in the foreign policy decision-making 
process without necessarily neglecting other perspectives, which consider the importance 
of a leader’s religious worldview in shaping Indonesia’s foreign policy. The rise of Islam 
in contemporary Indonesian politics and the diminishing suspicion of ‘nationalist’ leaders 
towards Islamist political parties wishing to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia give 
further opportunity for Muslim groups to have their voice heard both in domestic politics 
and foreign policy. 
 
As with previous studies on Islam and Indonesian foreign policy, this study places the role 
of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy in the domestic context. It means that domestic 
politics create the context for the role and influence of Islam in the country’s foreign 
policy (Sukma, 2003). However, unlike previous studies that do not clearly define ‘Islam’, 
this study aims to differentiate between Islam as an ideology or ideas, and Islam as a 
movement, which touches on the roles of Muslim groups and Islamic parties. This is 
significant because previous studies and more recent coverage in the existing literature do 
not properly situate the influence of Muslim groups on Indonesia’s foreign policy.  
3. Research methodology 
This thesis employs qualitative research methods and a case study approach. There are 
many benefits for researchers in utilizing a qualitative research methodology. First, it 
offers rich descriptions and well-founded rationale to explain social phenomena in their 
context, and second, it enables researchers to trace historical events, their causes and 
consequences and come up with insightful explanations to all of these (Mayan, 2001). 
Qualitative research tends to focus on smaller elements (small N) of people or society. It 
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aims to depict the meanings, understandings, and perceptions that individuals and people 
connect to experiences, behaviours, and social development. This kind of research is quite 
malleable. It is compliant with a wide range of research methods and forms of data 
collection (Hennink, Hutter, & Bailey, 2011; Walter, 2010). 
 
This thesis embraced an interpretive paradigm as it emphasises qualitative methods such as 
case studies, interviews, and observations. Those methods are suitable to gain an 
understanding of how human beings interpret the world and their social phenomena 
(Willis, Jost, & Nilakanta, 2007, p. 6). Together with positivism, interpretivism is a 
dominant paradigm in social research. These two paradigms have an opposite orientation 
(Somekh & Lewin, 2005). Positivism’s central assumption is to explain the world 
objectively by employing a scientific method (Travers, 2001). Through this method, it is 
argued, people will come to know the world as it is. Positivism denies relativism and 
subjectivism and instead, exerts objectivism. On the other hand, interpretivism believes in 
the distinctions between the natural/physical sciences and social sciences. It acknowledges 
relativism and subjectivism. The researcher’s subjectivity may influence his research 
objects. There is no divisible separation between the researcher and the reality being 
investigated. In addition, natural reality differs from social reality. Therefore, the approach 
demands it necessary that social research have different research methods from that of the 
natural sciences (Willis et al., 2007). 
 
This thesis employs a case study approach as it is in line with the nature of an 
interpretative paradigm (Anderson, 1998). The decision to use case studies was based on 
the fact that the issues discussed in this thesis are post facto (after the event) studies. Berg 
and Lune (2012) said that “case studies are often adopted for post facto studies, rather than 
ongoing issues or questions” (p. 326). Case studies are commonly used as a research 
strategy in the fields of sociology, psychology, political science, social work, business, and 
community planning (Yin, 2003). 
 
The case study approach can also be applied in various levels and situations. It may 
potentially contribute to the existing literature and knowledge on individual, group, 
organisational, social, political, and many other phenomena. In a nutshell, this approach 
enables us to provide comprehensive and meaningful elements of “real life events such as 
individual life, organsational behavior, social change, and international relations” (Yin, 
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2003, pp. 1-2). Therefore, this approach is important to this study in that it deals with 
individual, group, institutional, and political phenomena related to the role of Islam in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
 
Gerring (2004) defines a case study as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose 
of understanding a larger class of similar units” (p. 342). Meanwhile, Yin (2003) defines it 
as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident” (p. 13). Both definitions explicitly indicate that the process of conducting a case 
study is related to the bounded nature of the case and its contextual setting. As a bounded 
phenomenon, a case study is very much related to time, location, event, programme, and 
others indicating the boundaries of a case study’s contexts (Cresswell, 2007). Thus, it also 
helps the researcher to decide the selection of cases in his/her case study. 
3.1. Case selection 
 
This thesis has chosen as its cases: Indonesia’s foreign policies towards the Iranian nuclear 
issue; the independence of Kosovo; and Palestinian statehood. These three cases are used 
to explore the role of Islam, and in particular Muslim groups, on Indonesia’s foreign 
policy. This thesis focuses on a range of actors including Muslim religious leaders, 
religious organisations, mass media, other Muslim civil society and their influence in 
foreign policy formulation vis-à-vis the state or government’s foreign policy agenda. 
 
Referring to definitions of a case study by Gerring (2004) and Yin (2003) this thesis has 
been confined to cases with some of the following ‘boundaries’. First, this thesis focuses 
on cases which have been of interest to a large proportion of Indonesian Muslims when it 
comes to Indonesia’s foreign policy. These Muslim concerns are indicated by a significant 
and/or intensive response from Muslim groups that frequently demand that the government 
takes serious measures according to their aspirations. Second, this thesis has limited the 
cases to those occurring during the Yudhoyono administration, which offers a more recent 
focus than other studies. 
 
Why were these cases chosen? First, Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Iran’s nuclear 
programme was chosen because (a) the issue generated considerable concern among 
Muslim groups in Indonesia and from members of parliament; (b) This issue was quite 
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sensitive among Indonesian Muslims due to the involvement of the US and Israel. Worries 
that the US would attack Iran as it had Iraq increased the pressure on the Indonesian 
government; (c) The influence of Muslim groups as a moral force seemed substantial, 
pushing the government to shift its policy on the Iranian nuclear issue; (d) There was no 
vital national strategic interest that pushed the government to disregard Muslim groups’ 
aspirations; (e) Muslim groups’ aspirations were in line with the aspirations of the broader 
political constituencies. Therefore, it seems that Muslim groups were ‘collaborating’ with 
members of parliament; (f) there was a possibility of external pressure from the US and its 
allies opposing the Iranian nuclear programme. 
 
Second, the case of Kosovo’s independence was chosen because (a) the issue attracted the 
concern of Indonesian Muslim groups; (b) the issue has not been very sensitive among 
Indonesian Muslims; (c) despite intense pressure from Muslim groups, especially 
Muhammadiyah, their influence on Indonesia’s willingness to acknowledge the 
independence of Kosovo has been relatively low; (d) there was a vital national strategic 
interest related to separatism or national territorial integrity that encouraged the Indonesian 
government to block Muslim groups’ aspirations; (e) Muslim groups’ aspirations are not in 
line with the aspirations of the broader political constituencies. 
 
Third, Palestinian statehood was chosen because (a) this issue was quite sensitive among 
Indonesian Muslims due to the involvement of the US and Israel; (b) the influence of 
Muslim groups as a moral force appeared to offer substantial support to the government to 
take necessary initiatives to help the struggle of the Palestinian people; (c) there has been a 
‘common position’ among the government, Muslim groups, and members of parliament on 
Palestinian statehood; (d) Muslim groups’ aspirations are closely in line with the 
aspirations of the broader political constituencies; (f) there was no vital national strategic 
interest urging the government to disregard Muslim groups’ aspirations. Despite this, 
support for Palestine is justified by the 1945 Constitution, which urges the abolition of 
colonialism (in Indonesia, Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands is commonly regarded 
as a form of colonialism). 
3.2. Data collection and analysis 
 
The author conducted field research in Indonesia for a period of six months from July 2013 
to January 2014. This thesis used the following types of data as follows:  
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3.2.2. Primary and secondary written documents 
 
This research has utilised both primary documents such as unpublished documents from 
the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and unpublished documents from Muslim 
organisations, as well as secondary documents consisting of books, articles, and other data 
from daily newspapers and magazines. Complementing secondary data, the author 
conducted field research in Indonesia to collect some materials, such as unpublished 
documents, which could not be accessed through the internet, and to conduct interviews.  
3.2.3. Interviews 
 
The author consulted 53 interviewees (see appendix) as key informants who can be divided 
into four categories. The first were foreign policy decision makers from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and other related government agencies. The second were Muslim group 
leaders, including those from moderate groups such as Muhammadiyah and NU and also 
from militant Muslim groups such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). The third were 
academics and scholars who are considered experts in Islamic politics and Indonesia’s 
foreign policy.  The fourth group comprised of politicians, especially those who have had 
concerns about Muslim issues. The politicians consisted of members of parliament and the 
leaders of Islamic political parties such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice 
Party) or PKS; Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) or PPP; Partai 
Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) or PAN; and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 
(National Awakening Party) or PKB. The interviewees also included former officials and 
former members of parliament such as Jusuf Kalla, Indonesian Vice President in the 
periods of 2004-2009 and 2014-2019 and Dr N. Hassan Wirajuda, Indonesian Foreign 
Minister in the periods of 2002-2004 and 2004-2009.  
This research generally utilised a semi-structured interview format where questions were 
open-ended. Such questions consisted of opinions or value questions; feeling questions; 
and knowledge questions. The interviews in this regard were topical and evaluation 
interviews (Mayan, 2001). The interviewees were asked questions, among other topics, on 
(a) the influence of Muslim groups on foreign policy; (b) the response of the government to 
Muslim groups’ aspirations; (c) the mechanisms Muslim groups use to channel their 
aspirations to the Indonesian parliament; and (d) the mechanisms Muslim groups use to 
lobby the government and vice versa.  
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4. Time limitation 
 
This thesis focuses on the democratic era in the post-Suharto period, and particularly on 
the presidency of Yudhoyono from 2004 to 2014, for the following reasons. First, in 
Yudhoyono’s administration, Islam was openly regarded as an asset. His administration 
projected democracy and Islam as the two elements of soft power in Indonesian diplomacy 
(Sukma, 2011).  Indonesia’s foreign policy has also based itself around the country’s 
identity as the world’s largest Muslim country and the world’s third largest democracy. 
Consequently, this phenomenon adds political leverage for Muslim groups to voice their 
foreign policy aspirations.  
Second, the ascendancy of Yudhoyono to power marked the beginning of a consolidated 
democracy in Indonesia. Yudhoyono was elected through a direct presidential election in 
2004. Prior to a 2002 amendment to the 1945 Constitution, the president and the vice 
president of Indonesia were elected by the country’s highest body, the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (MPR).  
Third, in his two presidential terms—from 2004 to 2009 and from 2009 to 2014—
Yudhoyono formed his government with the support of all Islamic political parties 
including PPP, PKB, PAN and PKS  in his government coalition. Therefore, it is assumed 
by many that Yudhoyono has taken into account the interests of Islamic political parties 
with regard to Muslim concerns (interview with Al Muzammil Yusuf, 26/11/2013). 
5. Thesis structure 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Following this literature review and background 
chapter, Chapter Two discusses the role of Islam in Indonesian domestic politics. This 
chapter also traces the role of Muslim groups in the colonialist era and their power struggle 
vis-à-vis the secular national movement in Indonesia’s formative years. It addresses the 
role of Islam during the time of Sukarno and Suharto, the efforts of Muslims to deal with 
Suharto’s harsh policy towards Islam, and Suharto’s response to Muslims’ attempts to 
create a ‘Cultural Islam’ movement. This section also investigates the way in which 
Suharto’s Islamic policy and the Cultural Islam movement still influences Indonesian 
Muslim politics in the present day. It also examines the role played by Islamic political 
parties and Muslim groups in domestic politics during Indonesia’s democratic era.  
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Chapter Three investigates the extent to which Islam—as a political and moral force— 
influences Indonesian foreign policy. This chapter seeks to provide a snapshot of the role 
of Islam in Indonesia’s post-Suharto foreign policy before moving on in subsequent 
chapters to discuss specific case studies. It begins by outlining the basic tenets of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy and the state’s interpretation of international issues of concern 
to Muslims in Indonesia. For example, it looks at how issues relating to the plight of the 
Muslim people in Kosovo and Palestine fit into the framework of the country’s foreign 
policy. Also discussed is the influence of democratisation in Indonesian foreign policy 
including the government’s response to Muslim groups’ aspirations on international issues 
relevant to them. The necessity of restoring Indonesia’s international image in the 
aftermath of the Bali bombings and the need to eliminate the world’s misperception of the 
Muslim world including Indonesia have prompted the inclusion of Islam in the country’s 
public diplomacy. Subsequently, this chapter also examines the projection of Indonesia’s 
identity as the world’s largest democratic Muslim country. This image has formed 
Indonesia’s new international activism regarding Islam, which is intended to depict the 
country as a role model for other Muslim states with regard to the intersection of Islam, 
democracy and modernity.  
 
Chapters Four to Six constitute the case studies which represent the main analytical body 
of the thesis. Chapter Four examines the government’s policy towards the Iranian nuclear 
program when the country was a non permanent member of the UNSC in the period of 
2007 to 2008. This chapter analyses the reasons the government changed its policy from 
initially supporting UNSC resolution 1747 to abstaining on UNSC resolution 1803. This 
chapter explores whether pressure from Muslim groups, which were buttressed by 
members of parliament, was a determining factor in shifting that policy. This also requires 
an investigation into the foreign policy decision making process which may have included 
pressures from major Western countries sponsoring resolutions against the Iranian nuclear 
programme.  
 
Chapter Five reveals the Indonesian government’s response to Muslim groups’ aspirations 
towards the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. The extent to which the government 
responded to Muslim concerns over Kosovo and debates between the Indonesian 
government and Muslim groups on that matter will be examined. Also investigated in this 
part is the reaction and position of the Indonesian government prior to and immediately 
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following the declaration of Kosovo’s independence. It will be revealed how the two 
opposite sides (the government of Indonesia and the proponents of the recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence) used a concept of national interest to justify their respective 
arguments. To provide a broader perspective, the chapter also discusses other Muslim 
countries’ reactions and positions with regard to Kosovo’s independence, as there has not 
been a single response from the Muslim world.  
 
Chapter Six looks at the Indonesian government’s policy toward Palestinian statehood. 
This requires consideration of Indonesia’s policy toward the Palestinian question under the 
Sukarno and Suharto regimes as well the administrations of the post-Suharto era. By doing 
so, the author intends to offer a comparative perspective on the regimes’ policies on 
Palestinian statehood in the pre- and post-democratic era and to offer a general 
understanding of the impact of democratisation on the government’s response to Muslim 
groups’ aspirations on the Palestinian cause. As Palestinian statehood cannot be separated 
from discussions of Israel, Indonesia’s policy of non-recognition toward Israel in the pre-
and post-Suharto eras is also discussed. The chapter also treats as a sub-case the Gaza wars 
which allow description of the interplay between the Indonesian government and Muslim 
groups in a more specific context. 
 
Finally, Chapter Seven brings together the overall discussion by presenting a general 
conclusion on the role of Islam in contemporary Indonesian foreign policy and providing 
more specific conclusions which arise from the three case studies. The drawing of these 
conclusions is based on empirical evidence regarding the interplay between the 
government of Indonesia and Muslim groups on international issues which have become of 
concern within significant parts of Muslim society.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
ISLAM AND INDONESIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS 
 
 
1. Introduction 
It is not easy to define the role of Islam in the national politics of a pluralistic country such 
as Indonesia although Islam is a majority religion in that country. As a religion which does 
not separate religion and politics, Islam has been used by some actors to support efforts to 
establish an Islamic state. The latter is perceived by its proponents to be the ideal 
foundation from which to enforce shariah law. The idea of an Islamic state in Indonesia 
has greatly contributed to uneasy relations between Muslim groups and the government of 
Indonesia. Islam was regarded as a threat by the regimes of Sukarno and Suharto.   
 
Muslim views on Islam and politics are not monolithic. There are different interpretations 
ranging from legalism or formalism to substantialism.2 Islamic political vision was offered 
by Indonesia’s founding fathers along with other ideologies in their search for what might 
constitute an ideal Indonesia (Effendy, 2003). The country eventually became known as 
the Pancasila state. However, in the years following Indonesian independence in 1945, 
Muslims struggled to agree on what the ideal relationship was between Islam and politics. 
Their aspirations were channelled through political struggle. Political Islam, in reality, 
consistently failed to challenge the nationalist elements in the national political arena.  
 
Both in the Sukarno and Suharto periods, Political Islam3 was discouraged and was even 
marginalised. The appearance of some Islamic extremist rebels in the Sukarno era who 
promoted Islamic symbols and elements precipitated constant suspicion towards Muslim 
groups. The demise of Masyumi, an Islamic political party in the 1960s, marked the 
marginalisation of political Islam in Indonesia’s politics under Sukarno’s ‘Guided 
Democracy’ and in the Suharto period. The situation changed after Suharto stepped down 
from power in 1998. Muslims and other elements of society enthusiastically responded to 
the coming of the democratic era by establishing political parties. Religious and non-
                                                             
2 Substantialism refers to a perspective viewing the conclusiveness and integrativeness of Islam and opposing 
legalistic and formalistic expressions of Islam. Substantialism denies the “symbolic and ideological issues of 
political Islam” and stresses the importance of the substance of content of Islamic teachings (Bush, 2009, p. 
12; Effendy, 2003). 
3 Political Islam here is intended as a common name referring to political movements that use Islam to gain 
power through competitive elections and work within the existing political system (Lee, 2004, p. 87). 
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religious parties including Islamic political parties were established at that time. Some 
Islamic political parties used Islam as their foundation and others organised themselves 
around Pancasila. This chapter investigates the place of Islam in domestic politics and 
examines the extent to which Islam has influenced Indonesia’s political life. This chapter 
argues that Muslim groups have shown an increasing influence in domestic politics despite 
their electoral defeat in several general elections in the post-Suharto era. The detailed 
discussion on the interplay between Muslim groups and the government in the pre- and 
post-Suharto eras will be approached using Skidmore and Hudson’s statist-pluralist 
perspective which covers the interactions of state and society in both authoritarian and 
democratic regimes.   
 
This chapter starts by addressing power struggles among Muslims in the formative years of 
an independent Indonesia. It then discusses the place of Islam during the time of Sukarno 
and Suharto, the efforts of Muslims to deal with Suharto’s harsh policy towards Islam, and 
Suharto’s response to Muslims’ attempts to create a Cultural Islam movement. Finally, it 
examines the way in which Suharto’s Islamic policy and the Cultural Islam movement still 
influence Indonesian Muslim politics to the present day.     
2. The Dutch policy on Islam and the emergence of a Muslim nationalist 
movement 
Islam had an uneasy relationship with the state during much of the Dutch colonial era. 
Islam had developed as a source of opposition against Dutch colonial forces (Ali, 2013; 
Houben, 2003). For the Dutch, Muslims were regarded as a ‘political danger’ to colonial 
interests (Jung, 2010, p. 289). The Christianisation of the Dutch East Indies’ population 
was supported by the Dutch government to realise its colonial goals (Goksoy, 2002; Noer, 
1978; Pearson, 1990) and to impede the influence of Islam (Benda, 1958). However, 
compared to the Portuguese and Spanish colonial powers, the Dutch did not collaborate so 
closely with missionaries (Benda, 1958).  
 
Aside from being a source of opposition to Dutch rule, Islam was emphasised as a source 
of Indonesian nationalism. There was a strong belief among Indonesian people that the 
colonialists not only exploited their natural resources but also fought against their faith. 
Although such disputes were the result of arbitrary policies toward people and were mainly 
not connected with religious matters, popular revolts against colonialists were frequently 
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regarded as holy wars and positioned the colonialists as infidels. Popular mobilisation 
proved effective when using religion as a means to revolt against the colonial regime. 
Islamic sentiment also stirred up nationalism and anti-colonial sentiment (Sumanto, 2012, 
p. 30). Islam was one of the common factors in Indonesian life during the colonial era. It 
managed to bridge differences among various ethnicities and broke the partitions of 
localism. As Vandebosch (1952) wrote, “it is doubtful whether the propaganda for an 
Indonesian nationalism could have been successful without the activity of the religious 
elements” (p. 182).  
 
The Dutch policy towards Islam changed significantly after the appointment of Christian 
Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936), an outstanding Leiden scholar, as an Advisor on Arabian 
and Native Affairs in the Netherland East India in 1889 (Benda, 1958; Jung, 2010). Islam 
as religion seemed to be separated from politics, and in this period Islam was considered to 
be dangerous when it was involved in political activities (Benda, 1958). Religiously 
mobilised anti-colonial activities and Pan-Islamism agitations were not tolerated. To this 
end, the government empowered the aristocracy, local rulers, and local customs and 
traditions to fight against the political potential of Islam (Jung, 2010).  
 
Snouck’s views, which materialised through a policy toward Islam, reflected the Dutch 
political ethical policy4 more generally. These policies aimed to provide more 
opportunities for people of the colony to better their lives. By doing so it was hoped that 
integration between the colony and the Dutch motherland would improve. However, the 
policy failed. Instead of creating a sense of attachment to the Dutch motherland among the 
colony’s younger generation, the modern education system built by Snouck Hurgronje 
helped give rise to the nationalist movement (Jung, 2010).  
 
Indonesia’s nationalist movement attempted to find a national identity and to provide an 
alternative to colonialism. There were two main parts to the Indonesian nationalist 
movement. The first had its roots in the Javanese aristocracy and the Western educational 
values of Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavour). Established in 1905, this organisation aimed to 
promote the establishment of schools for Indonesians and the revival of pre-Islamic 
                                                             
4The ethical policy was “formulated to serve the interests and well-being of the indigenous people of the 
Dutch East Indies” (Bloembergen, 2006, p. 224). 
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culture. The second group was commonly associated with Sarekat Islam (Association of 
Islam) which used Islamic symbolism in a struggle against Dutch colonialism. As a 
consequence of the two groups, various social and political organisations emerged, striving 
for the independence of Indonesia (Syamsuddin, 1991). 
 
While Budi Utomo constituted a local organisation with its membership dominated by 
Javanese aristocracy, the first supra–regional mass movement in modern Indonesia was 
Sarekat Dagang Islam (Muslim Trading Association) or SDI which was established in 
1911. The movement then renamed itself Sarekat Islam (Association of Islam) or SI in 
1912 with H.O.S Tjokroaminoto as its prominent leader. As it began to identify itself as 
political party, the movement embraced an Islamic-socialist ideology with an Islamic 
modernist character by stressing rationality in understanding Islamic teachings and 
doctrines and eliminating the syncretised religion (Abdullah, 2009). The socialist ideology 
of SI envisioned the realisation of social justice in society which placed Islam as the basis 
of social values (Nasihin, 2012). Besides the kind of modernist Islamic thinking embraced 
by Agus Salim, which emphasised worship aspects, there was some indication that the 
movement was also influenced by Pan Islamism, which was ascribed to Egyptian thinker 
Jamaluddin al Afghani (Prins, 1959; Reid, 1967).  
 
SI can also be called an Islamist-nationalist movement as it demanded greater political 
independence for Indonesia. SI’s leaders such as Tjokroaminoto and Agus Salim have also 
been widely recognised as among the most prominent national leaders in the fight against 
colonialism. Therefore it is not surprising when we find the terms ‘Muslim nationalist’ and 
‘secular nationalist’ in the discussion of Indonesian history. Tjokroaminoto greatly 
influenced Indonesian secular nationalist leaders like Sukarno and others. As Korver 
(1988) has written, “in his autobiographical memoirs, Sukarno referred to Tjokroaminoto 
as his mirror and his first model in the arts of oratory and political leadership” (p. 21) 
 
However, this movement began to decline in the mid 1920s due to a split leadership and 
increased vigilance from the government. The movement’s efforts to exert a political role 
by renaming itself Partai Serikat Islam (Islamic Association Party) in 1923 and further 
becoming Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Association Party) in 1930 
achieved little success. At that point in time, the national leadership in search of 
independence was overtaken by secular nationalist leaders Sukarno, Hatta, and Sutan 
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Sjahrir (Benda, 1977). But there were no Islamic political movements dominating the 
Indonesian political sphere until the occupation of Japan in the early 1940s.  
 
As SI had been involved more deeply in the political struggle, the religious and social 
initiatives were handled by Muhammadiyah (Abdullah, 2009). Founded by Kyai Haji 
Achmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta in 1912, Muhammadiyah avoided direct involvement in 
politics and focused more on economic, social, cultural (education) and religious activities. 
This organisation played an important role in pre and post-Indonesian independence 
politics. As a reformist and modernist religious movement, Muhammadiyah was 
concerned about efforts to purify Islamic teachings that were not based on Al-Quran and 
hadits, including innovations in shariah (bid’ah); syncretism; and local traditions (Benda, 
1977). Pragmatically, this movement adopted the methods of Christianisation although its 
establishment was believed to be an effort to curb Christianisation. It also adopted a 
Western education system and added Islamic content to it. Therefore, this movement was 
open and had significant cooperation with other Muslim groups (Federspiel, 1970; 
Muhammadiyah, 2010).  
 
Aside from the emergence of modernist movements like Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah, 
Jamiyat al-Islah wal-Irsyad in 1914 (Jonge, 1993) and Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union) in 
1923 (Federspiel, 2001), the Dutch colonial era also witnessed the establishment of 
traditionalist movements like Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Islamic Education Union) in 
1930 and NU in 1926. NU was founded by KH. Hasyim Asyari in Surabaya to voice the 
interests of traditional Islam, especially the pesantren (Islamic boarding school) system. 
The modernist movements in the Muslim world posed a kind of threat to traditionalist 
Muslims (Bush, 2009). The emergence of modernist organisations in Indonesia and the 
take over of Mecca and Medina by the Wahabi movement prompted NU to come into 
existence (Marjani, 2012). These groups closely follow a variety of traditional customs, 
values, and practices (Mehden, 2008).  In 1933 NU had 40,000 members and continued 
expanding its organisational wings for youth, women, education and cooperatives. By 
1938 its membership had reached 100,000 people with 99 organisational branches (Barton 
& Fealy, 1996).  
 
Despite their differences, both modernist and traditionalist movements were united for the 
sake of Indonesian independence. Both supported the creation of the Gabungan Politik 
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Indonesia (Indonesian Political Association) in 1934 and Majelis Islam A’la Indonesia 
(Indonesian Muslim Supreme Council) or MIAI in 1937 and the call for the formation of 
Majelis Rakyat Indonensia (Indonesian People’s Council) in 1939.  
3. The power struggle between secular nationalists and Muslim nationalists 
The two mainstreams of the nationalist movement—namely the secular nationalist 
movement and the Muslim nationalist movement—worked together to fight against 
colonialism yet competed against each other immediately before the independence of 
Indonesia. The future conception of a new state of Indonesia served as a driving force for 
further competition between the two main parts of the nationalist movement.   
 
The most important encounter between the secular and Muslim nationalists happened at 
the meeting of Badan Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (the Inquiry Committee for 
the Preparation of Indonesian Independence or BPUPKI) in June 1945, which aimed to 
debate the forthcoming state’s philosophical foundation and constitution. The debate 
reflected dichotomous political aspirations within Indonesian society between those 
wanting an Islamic state of Indonesia and those who were willing to have a secular one. 
The Muslim nationalists supported the proposal for Islam to be the basis of the state. 
Meanwhile the secular groups proposed Pancasila (five principles) as the state’s basis. 
Those five principles were nationalism, humanitarian/internationalism, mutual 
deliberation, social welfare, and Belief in God (Boland, 1971, pp. 20-23). The first group 
comprised Muslims of various traditionalist and modernist Muslim organisations and the 
second group consisted of Muslims from various secular organisations and a few non-
Muslims (Syamsuddin, 1991).  
 
A compromise was reached after an agreement to formulate seven words known as the 
Piagam Jakarta – Jakarta Charter. The charter aimed to become the preamble of the state 
constitution in which Pancasila had earlier been approved as the basis of the state. The 
Jakarta Charter was vital as it required the state should be based on ‘Belief in God’, 
followed by ‘seven controversial words’, namely: “dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syariat 
Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya” (with the obligation to carry out Islamic shariah for its 
adherents) (Boland, 1971; Hilmy, 2010, p. 73). These seven words of the Jakarta Charter 
have always coloured discussions on Islam-state relations in Indonesia. 
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The political compromise seemed fragile and was abrogated a few months later, one day 
after Indonesia’s independence and just moments before the constitution was adopted. The 
repeal came after a Japanese Navy officer’s report to Hatta that Christians residing in 
Indonesia’s eastern parts would secede if the Jakarta Charter was pursued. In fact 
Christians realised that the Jakarta Charter’s adoption would not create any threats to their 
life. However, they thought such constitutional elements reflected discrimination (Hilmy, 
2010). The deletion of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter was possible due to the 
tolerance and understanding of nationalist Muslim groups who had a strong commitment 
towards national unity which surpassed their religious beliefs. Another argument holds that 
nationalist Muslims’ positive response to the final decision was because Muslim groups 
were optimistic they could win the next general election, which would be held within six 
months. The proposal to establish an Islamic state would be easily adopted when they won 
at the polls. However, the general election was not held until 1955, and Muslim 
nationalists were not well represented in the Committee on the Preparation for the 
Indonesian Independence (PPKI) despite their significant role in the pre-independence 
period. Moreover, their representatives were old men who advanced wisdom rather than 
political gain (Syamsuddin, 1991). These factors may have influenced the nuance of the 
meetings with regard to the establishment of a new state of Indonesia and the acceptance 
of Muslim nationalist groups on the final decision abrogating the Jakarta Charter.  
 
The power struggle between secular and Muslim nationalists continued in the post-
independence period, marked by the establishment of Partai Nasional Indonesia 
(Indonesian National Party) in August 1945 and Partai Masyumi in November 1945. 
Masyumi’s membership comprised individual members and also included NU, 
Muhammadiyah, and some regional organisations in West Java as its extraordinary 
members (Boland, 1971, p. 41).  However, the aim to make Masyumi an Islamic unifier 
failed due to internal conflict. As a result, NU withdrew from Masyumi in April 1952 and 
converted into a political party (Boland, 1971). Aside from PNI, the challenge to Masyumi 
came from Partai Komunis Indonesian (PKI), the Indonesian Communist Party - a 
longtime foe of Muslim nationalists in the pre-independence period.  
 
The configuration of the three political forces of Islam, secular nationalism, and 
communism was shown in the result of the 1955 election, in which there was no dominant 
political party. The PNI gained the largest share of votes in the election (22.3%), followed 
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by Masyumi (20.9%), NU (18. 4%), and the PKI (16.4%). Other Islamic parties, namely 
the PSII and Partai Tarbiyah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Education Party) got 
only 2.9% and 1.3% respectively. All together, the Islamic parties won 43.5% of total vote 
(Boland, 1971; Liddle, 1996). The disunity of Islamic parties that led to their defeat was 
possible due to their political praxis interests and their differing modernist and 
traditionalist religious backgrounds.  
 
Tensions among Islamic parties, especially between Masyumi and NU, ocurred with 
regard to governmental position issues i.e. power sharing in the cabinet. In the aftermath of 
election, the second cabinet of Ali Sastroamijoyo—which included the PNI, Masyumi, and 
NU—was forged in March 1956. The resignation of Mohammad Hatta as Vice President 
due to his disagreement with Sukarno’s idea of ‘Guided Democracy’ sparked protests from 
his sympathisers and supporters, particularly those from islands outside Java, further 
strengthening anti-Jakarta and anti-Sukarno sentiment. Masyumi, whose constituents were 
mainly from islands outside of Java, joined in on the protests. Consequently, Masyumi 
withdrew from the cabinet, while NU continued to hold its seats. This intensified the 
tensions between Masyumi and NU (Boland, 1971, p. 87).   
 
Despite their differences and tensions, NU and Masyumi—along with other Islamic 
parties—worked in tandem to push for the return of the ‘seven words’of the Jakarta 
Charter to the Constitution Preamble. At the Constituent Assembly meetings (1957-1959), 
tasked with making a new state constitution, Islamic parties formed an Islamic bloc and 
confronted PNI and other non-Islamic parties (Boland, 1971). The confrontation ended 
with the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly by Sukarno after which, in mid-1959, he 
began to reinforce the 1945 Constitution, marking the beginning of ‘Guided Democracy’ 
(Lev, 1966, p. 277).  
4. The suppression of political Islam 
Indonesia under the secular nationalism of Sukarno and Suharto did not offer any chance 
for the establishment of an Islamic state. Both Sukarno and Suharto enforced strict controls 
on political parties. Muslim groups were suppressed and oppressed. The suspicion that 
Muslim groups had always aspired constitutionally or unconstitutionally to an Islamic state 
was paramount among the government and military (Carnegie, 2008).  
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The political realm in the Sukarno era was dominated by Sukarno (nationalists), Islam, the 
Army, and PKI. Muslim groups, especially Islamic political parties, faced confrontation 
with the rest of those powers. The suppression of Muslim groups was demonstrated by 
Sukarno when he banned Masyumi in 1960 as its leaders were involved in the Perjuangan 
Rakyat Semesta (Struggle of the Universe’s people) or PRRI in West Sumatera and 
Manado in 1958. In fact, the uprising did not solely involve Muslim elements but also 
Christian, ethnic and other groups (Liddle, 1992; Vlekke, 1959). Masyumi’s refusal to 
condemn those who were involved in the PRR (Feith, 1962) might also have been a trigger 
for the ban. As time passed, Sukarno increasingly showed his power by dissolving all but 
ten parties in April 1961 (Feith, 1962). With the exception of Masyumi, the rest of the 
Islamic parties (NU, Perti, and PSII) survived the harsh policy.     
 
Among the Islamic parties, only NU cooperated with the regime in areas such as the 
formation of the cabinet. NU cooperated with Sukarno throughout the Guided Democracy 
period (Federspiel, 1973). While ideologically and historically against communism, NU 
wished to cooperate with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) under the imposed 
ideological slogan of the Nasionalis-Agama-Komunis (Nationalist-Religious-Communist) 
or Nasakom which was created by Sukarno. Therefore Lev (1967) has referred to NU’s 
“uncertain political principles” (p. 55). Lev’s argument sees NU as opportunistic. Fealy 
(2003) and Marjani (2012) disagree with such a view. Fealy argues that NU’s political 
attitude in the period of 1952-1967 was the combination of accommodative and militant 
attitudes depending on the political context and situation. Meanwhile Marjani prefers to 
call it a tolerant attitude for the greater benefit of Muslim society. In the introduction to 
their edited book on NU (1996), Barton and Fealy (1996) contend that NU in the Sukarno 
period was known to have “political flexibility and accommodation” (p. xx). According to 
Fealy (2003), NU’s approach was not as opportunistic as many think. In fact, NU was 
consistent in its political religious stance which had been embraced for a long period. NU’s 
political ideology is based on Sunni Islamic jurisprudence which prioritises the protection 
and the benefits of Islam and its adherents.  
 
Despite Islam being regarded as a threat to the state, the army—especially those members 
of a modernist secular persuasion such as General Abdul Haris Nasution—had cordial 
relations with Islamic groups in order to promote religious activities (Federspiel, 1973). 
Besides the reflection of their religious awareness, their close relations with Islam might 
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also have been aimed at countering the communists who grew stronger everyday under the 
protection of Sukarno. According to Lev (1966, p. 278), Nasution himself was regarded by 
Sukarno as a rival to his power. Tensions between Sukarno and army leaders occurred 
frequently regarding the PKI. Consequently, Sukarno endeavoured to set out the power 
balance between army and other groups, to break up officer corps, and to weaken 
Nasution’s power even though he was not so ambitious as to challenge Sukarno for the 
presidency. With regard to the relationship between Islam and the army, Federspiel (1973) 
contends that Nasution’s group wished for the promulgation of “doctrinaire Muslim 
religious beliefs and ritual among armed services personnel as a means of assuring a 
common ethical and moral guide and standard of behaviour” (p. 410).  Nasution’s group 
utilised available instruments such as imam militer (the military chaplain service), regular 
Islamic commemoration days, and the issuance of religious books to realise its goals. 
However, their activities were mainly related to religious rituals and ceremonies and they 
shunned politically oriented activities.   
 
Muslim groups continued to experience unpleasant situations with regard to Islam-state 
relations for at least the first 20 years of Suharto’s rule (Hefner, 2000; Liddle, 1996). The 
role of Muslim groups was systematically diminished, and they had only a marginal place 
in the national political arena. Muslim politicians faced discrimination, persecution, and 
arrests. Suspected Muslim militants were excluded from the national bureaucracy and 
political activities. Islamic politics were labelled as right wing elements and treated as ‘a 
threat and public enemy’. Islam was ranked as the second most dangerous challenge after 
the leftist extreme: the communists who were responsible for the 1965 revolt (Liddle, 
1996).  
 
The change of regime from Sukarno to Suharto brought new hope for a better situation for 
Muslim groups. They expected to be able to forge a better relationship with the 
government and the army given that Muslim groups had played a pivotal role in bringing 
down the Indonesian communists in 1965. However, once again the new regime 
disappointed them as it refused to lift the ban on the Masyumi party. Instead, Suharto 
allowed the establishment of Partai Muslimin Indonesian (Indonesian Muslim Party) in 
April 1967 (Samson, 1968).  The seeds of Suharto’s authoritarianism had been clear since 
the beginning of his accession to power. The regime considerably intervened in and 
controlled the Parmusi party  (Porter, 2002). The government attempted to cut Parmusi’s 
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ties from Masyumi’s legacy and spirit. Consequently, Parmusi lost the spirit of struggle it 
had inherited from Masyumi.  
 
On the other hand, a number of NU members had been forced to join the Golkar and its 
affiliated organisations which were to become Suharto’s political machinery. Due to the 
manipulation and intervention of the government regarding Parmusi, Muhammadiyah 
dissociated itself from Masyumi and halted its support to Parmusi. This marked the 
withdrawal of Muhammadiyah from the political arena. Meanwhile, Parmusi collaborated 
with Golkar against NU and the PNI during the 1971 election campaign. This contributed 
further to the disunity of the political Muslim groups and dispersed their influence (Porter, 
2002). The result of systematic efforts of the government to control political life was seen 
throughout the 1971 election. Golkar seized 227 out of 360 allocated seats, while NU and 
the Parmusi gained 58 and 24 seats respectively (Samson, 1971). Of the total votes, Golkar 
reaped 62.8%, NU took 18.67%, and Parmusi 5.4% (Porter, 2002).  
 
Politically defeated, Muslim groups were often the subject of suspicion, marginalisation or 
even suppression (Effendy, 2003). This situation was worsened by the common perception 
that Islam was synonymous with rebellion and opposing the central government in the pre- 
and post-independence periods. The spectre of the Darul Islam fundamentalist revolt in 
1949 and the rising PRRI in 1958 led to the continuous suspicion and suppression of 
Muslim groups in this era. The arguments given for the suppression and suspicion of 
religious politics focused on the need for national unity and political stability (Vatikiotis, 
1998). As in the Sukarno regime, Suharto stopped Islamic elements from becoming 
important players in Indonesian politics. Suharto’s dual policy on Islam, according to 
Effendy (2003), seemed to emulate the Dutch colonial policy, namely preventing Islam 
from politics and at the same time promoting its religious rituals. Islam was confined to 
worship.  
 
In an effort to erode the link between aliran (stream)5 and the political behaviour of the 
people, the regime promoted Pancasila as the sole ideology for political and mass 
                                                             
5The santri (pious Muslim)-abangan (nominal Muslim) approach—which had been influenced by work of 
Geertz (1960)—has been frequently used to explain Indonesian politics especially in the eras of Sukarno and 
Suharto. It has been useful to look at “politik aliran” or “political stream” which was clearly reflected in the 
first democratic election in 1955. Aliran which literally translates as stream or current is used in the 
Indonesian political context as “any group characterized by adherence to similar ideas or ideals” such as 
aliran agama (religious stream) and aliran nationalis (nationalist stream). The 1955 election result shows the 
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organisations. The de-politicisation strategy that was also known as de-ideologization or 
Pancalization, drew heavily from the thought of a key New Order strategist, Ali 
Murtopo—a Muslim but one hostile to Muslim groups (Ramage, 1995, p. 186). This was 
an indiscriminate strategy, though it was an open secret that it was actually directed at the 
Muslim community. Indeed, Suharto utilised all possible means to secure his power, 
including making Pancasila the ideological legitimisation of his regime (Ramage, 1995). 
He controlled most aspects of Indonesian life. Suharto, as described by Ricklefs (2012), 
directed his people in not only how to act, but also how to think and feel. Therefore, only 
the regime had the authority to interpret Pancasila, which was consequently utilised as a 
means to guard the interests of the regime. The regime was accused of abusing the 
interpretation of Pancasila, which was often used to suppress its political enemies, 
especially Muslim groups.  
 
The implementation of this de-politicisation strategy reached its peak in 1985 with the 
adoption of a law requiring all mass-based organisations to accept Pancasila as their sole 
philosophical basis. This law was initially proposed in 1982. After deliberation of the bill 
in parliament, strong protests were sparked on many sides, especially among Muslim 
organisations. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, a former leader of Masyumi sent an open letter to 
Suharto in July 1983 accusing the government of using the bill as an instrument to control 
Islamic organisations. Indeed, politically-oriented Islam was the main target of the de-
politicisation program (Porter, 2002, p. 41). The regime insisted on its plan arguing that 
Pancasila should be accepted without conditionality as it was critical for maintaining 
national unity and stability (Ramage, 1995, p. 35). This obstinate initiative of Suharto’s led 
to a riot at Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta, in September 1984. Unarmed Muslims faced off 
with the military, leading to the death of dozens—according to the military—and 
hundreds—according to Abdurrahman Wahid—of innocent protesters (Raillon, 1993, pp. 
197-200; Ramage, 1995, p. 19).  
 
The decision to impose Pancasila as the sole foundation for political and mass 
organisations was a way to control their political aspirations. This movement had started in 
the very early years of Suharto’s administration. Through Law no. 3/1973, the government 
forced the fusion of nine political parties into two parties. PNI and other nationalist parties 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
reality of four more aliran politik (political streams) (Cribb, 1992, pp. 11-12).  The categorization of aliran is 
useful, though problematic due to blurred borders between one stream and the other. 
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as well as the Christian parties transformed themselves into the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
(Indonesian Democratic Party) or PDI, while the Islamic parties (NU, PSII, and Parmusi) 
fused to become Partai Pembangunan Indonesia (Indonesian Development Party) or PPP 
(Liong, 1988; Sabri, 2012). The PPP’s name was intentionally chosen by the government 
to dissociate the party with any Islamic character. However, the government failed to 
prohibit PPP from using Ka’bah (the cube-shaped architecture at the centre of the Haram 
mosque in Mecca) as its electoral symbol after the PPP threatened to withdraw from the 
1977 election if it was forced to do so (Liong, 1988). However PPP changed its party’s 
symbol of ‘Ka’bah’ with ‘Star’ when Pancasila was enforced for all political parties and 
mass organisations as the force majeure in 1984 (Weatherbee, 1984). From that time until 
the end of the New Order, the electoral vote was contested by Golkar, PDI, and PPP. Until 
the fall of Suharto, this helped Golkar to secure a landslide victory in every general election 
(Sabri, 2012).     
5. Cultural Islam and Muslims’ political rapprochement with Suharto 
In response to the political pressure on Muslim groups, their leaders were divided into 
two—but not limited to two—major camps. The first group comprised young Muslim 
activists and intellectuals, while the other consisted of most senior leadership of the 
Masyumi party which had been banned by Sukarno in the 1960s. Despite their agreement 
on the wisdom of using dakwah (religious proselytisation) as their approach to face the 
government’s harsh policy towards Muslims, both camps disagreed on long-term political 
goals (Hefner, 2001). While the latter still aspired to the establishment of an Islamic state, 
the former emphasised that the most imperative goal was to colour the state with Islamic 
principles such as a respect for pluralism, tolerance, and to advance good governance, 
protection of the weak and achieve social justice. The promotion of Islamic values was not 
to be imposed through the state but via Muslims’ hearts and minds by encouraging their 
religious awareness. Such a movement is commonly known as the Cultural Islam 
movement. The Cultural Islam movement did not come in a single coherent form. Instead, 
it reflected various manifestations which had a shared aspiration for the transformation and 
revitalisation of Indonesian Islam as well as the avoidance of a destructive confrontation 
with the Suharto regime (Fealy, Hooker, & White, 2006).  
 
To some extent this movement fitted the de-politicisation strategy that the Suharto regime 
employed to curb formal political Islam. The Cultural Islam movement emerged 
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concurrently with the regime’s hardest pressure towards politically motivated activities in 
the 1970s and 1980s (Fealy et al., 2006). Indeed, it is safe to say that while discouraging 
political Islam, Suharto promoted religious rituals and worship. These circumstances 
paved the way for the development of the Cultural Islam movement. The movement has 
had a great influence on Muslims’ perceptions of the relationship between Islam and the 
state. The Cultural Islam movement sought to promote Muslim aspirations through social, 
educational, intellectual, and other cultural aspects and shunned any kind of formal politics 
(Ricklefs, 2012, p. 48).  
 
Most proponents of this movement came from the modernist and traditionalist intellectual 
camps. Among the movements’ prominent figures were Nurcholis Madjid, an outstanding 
Islamic thinker and philosopher, Abdurrahman Wahid, a Muslim intellectual and pluralist 
adherent who would later become President of Indonesia, Johan Effendi and Dawam 
Raharjo—both intellectuals—and Kuntowidjoyo, an intellectual and humanist.   
 
Nurcholis Madjid’s concept of desacralization urged for the freedom of mankind to regard 
profane matters as if these matters were transcendental. As Al-Quran does not provide a 
detailed conduct for life, questioning the state, party and ideology are not something sacred 
(Weck et al., 2011). Subsequently, in order to shift the movement away from political 
Islam, Madjid came up with his remarkable slogan of 'Islam Yes, Islamic party No'. The 
future of Indonesian Islam, according to Madjid, would rest on culture, intellectualism, and 
education - and not on politics. Islamic parties would be counterproductive to the 
authoritarian regime. Any counter attack on the regime’s secularising tendencies would 
further affirm its view of Islam as a threat, and such a situation would not bring any benefit 
to Muslims. Nurcholis’ view shocked those proponents of a formal Islamic state whose 
belief was that Islam and the state are inseparable (Fealy, 2007a).  
 
Meanwhile, Abdurrahman Wahid was a religious nationalist and proponent of a secular 
state (Mujani & Liddle, 2009). Wahid believed the struggle for an Islamic cause could take 
any form so long as it did not contradict Islamic principles. He came up with the concept 
of the indigenisation of Islam (pribumisasi Islam), based on distinctive Indonesian 
features. He argued that the necessity of local situations should be taken into account when 
interpreting and understanding Islamic teachings, rather than separating Islam from its 
local cultural context by maintaining Islam in its original form. Therefore any effort to 
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promote Islam as the only determining source of life would potentially be divisive given 
the heterogeneity of popular customs in Indonesia. Yet the right of Islam to colour aspects 
of life in Indonesia is the same as held by other religions (Weck et al., 2011). Together 
with Kyai Haji (KH) Ahmad Shidiq, Abdurrahman Wahid was an architect of NU’s 
acceptance of Pancasila as the sole foundation of the Indonesian state in 1984 (Effendy, 
2003, p. 132).  After the NU national congress accepted Pancasila in 1984, Wahid stated 
that it was “only after clarifying that Pancasila should not be treated as a religion in the life 
of the nation nor be made to contradict religion that the congress was able to adopt the 
state ideology as its sole basis” (Wahid, 1996, p. xiv).  
 
Wahid’s initiative and efforts contributed to NU’s declaration on the finality of Pancasila 
as the state ideology. According to Wahid, NU’s withdrawal from practical politics would 
open wider opportunities as NU’s cadres could join any parties including nationalist-
oriented parties.  Subsequently, since the mid-1980s, NU has focused on social, economic 
and religious issues as well as political transformation programs (Effendy, 2003). Through 
its program on various socio-economic and religious issues, Muhammadiyah also 
rejuvenated the tajdid (renewal) of Islamic teaching that enabled it to cope with new 
challenges and to deal with the country’s main problems in social justice and poverty. Both 
NU and Muhammadiyah are committed to promoting good governance in accordance with 
their status as a moral force.  
 
Wahid developed NU into a more progressive organisation and frequently opposed 
Suharto. NU’s withdrawal from politics had major implications. It allowed its members to 
vote for any political party, not just the PPP. According to Effendy (2003),  NU’s step 
reflected the general movement of the Islamic political dynamic, putting stress more on 
substance rather than form.  
 
The second camp (Muslim modernist political leaders such as Natsir and other Masyumi 
figures who still aspired to the establishment of an Islamic state as their long term goal), 
turned their political activities into dakwah (Islamic proselytisation). This happened in the 
aftermath of the refusal of Suharto’s regime to restore the Masyumi party. Natsir 
established Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Da’wah Council) or 
DDII in 1967.  DDII’s mission was to promulgate Islamic teachings to society. Rather than 
imposing Islamic teachings from above (the state), he preferred to do it from below, within 
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society (Ricklefs, 2012). Like his junior intellectuals, Natsir realised that the new order 
regime was too strong to confront. In this context, the modernist DDII buttressed the 
government’s dakwah agenda which was intended mainly to prevent a communist revival. 
Both DDII and the government had the same objectives and end goal, namely a deeper but 
non-political Islamisation (Ricklefs, 2012) or rather ‘santrinisasi’ (a process to call 
nominal Muslims to be pious Muslims).   
 
Besides having been influenced by a global phenomenon of the Islamic resurgence, 
Suharto’s policies seeking to undermine political Islam had also contributed to the 
emergence of more exclusive dakwahis movements in the 1980s, which were commonly 
called the ‘Tarbiyah movement’. This movement initially grew in the Salman mosque at 
Bandung’s Institute of Technology. The movement then inspired others and spread to more 
campuses. This movement, with its secretive teaching and discussion, was known as usroh 
(nuclear family). The term ‘usroh’ is also used in the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul 
Muslim) in Egypt (Bruinessen, 2002). 
 
Such movements take the form of study circles (halaqah) that are established at mosques’ 
campuses. The teaching methods offer more literal interpretations of Al-Quran and Al 
Hadits, claiming that their teachings are in accordance with the teaching of the Prophet and 
his early companions (Salafush shalih). Because they do not give ‘text multi-
interpretation’ and tend towards ‘exactness’, such movements usually attract followers 
from ‘methodologically similar’ faculties such as the Faculty of Math and Natural 
Sciences. Such movements offered favourable environments for Middle-Eastern religious 
and political movements such as Hizbut Tahrir, Ikhwanul Muslimin, and Salafi-Wahabism 
to grow locally. Some movements preferred to operate clandestinely, especially those with 
political motives. As explained by Hairgrove and Mcleod (2008), Hizbut Tahrir, for 
example, chose to remain secret and have no name until it gained the confidence to 
become a mass organisation. This opportunity arose when Suharto’s regime fell in the late 
1990s.  
 
There were many other hardline movements similar to Hizbut Tahrir which grew secretly 
during the Suharto period. They recruited their cadres and ran their movements 
underground. They were politically motivated groups. Such movements include the Darul 
Islam (Islamic State) movement, Jamaah Islamiyah, and other similar groups. All wish to 
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establish an Islamic state based on their own distinct interpretation. Yet such movements 
have no political leverage in the real political arena as they have only a small number of 
followers and their radical ideologies do not attract people to join them. Morever, some 
groups of this kind remain clandestine. 
 
Compared to Tarbiyah and other conservative modernist movements such as DDII, 
Cultural Islam belongs to the substantialist moderate movement (the first camp) and has 
attracted more followers. The moderate movement is usually called the ‘Islam mainstream’ 
or ‘mainstream Islam’. Mainstream Islam is widely understood as an Islamic model that is 
associated with NU and Muhammadiyah. The Cultural Islam movement contributed to 
warm relations between Islam and the state. The suspicion of Islam began to diminish, 
leading to a change of political policy concerning Islam in the Suharto era. This involved a 
long process of dialogue regarding state-Islam relations.  
 
As a part of the dakwah movement, Muslim groups vigorously promoted both educational 
programs at the grass roots level and empowerment in society: initiatives which were 
intended to help Muslim society find balance with the state (Hefner, 2000). The Islamic 
resurgence in the 1970s and 1980s was concurrent with Suharto’s policy restricting 
Muslim activities to the non-political arena. This policy had “unwittingly contributed to 
the resurgence of Islam” (Hefner, 2000, p. 18). There was a significant increase in 
religious activities, the number of mosques, the number of Friday prayer attendees, the 
number of religious schools and their attendees, and other activities that led to the increase 
of the Islamic piety of society (Freedman, 2009). There was also an Islamic influence 
which had been visible in the commercialisation of products using Islamic symbols and 
motifs (Riddell, 2002).  Although dakwah (which was also initiated by more conservative 
modernist Muslim groups) had coloured the character of Islam in Indonesia, the outcome 
of the Islamic resurgence was more complicated than “a simple shift from secular 
nationalism to conservative Islam” (Hefner, 2000, p. 18).  Hefner believes that the 
increasing interest in sufism and the existence of the NU-Muhammadiyah combination as 
the bulwark of moderate Islam could ‘save’ the country from the control of conservative 
and radical Islam (Hefner, 2000). Aside from their role maintaining the character of 
moderate Islam in Indonesia, NU and Muhammadiyah as well as other Muslim groups 
managed to effectively influence state policy in domestic affairs (Freedman, 2009).  As a 
result, in the 1990s, Suharto took a different approach towards Islam. His government, to 
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some extent, accommodated the political aspirations of Islam. Muslims were given more 
places in politics without being suspected of being proponents of an Islamic state (Weiss, 
2010).  
 
The government endorsed numerous policies favouring Muslim groups, including: (a) Law 
No. 1 of 1974 on the the validity of marriage-based religion, especially Islam, (b) Law No. 
7 of 1989 on religious courts, which were granted the right to manage exclusively specific 
civil matters of Muslims, (c) Law No. 1 of 1999 on Islamic Law Compilation, (d) Law No. 
7 of 1992 on Banking which was amended by Law No. 10 of 1998 which requires 
conventional banks to open branches which operate on shariah principles (Weck et al., 
2011). Despite regulating banking in general and without mentioning shariah banking, 
Law No. 7 of 1992 started to mention the concept of profit sharing principle (mudharabah) 
which has been commonly used in shariah banking. This term was further explained in the 
government decree No. 72/1992 on Banking which also discussed financing based on 
profit sharing in line with shariah principles (Al-Hakim, 2013).  
 
In response to demands from various Muslim organisations and leaders, the administration 
of Suharto set in motion a number of other policies and actions: (a) Allowing female 
students in state schools to wear jilbab (veil); (b) Discontinuing a national sports lottery; 
(c) Sentencing a Catholic editor of Popular magazine who was found guilty of insulting the 
Prophet Muhammad; (d) Suharto’s pilgrimage to Mecca in 1991; and (e) the establishment 
of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association (ICMI) in 1991 (Liddle, 1996; 
Tirtosudarmo, 1992b). 
 
There are several explanations as to why political attitudes towards Islam changed in the 
last period of Suharto’s rule. First, Suharto needed to broaden his political base as he 
gradually lost the military’s support, in particular the support of General Murdani’s wing. 
He endeavoured to build alliances beyond his traditionally staunch allies including the 
military and the Golkar ruling party (Sukma & Joewono, 2007). Second, the establishment 
of ICMI was a part of Suharto’s political strategy rather than a willingness to 
accommodate Indonesian Muslims (Liddle, 1996). However, Suharto’s accommodative 
policies toward Muslim groups emerged as the impact of the Cultural Islam movement had 
been congruent with the new order’s de-politicisation strategy. The movement had an 
effect not only on ordinary Muslim people but also on the leadership of bureaucratic and 
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military organisations. The psychology of more mature Javanese Muslims also needs to be 
considered. Older Muslims typically pay closer attention to their religious deeds. It is 
worth noting that Suharto wished that it “be known that when he died, he would like the 
Muslims to pray for him” (Vatikiotis, 1998, p. 131). In an interview with Vatikiotis 
(1998), Habibie touched on Suharto’s Muslim affinities, referring to Suharto’s statement: 
“I was born a Muslim. I will struggle for the Muslim cause” (p. 131) 
6. Islam and politics in Indonesia’s democratic era: Pre-Yudhoyono era 
The democratic era that followed the fall of Suharto created more opportunities for all 
members of Indonesian society, including Muslims, to express their aspirations. The 
presence of Islam in the public sphere has been more apparent not only in the cultural 
arena but also in the ideological and political realms. This phenomenon has certainly 
contradicted secularist perspectives in which religious symbols and identities are kept in 
the private domain (Weck et al., 2011). According to Habermas (2006), the democratic era 
enables a variety of aspirations to be present in the public sphere. It allows religions to be 
in the public sphere as they generate democratic process legitimacy. The practice of 
democracy in Indonesia encouraged Muslim groups and offered the opportunity for them 
to return to the political arena. The involvement and accommodation of Islam in political 
parties has reflected a distinctive feature of the democratisation process in the country 
(Carnegie, 2006).  
More than 20 Islamic parties participated in the 1999 elections (Fealy et al., 2006). It must 
be noted that questions exist regarding the definition of Islamic parties, and it is a difficult 
task to clearly define them. The author follows the categorisation of Islamic parties 
presented by Azra (2006). There are at least two main features identifying a party as 
Islamic. First, there are those that have officially adopted Islam as their ideological basis as 
mentioned in their founding documents. These included PPP, the Crescent Star Party 
(Partai Bulan Bintang—PBB), Islamic Nation Party (PUI), and New Masyumi Party. Fealy 
(2001) labels such parties as formalistic Islamic parties for their adoption of Al Quran and 
As Sunnah (prophet tradition) as their sole ideological basis. 
The second group are those still committed to adopting Pancasila as their basis. They still 
utilise obvious Islamic attributes such as Arabic scripts and pictures with Islamic nuances 
as well as other symbols widely attributed to Islam.  Though these parties are perceived as 
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pluralistic, they are in fact Muslim-based parties. They have been supported by Islamic 
social organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah. These parties include PKB which is 
commonly associated with NU, and PAN whose traditional supporters are people 
associating themselves with the Muhammadiyah (Azra, 2006). These parties are labelled 
by Fealy (2001) as Pluralist Islamic parties. 
 
The establishment of new Islamic parties gained greater momentum with the repeal of the 
1985 Mass Organisation Law on the obligation of each political party and mass 
organisation to make use of Pancasila as its sole foundation (Azra, 2006). Aside from an 
indication of democratic euphoria, the establishment of many political parties might not be 
motivated by genuinely religious motives but instead by the interests of some Muslim 
elites in gaining political power (Azra, 2006). Forty-two Islamic parties emerged before 
being verified to contest the 1999 election. There was a hope that more Muslims would 
vote for Islamic parties like in 1955 as a result of santrinisasi during the New Order (Fealy 
et al., 2006). The rise of Islamic parties recalled old debates regarding Islam and state 
relations. There was a concern that the Cultural Islam approach, which was predominant 
during Suharto’s New Order, would be replaced by Islamic political formalisms (Azra, 
2006, p. 20).  
 
However, there is no indication that Indonesian Muslims, at least those represented by 
Islamic parties, are aspiring for the establishment of an Islamic state. No single Muslim 
leader has officially announced the necessity of the establishment of an Islamic state at the 
expense of Pancasila. Even the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan) or PK, which later became 
PKS, has maintained that Islamic substance is more important than the label (Azra, 2004). 
PKS is regarded as representing a new Islamic political resurgence. The embryo of PKS 
was born from the ‘Tarbiyah movement’. The cadre recruitments and basic trainings of 
PKS utilise the study circles (halaqah) of the Tarbiyah movement. PKS is also known as 
the Ikhwanul Muslimin (Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood) of Indonesia. Among Islamic 
parties, PPP and PBB campaigned for the return of the Jakarta Charter in the early 
democratic era, but to no effect.  NU, for example, through its sponsored party of PKB, 
strongly opposed the idea. (Liddle, 2003). Therefore, it is safe to say that most Islamic 
parties did not want to emulate the models of  Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (Fealy, 2003b). 
In the following general elections in 2004, there was no campaigning for the establishment 
of an Islamic state or to revive the Jakarta Charter from PKS, PBB or other Islamic parties. 
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Instead, they preferred to promote other issues, such as good governance, in their political 
campaigns.  
 
Despite their optimism, Islamic parties did not win the votes they expected. The 1999 
election confirmed the victory of non-Islamic parties with 62.2% of the total vote. 
Meanwhile, Islamic parties only reaped 37.5% of the total vote. Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia Perjuangan (Struggle Indonesian Democratic Party) or PDIP led by Megawati 
received 34% of the vote, Golkar (22%), PKB (13%), PPP (almost 11%), and PAN (7%) 
(Lee, 2004). Compared to the 1955 election where Islamic political parties garnered 
43.5%, there was a significant shortfall in their share of the vote. As the election winner, 
PDIP was not able to usher its chairwoman, Megawati, into the presidency. Instead, the 
Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) elected Abdurrahman Wahid as the 
fourth president and Megawati as the vice president. This circumstance occurred when 
Islamic political parties of both modernist and traditional orientations were united to form 
'the central axis' political coalition.   
 
From its inception, the coalition seemed fragile, and Abdurrahman Wahid of PKB was, as 
a result, initially reluctant to be pushed as an alternative presidential candidate. PKB 
doubted the seriousness and solidarity of the central axis members. When the coalition 
insisted on pursuing its political goal, Wahid became the fourth Indonesian president. 
According to Fealy (2003b), “Abdurrahman’s election appeared to show Islam’s power as 
a legitimating force in Indonesian politics. He was the first genuine Islamic leader to hold 
the presidency”  (p. 150). 
 
Only a short period of time passed before the disunity of the central axis became apparent. 
Amien Rais, the chairman of PAN and former chairman of Muhammadiyah who had 
encouraged Wahid to the presidency, also prominently advanced Wahid’s impeachment. 
As the chairman of MPR, he inaugurated Megawati as the fifth Indonesian President and 
Hamzah Haz, chairman of PPP, as vice president. The central axis has been the only 
coalition among Islamic political parties in the post-Suharto period. Other Islamic parties 
such as PKB, PPP, and PBB have experienced well-known internal conflicts.  
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7. Islam and politics in Indonesia’s democratic era: TheYudhoyono era 
The 2004 direct presidential election brought Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla to power. Voters 
preferred to vote for Yudhoyono, a nationalist candidate rather than Amien Rais, chairman 
of PAN, Hamzah Haz, and chairman of PPP as Indonesian president for the period of 
2004-2009. In fact, Islamic political parties achieved a significant number, namely: 38.35 
percent of the the total vote in the 2004 legislative election which was conducted prior to 
the presidential election (Al-Hamdi, 2013). However, all major Islamic parties, namely: 
PKB, PPP, PKS, and PAN joined Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party (PD) to form a governing 
coalation.  
 
Together with PD, these major Islamic parties ushered Yudhoyono to the second term of 
his presidency (2009-2014) (Sabri, 2012). There were not any prominent Muslim figures 
or leaders of the Islamic parties running for the presidential election. Likewise, compared 
to their achievement in 2004, they performed poorly in the 2009 legislative election, 
reaping only 29% of the total vote (Tanuwijaya, 2010). 
 
The 2014 general election showed similar trends. Islamic parties still could not manage to 
defeat nationalist parties in the election despite increased votes. They gained 31.4% in 
2014, a slight increase compared to their votes in 2009 (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014). 
Despite their poorer performance than the nationalist parties, the significance of the total 
votes of Islamic parties cannot be overlooked. A 31.4% share of the vote is well beyond 
the 20% needed to propose a presidential candidate. However, disagreements among 
Islamic political parties meant they could not manage to propose a candidate from their 
own parties. Instead, each decided to make a coalition with nationalist parties. Therefore, 
some Islamic parties joined the Red-White coalition (Koalisi Merah Putih) or KMP 
backing the candidacy of Prabowo Subiato, while other Islamic parties joined the Great 
Indonesia coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Hebat) or KIH, backing the candidacy of Joko 
Widodo who in 2014 became the 7th Indonesian president.  
 
Based on the election results in the post Suharto era, some observers have argued that 
political Islam in Indonesia failed (Ahmad, 2014) and that religious factors are 
insignificant in Indonesian politics. The enhanced piety of Indonesian Muslim society has 
not been reflected in political preferences  (Mujani, Liddle, & Ambardi, 2011). Aside from 
the great influence of Cultural Islam vis-à-vis political Islam, other factors that may have 
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contributed to the failure of Islamic political parties were their lack of an economic agenda 
and the issue of political Islam as a divisive factor. The latter factor has been prominent, as 
Muslims have no consensus on whether a more Islamic state may be formalistic and 
legalistic or substantive and cultural. The imposition of shariah law is also a contentious 
issue among Indonesian people, including Muslims (Bush, 2008; Lee, 2004). The 
contestation between traditionalist and modernist movements, in particular militant 
modernist groups such as the Tarbiyah movement, has been a determining factor for the 
disunity of Islamic political parties. In fact, the root of the political rivalry between 
modernists (e.g. Muhammadiyah) and traditionalists (e.g. NU) became apparent at the 
surface when NU left Masyumi in 1952 feeling itself marginalised within the party. From 
this time on, according to Fealy et al. (2006), “tension and acrimony between modernist 
and traditionalist became a hallmark of political Islam. Although both sides continued to 
speak of  Muslim solidarity, on most issues they saw themselves as rivals who were 
competing for legitimacy within, and leadership of, the Islamic community”  (p. 45).  
 
According to Mujani and Liddle (2010), Indonesian voter behaviour appears to be largely 
secular. This is not significantly related to sociological and cultural factors, but mainly to 
religious, ethnic and social class-related aspects. The voters’ choice was influenced mainly 
by contesting political characters and the degree of their association or identification with 
political parties. Another important factor is the government’s performance. The ruling 
party that supports the incumbent government will be greatly influenced with regard to 
vote getting. In 2009, voters preferred to choose the Democratic Party (PD) in the 
legislative election and voted for Yudhoyono as their president. At that time, the voters’ 
decision to re-elect Yudhoyono might have been based on their view of the success of the 
first period of Yudhoyono’s administration in which the PD was his ruling party (Mujani 
et al., 2011). 
 
Aside from the role of rational choice in voting, this political phenomenon (which has been 
labelled by some observers as ‘the failure of political Islam’) has been commonly 
associated with the direct or indirect effects of the Cultural Islam movement and the new 
order’s de-politicisation strategy. Both brought about significantly diminishing gaps 
between nationalist and Islamic political parties. It is my conviction that the Indonesian 
population may generally view that both nationalist and Islamic political parties offer a 
similar program. They tend to vote for parties that have an ability and commitment to 
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deliver their promised programmes. So far, nationalist parties are regarded as more 
competent than Islamic parties in this regard. According to Tanuwijaya (2010), all 
Indonesia’s competing parties, regardless of their official ideologies, tend to shift to 
middle-ground, melting pot ideologies, and from secular to religious views. Golkar and PD 
are no longer suitably categorised simply as secular nationalist parties as they are very 
accommodative to Muslim aspirations. Instead, they would better be positioned as 
religiously accommodative nationalist parties. Meanwhile, Islamic parties, especially non-
formal Islamic parties would better be called open inclusive political parties where they 
oppose the establishment of an Islamic state. 
 
Second, Cultural Islam and the New Order’s de-politicisation enabled santri to penetrate 
the nationalist parties. This was a result of diminishing suspicion towards santri Muslims 
with regard to the establishment of an Islamic state, creating a harmonious relationship 
between Muslims and other political forces (nationalists). This situation opened the way 
for santri Muslims to be involved in nationalist political parties rather than in Islamic 
political parties. For example, 83 percent of the Golkar members of parliament in the 
period 2004-2009 were Muslims, most of them with a santri background (Baswedan, 
2004). Akbar Tanjung and Jusuf Kalla, former Golkar chairmen, have strong santri 
backgrounds. Both were activists within Muslim Student Associations (HMI). There has 
also been ‘santrinisasi’ within nationalist parties, leading to their accommodative policies 
and programs regarding Muslim aspirations. The most secular nationalist party, PDIP, 
even established Baitul Muslim Indonesia (Indonesia Muslims’ House) where Chairman of 
NU, Said Agil Siraj, is one of theAdvisory Council members in the period of 2010-2015. 
Similar circumstances are demonstrated by PD. Majelis Dzikir SBY (God’s remembrance 
council of SBY), which has religious activities aiming at securing Muslim support for 
Yudhoyono and PD. Golkar also established an Islamic organisational wing earlier than 
any other nationalist party. In 1978, Golkar established Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah 
(Islamic Da’wah Council) or MDI. Prior to that, in 1971, Golkar invited Gabungan Usaha 
Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam (the Joint efforts for the improvement of Islamic Education) 
or GUPPI to become its organisational wing (Kholil, 2009).  
 
Many legislative policies confirm that nationalist parties have not demonstrated their 
‘basic’ character which shies away from Islamic causes. Tanuwijaya (2010) argues that 
one or more shariah-based local law has been implemented in 74 districts in the period of 
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2004-2009. Surprisingly, in 42 out of these 74 districts”, more than 50% of the votes 
belong to major nationalist parties. And in 72 of the 74 districts, nationalist parties along 
with PKB and PAN collected more than 50% of the total vote. Not only pluralist Islamic 
parties such as PKB and PAN, but also nationalist parties are ideologically supposed to 
prevent shariah-based local laws from happening. Almost half of those districts are 
traditional Golkar strongholds. Similar phenomena occurred at the national level in the 
period of 2004-2009. Golkar and PD even frequently collaborated with Islamic parties in 
tackling controversial religious issues. A contentious education bill was successfully 
passed and became Law No. 20/2003 on Education because of the support of Golkar 
(Baswedan, 2004; Tanuwijaya, 2010). The bill was controversial because it obliged any 
private schools, including non-Muslim schools, to provide religious teachers for students 
from a different religious background. A Catholic school, for example, was obliged to 
make available an Islamic religious teacher if it had Muslim students.  
 
Nationalist parties such as Golkar and PD also supported the passage of the controversial 
anti-pornography bill in 2008 (Tanuwijaya, 2010).  All nationalist parties also endorsed a 
joint three ministerial decree in 2008 concerning the Ahmadiyah sect, which is a very 
controversial issue. Human rights activists opposed the government’s semi-ban on 
Ahmadiyah as it threatened religious freedom. The decree prevents Ahmadiyah followers 
from practising and proselytising their beliefs. The government issued the decree to 
prevent further violence from occurring, especially from those opposing Ahmadiyah 
(Sukma, 2010). This undeniably indicates the difficulty of disregarding the role of Muslim 
aspirations in Indonesia’s domestic politics, though sometimes the pressures stem from 
militant Muslim groups in Indonesia’s daily political life.  
 
The Cultural Islam movement and Suharto’s accommodation of religious aspects along 
with the external influence of a religious resurgence in the public sphere provided the 
impetus for Muslims to express their faiths in various ways (Hasan, 2009).  Their ‘Islamic 
expression’ has increasingly moved into the centre of public life. This expression takes 
various forms, ranging from political and economic activities to social-cultural activities. It 
has become common for religious gatherings to be conducted at 5-star hotels. Pilgrimage 
to Mecca both for umroh—a small haji that can be conducted anytime—and haji which is 
conducted in the month of Dzulhijah according to the Islamic calendar—have become a 
new lifestyle. Instead of spending their holidays somewhere else, many Muslims prefer to 
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do umroh. TV entertainment programs frequently broadcast artists’ or entertainers’ 
experiences when they perform umroh, Ramadhan fasting and other religious activities.  
 
Wearing the jilbab (veil) does not necessarily indicate the piety of Muslim women. 
Instead, it can also be considered a fashion statement. Fealy and White (2008) have 
described aspects of the contemporary development of Indonesian Muslims, contending 
that Muslims are more aware of putting their money in shariah banking, browsing Islamic 
websites, using halal cosmetic products, watching religious television programs, and 
enjoying Islamic art and displaying it in the home than ever before. Others are more 
concerned about macro Islamic issues regarding how to strengthen religious morals in the 
state and society.  
 
Recently, the contemporary Islamic landscape has become more dynamic with the 
emergence of a Middle Eastern-oriented Islamic movement challenging the old Islamic 
mainstream organisations, Muhammadiyah and NU. The presence of transnational Islamic 
movements such as HTI and the Salafi Wahabi movement has instigated debate and 
controversies in Indonesia (Bruinessen, 2013a). What has been achieved by the Cultural 
Islam movement has, to some extent, been disturbed and downgraded by these movements. 
This situation has worried foreign observers who fear that the smiling/friendly Islam in 
Indonesia could be overshadowed by the emergence of conservative Islam (Fealy & White, 
2008). However, this anxiety is contested by Azyumardi Azra (interview, 25/10/2013) and 
by Martin Van Bruinessen. According to Bruinessen, the image of a rise in conservative 
Islam at the expense of mainstream Islam is based on a ‘superficial reading’ on Indonesia’s 
political development in the post-Suharto period (Bruinessen, 2013b). Indeed, despite their 
active expression in the public sphere, mainstream Islam is still prevalent. The new 
‘irritating’ movements remain very limited in number. 
 
The discussion above demonstrates that although the increasing piety of society did not 
translate into the victory of Islamic political parties over nationalist parties in the elections, 
Muslim aspirations have become among the most prominent issues to be taken into 
consideration by Indonesian regimes in the post-Suharto period. It is within such a 
domestic political context, that Indonesia’s foreign policy has also been constructed.  
 
The increasing influence of Islam in domestic politics is not only limited to the support of 
nationalist parties on laws favouring Muslim groups but it has also appeared in various 
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other fields in a variety of ways. The failure of some Islamic political parties, especially 
PPP and PBB, to revive the Jakarta Charter seemed to be compensated by the successful 
repeal of the 1985 Mass Organisation Law on the obligation of each political party and 
mass organisation to make use of Pancasila as its sole foundation.  
 
Prior to the passage of Law No. 20 of 2003, the state’s accommodation towards Muslim 
aspirations regarding education was clearly seen in the adoption of Article 31, especially 
verses 3 and 5 of the amended 1945 Constitution. Article 31 (3) states that “the 
government shall manage and organise one system of national education, which shall 
increase the level of spiritual belief, devoutness and moral character in the context of 
developing the life of the nation and shall be regulated by law”. Meanwhile article 31 (5) 
stipulates that “the government shall advance science and technology with the highest 
respect for religious values and national unity for the advancement of civilisation and 
prosperity of humankind”. The repeal of 1985 and the adoption of Article 31 (3) and 
Article 31 (5) has, according to Hidayat Nurwahid, a PKS leader, exemplified the 
strengthening influence of Islam in Indonesian politics (interview, 2/12/2013).  
 
The place of Islam became more noticeable the more the state endorsed those laws and 
policies favourable to Muslims. First, during the legislative process strengthening legal 
instruments on shariah banking/finance, marked by the adoption of Law No. 21 of 2008 on 
shariah banking, almost all factions representing political parties in the DPR agreed on its 
adoption (Asriani, 2008). This law has strengthened the place of shariah banking as an 
integral part of the national banking system. Consequently, Indonesia constitutes a country 
following dual banking systems, where shariah banking and conventional banking systems 
operate side by side (M. Arifin & Nasution, 2015).  Earlier, law No. 19 of 2008 on shariah 
obligation was also endorsed. Such an obligation is expected to attract more Muslim 
investors (Fatah, 2011). Yudhoyono set in place a policy supporting the development of 
Shariah banking. He launched a Shariah Economic Movement (Gerakan Ekonomi 
Shariah). His government aspired to have Indonesia become a centre of the world shariah 
economy, and at the same to be integrated with the international shariah system (Aryani, 
2013). 
 
Second, responding to the increasing piety of Indonesia’s Muslim society, and especially 
their readiness to pay zakat (almsgiving) and to donate their wealth in the forms of infaq-
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shodaqoh (giving a donation for the sake of God) and waqaf (the Muslim practice of 
property endowment for public or religious uses due to religious cause), DPR endorsed 
Law no. 41 of 2004 on Waqaf and Law no. 23 of 2011 on the management of zakat, infaq, 
and shodaqoh. Law no. 23 of 2011 has amended and revised the law No. 38 of 1999 on the 
management of zakat. Third, the legal instrument securing Muslim aspirations for the 
availability of approved halal products was firmly established by the adoption of Law No. 
33 of 2014, less than one month before Yudhoyono ended his presidential term on 20 
October 2014 (Maharani, 2014).  
 
Finally, the Yudhoyono administration’s unwillingness to repeal the Blasphemy Law no. 
1/PNPS/1965 undeniably indicated a pro-Muslim group policy. Muslim groups believe 
that such a law functions to protect Islam as a majority religion as well as to avoid 
heretical practice in religious teaching. During the Yudhoyono era, there had been some 
prosecutions for persons or certain religious sects accused of insulting a religion, 
especially Islam. This raised protests from human rights and pluralist activists. The 
perceived misuse of the Blasphemy Law was condemned by both local and international 
human rights organisations (Crouch, 2012). Amnesty International, for example, put 
pressure on the government to repeal the law. However, the implementation of the law has 
been maintained by the Indonesian government as it has mulled over the interests of 
Muslim groups still willing to enforce the law of Blasphemy. In this regard, NU and 
Muhammadiyah and other Muslim groups worked hand in hand to try to stem the agenda 
of NGO activists, especially when they proposed a judicial review of the Blasphemy Law 
by the Indonesian Constitutional Court. As a result of Muslims groups’ pressure, the NGO 
activists’ request for judicial review was rejected by the Court (F. A. Arifin, 2014).  
 
Yudhoyono even proposed an international protocol against blasphemy at the 67th UNGA 
in September 2012. This was in response to Muslim protests around the world including 
violent protests staged by 1000 conservative Muslims at the US Embassy in Jakarta in 
early September 2012 which was fuelled by a provocative film The Innocence of Muslims 
(Lamb, 2012). Despite claiming that Indonesia had few credentials to promote the issue 
due to the perceived abused use of the Blasphemy law domestically, Indonesia proceeded 
to develop a roadmap for the protocol. However, Yudhoyono’s initiative does not seem to 
have materialised. His initiative was clearly directed at a domestic audience. The problems 
that might be faced in pursuing such a protocol were well-understood by the Indonesian 
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government. Foreign Minister Natalegawa expected that countries like the US which allow 
freedom of expression would object to such an idea (Antara, 2012b). Therefore, the 
government wanted to show its understanding to Muslim groups in Indonesia about their 
concerns. 
 
The role of Muslim groups, and mainly of NU and Muhammadiyah in the process of 
passing these laws, has been crucial as they are the main stakeholders in these concerns. 
The DPR usually invites NU and Muhammadiyah as well other relevant Muslims groups 
to public hearings. For other cases, members of parliament and the government visit their 
offices (headquarters) to discuss and consult on many issues. It is sensible for the 
government and DPR to consult with NU and Muhammadiyah as well as other Muslim 
groups, including when DPR discusses bills of concern to Muslims (interview with 
Hidayat Nurwahid, 2/12/203).   
 
Conversely, the opposition of Muslim groups to policies or proposed bills typically has a 
large influence on the process of government decision-making or on the process of 
legislation in DPR. NU, for example, has opposed the passage of a bill on tobacco, and its 
opposition has caused the delay of the bill’s adoption. This is because—according to 
NU—the bill proposed by the government will badly affect the lives of tobacco farmers in 
the country. NU argues that the limitation of tobacco products as enshrined in the bill 
should be based on the public interest and not the interests of certain groups. The 
ratification on the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) has allegedly 
driven the government to propose such a bill limiting tobacco products (Zubaidah, 2014).  
In the case of Muhammadiyah, from the end of 2012 to early 2015, this organisation 
proposed judicial reviews four times on laws that it considers have caused adversity to 
society. It lodged four laws to be judicially reviewed by the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court, namely Law No. 22 of 2001 on Oil and Gas, Law No. 44 of 2009 on Hospitals, Law 
No. 17 of 2013 on Mass Organisation and Law No. 7 of 2004 on Mineral Resources. All of 
Muhammadiyah’s lawsuits were accepted by the Constitutional Court although not all 
articles proposed by the organisation were agreed upon. Its success in previous judicial 
reviews made this organisation more confident and it has prepared judicial reviews on 
other laws it sees as non people-oriented. For example, at present, it is preparing to 
propose judicial review on Law No. 25 of 2007 on Foreign Investment (Biyanto, 2015).  
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8. Conclusion 
Islam was a source of resistance and nationalism in Indonesia’s colonial period. The 
modern Indonesian movement was also pioneered by an Islamic organisation. As such, 
Islam was regarded by the Dutch authorities as a threat that needed to be marginalised 
politically.   
 
The battle between Muslims and nationalist groups began in the formative years of the 
Indonesian state. Their political compromise was the acceptance of Pancasila as the state’s 
foundation, defining Indonesia as neither religious nor secular. Islamic parties still 
struggled to realise what they perceive as an ideal form of state in the Sukarno era. They 
demanded the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the country’s constitution but their 
demand was not accommodated. The Charter, requiring the upholding of Islamic shariah 
for its adherents, united the fragmented Islamic political parties. Their lack of success did 
not eliminate Islam as an important factor in Indonesian politics. Islamic political parties 
enjoyed a role in the liberal democratic era from the early 1950s to the late 1950s.  
 
The role of Islam in Indonesian politics had declined significantly by the early 1970s when 
Suharto’s de-politicisation strategy was enforced. Islam was politically marginalised. 
Suharto’s policy seemed to adopt Hurgronje’s Dutch approach. He barred Islam from 
politics and at the same time encouraged its religious rituals. This pushed Islamic leaders 
to find a strategy that did not contradict the government policy but still benefitted 
Muslims. Spearheaded by Muslim intellectuals such as Nurcholis Madjid and 
Abdurrahman Wahid, along with the efforts of Muhammadiyah and NU, Cultural Islam 
was promoted as the way Islam could struggle on under the authoritarian regime. Cultural 
Islam encouraged Islamic symbols and was not confined to rituals and worship, but it 
thrived beyond that, reaching all aspects of life. However Cultural Islam was transformed 
into a cultural movement. Jilbab, for example, did not merely reflect ‘the assumed’ 
obligation for a women to wear it and use it when attending religious gatherings, but was 
also transformed into a fashion. The Cultural Islam movement proved effective in easing 
the tensions between Islam and the state, leading to Suharto’s accommodative policy 
toward Islam in the 1990s.  
 
This movement has had a great influence on Muslim perceptions of the relationship 
between Islam and the state. Except for radical new groups, Indonesian Muslims do not 
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deem it necessary to establish an Islamic state. Likewise, they do not believe that it is only 
Islamic parties which can accommodate their aspirations. Consequently, together with 
Suharto’s de-politicisation, this movement contributed to the change of Muslim political 
behaviour including their electoral behaviour and the diminishing factor of aliran politics 
(the political stream) which was prevalent in 1950s.   
 
Therefore, the electoral defeat of Islamic political parties does not necessarily suggest the 
decline of Islam in Indonesian politics. Rather, Islam has expanded its political influence 
over nationalist parties with regard to the way in which they adopt Muslims’ aspirations. 
The ruling party of PD and its coalition have applied an accommodative approach towards 
Muslim aspirations. With the diminishing political stream, there have not been significant 
differences between parties’ ideologies and platforms. Political coalitions are formed based 
on political pragmatic interests. In this context, all Islamic political parties were parts of 
Yudhoyono administration’s coalition after 2004. Perhaps this phenomenon has been best 
described by Nasr (2005), who writes that “regular competitive elections have both pushed 
religious parties toward pragmatism and pulled other parties into more diligent efforts to 
represent Muslim values” (p. 19).   
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN INDONESIA’S POST-SUHARTO FOREIGN POLICY 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter showed that the emergence of Islamic political parties, the 
proliferation of Muslim organisations and the increasing presence of Islam in Indonesia’s 
public sphere can be regarded as manifestations of the increased role of Islam in 
Indonesia’s domestic politics. Has Islam’s increasing role in domestic politics brought 
about the same trend in foreign policy? To answer this question we first need to discuss the 
extent to which Islam as a political and moral force influences Indonesian foreign policy. 
This chapter starts with the argument that Muslim groups have had more influence on 
Indonesian foreign policy after the shift from Suharto’s authoritarian era to a more 
democratic regime.  
 
Many previous studies on Islam and Indonesia’s foreign policy usually conclude that Islam 
has a marginal role to play in external affairs. Islam in this regard has been portrayed as a 
political ideology driving foreign policy. Ideologically, Islam and other religions have 
never been formally admitted as driving factors in any of Indonesia’s policies. However 
this study, which stresses the ‛moral and political’ influence of Muslim interest groups, 
will provide a different nuance regarding Islam and foreign policy in the context of a 
democratic Indonesia.  
 
Despite being home to the largest Muslim population in the world, for decades Islam never 
had a salient position in either the domestic politics or the foreign policy of Indonesia. It is 
only since the arrival of the democratic era in the late 1990s that Islam has grown salient, 
including in domestic politics. This phenomenon has been marked and driven by the rise of 
Islamic political parties and the growing role of Muslim groups and organisations. Indeed, 
Indonesia had in fact disengaged from the world’s Islamic affairs, particularly during the 
pre-democratic era. The country seemed to be holding itself back from playing a 
prominent role. Many observers have referred to this as Indonesia ‘punching below its 
weight’ in the Muslim world (Pitsuwan, 2012).   
 
This chapter will outline the basic tenets of Indonesia’s foreign policy and its interpretation 
with regard to issues that have concerned Muslims. The subsequent discussion will touch 
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on the influence of democratisation and the role of Islam in foreign policy, including the 
government’s response to Muslims’ aspirations, particularly in relation to international 
events. This chapter then explores the projection of Indonesia’s international identity as the 
largest democratic Muslim country in the world, and the country’s new international 
activism in becoming a role model for other Muslim countries with regard to Islam, 
democracy and modernity. In this chapter, Putnam’s approach is used to analyse the 
Indonesian government’s policies as a result of the pressures from both the US and 
Muslim groups with regard to the 9/11 incident, the Bali bombings, and the Iraqi and 
Afghan wars. At the same time Skidmore and Hudson’s statist-pluralist approach will be 
used to investigate the emergence of foreign policy actors other than the government of 
Indonesia in the post-Suharto era and how they interacted with the government as well as 
the inclusion of Islamic elements in Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
2.      Basic tenets of Indonesia’s foreign policy 
Change and continuity has been a feature of Indonesia’s foreign policy from the Sukarno 
era until the present day. As well as abiding by Pancasila and the 1945 constitution as its 
principled foundations, Indonesia has always advocated an ‘independent and active’ 
principle as a guide for its foreign policy. This was first put forward by Hatta in September 
1948, against the backdrop of Cold War rivalries.  
 
‘Independent’ in this context means, “Indonesia plays no favourite between the two 
opposed blocs, and walks its own path through various international problems” (Hatta, 
1953, p. 444). This independent stance was expected to enable the country to determine its 
policies according to its national interests, “neither submitting to the pressures of other 
countries nor aligning itself with any power bloc” (Hatta, 1973, p. 11). Hatta disagreed that 
this implied neutrality in Indonesia’s foreign policy. In the context of international 
solidarity, neutrality was interpreted as “an anti-social status” that cannot be adopted by 
Indonesia (Hatta, 1953, p. 443). An independent policy does not mean standing alone. 
‘Active’ in this context means “the effort to work energetically for the preservation of 
peace and the relaxation of tension generated by the two blocs, through endeavours 
supported if possible by the majority of the members of the United Nations” (Hatta, 1953, 
p. 444).  The background of the Cold War was still very much present at the establishment 
of this foreign policy principle. Nonetheless, the principle endures and has become a 
constant feature of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era (Sukma, 1997). 
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Along with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, the bebas-aktif (Independent-active 
principle) has ensured continuity in Indonesia’s foreign policy aims since the early era of 
Indonesia’s independence.  
 
Islam has been embraced by the majority of the population, but it is given the same status 
as the other five formally recognised religions. Islam has never been the philosophical 
basis of the state nor an official state religion. Like other states with a Muslim majority, 
Indonesia faces the issue of how to accommodate Muslim aspirations in political life and 
how to carry out foreign policy in an appropriate manner. Muslim political aspirations 
cannot be disregarded, particularly in the democratic era. However, satisfying Muslim 
concerns toward international Muslim causes is not always easy.  
 
Leifer (1983a) and Sukma (2003) argue that problems involving Muslim causes and the 
state’s formal identity have not been totally resolved. This is a persistent challenge that 
requires the state to tread carefully. Such situations place Islam in a peripheral and 
secondary position, leading to its relative absence in Indonesia’s foreign policy. The 
unresolved relationship between Islam and the state’s identity has brought about a 
symbolic or rhetorical accommodation of Islam in foreign policy. Thus, this is an 
‘accommodation’ not in ‘substance’ but rather in ‘form’. Political pragmatism has led to a 
‘symbolic accommodation toward Islam’ (Leifer, 1983b; Sukma, 2003). Indonesia’s 
relations with Middle Eastern countries, for example, have not been based on co-religionist 
or Islamic considerations, but pragmatic motives. Moreover, in the Suharto regime “the 
government took great care not to allow foreign policy to be dictated by Islamic 
considerations” (Sukma, 2003, p. 62).   
 
This conclusion may be applicable if ‘state identity’ is the main reference point. However, 
this position falls short when examining political realities. For example, former Foreign 
Minister Hassan Wirajuda acknowledges that issues where Muslims are concerned have 
not been freely articulated, emphasising that these are more form rather than substance 
(interview with Hassan Wirajuda, 17/12/2013). Interviews suggested that the government 
has substantially accommodated Muslims’ concerns as long as they do not challenge 
Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the independent and active principle of foreign 
policy.  
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In this author’s view, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution do not directly stipulate how 
foreign policy should be conducted, however, they do provide a guide. The principle of 
humanitarianism is commonly cited as an ideological rationale for foreign policy action, 
including issues pertaining to Muslim Rohingya, Muslim Bosnia, Muslim Kosovo and 
Palestine. As well as this humanitarianism base, Indonesia’s active foreign policy in 
relation to Palestine is also based on aspects of anti-colonialism. Colonialism goes against 
the values enshrined in Pancasila, namely humanitarianism and social justice. This anti-
colonial stance also derives from the 1945 Constitution that requires the country to strive 
for the elimination of colonialism and for the promotion of a new world order based on 
independence, perpetual peace and social justice. 
 
There has been a gradual shift in the way Muslim aspirations are expressed with regard to 
foreign policy. Initially reluctant to formally join the OIC, Indonesia is growing more 
assertive within this Islamic multilateral organisation. Established at Rabat in 1969 as a 
response to the burning of Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, the OIC set up its permanent 
secretariat in Jeddah in 1970. Indonesia sent its first delegation to the OIC meeting of 
March 1972. The purpose of the meeting was to form a charter with the main objective, 
among others, to ‘promote Islamic solidarity among member states’. The charter’s articles 
state that “every Muslim state is eligible to join the Islamic Conference on submitting an 
application expressing its desire and preparedness to adopt this charter” (OIC, 1972, p. 
115). This could be interpreted as OIC membership reflecting affirmed state identity. 
Facing the dilemmas caused by dynamic domestic politics, the government of Indonesia 
did not sign the charter and declined formal membership in 1972 (Leifer, 1983b). At that 
time, it was thought that becoming a signatory party would automatically cause Indonesia 
to be regarded as an Islamic state, a move that was treated with caution. Despite not being 
a full member of the OIC, Indonesia continued to participate in the organisation’s 
programs and activities. However, as Perwita (2007) argues, this participation was more to 
implement an independent and active policy rather than to express any Islamic sentiments.  
 
By the 1990s, Suharto’s policy towards the OIC had changed. Criteria for membership had 
changed from being a “Muslim state” to having a ‘Muslim majority’ (Perwita, 2007, p. 
47). Suharto’s political rapprochement with Muslim groups contributed to the shift of the 
country’s standing in the Muslim world, especially within the OIC. Its full membership in 
1990 and Suharto’s attendance for the first time at the OIC summit in Dakar, Senegal in 
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1991 was clear evidence of this shift. Currently, Indonesia’s image as a ‘Muslim country’ 
is hardly controversial. Indeed, Indonesia openly claims to be the largest Muslim country 
in the world with a democratic political system. 
 
Although there had been efforts to play a more active role in the OIC and throughout the 
Muslim world by the end of the Suharto era, Muslim aspirations still could not be freely 
expressed using formal symbols. The government continued to play down the Islamic 
factor as it was feared that any recognition would provide a political platform for domestic 
political actors, especially Muslim groups, to dictate foreign policy. For instance, the 
government frequently worked to avoid condemning the United States and its allies despite 
pressures from Muslim groups (Azra, 2006).  When the Iraq War broke out in 1991, the 
government put religious issues aside in responding to the war, which had sparked great 
protest among Indonesian Muslims against the United States and its allies. Instead, the 
government emphasised the need to assist the Iraqi people in the fields of humanitarianism 
and the economy (Azra, 2006, p. 101).  
 
The author argues that this accommodating policy toward Muslim groups regarding 
Islamic causes was frequently wrapped and packaged in the framework of implementing 
Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, as well as Indonesia’s ‘independent and active’ foreign 
policy principle. The government seemed to substantially adopt Muslim aspirations at the 
same time it disregarded Islamic factors in its official forms or symbols. 
 
The independent and active principle has become a constant feature of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy. It is truly a unique concept to Indonesia, and has remained unchallenged until now. 
According to Weinstein (1976) and Sukma (1997), the concept has survived due to a 
number of flexible interpretations. Each regime has had no choice but to enunciate an 
independent and active policy. All regimes from Sukarno until Yudhoyono have claimed 
that they conducted their foreign policy in accordance with this principle. However, the 
interpretation and implementation of this principle within Indonesia’s actual foreign policy 
has been varied and subject to the flexible interpretations of each regime. Yet this variation 
does not mean that the independent and active principle is meaningless as a guide to 
Indonesia’s foreign policy.  
 
This principle in Indonesia’s foreign policy has been wide-ranging since the mid-1950s, 
covering a no-pact and non-alliance policy, as well as the need to establish balanced 
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relations with two rival blocs (Pitsuwan, 2014). Subsequently, Sukarno radicalised foreign 
policy in the Guided Democracy period. Bebas-aktif was defined as a core plank of 
Indonesia’s international leadership among developing world movements which 
confronted neo-imperialism (Sukma, 1997). This radicalisation of foreign policy was 
aimed at liberating West Papua from the Dutch. This liberation was an essential symbol of 
national unity but it also demonstrated Sukarno’s political clout (Leifer, 1983a). 
 
Sukarno initiated a series of anti-colonial efforts including the establishment of the New 
Emerging Forces (NEFOS) to replace the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS), as well as 
the Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Beijing-Pyongyang Axis. This nexus was intended to eliminate 
colonialism and neo-colonialism by the US and its Western allies.  
 
However, whether Sukarno’s foreign policy abided by the independent and active policy as 
defined by Hatta is subject to debate. Agung (1973) believed that Sukarno deviated 
substantially from the doctrine of  independent and active policy, while Weinstein (1976) 
argued that Sukarno seemed to ignore the independent aspect and focused more on the 
active side. 
 
Suharto’s rise to power saw substantial changes to Indonesia’s foreign policy, which 
became oriented more toward supporting economic development. Suharto took a more 
pragmatic approach to foreign policy than his predecessor. His policy was marked by 
closer relations with the Western countries from whom he had received aid (Sukma, 1997). 
At the same time, Indonesia’s relationships with a number of communist countries 
deteriorated. However, during an interview with Keizai Shimbun in January 1998, Suharto 
reaffirmed his commitment to an independent and active foreign policy, and rejected the 
claim that he focused too heavily on the relationship with the West (Drajat, 2001).  
 
To address its economic priorities, Indonesia returned to become a member of the UN, 
normalised relations with Malaysia, and sponsored the establishment of ASEAN. In 
Suharto’s view, domestic and regional security and political stability were critical to the 
promotion of national economic development. In the first 20 years of his rule, Suharto’s 
foreign policy was inward-looking and rather low profile. His foreign policy assertiveness 
only began in the 1990s. Many observers such as Anwar (1994) state that the international 
assertiveness of the last decade of Suharto’s foreign policy is linked with an allegiance to 
the independent-active doctrine. Besides becoming a full member of the OIC, Indonesia 
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chaired the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1992-1995, the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) group in 1994, and became a peace broker in Cambodia in 1992 and 
in the Philippines in 1993-1996 under the aegis of the OIC (Anwar, 1994). Indonesia’s 
foreign policy took on a higher international profile after Suharto became confident the 
country had made significant steps toward successful development, perhaps with the 
intention to parade this success to the world and to take on an international leadership role. 
Despite this international leadership ambition, however, Indonesia had never aspired to 
become a leader within the Islamic world (Suryadinata, 1995). 
 
3. Indonesia’s democratised foreign policy 
 
After Suharto, the instrumental role of Islam seemed apparent during the Habibie and 
Abdurrahman Wahid administrations, when Islam was used in both political language and 
symbols (interview with Azyumardi Azra, 25/20/2013). However, according to Sukma 
(2003), the growing imperative of Islam in domestic politics was not automatically 
reflected in the country’s foreign policy. As a transitional president, Habibie faced severe 
challenges to his political legitimacy, as he was regarded as the continuation of his 
predecessor. Thus, it was not expected that he would promote the aspirations of his people 
(Ananta, Arifin, & Suyadinata, 2005; He, 2008).  
 
Concerned with issues of legitimacy, Habibie distanced himself from Suharto by initiating 
press freedoms, releasing political detainees and liberalising political laws and laws related 
to political parties. During the Habibie administration, human rights laws were introduced 
and decentralisation of authority to the regions began. All efforts were expended in laying 
down the foundations of the country’s democratisation. His administration also dealt with 
challenges related to economic recovery and public security. Overall, domestic concerns 
appeared to come to the fore during this era. 
 
Habibie leveraged foreign policy to gain international support to overcome his lack of 
political legitimacy (He, 2008). He garnered a positive international response following his 
democratisation program, the 1999 general election, and the preparation of the East Timor 
referendum. His economic recovery efforts were also largely successful. The IMF and the 
World Bank lent its assistance and policy advice, which in turn improved the economy and 
stabilised the country’s currency. The IMF and the World Bank expressed their trust in his 
administration, disbursing US$43 billion and offering another US$14 billion to aid an 
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economic recovery (Schwarz, 2012, p. 373; Vermonte, 2005). However, this relatively 
successful record was ‘rendered void overnight’ by the riots sparked by the East Timor 
referendum. The riots were perpetrated by pro-integration militias backed by the military, 
damaging Habibie’s international position (Anwar, 2005). Habibie was considered to have 
failed in resolving the complex political crisis in Indonesia (He, 2008), and lost the 
opportunity for another presidential term.  
 
In contrast with Habibie, Wahid commenced his tenure with strong legitimacy and popular 
support. He was the first Indonesian president elected via a transparent and democratic 
process. Early political support for Wahid came from Poros Tengah (Central Axis), a 
coalition of mostly Islamic parties. The challenges he faced included a potential break-up 
of the country’s territory, promoting good governance, the economic recovery process, and 
a lack of capacity to consolidate democracy. As a result, Abdurrahman Wahid’s foreign 
policy sought international support for national territorial integrity, economic recovery, 
democratic consolidation, and the restoration of its tarnished international image which 
was perceived as a stumbling block for foreign investors (Anwar, 2005).   
 
To achieve this goal, Wahid travelled overseas a great deal to secure international 
assistance, and received formal support from a variety of countries he visited. He also 
received assurances from the Muslim Group at the United Nations, a caucus of Muslim 
nations that overlaps with the OIC (A. Smith, 2000). In addition, Indonesia also secured 
agreements in relation to economic aid and trade relations. However, his long absences 
abroad resulted in a backlash at home (Anwar, 2005). Wahid visited a total of 90 countries 
within 21 months of his presidency, and his foreign policy was regarded as high profile but 
erratic. Despite maintaining a strong international vision in raising Indonesia’s profile in 
the region and beyond, domestic concerns caused him to lose sight of this vision. 
 
The continuing issues in East Timor placed Wahid under additional strain, and he felt that 
Indonesia was betrayed by the West. Australia was suspected of espionage even before 
the East Timor referendum, and the suspension of US military assistance strengthened 
that sentiment (A. Smith, 2000). Against this backdrop, Wahid proposed the 
establishment of a coalition of major Asian countries, widely known as ‘Asia’s Central 
Axis’. This coalition was expected to include Indonesia, India, China, Japan and 
Singapore, with the purpose of maintaining peace and stability in the region and building 
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a just international political order (A. Smith, 2000). However, there was no clear 
modality or method to support his proposal to establish ‘Asia’s Central Axis’, and the 
proposal failed to materialise.   
 
Both Habibie and Wahid had strong Islamic credentials, considering their political 
supporters. Habibie was the chairman of ICMI, while Wahid was the Chairman of NU. 
Wahid was also well-known as a moderate Islamic champion, and an advocate for 
democracy and pluralism. When efforts were made for Habibie to step down from his 
presidential seat, Muslim groups from modernist-oriented organisations in particular 
stepped up to defend him.  
 
One of Habibie’s strongest supporters among Muslim groups was Komite Indonesia untuk 
Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for Muslim World Solidarity), or KISDI. 
This group had supported Habibie’s candidacy in becoming Suharto’s vice president. It 
accused other groups that opposed Habibie of being ‘enemies of Islam’. The KISDI also 
staged a rally in front of the People’s Consultative Assembly on 22 May, 1998, under a 
banner that read: “Those who Oppose Habibie are Enemies of Islam” (Sukma, 2003, p. 
84). Formal support for Habibie was provided by the Golkar Party as his main political 
backbone. Many in this party were affiliated with the ICMI, and became more involved 
with Golkar during Habibie’s presidency. Prominent ICMI figures included Adi Sasono 
and Marwah Daud, who both maintained important positions in the party. The Chairman of 
the Golkar party, Akbar Tanjung, was the former chairman of the Muslim Student 
Association and a known Habibie loyalist. Although the nationalist-oriented group was 
still strong within the Golkar, the party became more ‘Islamized’ when pro-Muslim party 
cadres came to play a more pivotal role (Sukma, 2003). 
 
While both Habibie and Wahid’s foreign policies might not reflect a strong Islamic 
orientation, their legacy in establishing democracy has impacted the foreign policy of 
subsequent administrations. Democratisation and other dynamic changes in the domestic 
political environment have swept through all aspects of Indonesian social and political life, 
including foreign policy and diplomacy. Previously, foreign policy and diplomacy had 
been regarded purely as the domain of the executive branch. Consultations between the 
government, parliament and other foreign policy stakeholders took place only minimally, 
or never even took place at all. Democratisation allowed for the involvement of more 
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stakeholders in foreign policy decision-making and implementation. The involvement of a 
great number of non-governmental actors allowed for the reflection of more 
comprehensive notions of Indonesia’s national interests (Alami, 2011).  
 
Habibie laid the foundations for this democratized foreign policy with the issuance of Law 
No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations. This law defines foreign relations as “every activity 
related to regional and international aspects which is conducted by central and regional 
government or its institutions, state institutions, state-owned companies, political parties, 
societal organisations, non-government organisations or Indonesian citizens”. This 
definition covers a broad spectrum of actors within foreign relations, including both state 
and non-state actors (Alami, 2011). Meanwhile, Wahid brought about a shift from military 
domination to civilian supremacy, including in the realm of foreign policy. According to 
Dosch (2006), in the Suharto era, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “would simply follow the 
unitary opinion of the President and Lemhanas (Institute for National Resilience). Now, 
the MFA has to listen to various opinions from the president, the parliament, military, and 
other stakeholders. It seems that the military’s influence has significantly shrunk in the 
general conduct of Indonesian foreign policy” (p. 54). 
 
The emergence of various actors in foreign policy and diplomacy has resulted in a more 
democratic foreign policy. However, in this context, the government through its Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs is still the central and dominant actor. Responding to international 
challenges and domestic needs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Megawati 
administration and the Yudhoyono administration carried out a restructuring program 
(Benah Diri). The program was aimed at ‘linking’ and ‘closing’ international and domestic 
factors. According to Vermonte (2005), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs realised that 
diplomacy must be understood as a way to strive for national interests as well as 
communicating international developments to a domestic audience. President Megawati’s 
Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda deemed this concept an ‘intermestic factor’. This 
concept was widely expressed during the presidencies of Megawati and Yudhoyono 
(interview with Hassan Wirajuda, 18/12/2013).   
 
As Foreign Minister, Wirajuda also popularised the concept of total diplomacy. This 
concept originated from Mohammad Hatta, the country’s founding father and the architect 
of Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy doctrine. Wirajuda frequently quoted 
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Hatta’s concept of total diplomacy. Here, total diplomacy is described using the metaphor 
of a football strategy, whereby every player has an equal opportunity to ensure the team 
wins the game (interview with Wirajuda, 18/12/2013).  
 
In total diplomacy, all segments of society are involved in foreign policy formulation and 
implementation. Such diplomacy requires synergy from all domestic stakeholders to 
formulate a comprehensive foreign policy based on this intermestic approach (Alami, 
2011). In the Indonesian context, total diplomacy has been concretely implemented 
through the ‘Foreign Policy Breakfast’ event which was firstly proposed and popularised 
by Wirajuda under Megawati’s administration. This is a regular forum held at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, where various stakeholders are invited to discuss particular issues. In 
this way, the government receives inputs at the same time as having the opportunity to 
disseminate concepts, ideas, proposals, and policies to wider society. Parliamentarians and 
Muslim groups are among these stakeholders, and their presence is felt when it comes to 
foreign policy and diplomacy.  
 
In the post-Suharto era the government could not arbitrarily behave in the same manner as 
the government did prior to May 1998. Furthermore, Indonesia’s parliament now has more 
power when it comes to foreign policy. Although two amendments of the 1945 
Constitution made in the reformasi (reform) era have not negated the central power of 
president in foreign policy, parliament now has more power compared to its rubber stamp 
function during the Suharto era. Ambassadorial appointments must pass through ‘a fit and 
proper test’ conducted by parliament, and sometimes candidates nominated by the 
government fail this test.  
 
In the early democratic era when all segments of society were revelling in the new 
democratic process, parliament tried to secure more power over the government. The 
parliament, particularly ‘Commission I’which oversees defence and foreign affairs, had for 
some time positioned itself in opposition to the government. It challenged Megawati’s 
administration, particularly with regard to East Timor and Australia.  
 
It appears that ‘opposition’ to the government did not exclusively belong to ‘Commission 
I’, but in fact went even further. In early 2002, the Commission urged Prime Minister 
Howard of Australia to postpone his visit to Jakarta, an action immediately supported by 
the Speaker of DPR, Akbar Tanjung and the Speaker of MPR, Amien Rais. Both Amien 
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and Akbar refused to meet with Howard (Dosch, 2006). This action was thought to be 
related to issues that took place in the aftermath of the East Timor referendum, the 
widespread anti-Australian sentiment concerning the Australian peacekeeping force in East 
Timor, the shared feeling that Australia betrayed Indonesia in relation to East Timor, and 
the accusation that Australia supported West Papua’s independence.  
 
Although a pluralistic system of foreign policy decision making has been increasingly 
promoted, the government has sometimes ignored stakeholders’ views on certain issues, 
resulting in hostility toward the government. These issues include the Defence 
Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Singapore in 2007, and the Iranian Nuclear issue in 
2007.   
 
In the case of the DCA, a majority of the members of parliament refused to ratify the 
agreement signed in Bali on 27 April 2007 by the governments of Indonesia and 
Singapore. This agreement was signed together with an agreement on extradition as a 
single package. DPR argued that the government had violated Article 11 of the 1945 
Constitution on the authority of the parliament to approve or reject international 
agreements based on the national interest. Moreover, the government did not involve the 
parliament during the negotiation process, drawing accusations that it had not 
communicated in a transparent way with the parliament (Alami, 2011) 
 
The parliament also objected to the content of the agreement, arguing that certain articles 
were more beneficial to Singapore than Indonesia. The agreement allowed Singapore to 
conduct its military exercises and to involve other parties when carrying out any military 
exercise with Indonesia. Their most significant point of contention was that the agreement 
could potentially threaten Indonesia’s sovereignty. The parliament was clear in that it 
wanted the agreement to be separated from the agreement on extradition. Meanwhile, 
Singapore maintained that the extradition agreement would not be ratified if it was not 
bundled together with the DCA. Currently, both agreements are on hold. Many argue that 
Indonesia is in great need of the extradition agreement, as a way of retrieving illegal funds 
earned via corruption which are now sitting in Singaporean banks (Alami, 2011) 
 
The interests of the parliament have often converged with other stakeholders, including 
Muslim organisations, when it comes to foreign policy formulation. The parliament 
frequently “jumped on the bandwagon” of the anti-American, anti-Israel, anti-Australia, 
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and anti-Malaysian sentiment  (Dosch, 2006, p. 62). When Wahid proposed opening 
diplomatic relations with Israel, he faced severe criticism from Muslim groups, and was 
charged with being insensitive. The parliament then joined the public and voiced its strong 
objection to Wahid’s proposal. Having learned from previous experience, Wahid paid heed 
to the parliament’s suggestion and postponed his planned visit to Australia several times.  
Indonesia-Australia relations at the time were at a low point in the aftermath of the East 
Timor referendum (Mashad, 2008). In the post-Suharto era, not involving other foreign 
policy stakeholders in such matters frequently generated criticism from the public and 
parliament. The government faced further backlash when it decided to vote in favour of the 
Iranian Nuclear Program Sanctions in 2007. As a non-permanent member of the UNSC, 
Yudhoyono’s administration was accused of following the lead of the United States and 
other major powers.  This decision generated criticism from Muslim groups as well as the 
parliament. Eventually the parliament used the rights of interpellation on the government, 
causing domestic political turbulence. This case will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Four. 
4. Muslim aspirations and the government’s response 
4.1. The change in Islam’s role 
 
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the role of Islam in Indonesia’s 
foreign policy has begun to change. There are at least four reasons for this development. 
First, Islam was thrust into the world’s spotlight in a negative way and Indonesia with its 
large Muslim population had a vested interest in restoring this image. In many respects, the 
government felt a responsibility to disassociate Islam and Muslims from terrorism. The 
government also sought to project a face of ‘Indonesian Islam’ as peaceful and moderate.  
Second, the events served as an impetus for Muslim groups to become more involved in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy. Such groups utilised this momentum to consolidate their power 
and show their strength on international issues that concerned them. The reformasi 
(reform) era and the increasingly democratised political system which followed had 
provided the opportunity for many aspects of society, especially Muslim groups, to have 
their voices heard. This led Muslim groups in Indonesia to stage strong protests when the 
US connected 9/11 with Islam. 
75 
 
Third, unlike Sukarno and Suharto who both attempted to insulate domestic politics from 
international Islamic influence, the administrations of the post-Suharto era have been more 
open and relaxed in responding to such influence and the government has even seemed to 
use this factor to acquire domestic support. The government appears to have been more 
responsive and accommodative toward Muslim groups in regard to international issues that 
concern them, as long as they do not contradict sharply with the basic tenets of Indonesian 
foreign policy and/or fundamental national interests.  
Fourth, formal political Islam and the establishment of an Islamic state are deemed to be 
less of a threat. This is in contrast with Suharto who was suspicious of political Islam 
throughout much of his rule. In fact, Islam was considered the enemy, second only to 
Communism. As such, only a limited number of pious Muslims were appointed to 
strategic positions. During his tenure Suharto preferred to take advice from Christians and 
nominal Muslims like himself (Effendy, 2003). The coming of the democratic era has 
indeed turned the situation around for Muslims.  
4.2. Domestic reaction and governmental response to the 9/11 tragedy and the 
Afghanistan war 
 
The US response to the 9/11 tragedy and the way it undertook the global war on terror 
provoked harsh reactions from Muslims around the world. Not long after the events of 
9/11, the US targeted Osama bin Laden, an Arab Muslim and head of the Al-Qaeda 
terrorist group, as the main suspect behind the attacks. Using the banner of Islam, Al-
Qaeda had long advocated a terrorist campaign against the US. In the global war on terror, 
President Bush grouped countries into those who are ‘with us’, and those who are ‘against 
us’. The attack was a turning point for the global political and security environment, as 
Bush’s foreign policy placed the highest priority on fighting terrorism at the expense of 
other agendas, including the promotion of human rights and democracy. The allegation of 
Muslim involvement in the attack and the insensitivity of Bush in using the term ‘crusade’ 
and ‘Operation Infinite Justice’ (before being replaced by ‘Operation Enduring Justice’) 
incited significant resentment among Muslims. ‘Crusade’ was interpreted by Muslims as a 
reference to the war between Muslims and Christians to rule Jerusalem, and a power 
struggle between the two groups. The replacement of ‘crusade’ with the term ‘Operation 
Infinite Justice’ again bothered Muslim groups as they believe that only ‘God is infinite’ 
(Azra, 2006, p. 57). Although the term ‘crusade’ was not intended to refer the spirit of war 
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between Christians and Muslims in the Middle Ages, it was still “presented as a moral 
crusade, a fight of good against evil” (Camroux & Okfen, 2004, p. 164). Thus this choice 
of word was deeply insensitive in the eyes of Muslims. Such insensitivity only served to 
increase anti-American sentiment among Muslims around the globe. Muslims in 
Indonesia, especially militant groups, reacted harshly to the US for immediately linking 
the attack by Al Qaeda with talk of a retaliatory attack against Afghanistan after the US 
accused the Taliban of providing a safe haven for the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 
attacks.  
Although Bush denied that the United States’ war against the Taliban and Osama bin 
Laden equated to a war on Islam, hard-line Indonesian Muslim groups believed that the US 
had secret plans to destroy Islam (Azra, 2006, p. 164). They also accused Megawati of 
being too lenient toward the US. The absence of any condemnation by Indonesia toward 
the planned strike on Afghanistan was considered anti-Islam and against the wishes of 
Muslims. At the very least, hard-line Muslim groups considered Megawati’s attitude as an 
unfriendly signal to Islam. Prominent hard-line Muslim groups in Indonesia that expressed 
dissatisfaction toward Megawati and confronted US policy included FPI, Communication 
Forum of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah (FKAWJ) and its militia wing, the Jihad Militia Force 
(Laskar Jihad), and HTI. MUI, and the Unity of Action of Indonesian Muslim Student 
(KAMMI) were also critical of the government. The latter even staged mass street protests 
against the attack on Afghanistan (Azra, 2006). Likewise, the moderate Muslim groups of 
NU and Muhammadiyah were also critical of the United States’ war on terror, especially 
the planned attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq. This situation brought various Muslim groups 
into a united movement, under a singular “concern, rhetoric and action” (Hasan, 2005, p. 
304). Immediately after the 9/11 tragedy, Hamzah Haz, the vice president and the 
chairman of PPP, issued a statement criticizing the US (A. Smith, 2010). He mentioned 
that the US attempted to discredit Islam through the tragedy. He further stated that “the 
attack would hopefully cleanse America’s sin” (Sukma, 2003, p. 132).  
Against this background, Megawati paid a previously scheduled visit to Washington a 
week after the 9/11 attack. President Bush’s decision not to rescind his invitation to 
Megawati was interpreted as an attempt to show the US was not targeting Islam or 
Muslims when it launched its global war on terror (Anwar, 2005). As Megawati was 
president of the largest Muslim country in the world, it was hoped the visit would have 
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symbolic purpose. Megawati’s strong condemnation of the 9/11 attack and her willingness 
to cooperate with the international community in the fight against terrorism were 
welcomed by President Bush. In return, Bush reiterated US support for Indonesia’s 
territorial integrity (Murphy, 2010, p. 371), pledged to provide a financial aid package 
worth $567.7 million, and renewed military relations including a lifting of the embargo on 
commercial sales of non-lethal defence equipment (Malley, 2002, p. 131). Both countries 
also established a bilateral security arrangement.  
However, Megawati’s mission was not considered to be a success by many domestic 
constituents, particularly Muslim groups. From their perspective, she was bought off by 
the US to support the attack on Afghanistan (Anwar, 2005, p. 107). In this view, the 
Indonesian government had been pressured to take a cautious response. Within Indonesia’s 
domestic politics, there was a power struggle between moderate Muslim groups and less 
moderate organisations. At the same time, Muslim groups across the board also began to 
pressure the government. Militant groups utilised the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent wars 
on Afghanistan and Iraq to exert their legitimacy as defenders of Islam (Hasan, 2005) and 
to consolidate their political power. The harsh Muslim reaction might also be interpreted 
as a strong determination to participate in the formulation of foreign policy (Perwita, 
2007). The backlash and widespread street protests by Muslim groups toward the United 
States’ planned retaliatory action towards Afghanistan gave Megawati a small window of 
opportunity. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Projects (2002), the Indonesian public 
was mainly against the war in Afghanistan (A. Smith, 2003). On the other hand, the 
government itself was concerned that the United States-led global war on terror would 
create conditions favourable to the rise of radical Muslim groups.  
Therefore, Megawati found herself in a position of having to balance domestic political 
aspirations and Indonesia’s involvement in the global war on terror which Putnam (1988) 
names the ‘two level approach’. In this context, the government had to reconcile both 
domestic and international concerns. In the domestic sphere, diplomacy and foreign policy 
ought to receive approval from as many stakeholders as possible, including from Muslim 
groups. This placed Megawati in a difficult position, and she remained silent on this issue 
for quite some time. Some intellectuals, such as Azra (2006), argue this silence indicated 
her difficulty in balancing both domestic and international imperatives. The difficult 
domestic challenges she faced resulted in a slow response on Afghanistan. Three things 
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can explain this indecisiveness. First, she lacked Islamic credentials. Her party was 
regarded as the most secular or nationalist party in the country. Second, she needed the 
support of Islamic parties, as she could not maintain her power without them. Her 
ascendency to power was in fact due in large part to the Islamic parties’ coalition 
spearheaded by Amien Rais, the chairman of PAN and former chairman of 
Muhammadiyah. Moreover, although her party was the largest at the time, it held less than 
one-third of the seats in Indonesia’s parliament (Malley, 2002). Third, Megawati lacked 
leadership capacity in the fragmented political power structure of the post-Suharto era.  
 
Megawati’s delayed response and her silence on the war in Afghanistan was considered by 
less moderate Muslim groups as a soft attitude toward the US, a claim the government 
denied. Wirajuda argues that after the 9/11 tragedy occurred, the country had in fact 
maintained a clear position. He points out that Indonesia had strongly condemned the 
terrorist attacks. Second, he claimed, Islam was peaceful, tolerant, and anti-violence, 
clearly separating Islam from such acts. Third, the government maintained that terrorism 
threatened international peace and security (interview with Hassan Wirajuda, 18/12/2013). 
On this last point, Indonesia wished to emphasise that terrorism not only posed a threat to 
the US but also threatened international peace and security, including that of Indonesia.  
 
Anti-American sentiment in Indonesia reached fever pitch when the US and its allies 
launched military operations in Afghanistan in 7 October, 2001, posing a severe challenge 
to Megawati’s administration. The following day on 8 October, 2001, the government 
issued a statement outlining six key points. First, that the government was deeply 
concerned that military action took place following the 9/11 terrorist attack. Second, that 
the government noted the US government’s statement that the military operation was only 
intended for limited targets, namely terrorist training camps and military installations in 
Afghanistan. Attention was also drawn by the statement to the concern that the military 
operation should not be construed as a retaliatory act or hostility against Islam. Third, 
Indonesia urged that the military operation be strictly limited in terms of its intensity, 
targets and duration so as to minimise civilian casualties. Fourth, Indonesia called on the 
United Nations, especially the UNSC, to collectively respond to the situation. Fifth, the 
government expressed the solidarity of Indonesian society with the Afghan people, stating 
that actions should not be carried out unlawfully nor disturb public security and order. 
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Finally, the government announced it would send humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan 
and urged the participation of Indonesian society in this regard (Gatra, 2001).  
 
Although the statement was based on a deep understanding of national interest and Muslim 
aspirations, as admitted by the then Coordinating Minister for Political and Security 
Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, it was severely criticised by Muslim groups (Gatra, 
2001). Militant Muslim groups were angry as they believed the government was pro-
American and had failed to condemn the military operation in Afghanistan. Both radical 
and moderate Muslim groups denounced the attack, and anti-American sentiment grew 
strong in various cities around the country.  
However, different groups expressed their discontent in different ways. Militant groups 
demonstrated on the streets, including in front of the US Embassy in Jakarta and US 
representative offices in other regions of Indonesia. They threatened US nationals and 
foreigners and boycotted US-related products, properties, and symbols, including 
McDonald’s restaurants. They also pressured the government to sever diplomatic relations 
with the US (Anwar, 2005; Chow, 2005; Hasan, 2005). A nation-wide campaign to defend 
Afghanistan was also launched. These groups recruited, trained and later sent to 
Afghanistan a number of volunteers, of which 1800 registered for the task. These 
volunteers came from Jakarta, Central Java, and West Java. The Indonesian Muslim Youth 
Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia—GPII) organised the jihad recruitment in 
Jakarta, and recruitment took place in a number of cities across Indonesia (Azra, 2006).  
In contrast, moderate Muslim groups like NU and Muhammadiyah condemned the US 
action in Afghanistan but disagreed with radical groups on the sending of jihadis to 
Afghanistan. These moderate groups argued that jihad does not always mean ‘holy war’. 
For instance, efforts to develop Muslim ummah also can be called jihad. They denied the 
notion that the 9/11 attack was a tragedy of religion, and instead framed it as tragedy of 
humanity. They urged the Muslim world to refrain from linking terrorist attacks to a 
religious conflict. In short, the moderate groups did not follow the methods of the more 
militant groups, despite having the same goal in condemning the US attack on 
Afghanistan. Muhammadiyah and NU as well as other prominent Muslim figures with a 
moderate orientation harshly criticised MUI which seemed to agree on the idea of calling 
for jihad (Azra, 2006).  
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This pressure forced Megawati to reassess her ‘defensive’ attitude. She eventually changed 
her position and bowed to pressure. On the commemoration of the Prophet Muhammad’s 
ascension at the Istiqlal Grand Mosque on 14 October, 2001 she clearly stated that 
“whoever commits terror must be punished, but it is unacceptable that someone, a group or 
even a government—arguing that they are hunting down perpetrators of terror—attack 
people or another country for whatever reason” (Azra, 2006, pp. 64-65). She further 
stressed the importance of observing existing rules, as an action initially meant to combat 
violence might eventually create new acts of terror and hostility. Terror cannot be resolved 
through terror, she argued (Azra, 2006; Sukma, 2003). 
Despite refraining from openly criticising the United States, Megawati’s statement was 
clearly targeted. Naturally, her statements disappointed Washington (A. Smith, 2003, p. 
455) and its allies. The Australian prime minister John Howard also criticised her stance, 
claiming that her statement could bring instability to the Asia-Pacific region (Sukma, 
2003).  
However, the country continued with its critical stance toward the US and its allies. 
Indonesia stated that it remained committed to fight terrorism despite its strong 
disapproval of the use of military operations in any country (Azra, 2006) without the 
mandate of the UN. The Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, 
Yudhoyono, argued that the excessive use of military cooperation to combat terrorism 
would be counterproductive and could spark a clash of civilizations (Sukma, 2003). 
The government’s changing attitude generated a positive response from around the 
country. The chairman of Muhammadiyah, Syafii Ma’arif, for example, expressed his 
satisfaction and commended the government’s steps, urging it to follow up with 
meaningful action. Meanwhile, hardliners hoped that Indonesia’s position would be 
conveyed in an even stronger tone (Azra, 2006). Eventually, a stronger stance was 
expressed by both Foreign Minister Wirajuda in the commencement of the fasting month 
of Ramadhan in mid-November 2001, and President Megawati at the opening of the MPR 
Meeting. Megawati requested that the US halt bombing during Ramadhan and Christmas, 
expressing the necessity of a humanitarian ceasefire, and the need for a political settlement 
via diplomatic channels (Sukma, 2003).  
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Meanwhile, Wirajuda emphasised the meaningfulness of Ramadhan for Muslims and the 
likelihood of an explosive response if military operations took place over Ramadhan 
(Azra, 2006). Both Megawati and her foreign minister made all indications that a 
prolonged and excessive military operation would not only be counterproductive but could 
also undermine the global coalition on the war on terror (Azra, 2006; Sukma, 2003). 
Indonesia similarly articulated its position during international forums. In an APEC 
meeting in Shanghai, Indonesia requested that the UN take a pivotal role and initiate a 
collective response to fight global terrorism (Sukma, 2003). Indonesia also urged OIC 
member states to take similar stances to its own, namely the end of US military operations 
before the commencement of Ramadhan. Indonesia certainly appeared to take a firmer 
stance than other OIC member states, who merely expressed their concerns in relation to 
the military operation and urged the minimisation of innocent casualties (Azra, 2006).  
The government’s positive response to Muslim aspirations on this issue indicated its more 
accommodative policies when it came to Muslim issues. More accommodative foreign 
policies toward Muslim aspirations in the post Suharto era showed a shift from normally 
‘ambiguous’ policies to ‘unambiguous’ ones (interview with Azyumardi Azra, 25/10/ 
2013). Subsequently, Megawati seemed reluctant to fully participate in the global war on 
terror (A. Smith, 2010). The government did not wish to be seen as being pressured by 
Washington, as this would reflect negatively at home. Indonesia’s reluctance could also be 
construed as a lack of enthusiasm in responding to the US’s demands to freeze financial 
resources of suspected organisations that might have international terrorism connections 
(Sukma, 2003). Megawati’s reluctance in fighting global terrorism was supported by Vice 
President Hamzah Haz and other key figures in the Megawati cabinet and the Indonesian 
military, who argued that international terrorism did not exist in Indonesia (A. Smith, 
2003, p. 451). Megawati’s reluctance to enter the global fight lasted for a year after the 
9/11 attack. According to Murphy (2010), the Bali bombing was the turning point for 
Indonesia, which then brought about a firmer policy in relation to radicalism and terrorism. 
4.3. Domestic reaction to the Iraq war and the government’s response 
 
In mid-2002 as public debate in Indonesia over the US military operation in Afghanistan 
dwindled (A. Smith, 2003), the US and its allies waged a war on Iraq to topple Saddam 
Hussein’s regime. The US’s pre-emptive strike in Iraq was generally condemned by 
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Indonesians, especially Muslim groups, prompting anti-American demonstrations 
(Murphy, 2010). Two main factors that explain the strong condemnation are as follows; 
first, the unilateral acts of the US and its allies without the consent of the UN were thought 
to be arrogance on part of the US as the world’s sole superpower, breaking norms of 
sovereignty, territoriality, and non-interference. Indonesia and several other ASEAN 
countries, particularly Malaysia, believed the military operation in Iraq could not be 
justified. Second, the US attack in Iraq reinforced the impression of a campaign against 
Islam, angering Muslims both in Indonesia and around the world. Using their dominant 
power, the US and its allies had arbitrarily invaded the Muslim country of Iraq.  Like 
Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein was regarded by radical Muslim groups as a symbol of 
the fight against the dominance and arrogance of the US and other western countries.  
There was a fear from more mainstream and moderate Muslim groups of NU and 
Muhammadiyah that the war allowed more radical groups to grow both domestically and 
internationally. The Iraq War, they argued, provided a medium for radicals to seize 
domestic politics at the expense of democracy, pluralism, and tolerance (Murphy, 2010, p. 
372). In December 2002, the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, 
Yudhoyono called for a peaceful solution to the Iraq crisis, arguing that the invasion of 
Iraq would bring about severe counteractions in Indonesia and indeed the world. 
Yudhoyono stressed Indonesia’s position that the US should act in accordance with UN 
stipulations. Furthermore, it was said, unilateral action was not justified and would only 
result in harsh criticism from the government and the people of Indonesia (A. Smith, 2010, 
p. 146).  
When the military operation against Iraq was launched on 20 March, 2003, both 
Indonesia’s government and Muslim groups strongly condemned the unilateral actions of 
the US and its allies. Immediately after the war began, the Indonesian government issued a 
statement containing the following points. First there was Indonesia’s strong 
condemnation of US military aggression in Iraq. Second, US unilateral aggression military 
was seen as going against UN rules, violating the mandate of the UN (A. Smith, 2010). 
Third, that military aggression was a threat towards world peace and security. The 
Indonesian government then called on the UNSC to carry out its mandate to ease the Iraq 
crisis (interview with Wirajuda, 18/12/ 2013). This statement echoed public sentiments 
throughout the country, as many segments of society strongly deplored US military action.  
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At this stage, both the Indonesian government and Muslim groups held the same viewpoint 
in regards to the Iraq war. In line with Indonesia’s increasingly democratised foreign 
policy, the likelihood of reaching a consensus between the government and the people 
remained open. At a Foreign Policy Breakfast in the end of 2002, a regular event at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government and other foreign policy stakeholders jointly 
discussed a number of issues, including the Iraq crisis. With widespread public support, 
mainly from Muslim groups, the government was able to express its position firmly and 
confidently. When receiving a call from US Secretary of State Colin Powell seeking 
support for the military operation in Iraq, Wirajuda responded that the government had 
issued the aforesaid statement reflecting the voice and aspirations of both the government 
and Indonesian people. Colin Powell said, “I understand. Let’s as democracies agree to 
disagree” (interview with Hassan Wirajuda, 18/12/ 2013).  
It certainly appeared that the Indonesian government was well aware of the necessity of 
involving other stakeholders in foreign policy making. In the case of the Iraq War, the 
government was engaged in intense consultation with leaders of Muslim groups. This 
underlines the point made earlier, that despite its central role, the government is not the 
only actor in foreign policy decision-making in the post-Suharto era. In fact, involving 
other stakeholders has helped create a more solid and comprehensive foreign policy, and 
has given the government more confidence when dealing with countries like the United 
States.  
4.4. Reaction of Indonesian Muslims to the Danish caricatures 
 
Another issue that attracted the concern of Muslims in Indonesia, and indeed throughout 
the world, was the publication of caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad in the Danish 
Jylland Posten newspaper in September, 2005. Wider controversies followed in early 2006 
when other Danish media published similar caricatures. Muslims denounced the physical 
illustration of Prophet Muhammad and the insulting nature of the drawings, (Daniels, 
2007, p. 232) and called for a ban of such caricatures. The inability of the Danish 
government to properly respond to the issue exacerbated the controversy (Lindholm & 
Olsson, 2011). What had initially been a domestic issue causing a relatively low level of 
debate, soon grew to global proportions, where it reached fever pitch (Lindekilde, 2009). 
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The debate initially focused on the clash of free speech and religious sensitivity. On 25 
October 2005, when 11 ambassadors from Muslim majority countries asked for a meeting 
with the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, he declined, as he considered the 
request a form of foreign pressure. His rejection of dialogue with Muslim countries and the 
Community of Islamic Faith in Denmark indicated a government failing to read the sheer 
magnitude  of the crisis (Lindholm & Olsson, 2011, p. 260). The Danish government 
framed the situation as a matter of free speech, stating that any intervention was 
impossible. The government seemed to share the opinion of Jyllands-Posten’s editor, 
Fleming Rose, and the Danish population, that Danish Muslims should integrate into 
Denmark’s secular community, a community that respects freedom of speech. 
Furthermore, they argued, Muslims should not ask for special consideration in regard to 
“their religious feelings” (Powers, 2008, p. 343). However, for Danish Muslims the 
caricatures felt like discrimination (Lindholm & Olsson, 2011). According to Hussain 
(2007) the controversy was the manifestation of “a century-long clash of misconception” 
(p. 113). This clash has consisted of (a) Muslim perceptions that Westerners have a 
different concept of ‘profanity’; and (b) the perception that the West was engaging in a 
new Crusade against Islam. This was the result of the political situation in relation to the 
Israel-Palestine conflict, the Gulf War (1991), the Afghanistan War (2001) and the Iraq 
War (2003). It certainly appeared that both freedom of speech and religious sensitivities, as 
well the idea that the physical portrayal of the Prophet Muhmmad is not allowed in Islam, 
took second place in this controversy. In fact, the outrage among Muslims was more a 
reaction of “the discriminatory nature of the depiction” (Hussain, 2007, p. 115). Thus, the 
feeling of unequal treatment of Muslims was the primary factor that triggered protests 
across the globe.  
As publications of the caricatures grew and anger rose toward the Danish government and 
their handling of the issue, OIC leaders met in Mecca, Saudi Arabia to address the issue 
(Powers, 2008, p. 344). Diplomatic relations between Denmark and Muslim countries, 
especially Egypt and other Middle Eastern states, grew strained. Even more insulting 
caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad were published, including one depicting 
Muhammad wearing a turban shaped as a bomb with a burning fuse. Many Muslims 
believed such images equated Islam, and its prophet, with terrorism. Subsequent 
condemnation and protests came from Muslims around the world, including Indonesia. 
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This controversy thrust Denmark into a diplomatic crisis, described as the most severe for 
the country since World War II (Lindholm & Olsson, 2011, p. 255).  
In Indonesia there were both peaceful street demonstrations and violent demonstrations, 
and calls to cut diplomatic relations with Denmark. Militant groups including FPI, HTI, 
and Anti America and Israel Islamic Community (KUMAIL) protested for several weeks 
in the front of the Danish and US embassies and consulates, and staged both violent and 
peaceful actions. These groups mobilised thousands of demonstrators, and rejected the 
rather reluctant regret of Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Both the Danish 
embassy and consulate were closed for a month in February 2006, over ongoing security 
concerns (Lie, 2008).  
Meanwhile, moderate Muslims, NU and Muhammadiyah also denounced the Danish 
caricatures in public statements. Moderate Muslims generally did not partake in street 
demonstrations, and cautioned against overreaction. Instead, these organisations pushed 
the government to strongly criticise the publication of the caricatures. However, 
Muhammadiyah made the unusual move of suggesting that moderate Muslims boycott 
Danish products, a tactic that other Muslim countries had adopted. Typically, local and 
international media tended to broadcast the protests of militant groups, but ignored the 
voice of moderate Muslims in favour of “sensational images of violent extremists” 
(Daniels, 2007, p. 238).  
The Liberal Islamic Network (JIL), a small group of Indonesian Islamic liberals, also 
responded to the issue. This group criticised the response of fellow Muslims, believing that 
their overreaction might provide a motive for racist, extreme right-wing groups in Europe 
to carry out unlawful acts toward European Muslims. This was not so much a clash of 
religious groups, but rather a clash of fundamentalist groups. JIL understood the honoured 
place of the Prophet Muhammad in Islam and of the sensitivity around insulting him. This 
group also acknowledged that the anger of Muslims was brought about by a sense of 
global injustice toward Muslims (Daniels, 2007, pp. 237-239). At the same time, PKS 
protested the caricatures in dialogues with Danish representatives, public statements, and 
peaceful street rallies. Anarchist actions were avoided, and the group sought apologies 
from both the Danish government and all European nations in which the caricatures were 
republished (Daniels, 2007).    
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In response to the issue, the Indonesian government condemned the publication of the 
caricatures and tried to address Muslim aspirations. Even President Yudhoyono made 
public statements, including an article in the International Herald Tribune on 10 February, 
2006, that denounced the publications for insulting the religious beliefs of Muslims. 
Yudhoyono stated that “reprinting the cartoons in order to make a point about free speech 
is an act of senseless brinkmanship. It is also a disservice to democracy. It sends a 
conflicting message to the Muslim community: that in a democracy, it is permissible to 
offend Islam” (Yudhoyono, 2006).  He also questioned the tolerance of insulting Islam in 
liberal democracies and pointed to the emergence of Islamophobia in the West 
(Yudhoyono, 2006). In Indonesia, religious harmony trumps the importance of free speech 
(Daniels, 2007). But despite accommodating the concerns of Muslims, the government did 
not bow to pressure from certain radical groups to severe diplomatic relations with 
Denmark. In fact, the government deemed the apology from the Danish embassy in Jakarta 
suitably proper (Perwita, 2007).  
5. Toward a new Indonesian international identity 
5.1. New international identity 
 
President Yudhoyono explicitly set out his view of Indonesia’s international identity 
during his first foreign policy speech in 2005, stating that this identity should be reflected 
in its independent and active foreign policy.  He argued that the identity “must be rooted in 
a strong sense of who we are” (Yudhoyono, 2005). Previously, Indonesia’s international 
identity was well established as a natural leader of ASEAN, ASEAN’s ‘Big Brother’, a 
Third World leader, and a NAM leader.  
Yudhoyono’s foreign policy speech illustrated the desire to transform the country’s new 
international identity in line with the domestic political changes (Anwar, 2010a) of the 
post-Suharto era. The establishment of an international identity would reflect new 
elements of these domestic changes, chiefly the democratisation process and the increasing 
role of Islam in national politics. Yudhoyono affirmed that the country’s international 
identity would reflect its position as the country with the largest Muslim population in the 
world, and as the world’s third largest democracy. Although Islam was previously 
regarded as an enemy and a liability during the Suharto era, Islam is now considered an 
asset for national diplomacy by the Indonesian government.  
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Indeed, the rise of Islamic political parties, Muslim groups and organisations, combined 
with the arrival of the democratic era allowing all segments of society to be involved in 
politics, has enabled Islam to be a core plank of national identity, placing it at the center of 
domestic politics. Consequently, this Islamic element has also shown itself in Indonesia’s 
foreign policy. Indonesian diplomacy has attempted to portray Indonesia as a moderate 
Muslim country. Its relative success in achieving a consolidated democracy has given it 
confidence to exert greater influence in the regional and global arena (Sukma, 2012, p. 78).  
5.2. A new orientation 
 
The inclusion of Islam in foreign policy was inseparable from Indonesia’s goal to restore 
the country’s image after the occurrence of terrorist acts in the country. In the aftermath of 
the Bali bombings in October 2002, US officials named Southeast Asia, mainly Indonesia, 
as “the second front in the war on terror” (Murphy, 2009, p. 74). US Deputy Defense 
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz went as far as to state that Indonesia was a breeding ground for 
terrorists. His statement was perhaps based on evidence of a terrorist training camp in 
Sulawesi; the returning jihadis from Afghanistan; the rise of Islamic radical groups like 
Laskar Jihad and others; the horizontal conflicts in Ambon and Poso in South Sulawesi 
that pitted Muslim and Christian adherents against each other, and the conflict in West 
Kalimantan involving Madura and Dayak groups, together with Bugis people. At the time, 
such horizontal conflicts were wrongly portrayed as religious conflicts (interview with 
Umar Hadi, 25/09/2013).  
The growing misperceptions between the West and Muslims were largely unavoidable in 
the aftermath of 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the terrorist bombings in 
Southeast Asia. Bush’s statement that the war on terror was not the same as a war on 
Muslims did not help matters a great deal. The Indonesian government had maintained a 
position right from the beginning that the terrorist acts had no relation with Islam. 
However, as mentioned earlier, hardline Indonesian Muslims believed that the US and its 
allies were waging war on Islam in the name of a global war on terror.  
Suspicion as to United States motives significantly eroded after the Bali bombings. Prior to 
this, warnings from the United States of the possibility of a 9/11-style terrorist attack in 
Indonesia were met with scepticism. Megawati’s vice president Hamzah Haz appeared to 
be one of these sceptics. Republika, a daily Muslim newspaper, had claimed that the US 
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was in fact spreading ‘information terror’ amid its failure to validate its claims regarding 
the existing links between Indonesian radical Muslims and Al-Qaeda (Malley, 2002). Even 
Sholahuddin Wahid, a leader of NU and brother of Abdurrahman Wahid, stated that the 
US was carrying out “propaganda tricks” (A. Smith, 2003, p. 456).  
The Bali bombings were followed by several other attacks, pushing Megawati to take 
decisive action against violent extremist groups. Moderate Muslim groups such as NU and 
Muhammadiyah supported Megawati’s efforts in the fight against terrorism and in 
attempts to de-radicalise hard-line Muslims. Mainstream Muslim groups of NU and 
Muhammadiyah released a joint statement denouncing violence in the name of religion. 
The Bali bombing was a turning point that empowered moderates, representing a triumph 
over radical groups that had dominated the public sphere in the post-Suharto era.  Though 
small in numbers, the hard-liners were vocal and garnered a great deal of media attention. 
Despite their majority status, moderates did not typically articulate their concerns in an 
emotional way, earning them the moniker of ‘silent majority’. With the rise of the use of 
social media, they have become ever more vocal and often confront hardliner groups on 
social media platforms and the internet. The government included them in Indonesia’s 
public diplomacy activities. The country also started adopting the theme of ‘empowering 
the moderates and strengthening their voice of moderation’ in its public diplomacy. 
Through the Foreign Policy Breakfast, the government frequently sought their opinion and 
absorbed their aspirations so as to be included in Indonesia’s diplomacy programmes.  
However, as radical groups often express their concerns publicly in the streets and beyond, 
they tend to dominate the media spotlight.  
In addition to this, the government affirmed its position that terrorism had no relation with 
Islam. It also attempted to combat terrorism and restore Indonesia’s negative international 
image. The country did not heed prior warnings from the US regarding potential terrorist 
attacks, and they faced the following challenges in the aftermath of the Bali bombings: 
First, there was no legal instrument that could be used to handle the problem, as the 
country had revoked its Anti-Subversive law. Hastily, the government introduced an Anti-
Terrorist decree known as Perpu No. 1/2002, enabling police to detain terrorist suspects. 
This was later replaced by Law No. 15/2003 on Combating Terrorist Acts. Foreign 
governments, particularly the US, pressured Indonesia to pass an anti-terrorist law, but 
both the government and the parliament had declined (Malley, 2002). Second, society 
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lacked trust in the police and the country’s intelligence agency. At this time, the 
Indonesian National Police had recently separated from the Indonesian National Military 
(TNI) to become an institution in its own right. Meanwhile, the National Intelligence 
Agency (BIN) was created, replacing the National Intelligence Coordinating Body (Badan 
Koordinasi Intelijen Nasional—BAKIN). BAKIN functioned differently from BIN, as it 
was merely a coordinating body overseeing various intelligence agencies within several 
institutions as well as in local governments. The government had to cope with such 
institutional challenges. Fourth, it was necessary to strike a delicate balance between a 
security approach and maintaining a newly established democracy when combating 
terrorism (interview with Umar Hadi, 25/09/2013). 
In their decision-making process, the government considered the following aspects. First, 
it was in the national interest to maintain and promote the process of democratisation. 
Indonesia had resisted foreign pressure to pass an anti-subversive law like Singapore’s 
Internal Security Act (ISA). If such a law were to be passed, it was feared it would hamper 
the democratisation process and incite a backlash from the population (interview with 
Umar Hadi, 25/09/2013). Second, taking into account the fact that Indonesia is a Muslim 
majority country, it was believed that the national interest lay in viewing terrorist threats in 
a ‘proportional manner’, whereby terrorism would be separated from Islam. The 
government worked to provide assurances that there was no relation between Islam and 
terrorist acts undertaken by extremist Muslims. The question instead was how Indonesia 
addressed the challenge of international terrorism within the democratic platform and its 
new democratic path. Third, from the outset Indonesia had stressed that the terrorist threat 
was an international security threat. As such, combating terrorism would require ‘real’ 
cooperation. Indonesia itself was a victim of terrorism as attacks on its soil were also 
carried out by Malaysians. Prior to the 9/11 attack, a Malaysian terrorist had detonated a 
bomb in Atrium, Jakarta in 2000. In sum, the ‘shift’ in Indonesia’s priorities and approach 
within its foreign policy and diplomacy could be seen in relation to Islam, the democratic 
platform and international cooperation.  
Indonesia’s diplomatic strategy set out to (a) promote international cooperation in fighting 
terrorism, particularly in building the capacity of law enforcers and (b) encourage religious 
and cultural dialogue (interview with Hassan Wirajuda, 18/12/2013). Indonesia initiated 
the Bali Regional Conference on Counter Terrorism, as also known as the Bali Process. 
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The initiative concluded with the establishment of the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement 
(JCLEC) in Semarang, Central Java in 2004. The center now functions as a training center 
for law enforcement officers from across Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, as a response to 
international terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, Indonesian diplomacy also 
promoted dialogue as a non-security approach to counter the common misperception in the 
West that Islam is associated with terrorism. Such dialogue was aimed at countering the 
so-called ‘clash of civilizations’ as depicted by Huntington (1996).  
In fact, Western misperceptions toward Islam had developed long before the 9/11 attacks. 
The terrorist attacks of September 2001 had only confirmed them, predominantly the 
widespread idea that Islam is associated with violence, intolerance, and even terrorism. 
Immediately following the blast at the Alfred P. Murral Federal Building on April 19, 
1995, most media hastily reported that the bombers were Islamist terrorists. However, the 
perpetrators were actually Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, and this terrorist attack 
was the worst to occur on US soil prior to 9/11. 
When the 9/11 tragedy occurred, Indonesian foreign policy decision makers were 
concerned about the implications for Muslim countries like Indonesia. As a majority 
Muslim country, Indonesia would unavoidably bear a share of this existing misperception 
about Islam. However, the majority of Indonesian people believe that Islam is a peaceful, 
anti-violent, and tolerant religion. As Foreign Minister Wirajuda said, Indonesia had to 
issue a firm and clear statement in response to the 9/11 tragedy (interview with Hassan 
Wirajuda, 18/12/2013).  
Faced with widespread misperception and the ‘damaged image’ of the country as a result 
of terrorist acts, the government of Indonesia hoped to promote religious and cultural 
dialogue as part of its public diplomacy. Adopting the theme of ‘empowering the 
moderates and strengthening their voice of moderation’, the country sought to portray 
moderates as the true face of Indonesian Muslims to the international community. The 
success of combating terrorism in the long term will greatly depend on the empowerment 
of these Muslim moderates.  
5.3. New activism in Indonesia’s foreign policy 
 
Religious and cultural dialogue has taken place since 2004 within the framework of 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation. Indonesia has conducted bilateral 
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interfaith and cultural dialogues with 22 countries including the US, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, the Vatican, Italy, Pakistan, Argentina and Russia. An example of such 
initiatives is the establishment of the Indonesia-UK Islamic Advisory Council whose 
mission is to promote moderate Islam in both countries (Sukma, 2008).  
 
In cooperation with Australia and Muhammadiyah, the Indonesian government initiated 
and hosted the first Asia-Pacific Interfaith Dialogue in Yogyakarta in 2004 under the 
theme ‘Dialogue on interfaith Cooperation: Community Building and Harmony’. One of 
the stipulated agreements was the establishment of an International Centre for Religious 
and Cultural Cooperation in Yogyakarta. Subsequent dialogue was held in Cebu, the 
Philippines (2006), Waitangi, New Zealand (2007), and Phnom Penh, Cambodia (2008). 
Indonesia again hosted the sixth Regional Interfaith Dialogue in Semarang in 2012, and 
the Semarang Plan of Action was established. As part of these efforts, Indonesia 
established an Art and Cultural Scholarship for Future Faith Leaders and Media and Peace 
Journalism activities (interview with an official of MFA, 18/11/2013).  
Interfaith dialogue has also been promoted through ASEM (Asia-European Meeting) and 
APEC. The first ASEM interfaith dialogue was held in Bali in 2005, under the theme of 
‘Building Interfaith Harmony within the International Community’, and was co-sponsored 
by Indonesia, the UK, and the European Union. Subsequent ASEM dialogues were held in 
Larnaca, Cyprus (2006), Nanjing, China (2007), and The Hague, Holland (2008). 
Indonesia also initiated the APEC Intercultural and Faith Symposium: Building Mutual 
Trust and Acceptance for the Stability and Prosperity of the APEC Region in Yogyakarta 
in October 2006. The results of this dialogue were conveyed to the APEC Economies 
Leaders’ Meeting (AELM) in Hanoi, Vietnam, in October 2006 (Rakhmawati, 2010). This 
has been accompanied by an interfaith and intercultural program involving youth from 
around the world, known as the Interfaith Youth Camp, first held in Surabaya in July 2008 
(Rakhmawati, 2010).   
Indonesia also actively participated in the UN Alliance of Civilizations (AOC), with the 
last meeting held in Vienna, Austria, in 2003. Indonesia hosted the UNAOC in Bali on 28-
20 2014 which was attended by 1480 participants from 98 countries and 23 international 
organisations. These organisations are members of the UNAOC’s ‘Group of Friends’. 
Indonesia views the UN AOC as a very important forum for inter-religious and cultural 
dialogue involving the government and civil society (Kemlu, 2015). According to a 
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Foreign Ministry official, this dialogue has not involved militant Muslim groups. 
However, in a Cebu Interfaith Dialogue in 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited a 
member of DPR, from the Islamist political party PKS, to attend the dialogue (interview 
with an official of MFA, 18/11/2013).  
 
In addition to government-led interfaith and cultural dialogue, there has also been also a 
series of activities led by NU and Muhammadiyah. With the support of the government, 
NU initiated and hosted an International Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS), held in 
2004, 2006, 2008, 2014 and the fifth in 2015. The ICIS is usually opened by the 
Indonesian president and attended by hundreds of people from more than 50 countries. 
Alongside Muslim clerics, Muslim scholars, Islamic studies scholars, and politicians, the 
ICIS also invited prominent world figures including the Prime Minister of Malaysia, who 
deliver keynote speeches. 
With support from the government, Muhammadiyah established a World Peace Forum 
(WPF) which met for the first time in 2008 and most recently in 2015. The forum was 
intended as a space for world advocates to express their messages of peace and to shun 
violent means of settling conflict.  
In response to the Danish caricatures and other similar incidents that emerged as a result of 
the existing misperception between the Muslim world and the West, Indonesia, in 
cooperation with Sweden, has held a series of meetings called the Global Inter-media 
Dialogue. The country has also actively taken part in similar dialogue within the Muslim 
world. For instance in 2011, Indonesia held the 2nd International Conference on Islamic 
Media in Jakarta (interview with an official of MFA, 18/11/2013).    
Both NU and Muhammadiyah have been actively involved in the peace process in 
Southeast Asia and beyond. Muhammadiyah has been involved in the Southern Philippines 
peace process between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF). Muhammadiyah has been a member of the International Contact 
Group of the GPH and the MILF peace process. On the sidelines of the WPF, 
Muhammadiyah has also held the Special MNLF-MILF Dialogue Session promoting unity 
between conflicting Muslim parties of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and 
the MILF. Muhammadiyah has also played an important role in helping efforts to settle the 
conflict in southern Thailand by focusing on a capacity-building program for the Pattani 
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people. Since 2008, around 300 Pattani students have been awarded scholarships to study 
at various universities managed by Muhammadiyah (interview with Dr Riefqi Muna, 
2/12/2013).    
 
NU has also played a role in the peace process in Afghanistan. It initiated a forum entitled 
“Role of Ulama (Muslim clerics) in Peace and Reconciliation of Afghanistan,” involving 
dialogue and workshops. It has sought to facilitate the reconciliation of ulama (Muslim 
clerics) in Afghanistan. The forum was first held in Jakarta in 2011 and attended by Dr. 
Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Chairman of High Council of Afghanistan. On his suggestion, 
the second dialogue was held in Afghanistan and was attended by ulama from 12 
provinces. NU has also granted scholarships to Afghan students to study in various 
universities that it manages (PBNU, 2013).  
 
There are many other examples of the increasing engagement of Indonesian Muslim 
organisations in international diplomacy. After the concept of total diplomacy was 
embraced by the government, especially under the presidency of Megawati and in the first 
period of Yudhoyono’s administration Indonesia encouraged some religious organisations, 
especially Muslim groups, to play a pivotal role and in many ways become the ‘backbone’ 
of the country’s public diplomacy (interview with Maskuri Abdillah, 30/09/2013). 
Activities like those undertaken by NU and Muhammadiyah may also be understood as 
efforts to empower moderates in both domestic and foreign groupings.  
 
A number of factors have seen a swell in Indonesia’s confidence and a projection of its 
new international identity as the world’s largest Muslim democratic country as well as an 
aspiration to become a “peace-maker, confidence-builder, problem-solver, bridge-builder” 
between the West and the Muslim world (Yudhoyono, 2005). These factors are as follows: 
(a) the relative success in fostering democracy in the world’s largest Muslim country and 
managing the response of Indonesian Muslims to US military operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq; (b) the ability to settle protracted secessionist conflict in Aceh and its experience 
as a peace facilitator in Cambodia and the southern Philippines (c) the appreciation of the 
West with regard to the success of the democratic process in Indonesia and its hopes that 
Indonesia could become a role model for other Muslim countries. 
 
In strengthening its image as a moderate Muslim country and bridge-builder between the 
West and the Muslim World, and in addition to initiating and promoting interfaith and 
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cultural dialogue, Indonesia has sought to play the role of peace-broker in settling conflict 
in the Muslim world. It initiated a meeting between Sunni and Shiah scholars from all over 
the world to find ways to solve sectarian conflict in Iraq. But the meeting was 
unsuccessful, largely because  leading Iraqi and Iranian Shiah clerics refused to attend in 
protest at Indonesia’s support of a resolution imposing sanctions against Iran (Murphy, 
2009). Its involvement in the Annapolis conference in 2007 and its decision to dispatch a 
large contingent of UN peacekeepers to Lebanon is further indication of its desire to play 
this role (Sukma, 2008). Indonesia has promoted democracy to other Muslim countries, 
sending the message that democracy and modernity are not only possible but also expected 
(Sukma, 2011).  
 
Indonesia has pursued its interest in including elements of democracy and human rights 
(including the rights of woman and good governance) in the new OIC charter. Indonesia 
was a strong advocate of the establishment of the OIC Independent Permanent Human 
Rights Commission (interview with Hassan Wirajuda, 18/12/2013). The commission held 
its first meeting in Jakarta in February 2012. The adoption of this new charter took place 
more than two years before the Arab Spring, and the discussion on democracy and human 
rights was quite progressive as no Arab countries had dared to promote those issues, as 
they were considered too sensitive.  
 
Indonesia had also been encouraged by the West to get more involved in the Palestinian 
conflict. As a country viewed as ‘moderate’ by the West, Indonesia “felt pressure from the 
Western world to speak out against the more conservative strand of Islam” (Pitsuwan, 
2012, pp. 348-349). Indonesian Islam is characterised by its ability to coexist with the 
values of democracy and modernity. One of the first to take note of the compatibility of 
Islam in Indonesia with democracy and modernity was Hillary Clinton, who said, “If you 
want to know if Islam, democracy, modernity and women’s rights can coexist, go to 
Indonesia” (Landler, 2009). 
 
Diplomacy programmes that emphasise Islam as an asset for soft power in diplomacy 
continued into the second term of Yudhoyono. However, there were no breakthroughs for 
the role of Indonesia in this regard. In fact, there is currently the impression that 
programmes and agendas that emphasise elements of Islam are in decline. There are 
several reasons for this. First, the idiosyncrasies of foreign policy actors, especially the 
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Foreign Minister. Hassan Wirajuda (2002-2009) appears to have been more passionate 
about promoting moderate Islam and democratic values to other Muslim countries 
compared with his successor, Marty Natalegawa (2009-2014). Second, changing regional 
and international environments forced the government to set other agendas and priorities. 
The US global agenda shift from the global war on terror to other international priorities 
also impacted Indonesia’s foreign policy interests. Indonesia has been concerned with the 
border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia and the contestation between major 
powers in the South China Sea, an issue that directly involves ASEAN countries. Great 
power rivalries have caused disunity between ASEAN members, especially when 
Cambodia assumed the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2012. Third, the public diplomacy 
objective of restoring Indonesia’s negative image following the Bali terrorist attacks and 
the projection of Indonesia as a country for other Muslim nations to emulate has more or 
less been realised. Therefore, there is now a need to emphasise other foreign policy 
agendas and priorities that more aptly respond to regional and international realities.  
 
However, with this ‘shift in emphasis’, many Indonesian Muslim figures, observers, and 
politicians have severely criticised the government for its unclear position on the issue of 
the Arab Spring. Intellectuals such as Azyumardi Azra and Rizal Sukma believe that in the 
face of changing regional and international contexts and strategies, the Indonesian 
government should continue to promote democracy and human rights (Alexandra & 
Basuki, 2014), as well as continue its efforts as a role model for other Muslim nations. 
They argue these two aims should be embedded in the country’s foreign policy, regardless 
of the domestic and international climate.  
5.4. The limits of Indonesia’s international identity projection 
 
Whether or not Indonesia has succeeded in projecting its international identity has been 
subject to debate. As argued previously, the activism of Indonesia’s foreign policy in 
relation to Islam was mainly driven by domestic politics but catalysed by international 
events. Its objective in protecting its international identity as a Muslim democratic country 
through interfaith and cultural dialogue and other initiatives was largely regarded as 
successful. What has been questioned, however, are its efforts toward the goal of 
becoming a peacemaker in the Muslim world, and a bridge-builder between the Muslim 
world and the West.   
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Indonesia has faced a variety of challenges in reaching this goal. First, active Muslim 
militant groups, especially HTI and FPI, have frequently worked to undermine democracy 
in Indonesia. Their actions have raised questions over whether Islam, democracy, and 
modernity can develop together. Here, it is claimed that Indonesia, as a country where 
democracy, modernity, and Islam converge, should “establish an effective foreign policy 
that can have influence in the current global discourse between Islam and the West and 
within the Islamic world itself” (Anwar, 2010a, p. 52). It appears that the country’s 
domestic political dynamic, which is sometimes coloured by conflict between radical 
Muslim groups and Christians (particularly in regard to the establishment of churches and 
attacks on Islamic minority sects like Ahmadiyah), does not support the image that 
Indonesia hopes to project to the outside world.   
 
Second, Indonesia has limited influence within the Muslim World. Its role in the OIC has 
been marginal—the group is dominated by 22 Arab League members. Meanwhile, the 
most prominent member of the Arab League is Saudi Arabia, the biggest financial backer 
of the OIC. To some extent, Saudi Arabia has dominated the setting of the OIC agenda. 
Hassan Wirajuda described how the Arab League members presented a draft of the OIC 
statement for approval regarding the US intervention in Iraq as a result of their meeting 
with the wider OIC (interview with Hassan Wirajuda, 18/12/2013). This move caused 
discontent among non-Arab members including Indonesia, Turkey, Malaysia and Iran. 
They then established the Developing Eight (D-8), comprising eight OIC members: 
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey (Pitsuwan, 
2012).  
 
Third, the Arab world has often considered Islam in Indonesia as far from ideal. In their 
view, Indonesian Islam is influenced by local tradition and syncretism, and Indonesian 
Muslims are seen as “second class” Muslims (Murphy, 2009, p. 77). Fourth, the absence of 
diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Israel has dented Indonesia’s willingness to get 
further involved in the Palestine-Israel conflict. Although Western countries have 
encouraged it to be more involved in Middle-Eastern conflicts, Indonesia has no 
diplomatic relations through which to engage Israel. Every effort to form relations with 
Israel, even formal trading relations, typically incites strong protest from Indonesian 
domestic constituents, similar to the events of the Abdurrahman Wahid administration. 
Finally, Indonesia has limited financial resources (Murphy, 2012) to support its policy of 
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becoming a peace-maker and bridge-builder between the Muslim world and the West, as 
well as within the Muslim world itself. 
6. Conclusion 
Indonesia’s foreign policy can be said to have a few clear characteristics in the post-
Suharto era. The impact of democratisation on the implementation of foreign policy, 
particularly in regard to decision making, has been somewhat different from previous eras. 
Foreign policy has not only been conducted in cooperation with a range of government 
actors, but also wider stakeholders including Muslim organisations. This represents a shift 
or even relaxation in the way Muslim aspirations have been treated in the post-Suharto era. 
It has become apparent that Islamic elements may be included in Indonesian foreign policy 
as long as they align with the core policy tenets of Pancasila as state identity, the 1945 
Constitution, and the principles of an independent and active foreign policy. Indonesia’s 
foreign policy is not to be based on religious principles, but rather should reflect national 
interests in general. Thus, the inclusion of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy has not led 
to any dramatic foreign policy changes. Rather, the change that has occurred is recognition 
of the new aspirations of Muslims in the post-Suharto era.  
 
It is important to differentiate between Islam as a political ideology and the political and 
social movements that influence Indonesia’s foreign policy. As a political ideology, Islam 
is not found in any form in the country’s foreign policy. Thus, we can conclude that 
Indonesia’s foreign policy is not based exclusively on Islamic considerations. The country 
has also sought to avoid the expression of its foreign policy in terms of co-religionist 
solidarity. However, Islam does play a pivotal role in the social and political realm, and 
elements of Islam are apparent and embedded in the country’s foreign policy as a result. 
 
A crucial motivation for the use of Islam in Indonesian public diplomacy was to restore the 
country’s international image in the aftermath of the Bali bombings and to rectify the 
misperception of the Muslim world in the West, particularly after the 9/11 tragedy. These 
two aims are the result of changing international politics in the aftermath of 9/11, as it is 
believed that misperceptions will result in a disadvantageous situation for Indonesia as a 
Muslim majority country. However, the recognition of Islam as an important asset in 
public diplomacy was also be indirectly encouraged by the West, especially the United 
States, which expected Indonesia to be a role model for other Muslim countries due to its 
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compatibility with democracy and modernity. With the West’s encouragement, Indonesia 
has gained confidence in projecting a new international identity that emphasises Islam in 
its foreign policy. Clearly then, rather than merely arising out of domestic factors, the 
importance of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy is driven by both domestic and 
international factors.  
 
The emphasis of moderate Islam as the true face of Indonesian Islam may be interpreted as 
the triumph of moderate Muslim groups over more radical groups. Despite their small 
number, radical groups have more expressively voiced their concerns than the moderates. 
According to Anwar (2010b), the promotion of interfaith and cultural dialogues, which 
have become main aspects of Indonesia’s recent public diplomacy, has been considered 
imperative in the efforts to overcome religious radicalism in the country.  
 
Finally, the way Muslim groups in Indonesia influence foreign policy is in the form of 
pressure to the government on international issues related to Muslim causes. These 
pressures are generally reactive, and therefore the accommodation of such pressures by the 
government will also be reactive. Such accommodation usually does not lead to state 
activism manifested in programmes and activities within Indonesian foreign policy. The 
Indonesian government’s responses to the Gulf War and US military operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq are all forms of this reactive accommodation. However, in relation to 
terrorism and the global misperception of Islam, the government’s adoption of Muslim 
aspirations has brought a sense of activism to its foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INDONESIA’S POLICY ON THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME 
(2007-2008) 
 
1. Introduction 
Indonesia was elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC for the period of 2007-
2008. At that time, among the most pressing issues to be discussed was Iran’s nuclear 
programme. The issue became the main agenda item after the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) issued a resolution in September 2005 which handed over the case to the 
UNSC (Bahgat, 2007). As a non-permanent member of the UNSC, Indonesia was involved 
in drafting resolutions, including on the Iranian nuclear issues. UNSC resolution 1747— 
which imposed sanctions on Iran—was unanimously adopted by all 15 members of the 
UNSC including Indonesia on 23 March 2006. The resolution contained several harsh 
measures, as Iran was believed not to be in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) to which the country is a party (Vermonte, 2014).  At that time, Iran was allegedly 
seeking to develop nuclear technology for military purposes.  
 
Indonesia’s decision to vote in favour of resolution 1747 provoked considerable criticism 
within the country. Sanctions were viewed by many Indonesian Muslim groups as unfair 
treatment. They believed that the US had applied double standards in reinforcing the NPT 
regime, and that Iran was unfairly targeted in this regard. It was argued that Israel, for 
example, should also be treated the same. The two countries’ different status in relation to 
the NPT (Israel was not a signatory) should not prevent fair treatment from being enforced. 
The issue became an ‘Islamic issue’ in Indonesia as it involved Iran, an Islamic state 
(Anwar, 2010b). Some Muslim groups thought that the treatment of Iran represented a war 
against the Muslim world (Anwar, 2010a). 
 
NU and Muhammadiyah strongly protested against the decision made by the government. 
The government was accused of not being sensitive to the hearts of Muslims and of 
succumbing to the US and other Western countries’ interests (Maghribi, 2007). Indonesia 
was seen as being steered by the US in the UNSC.  
 
Although the Iranian issue itself was not related to religious issues, widespread rallies in 
Indonesia were inseparable from religious sentiments. The public perception, including 
that of Muslim groups, was also shared by many members of the DPR. Representatives 
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from both Islamic political parties and nationalist parties objected to the government’s 
support of the resolution. The disapproval eventually led parliament to demand the right of 
interpellation6 to the government.  
 
After voting in favour of UNSC resolution 1747, Indonesia abstained from voting on 
resolution 1803 on the extension of sanctions against Iran. This chapter will analyse the 
political background prompting the government to change its position from supporting 
sanctions on Iran to abstaining on the subsequent resolution. I argue that although the 
foreign policy making and implementation process was largely the domain of the 
government, domestic political forces, and in particular Muslim groups backed up by 
parliament, had a substantial influence on Indonesia’s approach to the Iranian nuclear 
issue. I also argue that this substantial influence occurred as Muslim groups’ aspirations 
and interests converged with other foreign policy stakeholders, mainly parliament.  In this 
vein, Putnam’s approach provides a framework for the international and domestic linkage, 
while Skidmore and Hudson’s statist-pluralist approach highlights the need for the 
government in a democratic era to share its exclusive domain on foreign affairs with other 
stakeholders. 
2. The development of the Iranian nuclear programme 
Iran came under increasing scrutiny from the United States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
in 2001. The US named Iran as a member of the ‘Axis of Evil’ together with Iraq and 
North Korea. In this context, the Iranian nuclear issue became the subject of increased 
concern (Cordesman & Al Rodhan, 2006). It seemed that a focus on Iran was more 
attractive to the US and other Western countries than a focus on North Korea. This 
                                                             
6According to Mochtar (2014), “interpellation in a presidential system [like in Indonesia] is used to request detailed 
elucidation of a policy, and only when the questioned policy meets the clauses for the removal of the president can the 
impeachment process be initiated”. The right of interpellation can be forwarded to and executed in a plenary session if it 
is proposed at least by 13 members of DPR (interview with Abdillah Toha, 11/12/2013). The interpellation on Iran’s 
nuclear programme—according to Abdillah Toha, a main sponsor of DPR’s interpellation—aimed to rectify the 
perceived deviation/violation of the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign policy. The government’s decision regarding UNSC 
resolution 1747 had disregarded the spirit and principles of the 1945 Constitution, failed to channel the Indonesian 
people’s aspirations, damaged national interest in the long run, and eliminated the opportunity of being an independent 
force in an effort to find a peaceful solution in the world, especially in the Middle-East. Using the right of interpellation, 
DPR asked for the government’s explanations as follows. First, what was the basis of the government giving its approval 
to UNSC resolution 1747? Second, did the government’s decision on supporting sanctions again Iran not contradict the 
1945 Constitution, especially on articles relating to the rights to benefit science and technology for the people’s welfare? 
Third, did the government not consider the resolutions a discriminatory and a form of double standard if considering that 
such a resolution is never applied to Israel—although it is a non-NPT party—that clearly has developed nuclear 
weapons? (DPR, 2007). 
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emphasis on Iran became more substantial as the US linked it with Islamism and anti-
Americanism in the restive region of the Middle East (Bonab, 2009).  
 
The Iranian nuclear issue also gained attention in the mass media. CNN, for example, 
reported on Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities in Natanz in November 2002 (Bonab, 
2009). The story began when an opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of 
Iran (NCRI), revealed a clandestine Iranian nuclear programme on 14 August 2002. This 
revelation strengthened the suspicion that Iran had been illegally developing its nuclear 
technology. The country had failed to disclose its main two nuclear activities: a uranium 
enrichment programme in Natanz and heavy water production in Arak (Bahgat, 2007, p. 6; 
Barzashka & Oelrich, 2012; Schake, 2007). Iran was regarded as deceiving the IAEA for 
at least 18 years (Schake, 2007). The IAEA believed that in the period 1984-2002 Iran 
violated its obligations under the NPT Safeguard Agreements to inform the agency about 
its nuclear activities. The revelation of Iran’s connection with A.Q. Khan, a Pakistani 
nuclear weapon expert, increased the list of its undeclared nuclear activities, namely 
acquisition of P2 centrifuge designs and components from Pakistan (Schake, 2007). 
 
On 9 February 2002, President Mohammad Khatami welcomed the IAEA to inspect 
Iranian nuclear facilities, including Natanz. Three years of IAEA investigations from 2002 
to 2005 did not reveal any certain conclusions. There was no assurance that the country’s 
nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes, but nor was it clearly designed for nuclear 
weapon ambitions. The agency has not published evidence declaring nuclear material has 
been diverted for military purposes (Smith, 2011). However, there was evidence of 
uranium enrichment; the IAEA was not given all the necessary access to examine 
documents and to inspect dubious sites; and finally there was evidence of Iran’s 
connection with A.Q. Khan (Barzashka & Oelrich, 2012; Dewaele & Pullinger, 2006; 
Schake, 2007). 
 
The European Trio of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (the so-called EU3) had 
made efforts to facilitate cooperation on Iran’s nuclear issue. Their work produced the 
Tehran Declaration in October 2003. This agreement bound Iran to fully cooperate with 
the IAEA and to sign and implement the IAEA Additional Protocol (Dewaele & Pullinger, 
2006). However, Iran seemed reluctant to ratify the Additional Protocol. Tehran put 
restrictions on the IAEA’s inspection of undeclared nuclear facilities and stated that 
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inspection could be conducted only with prior agreement on limited terms (Cordesman & 
Al Rodhan, 2006). 
 
Another agreement was reached in November 2004, this time known as the Paris 
Agreement. This agreement was reached in the face of US threats to bring the case to the 
UNSC (Katzman, 2012). However, the agreement did not last long, and broke down after 
Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005. As Iran broke the IAEA’s seals and continued its 
uranium enrichment at the Isfahan reactor on 8 August 2005, the agency board announced 
that the country had failed to comply with the NPT Safeguards Agreement. This was in 
relation to “the reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use, as well as the 
declaration of facilities where such material had been processed and stored” (IAEA, 2005, 
p. 1). 
 
In 2005 the confrontation between Iran and the US and some European countries entered a 
new stage. As a sequel to the agreement’s failures, the IAEA Governor Board adopted a 
resolution bringing the case to the UNSC in February 2006 (Bahgat, 2007). However, 
some interesting events happened during the adoption of the resolution. The agency failed 
to reach a consensus, and the decision to bring the Iranian nuclear issue to the UNSC was 
made through majority voting. This showed that the response of the international 
community on Iran’s nuclear programme was split (Bahgat, 2007). 
 
In fact, Iran’s nuclear programme would not have been possible were it not for the US and 
other Western countries’ contributions (Bonab, 2009). Iran started developing its nuclear 
technology in the era of Shah with the support of the US and its allies. Beginning with the 
signing of a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States in 1957 (Bahgat, 
2007), Iran steadily built up its nuclear programme. Aside from the US, Iran was assisted 
by other Western countries such as West Germany and France (Takeyh, 2006). At that 
time, the US and European countries never questioned Iran’s status as a rich oil country 
that might not need nuclear energy. Instead, they sold the nuclear technology for the 
construction of nuclear plants which could easily be converted for military means (Takeyh, 
2006). On that basis, Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1970 (Bahgat, 2007). 
The nuclear cooperation that created mutual benefits between Iran, the US and some 
European countries ended in 1979 with the removal of Shah. The establishment of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran marked the beginning of hostilities between the US and Iran.  
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Since that time, successive US administrations have sought to prevent Iran from 
developing its nuclear technology. In the era of the Reagan administration, the US forged 
an agreement with its European allies to abandon their cooperation with Iran (Takeyh, 
2006). Consequently, Iran turned to Russia and China as its partners in pursuing its nuclear 
programme in the 1990s. China lent its support for the Isfahan nuclear site and Russia 
secured a deal to complete the Busher reactor in the early 1990s and since then has refused 
US pressures to abandon the deal (Barzashka & Oelrich, 2012). 
 
Iran has appeared determined to achieve its ambitions in nuclear technology. Many aspects 
have been analysed to determine the country’s motives on its nuclear programme. Some 
believe that Iran’s behaviour was encouraged by its ‘irrational’ Islamic ideology. But this 
has been rebutted by scholars such as Takeyh (2006), Perthes (2010) and Davis et al. 
(2011). They view that Iran’s nuclear programme was motivated by the country’s national 
interests which are pragmatic in nature. Perceived threats from Iran’s rivals in the region 
and from the US, coupled with its aspirations to become a regional power, are Iran’s 
defined national interests. It is imperative to look at its nuclear motives from this 
perspective.  
 
Historical records showed that aside from becoming a great power in the historic Persian 
Empire, Iran was invaded and supressed by foreign forces such as Arabs, the Mongols, the 
United Kingdom, and Russia. The United States also coloured the country’s political life. 
The US supported the coup in 1953 to install the Shah’s regime into power. Likewise, the 
US, most Arab states, and many other states supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war 
(Perthes, 2010). During the Iran-Iraq war from 1980-1989, when Iraq under Saddam 
Hussein used chemical and biological weapons against Iran, the international community 
was largely indifferent. This historical background contributed to the perception among 
Iranian elites that their country had been under constant threat. It also strengthened Iran’s 
conviction that its national security should not be reliant on other countries nor the 
international community.  
 
The combination of pragmatic interests (namely the need to survive in the face of external 
threats) and the feeling of national pride gives much impetus for Iran to persistently 
develop its nuclear technology (Baktiari, 2007). Despite its divided society, many Iranian 
people supported their government with regard to their country’s nuclear issues (Bahgat, 
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2007). If Iran continued to acquire nuclear weapons, these would likely be used as part of a 
deterrent strategy (Islam, 2010; Saikal, 2006; Sherrill, 2012). The state might also have 
learned from countries possessing nuclear weapons outside the P-5. North Korea, for 
example, has been able to utilise its nuclear capabilities to bargain its position vis-à-vis the 
US and its allies.  
 
Besides Israel and the US, many analysts identify Iraq and Pakistan as potential threats to 
Iran (Bahgat, 2007). Takeyh (2006), for example, states that although Iran-Pakistan 
relations have been improved in the aftermath of 9/11, Iran has been worried about the 
instability of the Pakistani leadership. The fear of Pakistani radical Sunnis gaining power 
and access to nuclear weapons is something that creates anxiety among the Iranian elites. 
This feeling was the same when Pakistan conducted a nuclear test in 1998 (Takeyh, 2006). 
Thus, according to Dorraj (2006), Iran has not been able to settle the future spectre of a 
possibly hostile nuclear Pakistan. Yet it is hard to argue that Pakistan is a factor 
encouraging Iran to develop its nuclear technology. Despite their differences, the two 
countries have cooperated on the construction of a pipeline to ship natural gas from Iran to 
Pakistan and possibly to India (Bahgat, 2007).  
 
There are different opinions as to whether Israel as a nuclear state has also pushed Iran to 
develop its nuclear weapons. Dueck and Takeyh (2007) and Takeyh (2006) argue that 
although there are hostile relations between Iran and Israel, it is difficult to conclude that 
Iran’s motive to possess nuclear weapons is because of Israeli threats. Without 
disregarding the possibility of a direct military clash with Israel as suggested by some of 
Iran’s rhetoric, both countries have carefully circumvented direct military confrontation. 
Meanwhile, other scholars such as Dorraj (2006) and Bahgat (2007) argue that Israeli 
threats backed up by the US, have been one of main elements encouraging Iran’s nuclear 
programme. Israel is seen by Iranian clerics as a surrogate of the US in the region. Both the 
US and Israel are hostile to the Islamic movement and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(Dorraj, 2006). In addition, Israel is a contender with Iran for regional power status. It is 
reasonable to consider Israel as an important element in Iran’s geostrategic policy (Bonab, 
2009, p. 168). 
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3. The Iranian nuclear issue in the UNSC 
Ahmadinejad’s rise to power in 2005 was portrayed by the world as the rise of Iran’s hard-
line assertiveness (Baktiari, 2007). It was anticipated that this would increase the difficulty 
of negotiations between Iran and the EU3. Iran violated the Paris Agreement by opening 
the IAEA’s seal at Isfahan nuclear plant on 8 August 2005 and resuming uranium 
enrichment activities (Dewaele & Pullinger, 2006). Responding to this matter, the IAEA 
issued a resolution on 24 September 2005. Due to its failure to reach a consensus, the 
decision was made through voting by 21 votes to one (Venezuela), with 12 abstentions 
including Russia and China. The resolution stating that Iran was in non-compliance with 
the NPT marked a new stage of handling the issue. It referred the case to the UNSC 
(Bahgat, 2007; Dewaele & Pullinger, 2006). 
 
The resolution did not, however, indicate a specific timeframe for the case to be brought to 
the UNSC (Bahgat, 2007). In fact, there was an opportunity for Iran to comply with the 
IAEA requirement before the agency reported it to the UNSC. After waiting for a few 
months, the IAEA concluded that Iran had not satisfied the agency. In early January 2006, 
Iran broke the IAEA seals at Natan nuclear enrichment plant, resuming its nuclear research 
programme which had been frozen for two years. Consequently, the IAEA Governing 
Board held an extraordinary meeting on February 2-4, 2006. The meeting decided to report 
Iran to the UNSC by 27 votes to three (Venezuela, Cuba, and Syria), with five abstentions 
including Indonesia (Dewaele & Pullinger, 2006). Russia and China supported the 
resolution on the condition that it did not contain any clause stipulating immediate 
sanctions (Saikal, 2006). Enforcement of the resolution was postponed until the Director 
General of the IAEA delivered a report before the IAEA meeting in March 2006 (Dewaele 
& Pullinger, 2006; Saikal, 2006). The IAEA officially reported Iran to the UNSC on 8 
March 2006. This constituted a boost for the US and the EU3 (Saikal, 2006). In response, 
Iran suspended and did not ratify the Additional Protocol (Barzashka & Oelrich, 2012) and 
declared the end of its suspension of full-scale uranium enrichment. At that time, Iran also 
threatened to withdraw from the NPT (Dewaele & Pullinger, 2006). In April 2006, 
President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had successfully enriched uranium at Natanz 
nuclear reactor to 3.5% of the fissile isotope, the low-enriched uranium appropriate for use 
in power stations (Delpech, 2007; B. Smith, 2011). 
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Reporting Iran to the UNSC was intended to send a strong signal that the IAEA was not 
satisfied with Iran’s position. This strategy was also designed to maintain pressure on the 
country (Dewaele & Pullinger, 2006). Threatening Iran by reporting the case to the UNSC 
was the trump card played by the EU3 when dealing with Iranian negotiators prior to the 
Ahmadinejad administration. The Ahmadinejad administration, however, did not 
apparently care. The EU3 miscalculated in assuming that Iran was worried about its 
nuclear case being referred to the UNSC. In Iran there was a widespread belief that the 
pressure from the EU was unfair and  that the IAEA was being bullied by the US (Ansari, 
2007). Therefore, many Iranian people regarded the IAEA process as unreliable. 
Ahmadinejad said that Iran would never bow to pressure from the US and its allies and 
that Iran had survived US sanctions for more than 25 years. While criticising the referral of 
the Iranian nuclear issue to the UNSC, he called for complete disarmament and the 
establishment of a weapons of mass production (WMD) free zone in the Middle East 
(Saikal, 2006).  
 
In March 2006 the UNSC issued a non-binding statement calling for the suspension of 
Iran’s uranium enrichment within 30 days and the resumption of the talks (Bahgat, 2007). 
To further persuade Iran, in June 2006 P-5+Germany offered a package comprising both 
penalties and economic incentives to encourage the suspension of Iran’s uranium 
enrichment. This reflected a unified position among the P-5, including Russia and China. 
More importantly, the US became involved in a direct negotiation with Iran for the first 
time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution (Bahgat, 2007; Spies, 2009). Unfortunately, the 
above strategy did not work. Neither incentives nor disciplinary approaches led to the 
intended goals.  
 
Subsequently, the UNSC adopted resolution 1696 on 31 July 2006 demanding that Iran 
suspend all uranium enrichment and related activities within 30 days and cooperate with 
the IAEA. The resolution was issued under Article 40 of the UN Charter stipulating that 
compliance was mandatory. It was not passed under Article 41 on economic sanctions nor 
was it based on Article 42 authorising military action (Katzman, 2012). The resolution did 
not impose sanctions but if Iran did not comply further appropriate measures would follow 
(Starr, 2010). The willingness of the US to delete the reference to Article 42 led to the 
consensus among the P-5 (Nicolli & Delaney, 2007). Iran responded by sending a proposal 
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of engagement with the West (Katzman, 2012), but  this proposal was regarded as vague 
and unhelpful.  
 
Israel’s attack on Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon in mid-July 2006 was expected to 
weaken the position of Iran due to the defeat of its main allies. However, the opposite 
occurred. Hezbollah emerged as a champion along with Iran as its main supporter. 
Predictably, this made Iran more confident to ignore the resolution (Nicolli & Delaney, 
2007). It allowed the deadline to pass by without any substantial action. As a result, the 
UNSC unanimously approved resolution 1737 imposing sanctions against Iran on 23 
December 2006. The resolution was issued after considering the report of the IAEA 
Director General dated 31 August 2006. The report mentioned that Iran had not addressed 
the prominent problems of verification, had been not transparent with its nuclear activities 
nor had it halted its uranium enrichment activities. Iran had broken the provisions of the 
Additional Protocol (IAEA, 2006). 
 
The resolution was adopted under Chapter 7, Article 41 of the UN Charter. It prohibited 
selling or financing technology that could contribute to Iran’s uranium enrichment or 
heavy-water processing activities. It also urged states to freeze funds and other financial 
assets and economic resources of 10 named Iranian nuclear and missile companies and 12 
persons related to the Iranian nuclear programme. However, as an interesting exception, 
the resolution was not applied to the Busher nuclear reactor (Katzman, 2012; UNSC, 
2006).  
 
Russia had objected to an earlier draft put forward by the EU3 which included a travel ban 
for those involved in the Iranian nuclear programme. Russia sought to water down the 
resolution, and instead of imposing punishment, Moscow’s position was that the resolution 
should be designed to push Iran to the negotiating table. Moscow’s overall relations with 
Iran and its strategic interests encouraged Russia to soften any attempt to impose harsh 
sanctions against Iran (Harvey & Sabatini, 2010). 
 
After Iran’s refusal to temporarily suspend its uranium enrichment, the UNSC 
unanimously adopted resolution 1747 on 24 March 2007. Besides demanding the 
suspension of Iran’s uranium activities by 24 May 2007, the resolution imposed additional 
sanctions (Katzman, 2012). This followed a report by the Director-General of the IAEA of 
22 February 2007 which was unable to conclude that Iran’s nuclear programme was for 
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peaceful purposes (Gindarsah, 2012a). The continued programme of enriching uranium 
and constructing heavy water reactors was seen as an indication of Iran’s disobedience.  
 
This resolution imposed stricter sanctions against Iran. It included an arms embargo, 
restriction on states and international institutions making new commitments concerning 
grants, aid and loans (except for humanitarian and developmental purposes), and contained 
a request for the suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment within two months. The 
resolution also urged freezing assets of an additional 28 government officials, military, and 
institutions related to the Iranian nuclear programme. There was also a stipulation 
requiring states to report to the United Nations concerning the travel of those being 
sanctioned when entering their territories (UNSC, 2007b). Despite its noncompliance with 
resolution 1747, Iran did sign an agreement with the IAEA to settle prominent questions 
relating to its past nuclear activities by the end of 2007 (Katzman, 2012). 
 
Subsequently, the UNSC issued the resolution 1803 on 3 March 2008 by 14-0 with 
Indonesia’s abstention. This expanded the list of people and institutions covered by 
previous sanctions (Harvey & Sabatini, 2010). It imposed a strict travel ban for 5 Iranians 
mentioned in Annex II and required travel reports of 13 persons named in Annex I. There 
was also an authorisation of inspections of shipments by Iran Air Cargo and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Shipping Line, if the shipments were suspected to carry banned WMD-
related materials. The resolution also expressed the wish of the P5+1 to provide additional 
incentives to settle the problem through talks beyond those incentives given to Iran in June 
2006 (Katzman, 2012; UNSC, 2008b).  
 
Another resolution concerning the Iranian nuclear programme was unanimously approved 
on 27 September 2008. Resolution 1835 was a response to the IAEA’s report of 15 
September 2008. The agency stated that Iran had not stopped its uranium enrichment 
programme. No additional sanctions were imposed, but there was simply a demand for the 
state to comply with previous resolutions (Starr, 2010; UNSC, 2008c). Indonesia voted in 
favour of the resolution as it did not impose additional sanctions; and the country’s 
proposed amendments were accommodated in a commitment to a negotiated solution as 
part of a ‘dual track approach’7 (UNSC, 2008d). Russia also opposed additional sanctions 
                                                             
7 It refers  to “the moves after June 2006 to increase pressure on Iran were coupled by attempts of the 
permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) to introduce Iran into negotiations by 
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against Iran, partly because of tensions with the US and its allies in relation to the Georgia-
Russia conflict (Katzman, 2012).  
 
China was also reluctant to impose additional sanctions. In spite of its concerns about the 
possibility of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, China had not seen Iran as a direct threat. 
China emphasised that there was more time left for diplomacy. Therefore, there was an 
accusation that China was more concerned with its commercial interests and energy needs 
than preventing Iran’s nuclear activities. The country relies on Iran’s energy supply. 
Around 15% of China’s oil comes from Iran (B. Smith, 2011). 
 
UNSC resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) 
failed to stop Iran from developing its nuclear programme. Iran has insisted that it is 
pursuing nuclear technology for peaceful means. A more recent UNSC resolution 1929 
was adopted on 9 June 2010, which placed substantial additional economic sanctions on 
banking and energy (Kenneth  Katzman, 2015). However, this resolution only created a 
‘real’ breakthrough once President Hassan Rouhani came into power in August 2013. 
Since that time, peace talks have progressed significantly and a Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action (JCPOA) was finalised in July 2015. The JCPOA is aimed at ensuring that Iran’s 
nuclear programme is purely for peaceful purposes. This agreement replaced the Joint 
Plant of Action (JPA) interim nuclear deal which had been in force since January 2014 
(Katzman & Kerr, 2015).  
4. Indonesia and the UNSC on Iran’s nuclear programme 
Weapons of mass destruction have become a concern in Indonesian diplomacy. Indonesia 
urges the implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. The Nuclear Weapon States 
(NWS) tend to emphasise the implementation of non-proliferation. They pay less attention 
to the pillars of disarmament and nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Indonesia 
consistently views disarmament as imperative given that it could strengthen international 
peace and security (Parnohadiningrat, 2005). Indonesia supports the development of 
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The country’s stance on on the Iranian  nuclear 
issue has been in line with the above position. Indonesia supports Iran as long as it 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
offering it economic incentives in return for suspension of its ‘proliferation sensitive’ nuclear activities” 
(Spies, 2009). 
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develops its nuclear technology for non-military goals. To that end, Indonesia has urged 
Iran to be transparent under IAEA inspection and verification.  
 
Indonesia wanted the Iranian nuclear issue to be addressed peacefully through multilateral 
forums. A unilateral approach would not solve the problem. Continuous engagement 
involving the Middle Eastern countries and international society was important to create a 
WMD-free Middle East (Parnohadiningrat, 2005).  
 
In the drafting of UNSC resolution 1747, Indonesia proposed some amendments to the 
initial draft sponsored by the P-5+1. In its proposal, the country stressed the need to create 
a Middle East free from nuclear weapons and other WMD, rather than only mentioning 
Iran’s nuclear threats. Indonesia’s point in this matter was seemingly also directed at Israel 
which possesses nuclear weapons. It also urged that efforts be made to apply non-
proliferation pillars in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. Therefore, the draft was 
expected not only to cover the recognition of rights of each NPT party to develop nuclear 
power for peaceful purposes, but also to remind all countries possessing nuclear weapons 
of their obligation to destroy their nuclear arsenals (BBC, 2007a). Indonesia also proposed 
an amendment affirming that all NPT parties, including Iran, have the right to develop 
nuclear technology for non-military means. Indonesia sought a reference to the necessity 
of lifting international sanctions against Iran should it meet with all the UNSC resolution’s 
provisions (Kompas, 2007). The country also emphasised that any negotiations involving 
the Iranian nuclear stand-off should be based on good will to achieve a resolution 
acceptable to all parties (BBC, 2007a). One day before the voting on resolution 1747, 
Yudhoyono called South African President, Thabo Mbeki and the Iranian President, 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to try and find a viable solution. At a press conference 
Yudhoyono stated that  
“We [Yudhoyono and Mbeki] expected Iran and the five permanent members of 
the Security Council to use the rest of the opportunity, no matter how small it is, 
to reach the best solution without imposing thorough sanctions which can create 
new problems. I also told President Mbeki that all members of the Security 
Council of the UN are given a chance to convey their views, so that whatever the 
decision [on the dispute solution], it will not be partial” (Xinhua, 2007a).  
 
Meanwhile, when talking to Ahmadinejad, Yudhoyono expected a compromise that could 
lead to a good outcome for all parties (Xinhua, 2007a). After Indonesia’s proposed 
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amendments were accepted by other members of the UNSC, Indonesia decided to support 
resolution 1747.  
 
Before becoming a UNSC non-permanent member, Indonesia had sought to reduce 
tensions around the Iranian nuclear issue. It believed that the existing dialogue mechanism 
which involved the EU-3 and Iran needed to be enlarged. The dialogue was supposed to 
include the UNSC non-permanent members and other developing countries in the NPT 
(Jakarta-Post, 2006a). Indonesia, as indicated by Yudhoyono, had showed its readiness to 
mediate the conflict. He was convinced that open conflict could be avoided through 
dialogue to find a peaceful and just solution (Collins, 2006). As a member of the IAEA 
Governors Board, Wirajuda visited Iran in January 2006, seeking a peaceful solution to the 
Iranian nuclear issue. Prior to the visit, he met the EU Foreign Policy Chief, Javier Solana. 
He called on the EU not to immediately bring the case to the UNSC (Xinhua, 2006a). At 
that time, Indonesia encouraged the EU and Iran to accept Russia’s offer to have uranium 
enriched in Russia and insisted that the problem could be settled through reconciliation 
(Xinhua, 2006b). 
 
When the Iranian nuclear issue was brought to the UNSC in early 2006, the Iranian 
Ambassador to Indonesia, Shaban Shahidi, met Yudhoyono and Wirajuda. Shahidi raised 
the inconsistency of the US and other Western countries towards Iran’s nuclear 
programme. Iran was disappointed that the Western countries had brought the nuclear case 
to the UNSC without involving Iran in the meeting (Xinhua, 2006b). Meanwhile, Wirajuda 
said that Indonesia’s position was consistent. It supported Iran’s right to enrich uranium 
for peaceful purposes, but wanted Iran to cooperate with the IAEA to find a common 
solution (Jakarta-Post, 2006a). Indonesia took the position that the case should not be 
brought immediately to the UNSC (Xinhua, 2006a). 
 
Indonesia’s engagement on the issue might have come about out of fear of what the US 
and its allies did with Iraq. The US along with its allies invaded Iraq for the purpose of 
toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. Like Iran, Iraq’s regime was accused of 
illegally possessing and developing weapons of mass destruction. Both Indonesian Muslim 
groups and the government of Indonesia feared that the US and its allies would launch a 
pre-emptive attack on Iran as it had been accused of illegally possessing nuclear weapons. 
Such worries were also expressed by Zulkifli Hassan, secretary general of the PAN, when 
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saying: “I'm afraid it will end up like Iraq. The US was so convinced that Iraq had WMD 
but later it turned out to be an empty accusation. If Iran is cornered then we are worried 
they could retaliate” (Khalik, 2007b).  
 
The negative impacts of ongoing problems regarding the Iranian nuclear situation also 
became a concern for Indonesia. Indonesia’s still-recovering economy might be adversely 
affected if the Iranian nuclear crisis led to war. This notion was confirmed by Wirajuda, 
who said that “our involvement in seeking an amiable solution is not without sufficient 
grounds. If we do not do anything we are afraid the crisis will evolve into something that 
could disturb our economy” (Witular, 2006). At that time the price of crude oil reached 
USD 68/barrel, steadily rising to a record high in August 2005 of USD 70.85. If there was 
no immediate peaceful solution, it was predicted that the oil price would skyrocket to 
above USD 100. Iran produced about 4.2 million barrels/day (bpd) of oil and exported 2.7 
million bpd, mainly to China, Japan, and the EU. Iran was the second largest producer of 
oil after Saudi Arabia in OPEC. Its oil reserves were estimated to reach 125.8 billion 
barrels which is approximately 10% of the world’s total (Witular, 2006). 
 
Indonesia took a cautious position. It attempted to demonstrate balance in its stance on the 
issue. Ahmadinejad’s visit to Indonesia on 10-14 May 2006 was warmly welcomed by the 
government of Indonesia. His public speeches at the University of Indonesia and the 
Islamic State University of Syarif Hidayatullah in Jakarta received standing ovations. 
Undoubtedly his visit was to gain support from the Muslim people of Indonesia where Iran 
had not been depicted as a hostile country as it had been in Western states (Gee, 2006). 
 
Throughout his visit, Ahmadinejad repeatedly said that the Iranian nuclear programme was 
only for peaceful purposes. The US and its allies liked to dominate nuclear technology and 
discourage the rest of the world from challenging that dominance. Iran, he said, had used 
its technology for useful purposes and “the welfare of the Muslim people around the 
world” (Gee, 2006, p. 38). His visit was successful in gaining significant sympathy among 
the Muslim Indonesian public (Hunter, 2010).  
 
When receiving the Iranian Majelis Speaker Gholamali Haddad Adel on 16 February 2006, 
Yudhoyono stated a similar position to Ahmadinejad. The intervention of the big powers 
would raise problems for the Muslim world. He emphasised the salience of exchanging 
views between his country and Iran to resolve the existing problems of the Islamic world. 
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His statement affirmed Indonesia’s position on the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes. Indonesia called for enhancement of nuclear cooperation with Iran within the 
framework of the IAEA. The president showed his country’s willingness to benefit from 
Iran’s experience in using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (BBC, 2007b). 
 
Indonesia maintained good bilateral relations with Iran. The two countries established a 
Bilateral Consultation Committee on Political Affairs on 9 May 2003 which conducted 
regular meetings. As developing countries, both states have showed a common interest in 
regional and international issues. Like Indonesia, Iran has taken part in international 
organisations such as NAM, OIC, and Development (D)-8. Their economic relations 
increased significantly. Trade accounted for US$259.32 million in 2004; US$368.76 
million in 2005; US$404.40 million in 2006; US$553.09 million in 2007; and US$975.31 
million in 2008 (Kemlu, 2012a). 
 
Indonesia’s good relations and its relatively supportive position on Iran made the 
Indonesian public think that their government would vote on Iran’s side. However, 
positive diplomatic relations did not appear to affect the government’s decision in the 
UNSC. It supported the sanctions on Iran by voting in favor of resolution 1747. Clearly, 
the government of Indonesia misread the concerns of its public, especially Muslim groups, 
which had been demonstrated during Ahmadinejad’s visit. That visit and the subsequent 
one from the speaker of the Iranian Parliament had considerably contributed to the 
pressure which came from Muslim groups and members of parliament when the 
government supported the UNSC resolution on sanctions against Iran later in March 2007. 
The government eventually had to face widespread criticism, especially from Muslim 
groups and members of parliament, in relation to that matter. Sensing Muslim groups’ 
aspirations, members of parliament from both the DPR and Regional Representative 
Council (DPD) began to put pressure on the government.  
5. Indonesia’s support for the sanctions on Iran and the domestic response 
The government’s decision to support resolution 1747 was regarded by Muslim groups 
(which were butressed by many Indonesian politicians), as a blunder. The government 
seemed indifferent to public opinion. Dissident public sentiment came mainly from 
Muslim groups including moderate groups such as NU and Muhammadiyah and from 
Muslim militant groups such as HTI. Even Abu Bakar Baashir, an Indonesian radical 
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Muslim cleric, showed his opposition against the Indonesian government’s decision 
(Detik, 2007). Although Iran was regarded as being the home of a Shiah population, 
Muslim groups simply viewed Iran as a Muslim country that had been treated unfairly by 
Western states. According to the Pew Research Centre, 77% and 64% of Indonesians had a 
positive perception of Iran in 2006 and 2007 respectively (PRC, 2015).  
 
Except PD, most political parties shared the public’s views. Strong protests against the 
government came mainly from the Islamic political parties such as PKB, PAN and PKS. 
The sponsors of the interpellation rights were mainly members of Islamic political parties. 
The pressures that were started by Muslim groups continued in parliament. Muslim groups 
and DPR members appeared to mutually cooperate. Muslim groups got their aspirations 
channelled through politicians; meanwhile politicians utilised the momentum to discredit 
President Yudhoyono.  
 
The government apparently did not anticipate that its decision would lead to significant 
domestic political upheaval. Yudhoyono confidently stated that resolution 1747 was 
intended to persuade Tehran to come to negotiations, not merely to impose sanctions. 
Sanctions were not the ultimate goal. The government’s position was consistent in 
supporting the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (Xinhua, 2007b).  
 
Although pressure began to grow, the government was still unaware of the magnitude of 
the political consequences that might arise. This was reflected by Wirajuda’s statement 
that the government would explain why it had supported the resolution. He considered that 
Muslim groups and the parliament had not been well informed and suggested that the 
resolution should be viewed comprehensively. It was a follow up to resolution 1737 asking 
Iran to stop its uranium enrichment. According to Wirajuda, in fact, Iran did not comply 
with the previous resolution (Xinhua, 2007b). Wirajuda stated that one reason why 
Indonesia supported the resolution was the change in Russia’s and China’s positions. Both 
countries had previously opposed the resolution, before eventually taking part in drafting 
it. The change in their position might be have been caused by their disappointment with 
Iran (NU-Online, 2007d).  
 
Unprecedented protests against the government were sparked not long after the vote. 
Muslim groups expressed their strong disappointment with the government’s decision. The 
protests were expressed in a variety of ways including making critical statements and 
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opinions in mass media; street rallies; letters of protest addressed to concerned government 
institutions and media; and political manoeuvres in parliament.  
 
Three different student organisations, namely HMI, KAMMI; and the Campus Dakwah 
Association, all rallied in Bogor, West Java on 3 April 2007. The rally denounced the 
government’s decision at the UNSC and demanded the revocation of Indonesia’s support 
of resolution 1747. They also urged the government not to bow to pressure from the US 
and the UN and said that Iran should be treated fairly with regard to the Iranian nuclear 
programme (Antara, 2007b). Earlier, the Forum of Islamic Ummah (FUI) and the Anti-
American Intervention Front (FAIA) staged a rally in front of DPR, protesting the 
government’s decision on Iranian sanctions. Some protesters were received by Vice 
Speakers of DPR, Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno and Zaenal Maarif, in their offices. While 
wearing masks of George W. Bush, the protestors carried a sheep and handed it to vice-
speaker Soetarjo. The sheep symbolised Indonesia under the sling of the US in relation to 
Iran’s nuclear programme (Gatra, 2007). 
 
Meanwhile, HTI staged a rally in front of the UN office in Jakarta and issued a statement 
on its website condemning resolution 1747. HTI urged Muslims to question the moral 
integrity of the President of Indonesia who they said did not strive for Muslim causes 
(Gunadi, Febriana, & Guritno, 2007; Yusanto, 2007). A street rally based on a similar 
concern was conducted by PPP and its affiliated organisations such as Angkatan Muda 
Ka`bah (Ka’bah Youth Association); Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah (Ka’bah Youth 
Movement); Wanita Persatuan Pembangunan (Woman of United Development); and 
Generasi Muda Persatuan Indonesia (Young Generation of United Development) on 27 
March 2007. These street rallies ended in front of the US Consulate General in Surabaya. 
While condemning the unfair treatment of Iran by the US and its allies, they also protested 
against the government support of resolution 1747 (Antara, 2007a). Meanwhile, 
Mahendradatta, a leading figure of the Muslim Lawyer Team, had called for support from 
Muslim groups including NU and Muhammadiyah for a proposed class action against the 
government. Mahendradatta believed that the government had violated Indonesian law. 
Among the initiators of the class action were Abu Bakar Baashir and Mashadi, head of the 
Forum of Islamic Ummah (FU)—a militant Muslim forum (Gunadi et al., 2007). 
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In contrast, moderate Muslim groups such as NU and Muhammadiyah generally avoided 
mass protests. They criticised the government through the media and conducted ‘political 
lobbies’ towards the government and parliament. The Central Committee of NU strongly 
condemned the government’s support of Resolution 1747. According to NU, the 
government’s decision was a fatal mistake. Hasyim Muzadi, the NU chairman said that 
“Indonesia’s decision to support the sanctions against Iran was a big blunder for the 
government” (NU-Online, 2007h). He argued that the decision would distance Indonesia 
from the Muslim ummah and other nations (NU-Online, 2007h). According to Muzadi, the 
government should be responsible to its people who are predominantly Muslims. Muzadi 
said that except for praise from the US, Indonesia did not gain any benefits from its 
decision (NU-Online, 2007j). NU supported the Iranian nuclear programme, arguing it was 
for peaceful purposes. It also expressed its concerns for other Middle Eastern states 
experiencing unjust treatment.   
 
Meanwhile, NU’s former chairman and the fourth Indonesian president, Abdurrahman 
Wahid also criticised the government’s decision. He said it appeared that Indonesia had 
succumbed to its master, namely the US (NU-Online, 2007b). Sanctions against Iran 
would not improve the situation in the Middle East and settlement of the Iranian nuclear 
programme should be pushed through diplomatic channels. Abdurrahman Wahid said that 
it was foolish if Indonesia’s support was based on the positions of Russia and China. 
(Surprisingly, given Wahid was widely known as being close to Israel and Jewish religious 
leaders, he was also very critical of Israel’s nuclear programme) (NU-Online, 2007a). In 
the case of the Iranian nuclear issue, his stance was not different from NU. As the Head of 
the Advisory Board of PKB, he affirmed that the position of the PKB was the same as NU 
(Muhaj, 2007). 
 
Muhammadiyah also echoed NU’s position. When receiving the Iranian Ambassador, 
Behrooz Kamavandi, Muhammadiyah’s chairman, Dr Din Syamsuddin, expressed the 
movement’s regret about the passage of resolution 1747. Din said that the UN should 
respect the rights of Iran to develop its nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. As a 
Muslim majority country, Indonesia should show its sympathy and empathy for Iran, not 
to support resolutions against it (Suara-Merdeka, 2007a). The government’s decision 
showed that the country only followed the interests of the major powers: a position that 
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would only benefit Israel. There was no reason to object to Iran’s nuclear programme for 
peaceful purposes (Khalik, 2007a). 
 
The Executive Committee of the Muslimat of NU issued a recommendation rejecting the 
government’s decision. The recommendation was a result of a national committee meeting 
on 29-31 March 2007. Its chairperson, Khofifah Indar Parawansa, stated that the resolution 
went against justice and humanity. She said that what transpired in the UNSC was 
discriminatory in letting Israel possess its nuclear weapons (NU-Online, 2007e, 2007k).  
 
In this regard, the government seemed to be perceived as lacking caution in foreign policy 
decision making, mainly on issues related to Muslim concerns. Having been accustomed to 
being ‘elite players’ in foreign policy decision making, foreign affairs officials failed to 
understand Muslim groups’ aspirations. Khofifah argued that “the feeling of most of the 
Muslim people was hurt by the government’s careless decision by supporting the 
resolution against Iran. During his visit to Indonesia, Ahmadinejad, met the government 
and had a trilateral meeting between Ahmadinejad, the government, and religious leaders. 
We were convinced that his country’s nuclear technology development was intended for 
peaceful purposes” (NU-Online, 2007e). 
 
Muslim youth organisations expressed similar concerns. The Al Irsyad Youth, for 
example, strongly criticised the government’s decision on the resolution. It said that the 
government succumbed to US pressure, despite Washington’s discrimination in favour of 
Israel. The support for the sanctions on Iran injured Muslim solidarity and cooperation. 
More importantly, the resolution was specifically imposed on Iran, not on Israel. 
According to Al-Irsyad, the government and the rest of the world should not deny the 
rights of Iran to develop its nuclear programme for non-military means (Chalifah & 
Alkatiri, 2007). The organisation also sent a letter of protest to the foreign minister, DPR, 
the Indonesian Mission to the UN in New York, the UNSC, and to mass media. More 
criticism came from the Youth Movement of Ansor and the Student Islamic Movement 
Association (PMII). They argued the government’s decision had hurt Iran and injured the 
feelings of Indonesian Muslims (Edwin, 2007; NU-Online, 2007l). Therefore, according to 
them, the government should be held responsible and needed to explain the decision in 
front of DPR (NU-Online, 2007e). 
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Iran’s Ambassador to Indonesia, Behrooz Kamalvandi, could not hide his disappointment 
with the Indonesian government’s decision. He claimed that the inconsistency of the 
government’s position had wounded Iran. Moral support from Muslim groups, by contrast, 
had raised Iranian morale in the face of the sanctions. Iran expressed its high appreciation 
to Muslim groups in Indonesia and the Iranian Ambassador met the NU and  
Muhammadiyah leaders at their offices (NU-Online, 2007c). Simultaneously, the US 
Embassy also approached the Islamic organisations, in particular NU. The approach was 
conducted even before the voting of the resolution on 23 March 2007. The US Chargé 
d’Affaires in Jakarta, John A. Heffren, met Hasyim Muzadi at NU’s office on 21 March 
2007. The US was concerned about NU’s strong opposition to the sanctions against Iran. 
To encourage NU to adjust its stance, the US offered cooperation in the fields of education 
and management. However, NU did not appear to change its position. It stated that it did 
not support either the US or Iran and was concerned only about the possible injustice and 
the chance of an impending US military attack on Iran (NU-Online, 2007f). 
 
Despite this criticism, the Indonesian government still seemed to underestimate the degree 
of discontent among Muslim groups backed up by many members of parliament. The 
Presidential Adviser for Foreign Affairs, Ali Alatas, for example, stated that there was 
public misunderstanding on the issue. The nuclear standoff, he said, should not be seen as 
a conflict between the Muslim and the Non-Muslim worlds. It was instead an issue of 
nuclear proliferation. With the resolution, Indonesia expected that all sides, especially Iran 
and the Big Five plus Germany, co-sponsoring the resolution, would still seek a peaceful 
solution through negotiations. Indonesia would have been consistent in its support of Iran 
if the country had been developing nuclear power for peaceful purposes, in line with the 
NPT (BBC, 2007). 
 
Foreign Minister Wirajuda repeatedly explained the background of why the country 
supported resolution 1747. He said that Indonesia’s support was based on a number of 
issues. First, Indonesia believed that the main aim of the resolution was to give priority to 
negotiations in the search for a peaceful solution to the problem. Second, most of the 
provisions in the resolution were consistent with Indonesia’s position. The resolution 
provided the opportunity for Iran and Western countries to develop peaceful approaches. 
Third, the resolution was intended to send a strong message to Iran that all UNSC 
members unanimously voted to impose new sanctionsdue to its refusal to stop uranium 
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enrichment. Fourth, during the drafting of the resolution Indonesia’s proposed 
amendments has been accommodated (Khalik, 2007a; Wirajuda, 2007).  
 
Prior to the voting, Wirajuda said that Indonesia had asked Iran to temporarily stop its 
uranium enrichment because it was a source of the West’s suspicion. Hassan denied that 
Indonesia was under pressure from the US and other Western countries to vote in favour of 
the resolution (Khalik, 2007a). Muslim groups and members of parliament stated that US 
pressure had occurred when President Bush called President Yudhoyono, and when US 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had called Yudhoyono and Wirajuda prior to the 
UNSC voting on resolution 1747. But Wirajuda argued that these calls were normal and 
did not mean pressure on Indonesia as the public believed. Indonesia was one of the few 
countries, he said, that could say no to the US. According to Wirajuda, Indonesia’s firm 
position in response to international issues had received acknowledgement from Russia’s 
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov who had said “to me, Indonesia is one the very countries 
that can say no” (interview with Hassan Wirajuda, 18/12/2013). In a number of meetings 
with Condoleezza Rice in Indonesia and the US, as well as in his meetings with Iran’s 
Foreign Minister, Wirajuda always stressed a balanced approach. Indonesia supported 
Iran’s nuclear programme for peaceful purposes and at the same time called on Iran to 
search for a peaceful solution and to cooperate with the IAEA (Jakarta-Post, 2006a).  
 
Another explanation for the government’s decision came from Presidential Spokesperson 
Dino Patti Djalal. He wrote an opinion piece for Kompas, the biggest daily newspaper in 
Indonesia, on 28 March 2007. His statement was considered insensitive and attracted a lot 
of criticism. He argued that Indonesia did not bow to any of the major powers, nor did it 
blindly defend Iran and make it Indonesia’s master (Djalal, 2007b). Muslim groups viewed 
his statement as belittling those who were opposed to the government’s decision. He 
implicitly stated that opponents of the government’s decision made Iran their master. He 
indirectly accused NU and Muhammadiyah of being a kind of servant to Iran. Sihbudi 
(2007b) argued that Djalal’s statement was humiliating and baseless. Both NU and 
Muhammadiyah clearly associated themselves with the Sunni Islam, and Sihbudi argued 
that it was impossible for the two Muslim organisations to have Shiah Iran as their master. 
Further, they said Indonesia’s support for resolution 1747 could have been interpreted as 
its support directly or indirectly for President Bush to attack Iran (Sihbudi, 2007b). In an 
opinion piece for Tempo—a leading national weekly magazine—on 8 April 2007, Dino 
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Patti Djalal explained the difficulties of Indonesia siding with Iran. First, Iran had broken 
previous resolutions 1696 and 1737 on its nuclear programme. Second, Iran had been 
regarded as uncooperative with the IAEA (Djalal, 2007a).  
 
Muslim groups and members of parliament argued that the government had implemented 
an inconsistent policy on the Iranian nuclear issue (Hayid, 2007; Suara-Merdeka, 2007b). 
From their views in the mass media, Muslim groups had expected the government to 
oppose the resolution. The government’s position was different from its approach shown 
during the visit of Ahmadinejad to Indonesia in May 2006 (Hunter, 2010). Muslim groups 
expected that the government would take a different position from the US and its allies in 
the UNSC as Indonesia had indicated by abstaining during the voting of the IAEA 
Governor Board meeting in February 2006. Muslim groups in Indonesia widely welcomed 
the government’s abstention showing the government’s disapproval of bringing the Iranian 
nuclear issue to the UNSC.  
 
Muslim groups’ views on the Iranian nuclear issue were confirmed by a survey conducted 
by Kompas in April 2007. More than half of respondents (50.4%) disagreed with the 
government’s decision. The survey also revealed that the level of disappointment of 
Muslim respondents was higher than non-Muslim respondents (Suryaningtyas, 2007). The 
government’s argument that Indonesia’s position in supporting UNSC resolution 1747 was 
based on the IAEA report and rational considerations of what had developed in the UNSC 
meeting was generally incongruent with public opinion. Most respondents (73.32%) 
expressed the belief that international pressure had been a determining factor in the 
government’s decision on that matter (Suryaningtyas, 2007). The government’s statements 
that Indonesia’s support for resolution 1747 was not greatly influenced by international 
pressure did not convince the Indonesian public. Surprisingly, Jusuf Kalla, the Indonesian 
vice-president in the periods of 2004-2008 and 2014-2019, acknowledged in an interview 
with the author that Indonesia had been pressured by the US. However, he did not mention 
the extent to which the pressure from the US had determined the government’s decision to 
support sanctions on Iran (Jusuf Kalla, interview, 4/12/2013). 
6. Collaboration between Muslim groups and parliament 
The aspirations of Muslim groups were quickly taken up to by political parties. Muslim 
groups and political parties were concerted in expressing their regret and condemnation of 
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the government’s decision. This is interesting because the parties came from very different 
political platforms. That said, the main sponsors of Muslim views in the DPR were the 
Islamic political parties. They articulated the same concerns that Muslim groups had 
expressed. They condemned the government’s submission to the US and other major 
powers. They accused the government of supporting discriminatory treatment and the 
double standard strategy of the US on the NPT (Suara-Merdeka, 2007a, 2007b). This 
objection came from members of parliament of both DPR and DPD. Theo Sambuaga, head 
of DPR’s Commission I on Security and International Relations stated that “Indonesia 
should not accept the new resolution because it is not clear what Iran actually has violated, 
what is the basis for the US to accuse Iran of trying to build nuclear weapons” (Khalik, 
2007b). Meanwhile a member of DPD, Marwan Batubara stated that “we regret the 
government’s decision to support the UNSC resolution on sanctions against Iran. Such a 
decision reflects the weakness of independence of Indonesia in dealing with the US 
political agendas. Why did Iran receive a different treatment compared to US, Israel, India, 
North Korea and other Western countries?” (Shaleh, 2007). The different treatment of Iran 
and Israel by the US was repeatedly mentioned by politicians. They also pointed to 
injustice towards Iran as a Muslim country. They saw similiarities to what Iraq had 
experienced in 2003. Muslim groups and many members of parliament also felt that as a 
developing country, Iran had received unfair treatment from developed countries, in 
particular the US.  
 
Among the most vocal politicians who repeatedly expressed their concerns about the 
government’s decision was Effendi Choirie from the PKB. He stated that the government 
had failed as it supported a resolution that went against the 1945 Constitution, article 28 
C(1). The article affirms the right to gain knowledge and technology for human welfare. 
Choirie further stated that “Indonesia lost its credibility in the eyes of third world 
countries. It failed to realise the country’s efforts to become a mediator in the Middle-East 
conflict” (Suara-Merdeka, 2007b). The same concerns were conveyed by Ali Mokhtar 
Ngabalin, a legislator from the Crescent and Star Party (PBB). He said that the 
government’s decision proved that Indonesia was still under pressure from the US. He 
stated that “It was useless to become a non-permanent seat of the UNSC if Indonesia was 
still under the pressure from the US. The government’s decision did not constitute the 
representation (aspiration) of the Indonesian society” (Suara-Merdeka, 2007b). 
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Meanwhile another member of DPR, Abdillah Thoha, and the vice-chairman of MPR, AM 
Fatwa, also strongly criticised the government. Both PAN politicians argued that Indonesia 
had succumbed to the imperialist countries led by the US to possibly invade Iran. Fatwa 
stated: “Why were we afraid of the US? Once again, Indonesia made a mistake on its 
foreign policy” (Suara-Merdeka, 2007b). 
 
The vice-speaker of DPR, Muhaimin Iskandar, acknowledged his concerns about the 
inconsistencies of Indonesia’s position. He claimed that in the beginning of the emergence 
of the Iranian nuclear issue, the government, the parliament, and the people of Indonesia 
had supported Iran in developing its nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. According 
to Iskandar, if the government suddenly changed its position, it showed inconsistency 
(Suara-Merdeka, 2007b). 
 
The views of Muslim groups were not only taken up by the politicians from Islamic parties 
but also by politicians from non-Islamic parties such as Yuddy Chrisnandi from the Golkar 
Party and Sidharto Danusubroto from PDIP. They said that the sanctions that were 
imposed on Iran were inappropriate. Accusations about Iran’s uranium enrichment had not 
been supported by adequate evidence. They argued that Indonesia should consistently 
support the Iranian nuclear programme as long as it was for peaceful purposes (Gindarsah, 
2012a; Hayid, 2007). Yuddy Chrisnandi stated that Indonesia had betrayed its friendship 
with Iran. Meanwhile, the chairman of the PDIP faction in DPR, Tjahjo Kumolo, warned 
the President to be consistent with the independent and active principles of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy (Harian-Terbit, 2007). 
 
Not long after the UNSC vote in March 2007, there was a quick move by politicians in 
DPR to channel Muslim groups’ aspirations in questioning and demand government 
accountability. On 24 March 2007, the First Commission summoned Foreign Minister 
Wirajuda. At that meeting, many members of DPR expressed their disappointment with 
the government. They argued that the resolution was not in line with the aspirations of the 
Indonesian people, in particular Muslim society. They said the Indonesian people 
supported the struggle of developing countries like Iran for justice including in developing 
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Second, resolution 1747 had put the emphasis 
on unfair sanctions rather than on solving a problem. It also created more tensions in the 
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Middle-East, narrowed the dialogue, and opened the possibility for violating Iran’s 
sovereignty (Rajagukguk, 2009). 
 
The DPR also pursued the right of interpellation to the government. This was mainly 
sponsored by law makers from the Islamic political parties such as Effendy Choirie from 
PKB, Abdillah Toha from PAN, and other law makers from PBB and PKS. Some non-
Islamic political party members in DPR such as PDIP and the Golkar party also became 
co-sponsors.  
 
NU and the Youth Movement of Ansor strongly supported the right of interpellation. NU 
argued that the sanctions to force Iran to halt its uranium enrichment programme would 
not change the situation in the Middle East. The government’s explanation that the 
sanctions were aimed at maintaining security and stability in the region was not persuasive 
(Nu-Online, 2007i). Meanwhile, Ansor regarded the interpellation as an opportunity for 
the government to explain the case to the people. This political statement was delivered 
during the 73rd Anniversary of Ansor, which was attended by Vice-president Jusuf Kalla, 
prominent figure and senior politician of the PDIP, Taufiq Kiemas and the Minister for 
Cooperative and Small and Medium Enterprise who is also the chairman of PPP, Surya 
Dharma Ali. According to Ansor, the government’s decision to support the resolution 
would jeopardise Iran and hurt the feelings of the Muslim world (Edwin, 2007). 
 
It was not difficult to get the support from other members of DPR to realise parliament’s 
interpellation. According to one report, within 20 minutes, 89 members of DPR had signed 
a petition for executing their interpellation rights to the government (Sihbudi, 2007b). In 
total 280 members of DPR from seven major factions, including Golkar and PDIP, 
supported interpellation. A report on the proposed interpellation rights of DPR was 
delivered by Abdillah Toha from PAN at the plenary session of DPR. The interpellation 
was eventually approved. The factions of PD and Partai Damai Sejahtera (the Welfare and 
Peaceful Party) voted against the interpellations and the faction of Partai Bintang 
Reformasi (the Reform Star Party), or  PBR, abstained (Sijabat, 2007).  
 
It is noteworthy that the case attracted the support of almost all factions in the DPR. Some 
parties such as PAN, PKB, PKS, and the Golkar party, which had joined the Democrat 
Party in a coalition to support the administration, also approved the interpellation. Their 
support of the interpellation demonstrated a ‘fragile’ governing coalition. A number of 
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political observers argued the strong opposition among political parties to the 
government’s decision on sanctions against Iran was related to dynamic domestic politics 
(Gindarsah, 2012a). The reduced cohesiveness of the governing coalition could be the 
manifestation of dissatisfaction among its members. The coalition supporting the 
Yudhoyono presidency consisted of the Democrat Party, the Golkar Party, and PPP, PKS, 
PBB. The coalition accounted for 414 seats (75%) of a total of 550 seats in DPR 
(Gindarsah, 2012a). Surprisingly, the major proponents of the interpellation came from the 
governing coalition. Except for PD, all members of the coalition were sponsors of the 
interpellation.  
 
On the day the interpellation was delivered by Abdillah Toha (15 May 2007), the Speaker 
of DPR, R. Agung Laksono from the Golkar Party, issued an approval letter to exercise 
DPR’s interpellation rights and invite the president to give an explanation before DPR. 
The interpellation was conducted on 5 June 2007. However, rather than appearing in 
person, the president only sent six ministers and a senior official to answer the questions 
on his behalf. Of course, the answers from the government were similar to those expressed 
earlier by Wirajuda. The plenary session was flooded with interruptions protesting the 
absence of the president. The session was finally adjourned and rescheduled in order to 
convince the president to attend (Rajagukguk, 2009). However, the absence of the 
president did not violate the DPR’s rules of proceedings (DPR, 2004). 
 
NU’s chairman Hasyim Muzadi said that the president should attend the interpellation. He 
stated that “the president should better attend it in order for the complicated problem to be 
more easily solved. Not like at present, the problem became complicated” (NU-Online, 
2007g). However, he said that his statement was not intended to interfere with the 
government’s approach (NU-Online, 2007g). Similar pressure came from the Islamic 
youth organisations such as PMII and Ansor. Both organisations asked the president to 
attend the interpellation, and argued that a direct explanation on the matter was necessary 
and the president should not be represented by his ministers (Edwin, 2007; NU-Online, 
2007l). The head of Ansor, Saifulloh Yusuf, stated that “Ansor expected the president 
would attend and explain its decision on the resolution 1747 to DPR. By doing so, the 
people would know why Indonesia supported the resolution” (Edwin, 2007). 
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After failing to summon the President, the leaders of DPR held a Consultation Meeting 
(Bamus) between the government and DPR on 3 July 2007. This meeting was an attempt 
to break the political stand-off and meeting agreed on the following points. First, the 
government needed to consult with DPR on policies relating to highly sensitive issues for 
the people which had a major impact on foreign policy and international treaties. Second, 
the president stated that there was no intervention and pressure from the US with regard to 
the government’s decision to support the resolution against Iran. Third, the president 
explained his foreign policy and the country’s national interests. Fourth, the president still 
had not decided on attending to the plenary meeting discussing Iran’s interpellation. He 
would wait for the results of the Bamus meeting which decided the schedule of the plenary 
session on Iran’s interpellation (DPR, 2004; Rajagukguk, 2009).  
 
The conduct of the right of interpellation was finally done on 17 July 2007 at the plenary 
session of DPR. Despite expectations and pressures from many sides, primarily Muslim 
groups, the president again did not attend the meeting. He assigned seven ministers to 
represent him in answering the questions from DPR. Despite many interruptions asking 
about the absence of the President, the meeting proceeded as scheduled. The government’s 
explanation was presented by the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Laws, Defence, and 
Security, Widodo AS. In response, some factions from the caucus of political parties in the 
DPR understood and appreciated the efforts and decisions made by the government in 
relation to resolution 1747. However, most of the factions rejected the government’s 
reasoning. The parliamentary parties argued that the problem could still be settled between 
Iran and the IAEA. The issue did not need to be discussed in the UNSC (Rajagukguk, 
2009). 
 
Despite dissatisfaction with the government’s decision, the meeting agreed not to extend 
the interpellation to the legislature’s ‘angket’ rights8 as the government had understood the 
views presented during the interpellation. DPR emphasised that the government should 
have more consultations with the DPR before deciding its foreign policy in order to 
include the people’s aspirations (Rajagukguk, 2009). 
 
 
                                                             
8 “The right to compel a person to attend a DPR meeting to provide information about a particular matter and 
to detain them for up to 15 days if they fail to comply” (Butt, 2015, p. 58) 
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7. The shift of Indonesia’s position 
After 2007 Indonesia’s policy shifted on the Iranian nuclear issue. It opted to abstain when 
the UNSC adopted resolution 1803 on 3 March, 2008, imposing additional sanctions 
against Iran. The country was alone in taking a different position from the other 14 
members of the UNSC (UNSC, 2008b). 
 
Muslim groups, members of parliament and the public at large including intellectuals 
responded to the decision with varying reactions. Political analyst Makmur Keliat said that 
abstention was the safest option for Indonesia. Meanwhile, Azyumardi Azra, a leading 
Islamic scholar, stated that abstention would come across as indecisive. He said that “we 
should have fully opposed the resolution if we are to comply with our soft-power foreign 
policy to uphold dialogue. Sanctions as we’ve seen, only groom radicalism” (Hotland, 
2008). Muslim groups commonly welcomed the decision. Citing an unpublished poll, 
Gindarsah (2012b) revealed that 63% of respondents supported the government’s decision 
to abstain on resolution 1803, 35% disagreed, and 2% abstained. The government’s 
decision was in line with a larger part of popular opinion, and that of Muslim groups.       
 
Many sides argued that the shift of the government’s position was because of public 
pressure. A researcher from LIPI (Indonesian Institute of Sciences) and a Muhammadiyah 
activist, Dr Riefqi Muna, believes that the shift of the government’s position on resolution 
1803 was because of pressure from society, especially Muslim groups and parliament. 
Indonesian foreign policy makers had used a rational choice approach by considering 
international and domestic factors to come to the abstention position (interview, 
2/12/2013). According to Vermonte (2014), all the political dynamics which had ocurred 
in and outside of parliament “led the government to adjust its position over the Iranian 
crisis” (p. 213). In this regard, the pressure and influence of Muslim groups which were 
supported by the parliament encroached on the government’s domain on a technical aspect 
of foreign policy making, affecting whether or not Indonesia supported UNSC resolutions 
(interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 20/11/2013). Since that time there was an indication 
that the government seemed to be more cautious and had changed the way foreign policy 
was to be formulated. The government increasingly involved the wider community in 
discussing Indonesia’s foreign policy issues, especially concerned members of the public. 
The shift in the government’s decision on resolution 1803 might be seen through this lens 
(interview with Abdillah Toha, 11/12/2013). 
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However, perhaps not surprisingly, the government was reluctant to acknowledge public 
pressure as a factor contributing to the change in Indonesian policy. Wirajuda said the 
decision was taken after considering the IAEA report in February 2008. According to the 
report, Iran had been willing to cooperate with the IAEA in making its nuclear plans 
transparent and compliant with the rules of the IAEA (Gindarsah, 2012a). The government 
saw positive developments on the Iranian side, and regarded further sanctions against Iran 
as unnecessary. Likewise, the Indonesian Representative to the UN, Ambassador Marty 
Natalegawa, said that “the IAEA-Iran Work Plan was a platform to restore the confidence 
of the international community” (Hotland, 2008). 
 
Yudhoyono also rejected the idea that the shift was related to domestic pressure or external 
interests. The government had independently decided its policy he asserted. Presidential 
spokesman Dino Patti Djalal said the abstention vote was not designed to avoid the 
recurrence of the interpellation move of the DPR nor harsh public pressure. He said that 
“since the inception, we had viewed that this...was [a] technical matter, not politics. We 
did not want this problem to be politicized because this issue was potentially prone to be 
politicized” (Okezone, 2008). 
 
The government’s argument that it ignored pressure from Muslim groups and members of 
parliament seems implausible. Yudhoyono needed their support in running his government 
as well as retaining power. He likely calculated all political consequences if he did ignore 
Muslim groups’ aspirations. Pragmatically, Yudhoyono would not have wanted to lose 
support from Muslim groups in the 2009 election. The fact that almost all members of the 
governing coalation supported the right of interpellation might have given more push for 
Yudhoyono to change the position of the government when it came to resolution 1803. The 
shift of the government’s position according to Abdillah Toha was not separated from 
domestic pressure (interview, 13/12/2013). The decision to abstain was taken to avoid 
further protests from Muslim groups and members of parliament including Yudhoyono’s 
coalition partners, when seeking his re-election in 2009 (Gindarsah, 2012a).  
 
Whatever the government’s motives, the decision to abstain was welcomed by DPR. 
Indonesia had not followed the US and had shown progressive diplomatic endeavour to 
implement its independent and active principles of foreign policy (Rajagukguk, 2009). The 
main sponsor of the interpellation, Abdillah Toha, said that “we saw there was progress on 
128 
 
the government decision where Indonesia was the only country to abstain on the 
Resolution 1803. Despite the strong external pressure, Indonesia still opted to abstain. We 
could regard it as an achievement for us” (Okezone, 2008). Other non-permament 
members of the UNSC, namely Vietnam, South Africa, and Libya, also experienced strong 
external pressure in the UNSC to support the resolution. The three countries eventually 
succumbed to external pressure (Okezone, 2008). 
 
A different voice was put forward by Effendy Choirie, a legislator from PKB. He regretted 
the government’s decision and suggested Indonesia should have taken a stronger stance. 
The abstention position on resolution 1803 reflected indecisive diplomacy. Such a decision 
demonstrated that the country’s president and foreign minister were indecisive leaders 
(Okezone, 2008). 
 
The government apparently tried to strike a balance between domestic politics and the US 
and its allies’ interests within the UNSC. Earlier, pursuing domestic political reconciliation 
and trying to avoid unnecessary domestic upheavals, Indonesia objected to a UNSC 
statement condemning Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s call for wiping Israel off the map 
(Gindarsah, 2012a). The country also opted to vote to abstain at an emergency session of 
the UNGA on a draft resolution putting little pressure on Israel over its action in Gaza 
(Gindarsah, 2012a). In the aftermath of the domestic upheavals due to the government’s 
decision on resolution 1747, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted additional closed 
breakfast meetings on foreign policy. The meetings were attended by concerned groups, 
especially Muslim group leaders and members of DPR (Rajagukguk, 2009). 
 
To further repair the damage in domestic politics and ‘restore’ Indonesia’s diplomatic 
relations with Iran, Yudhoyono visited Iran in March 2008. He was received by Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khameini, as a brother. Both 
countries agreed to cooperate in a number of areas. They agreed to build a USD$6 billion 
refinery in Banten and forged a commitment to supply 150,000 barrels of crude oil for the 
plant. Indonesian companies were also invited to participate in Iran’s upstream oil 
industry. As expected, Indonesia’s abstention generated a positive response from Iran 
(Jakarta-Post, 2008a). Prior to President Yudhoyono’s visit to Iran, the President sent his 
Special Envoy for Middle Eastern Affairs, Dr Alwi Shihab to Iran on 18-19 June 2007 to 
explain Indonesia’s decision on the resolution 1747. All these efforts might be viewed as 
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an effort to ‘repair’ Indonesia’s bilateral relations with Iran as well as to demonstrate the 
government’s willingness to accommodate public opinion on the Iranian nuclear issue. 
8. Conclusion 
It is undeniable that Islam was an important factor that influenced the shift of the 
Indonesian government’s decision on the Iranian nuclear issue. The Yudhoyono 
administration had an interest in improving its image among Indonesian Muslims.  
 
Since the beginning of the democratic era, Muslim groups have positioned themselves as 
among the influential forces in Indonesian politics and in foreign policy, especially on 
sensitive issues related to Muslim concerns. Pressure from Muslim groups was channelled 
through political parties and politicians in the DPR and greatly contributed to the change 
of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the case of the Iranian nuclear issue. Pressure from 
Muslim groups was quickly embraced by pragmatic politicians. The interests of Muslim 
groups and members of parliament converged to pressure the government. This 
combination of interests made the pressure effective. The government’s change of heart in 
the UNSC on the Iranian nuclear issue was apparently driven by domestic pressure, despite 
officials’ denials. Abstention was a reasonable option for Indonesia. Although there were 
harsh critics from Muslim organisations and the public at large, the government apparently 
still cautiously considered the external pressure of the US and its allies in the UNSC.  
 
The government seemed to misread public options when deciding to vote in favour of 
resolution 1747. The government’s denial of Muslim groups’ pressure was upheld to show 
that the goverment was the only legitimate agent in deciding and implementing foreign 
policy. Indeed, the goverment has remained the key player in foreign policy making and 
implementation. However, this case suggests political forces outside the goverment have 
gained a more substantial influence on the country’s foreign policy. The influence of Islam 
has become more important when Muslim aspirations coincide with the interests of 
politicians in parliament.     
 
It is rare that religious groups and politicians are in concert in Indonesia. This might be the 
first time the government has faced such a united movement. Muslim groups and members 
of parliament shared a view that the Yudhoyono government had betrayed Iran. Muslim 
groups demanded that the government should accommodate their concerns about the 
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West’s unfair treatment of Iran. The phenomena of Muslim groups’ pressures can be 
considered normal. The growing importance of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy 
coincided with the rise of Muslim groups and the establishment of Islamic political parties 
in the post-Suharto era. The influence of Islam on the country’s foreign policy became 
more noticeable on sensitive issues related to Muslim concerns. Indonesian Muslims 
became more concerned when the ‘Islamic issues’ related to Israel and to some extent, the 
US. The concern that the US would attack Iran as it had Iraq doubled the pressure on the 
Indonesian government. At that time, Muslim groups believed that the government had 
given the US and its allies the opportunity to invade Iran. A possible attack on Iran was 
one of the main explanations as to why the public, especially Muslim groups, regarded the 
government as having made a blunder when supporting the sanctions on Iran. Despite the 
government’s denials, the Iranian nuclear issue suggests that Muslim groups did play a 
crucial role in shaping a key foreign policy decision. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INDONESIA’S POLICY TOWARDS KOSOVO’S INDEPENDENCE:  
PREEMINENT NATIONAL INTEREST 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 was met with a 
range of international responses (Boulton & Visoka, 2010). These can be categorised into 
countries that have either recognised, objected, or stayed silent on Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence (Almqvist, 2009). Russia and China spearheaded the non-recognising 
countries, opposing the US and major EU countries such as the UK, France, and Germany 
which all sponsored Kosovo’s independence. However, the Council of the European Union 
has left the matter up to each member state to take a position on whether or not to 
recognise Kosovo (Duic, 2009).  Having no common foreign policy, the EU could create 
no single position. While the majority of members of the EU supported Kosovo’s 
independence, some members did not recognise it. Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain 
are among the countries that did not recognise Kosovo’s unilateral independence 
declaration. 
 
The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on Kosovo in July 2010 
stipulating that the unilateral declaration did not violate international law has not 
eliminated the debate on the status of Kosovo (Wolff & Rodt, 2013). Debate on Kosovo’s 
self-determination, secession and statehood have all continued (Pippan, 2010).  Despite 
disputes surrounding Kosovo’s legality, the number of countries that recognise Kosovo has 
increased over time (Kosovothanksyou, 2015). Indonesia is one of the non-recognising 
states. This policy has been questioned by Muslim groups and members of parliament. 
Proponents of recognition believe that there is no reason for the government to not 
recognise Kosovo. In spite of suggestions and pressures from Muslim groups, especially 
Muhammadiyah, the Indonesian government has remained firm on its position. The fear of 
repercussions from separatist movements in Indonesia is widely believed to be behind the 
country’s policy towards Kosovo. This chapter argues that Muslim groups’ aspirations 
were less effective in this case as they confronted the ‘perceived fundamental national 
interest’ in relation to national territorial integrity. Despite strong pressures from Muslim 
groups, especially Muhammadiyah, the Indonesian government did not entertain their 
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pressures to recognise Kosovo’s independence. The consideration of maintaining territorial 
integrity is paramount to Indonesia’s strategic national interests.  
 
This chapter discusses the Indonesian government’s response to Muslim groups’ 
aspirations regarding the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. It will also discuss the 
extent to which the government has accommodated the concerns of these groups.  Also 
highlighted is the debate on the status of Kosovo’s self determination, secession, and 
statehood. This case will show the shortfalls in Putnam’s approach on the need for the 
government to set a balance between domestic and international pressures and interests. 
Instead potential international pressure converged with already existing domestic pressure 
for Indonesia to recognise Kosovo’s independence but were still unable to change the 
position of the government of Indonesia.  
2. The status of Kosovo’s independence 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 prompted diverse reactions 
from other states. Since the 1999 NATO campaign (Fierstein, 2008) the international 
community has been deeply divided and Kosovo’s declaration only deepened these 
divisions. This was reflected by the failure of both the European Union and the UNSC to 
come up with a common position on whether to condemn or to approve Kosovo’s 
independence (Almqvist, 2009, p. 1). The EU took a pragmatic approach, letting its 
member states make a decision on whether to recognise Kosovo according to their 
respective national policies and interests (Duic, 2009, p. 166). 
 
As is widely known, Kosovo’s conflict has seen a debate between state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity on the one hand, and a people’s self determination and independence on 
the other hand. The unilateral declaration of independence has added further legal 
complexity (Muharremi, 2008), including raising the legal principles of territorial integrity, 
self-determination, state sovereignty and state recognition (Fierstein, 2008). The 
declaration of has sparked controversy over the legality of Kosovo’s statehood (Jaber, 
2010). International law has not given clear guidelines or stipulations as to how Kosovo’s 
situation might be addressed (Cerone, 2009). Instead, the case has demonstrated the 
phenomenon in which national political interests have influenced international law 
(Borgen, 2008b). Therefore, writers such as Hilpold (2009), Jia (2009) and Pippan (2010) 
suggest that scholars of international law should find a new approach to settle problems 
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like Kosovo due to the unavailability of international legal principles that fit with actual 
reality.  
 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) established two opposing sides 
with regard to the legality of its statehood, namely recognising and opposing states. In fact, 
there is another category of states outside those two groups, namely silent states which do 
not show a clear position on Kosovo’s independence.  
 
States that recognise Kosovo’s independence have defended their positions by putting an 
emphasis on political aspects and generally have avoided going into detail regarding 
aspects of international law. The prospect of peace and security in the Balkan region 
following Kosovan independence has been a prominent concern in their statements of 
recognition (Almqvist, 2009). They believe Kosovo’s independence would promote and 
create stability in the region. They see Kosovo as a sui generis case, not constituting a 
precedent for other cases (Bardos, 2008; Visoka & Bolton, 2011). Further, recognising 
states justify their support for Kosovo’s independence based on a number of factors, inter 
alia: gross human rights violations under Serbia’s President Milosevic; a decade of 
supervised international administration; the exhaustion of Kosovo’s final status 
negotiations; Kosovo’s acceptance of ‘international supervised independence’; and 
Kosovo’s assurance to promote minority rights (Visoka & Bolton, 2011, p. 2). States such 
as Costa Rica, Columbia, Ireland, Estonia, and the US made a special reference in their 
statements to the 1999 UNSC resolution 1244, the 1999 Rambouillet Accords, and the 
2007 Marti Ahtisaari Plan (Almqvist, 2009).  
 
In contrast, the majority of opposing states have based their objections on international 
law, especially the UN Charter on the principle of territorial integrity, and UNSC 
resolution 1244 (1999) (Almqvist, 2009). Opponents, including Russia, China, Spain, 
Romania, Vietnam and South Africa, found that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration was 
inconsistent with resolution 1244. They viewed Kosovo’s UDI as illegal, a violation of 
Serbia’s territorial integrity and the delineation of Kosovo’s international borders without 
the consent of Serbia (Visoka & Bolton, 2011). Aside from legal concerns, opposing states 
also have used political concerns such as the argument that Kosovo’s independence could 
create a dangerous precedent (Almqvist, 2009) by setting a legal validation for secessionist 
movements around the world to unilaterally declare independence, which may lead to 
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international instability. International law does not allow self determination outside the 
colonial context. According to these opposing states, in the absence of a parent state’s 
consent, the unilateral secession should be illegal and would create a negative precedent 
for other regions around the world (Visoka & Bolton, 2011). 
 
As Kosovo’s parent state, Serbia steadfastly sought to have Kosovo remain part of its 
territory. Immediately after the UDI, Serbia, together with Russia, demanded an 
emergency meeting of the UNSC on 17 February 2008. This was the first time in several 
months that the UNSC would publicly talk about the Kosovo problem (Duic, 2009; 
Weller, 2008). Serbia’s diplomatic initiative initially seemed successful. Russia’s veto 
along with China thwarted the endorsement of Kosovo’s independence by the UNSC 
(Jamar & Vigness, 2010). Besides China and Russia, other UNSC members at the time, 
namely Vietnam, South Africa, and Indonesia also indicated their opposition to Kosovo’s 
independence. While Vietnam and South Africa stressed the clash of Kosovo’s 
independence with resolution 1244, Indonesia expressed its concern that negotiations had 
not yet been exhausted (Weller, 2008). 
 
Although the majority of EU member states have recognised Kosovo, there are seven EU 
states that have refused to do so. Most of the seven non-recognising EU states including 
Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain, have faced secessionist problems (Bardos, 2008). 
Undoubtedly Serbia’s strongest ally is Russia. Aside from its contestation with the US 
concerning Kosovo’s fate, Russia’s opposition to Kosovo’s independence was caused by 
its concerns over Chechnya. Kosovo’s case has potentially brought about a greater threat 
of secession in Chechnya. However, paradoxically, Kosovo’s case had been used as a 
primary justification for Russia’s interference in Georgia and support for South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia (Jamar & Vigness, 2010), and later on Crimea and eastern Ukraine. China’s 
non-recognition of Kosovo is in line with its position on domestic non-interference 
principles. With regard to domestic concerns, China has faced secessionist movements in 
Tibet and Xinjiang Autonomous Region. China’s troubled relationship with Taiwan also 
contributed to its firm position with regard to separatism. Any success of separatist 
movements in another country is viewed by China as a threat to its own sovereignty and 
territorial integrity (Jamar & Vigness, 2010). 
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On the other hand, the US and major Western European states supported Kosovo’s 
independence even before it was declared (Vidmar, 2009). Those states argued that any 
delay in approving Kosovo’s status as an independent state could be calamitous for peace 
and security in the region (Ker-Lindsay, 2009). Supporting states described Kosovo as a 
sui generis case that had its own unique characteristics (Warbrick, 2008; Weller, 2008). 
These are related to the context of the collapse of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) and the mismanagement of the conflict in its aftermath (Abazi, 2008). From this 
point of view, the Kosovo case does not constitute a precedent for other unresolved ethnic 
conflicts. This argument is based inter alia, on the violent nature of the FYR’s break-up, 
serious human rights violations, international supervision and administration which 
prevented Serbia from having effective control over Kosovo since 1999, and the persistent 
impasse in negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade (Nevo, 2009).  
 
Furthermore, UN resolution 1244 internationalised the problem, noting that secessionist 
problems are primarily an issue of domestic law (Borgen, 2008b). The following official 
statement of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, as quoted by Patterson and Mason 
(2007), sums up the majority of Western countries in seeing the Kosovo case as sui 
generis: “The unusual combination of factors in the Kosovo situation—including the 
context of Yugoslavia’s break-up, the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
civilians in Kosovo, and the extended period of the UN administration—are not found 
elsewhere and therefore make a special case. Kosovo cannot be seen as a precedent for any 
other situation in the world today” (p. 97). Meanwhile, on 18 February 2008, the EU 
issued the following statement as quoted by Patterson and Mason (2007): “Kosovo 
constitutes a sui generis case which does not call into question these principles and 
resolution” (p. 97). However, not long after, Russia treated Kosovo as a precedent by 
supporting the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia (Nevo, 2009).  
 
Although supporting states avoided references to self-determination, their arguments 
inherently implied remedial-self determination when they cited the impossible human 
rights situation facing Kosovo under Serbia’s rule. Instead, their argument has been made 
in conjunction with references to the principles of effectiveness where for many years 
Serbia and Kosovo had been governed in total separation (Muharremi, 2008; Pippan, 
2010).  On the other hand, past human rights concerns did not directly lead to the right to 
secession but constructed “an effective situation that ultimately legitimized secession” 
136 
 
(Vidmar, 2009, p. 837). Such an argument has been put forward by Orakhelashvili (2008), 
who states that ‘factual effectiveness never creates legal positions on its own, but only 
coupled with agreement and consent between states” (p. 9). 
  
In line with this, Serbia and Russia argued that without the Serbian consent, resolution 
1244 would not allow Kosovo’s independence based on the resolution’s preambular 
paragraph: “Reaffirming the commitment of all member states to the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”. However, the EU argued that 
resolution 1244 neither promotes nor prevents Kosovo’s independence. The references to 
Serbia’s territorial integrity are “silent as to what form the final status of Kosovo takes” 
(Borgen, 2008a, p. 462) 
 
On 22 July 2010, the ICJ gave its advisory opinion with regard to the legality of Kosovo’s 
independence. This opinion was in response to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
resolution on 8th October 2008 questioning: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence 
by the Provisional Institute of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with 
International Law?” (Nevo, 2009, p. 99). The adoption of this resolution was considered a 
victory for Serbia’s diplomacy which had managed to secure support in the UNGA for that 
purpose (Pippan, 2010). However the ICJ did not issue the advisory opinion expected by 
Serbia (Falk, 2011). Instead, the advisory opinion said Kosovo’s declaration did not breach 
international law (Wolff & Rodt, 2013). Neither objecting nor supporting states gained 
much from the ICJ advisory opinion (Hannum, 2011), which settled only a few of the legal 
questions related to the situation surrounding Kosovo’s independence (Muharremi, 2010). 
However, the influence of the ICJ’s advisory opinion could not be disregarded “in the 
course of negotiations, with the international society being more supportive of Kosovo’s 
status as an independent state” which in turn increased the pressure on Serbia (Öcal & 
Çelenk, 2010, p. 180).  
 
The barriers to realising self-determination in relation to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence do not seem as high as previously considered. This can be seen in the 
increasing number of recognising states following the ICJ advisory opinion (Wolff & 
Rodt, 2013). Although the legality of Kosovo’s independence remains contested under 
international law, as of the May 20, 2015, Kosovo has been recognised by 111 out of 193 
UN member states (Kosovothanksyou, 2015).  
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Kosovo still faces challenges in gaining recognition from states, regionally and globally. 
Recognition is mainly a political not a legal act. Therefore, political recognition is a unique 
action by a given state. Intergovernmental organisations do not automatically lead their 
members to common positions on unilateral declarations. Therefore, we see divided 
positions among EU members, OIC states, and even the members of ASEAN. 
3. Muslim countries’ reactions 
As has been the case in other international organisations, the OIC has not united around 
one position on Kosovo’s independence. Only 34 out of 57 (60%) of OIC member states 
have recognised Kosovo. The organisation lets its member states decide based on their 
national policies and interests (Chickrie, 2009). 
 
Kosovo believes the OIC has a strategic role. As the second largest multilateral 
organisation after the UN, the OIC is deemed important for Kosovo to expand and enhance 
its international standing (MFA-KS, 2014). Since 1996, the OIC Secretariat has supported 
Kosovo’s right to independence (Al-Hamid & Naffee, 2012). Further, the support which 
has been granted by OIC Secretary General, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, following Kosovo’s 
UDI, shows that the organisation has given importance to the recognition of Kosovo. The 
OIC’s support was further demonstrated with the visit of Ihsanoglu to Kosovo on 1-3 May 
2013 (TodaysZaman, 2013).  
 
Despite being a secular country and having a Western political orientation (Krasniqi, 
2011), Kosovo seems unable to override its demographic structure which is around 90% 
Muslim. In this case, religious affinity among Muslim states seems to have become a 
salient factor. Kosovan Prime Minister Hashim Tachi said that his country’s policies have 
been in conformity with Muslim countries’ general political stances. He emphasised that 
“Kosovo is determined to further strengthen its ties with the OIC in the next phase” (Al-
Hamid & Naffee, 2012).  Yet Kosovo’s aspiration to become a member of the OIC has 
been hampered by the OIC membership criteria which requires that every applicant state 
(candidate) should first be a member of the UN (Al-Hamid & Naffee, 2012).   
 
The OIC is rather unique as an international organisation compared to other regional and 
international organisations. Unlike the ASEAN Secretariat, for example, the OIC 
Secretariat has more power and authority. To some extent, the OIC Secretariat enjoys a 
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considerable role, authority and power vis-à-vis the OIC member states. Therefore, 
Kosovo is not misguided when frequently approaching the OIC Secretariat in seeking 
recognition of its independence. The succession of the OIC Secretary General from 
Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu (of Turkey) to Iyad Madani (Saudi Arabia) has not apparently 
changed the support of Kosovo by the OIC secretariat. This was indicated by Iyad 
Madani’s statement that: “We strongly believe that Kosovo should be an independent state. 
Our role in the OIC is to encourage more member states to recognize Kosovo. As 
Secretary General, I do not see any reason for any of the member states not to recognize 
Kosovo” (MFA-KS, 2014).  
 
In spite of relentless support by the OIC Secretariat, OIC member states are still divided 
with regard to the recognition of Kosovo. However, it is worth noting that among the 
earliest countries recognising Kosovo’s independence were some OIC member states, 
namely Afghanistan, Albania and Turkey on 18 February 2008 as well as Senegal on 19 
February 2008.  
 
Turkey actively encouraged other countries, in particular the OIC states and the Arab 
League member states, to recognise Kosovo’s independence (Albeu, 2011). There were a 
number of reasons why: first, it was deemed necessary to have the final status of Kosovo 
confirmed so as to create a lasting peace in the Balkans. Second, so long as there was no 
decisive final status and the process remained open-ended, the state-building reforms 
required by the international community could not be effectively conducted by Kosovo 
Albanians (Eralp, 2010). Turkey’s position toward Kosovo may be regarded as 
controversial considering that it has also faced the Kurdish secessionist movement. 
However, Turkey’s view on the uniqueness of the Kosovo case and its conviction that the 
independence of Kosovo would promote peace and stability in the Balkan region led the 
country to take such a stance (Eralp, 2010). 
 
Turkey’s decision to recognise Kosovo led to negative relations with Serbia, yet the 
relationship quickly recovered. The rapprochement between the two countries began with 
the visit of President Abdullah Gül to Belgrade in October 2009, where the two countries 
agreed to disagree on Kosovo. Serbia also pragmatically applied this position toward all 
countries recognising Kosovo’s independence (Bechev, 2012).  
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Besides playing an intermediary role in prompting more African countries to recognise 
Kosovo (Delisio, 2013), Turkey has seemingly become the most prominent country in the 
OIC to encourage other member states to recognise Kosovo's independence. At the OIC 
Summit in Dakkar in 2008, Turkey made significant efforts to have a strongly worded 
statement leading to the OIC's support of Kosovo. However, some OIC member countries 
such as Egypt, Indonesia, Sudan, and Azerbaijan strongly opposed the issuance of such a 
statement in the OIC Final Communiqué. As a result, the OIC only expressed its solidarity 
with the Kosovar people without lending clear support to Kosovo's independence and 
without encouraging other OIC member states to recognise that independence 
(TodaysZaman, 2008). 
 
Kosovo has utilised religious solidarity in its diplomatic approach toward Muslim 
countries. Religion and particularly Islamic identity have constituted central factors in 
shaping public opinion. Arab governments may have felt considerable pressure from their 
people to recognise Kosovo (Nassar, 2008). Kosovo has hoped that Arab countries might 
take the lead among states to recognise its independence. To that end, Kosovo conducted 
the Kosovo and Arab World Conference on 25th August 2008 (Foniqi-Kabashi, 2008). 
Kosovo has also enjoyed support from the Arab League. The Secretary General of the 
Arab League, Nabil Al-Araby stated that “the Arab League is determined to support the 
principle of self-determination, as part of the UN Charter, emphasising that Kosovo’s 
cause is supported by the Arab League Organization” (MFA-KS, 2013). At present, all 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and other major Arab countries such as Libya 
and Egypt have recognised Kosovo's independence (Kosovothanksyou, 2015).  
 
Compared to Libya and Egypt, Saudi Arabia was much quicker in recognising Kosovo, a 
step which it took in April 2009. It is not difficult to understand Saudi Arabia's position. 
As a staunch ally of the US in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has often followed US 
policies. The country tabled a draft calling for recognition of Kosovo at the OIC 
Ministerial Meeting in Damascus, Syria, in May 2009, and demanded that the 57 OIC 
member states immediately recognise Kosovo in the name of Muslim brotherhood. 
However, Saudi Arabia's manoeuvre was strongly opposed by Iran, Syria, Algeria and 
Egypt. The amendments in the resolution removing any call to recognise Kosovo indicated 
the failure of Saudi Arabia as a proponent of Kosovo's independence (b92, 2009). Yet 
Saudi Arabia has helped and supported Kosovars since the Kosovan conflict by assisting 
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refugees in the entire Kosovo region. In the post-war era, Saudi Arabia lent its substantial 
assistance to rebuilding schools, healthcare centres and mosques which were destroyed 
during the war. During his visit to Riyadh in June 2012, Prime Minister Thaci managed to 
secure Saudi Arabian financial assistance to develop his country’s roads, education and 
other fields (kryeministri-ks, 2012).  
 
Libya and Egypt’s long standing relations with Yugoslavia and domestic political 
situations may have delayed their recognition of Kosovo (Cigar & Clawson, 1999). During 
NATO's strikes, Libya and Serbia were steadfastly committed to maintaining their trade 
and economic relations. Serbians had been involved in running Libyan industry and their 
officers had also turned their hand to training Gaddafi's personal guards (Schwartz, 2002). 
Traditionally under Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein, Libya and Iraq had interests in the 
decline of US presence and influence, including in the Middle-East (Cigar & Clawson, 
1999). The position of Libya and Iraq on the role of the US in NATO’s response to the 
Kosovan crisis should be seen through this lens. Therefore, any attempts by Kosovar 
delegations to have Libya abandon its pro-Serbian stance were ignored during the Gaddafi 
era (The-Economist, 2011). Libya believed that the UNSC was the only viable place to 
find a comprehensive solution acceptable to all. As a non-permanent member of the UNSC 
in 2008-2009, Libya had consistently called on all parties to maintain communication 
channels and dialogue to solve the differences between Serbia and Pristina (UNSC, 2008a) 
 
Egypt did not immediately recognise Kosovo following the steps of the US and the EU. It 
argued that the issues of independence and recognition should be addressed by all involved 
parties in the UNSC. Along with Iran, Syria, Algeria and Azerbaijan, Egypt once again 
opposed an OIC resolution on Kosovo which called for Kosovo’s recognition in May 2009 
in Syria. Eventually, the resolution only welcomed the developments made during the first 
year of Kosovo’s independence, without actually calling for its independence (Chickrie, 
2009).  
 
Recognition from both Egypt and Libya came only after the Arab Spring hit these two 
countries and changed their respective regimes. Egypt recognized Kosovo’s independence 
in June 2013. Meanwhile, Libya's recognition was made on September 25, 2013, after a 
meeting between Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zidan and Kosovo's Prime Minister Hashim 
Tachi on the sidelines of the 68th UNGA in New York (Mzioudet, 2013). 
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As opposed to Libya and Egypt which shifted their policies towards Kosovo in the 
aftermath of regime change, another important member of the OIC, namely Iran, has 
continued with its non-recognition of Kosovo's independence. Here it is interesting to look 
at Iran’s early reaction to the Kosovo crisis prior to NATO's air strikes. When Serbia made 
initial moves against Albanian Kosovo in early 1998, the Iranian media systematically and 
continuously urged its country to cooperate with the West in seeking a resolution to the 
Kosovo conflict (Cigar & Clawson, 1999). However, this situation was totally changed in 
the aftermath of the Rambouillet Agreement in February 1999. The Iranian media urged 
that the Kosovo conflict be resolved through UN channels, and condemned any actions by 
NATO as inappropriate or unacceptable. When NATO's air strikes commenced, Iran 
immediately took a position similar to Russia and China, blaming NATO for its illegal 
actions and condemning them as violating international law (Cigar & Clawson, 1999).  
 
Anti-American sentiments and suspicions, especially during the Ahmadinejad 
administration, have been deeply entrenched in Iranian public opinion. Iranian leaders 
continue to consider the US and its allies as a threat to their regime and its national 
interests. The US military presence in the Middle East, the perceived US interest in Iranian 
regime change, and its support for Sunni Middle-Eastern countries and Israel have 
nurtured Iran’s threat perception towards the US and its allies (Kenneth Katzman, 2015). 
Iran’s rivalries with other countries identified as US allies in the Middle East continue to 
strengthen its relations with Russia. All these political realities have directly and indirectly 
influenced Iran’s non-recognition policy towards Kosovo's independence (Hafezi & 
Wroughton, 2015).  
4. Indonesia and the Kosovo issue 
Indonesian Muslim groups have, generally speaking, harboured fewer concerns about 
Kosovo compared to their interest in Bosnia, even when the Kosovo crisis reached its peak 
in the 1990s. The Kosovo issue might reasonably be expected to command the same 
attention among Indonesian Muslim groups as the Bosnian plight, as both suffered the 
effects of ethnic cleansing (Sihbudi, 2001a).  
 
What made a difference between Kosovo and Bosnia according to Indonesian Muslim 
groups was first that the West was more responsive to the Kosovo crisis than to the 
Bosnian conflict. The West made efforts to halt ethnic cleansing or human rights abuses by 
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the Milosevic regime against the Albanian Kosovars. Therefore, the atrocities by 
Milosevic were halted relatively sooner in Kosovo than had occurred in Bosnia (Sihbudi, 
2001a). The West's quick response helped diminish the suspicion of Indonesian militant 
Muslims towards the West. In Indonesia, hostile sentiment towards the West, mainly the 
US, was an effective tool for mobilising mass responses from Muslim groups.   
 
Second, the peak of the Kosovo conflict at the end of the 1990s coincided with Indonesia’s 
severe economic crisis, which in turn led to political turmoil within the state (Sihbudi, 
2001a). Therefore, at the height of the Kosovo crisis, all efforts were concentrated on 
overcoming domestic problems; including Indonesian diplomacy which was directed at 
supporting the country’s economic recovery. Consequently, Indonesian Muslims and the 
government were less attentive to international issues, including the Kosovo conflict which 
ordinarily would have raised their concerns. In addition, in 1999 Indonesia was occupied 
with a popular referendum on East Timor, and problems related to this referendum 
dominated its diplomatic efforts. 
 
The presence of the US and other Western states in Kosovo sparked a notable contrast 
between Indonesia and Malaysia, the two Southeast Asian countries with the largest 
Muslim populations. The West’s assistance to Kosovar Muslims in their fight against 
Christian Serbs appeared to stir up mixed feelings among Muslims internationally. These 
circumstances might have managed to reduce perceptions that the West was anti-Islam.  
 
Against such a background, Malaysia supported NATO's air strikes to prevent further 
threats to Kosovar Albanians. Malaysia regarded these strikes as distinct from US-led 
military actions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan which the Malaysian government had 
criticised. Malaysia's stance was described by Ambassador Hasmy Agam, Malaysia's 
Permanent Representative to the UN, as “a reluctant exception” to its traditional stance 
that all international security issues including those in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan should 
be addressed in the UN Security Council. Despite Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s 
sceptical feelings on the West’s keenness to protect Muslims, Malaysia supported NATO's 
military actions in Kosovo (Vinocur & Richardson, 1999).   
 
Meanwhile, Indonesia issued a statement condemning the bombing and urging the two 
parties to refrain from the use of force, discontinue violent actions, and to return to 
negotiation. Indonesia stressed the importance of negotiation as a way to settle the 
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problem, instead of through the use of weapons (Jakarta-Post, 1999a). Indonesia’s position 
seemed to be consistent from the beginning in the sense that the country emphasised the 
importance of renegotiation and respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Jakarta-Post, 1999a). Kosovo had not come under the 
spotlight in the Indonesian press and it had not been a serious concern for Indonesian 
Muslim groups, thus there was little pressure from society contributing to the shape of 
Indonesian policy on this issue. In this case, the government had relative freedom in 
shaping its position regarding NATO's airstrikes in Kosovo.  
 
Indonesia's position also reflected its concern over the violence and riots in the aftermath 
of East Timor's referendum which happened concurrently with the Kosovan crisis. In this 
regard, Jakarta had interests in shielding this violence from outside intervention (Vinocur 
& Richardson, 1999). Therefore, Indonesia's position and statement regarding NATO's 
bombing in Kosovo was in line with its national interests.  
 
The situation in Kosovo sparked a heated debate among Ministers attending the ASEAN 
Regional Forum in Singapore on July 26 1999. Among non-Western members of the ARF, 
some were concerned about NATO’s unilateral military operations in Kosovo. They were 
afraid of the erosion of basic international principles that possibly resonated in their 
region. The debate caused ‘a last minute hitch’ in finalising the Chairman’s Statement 
(Jakarta-Post, 1999b). Many compromises were achieved. Instead of expressing ‘regret’ 
for NATO's bombing, the statement only mentioned “concern with its wider implications”. 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas's intervention helped overcome the standoff on 
how the issue should be addressed in the ARF Chairman's Statement. Alatas made 
additions to the statement to specify that NATO's military action was intended to halt war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. Therefore, the issue was moved away from sole 
reference to the bombings against Yugoslavia, and toward concerns regarding human 
rights violations. The ARF Chairman's Statement affirmed support for the UN Charter and 
international law and called for a political settlement. The Indonesian delegation argued 
that in Kosovo's case, the UNSC had been pushed aside and that international society 
should pay attention. Besides acknowledging the human rights abuses by Yugoslavia, the 
Indonesian delegation firmly stated that NATO's military action was not in accordance 
with the UN Charter (Jakarta-Post, 1999b). 
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Ali Alatas's efforts to bring together opposing sides on the Kosovo issue for the sake of 
drafting the ARF Chairman's Statement were typical of Indonesia's point of view. The 
country has always tried to adopt a mediating position as long as the ideas have not 
directly touched its basic national interests. Many Indonesian observers have argued that 
Indonesia’s positions have not been firm enough. Indonesia’s non-confrontational or non-
hostile views were reflected in its position responding to NATO's bombing in Kosovo. 
Instead of using the word ‘condemn’, Indonesia chose ‘regret’ to express its disagreement 
with the US and its allies’ actions in Kosovo. Indonesia disagreed with these actions, 
arguing that they violated the basic principles of international law. Aside from criticising 
NATO, Indonesia also acknowledged the existence of human rights violations committed 
by the government of Yugoslavia (Jakarta-Post, 1999a, 1999b).  
 
To this point, the interplay between Indonesia’s state and society on the Kosovo issue has 
not been considered. In such a situation, the Indonesian government looked free to pursue 
a policy on the Kosovo crisis without any significant pressure from public opinion. The 
absence of a critical view from society with regard to NATO’s bombing in Kosovo placed 
the government as the sole or dominant actor in the foreign policy decision making 
process.  
 
This situation was very different from Indonesia's foreign policy behaviour in responding 
to the Bosnian crisis, in which pressures from Muslim groups were so strong. At that time, 
even the authoritarian regime of Suharto seemed, to some extent, to accommodate 
Indonesian Muslims' aspirations. The government was seen to have conducted some 
policies and actions which were in line with, or even pleasing to, domestic Islamic groups.  
 
With regard to the Bosnia issue, Indonesia supported the adoption of the OIC resolution 
calling on the UN to impose economic sanctions and also take military actions to bring an 
end to the war initiated by Serbia against Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the Chair of the 10th 
NAM Summit in Jakarta, from 1-6 September 1992, Indonesia spearheaded the issuance of 
the NAM Final Document which called for respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
and independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The same point was made in President 
Suharto’s intervention in the meeting on the necessity of upholding sovereignty and 
territorial integrity as well as preserving the cultural heritage of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Suharto himself instructed that Indonesia should adopt a more concrete policy toward 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina. Subsequently, the country recalled its ambassador to Yugoslavia, 
Sunjoto Pamungkas (Perwita, 2007). Further measures taken by Indonesia included 
sending 20 military observers and a 200-person medical detachment under the UN 
peacekeeping force (Suryadinata, 1995). Moreover, the visit of Suharto to Bosnia-
Herzegovina to offer good offices to conflicting parties and to help build a mosque in 
Sarajevo was hailed and celebrated by Indonesian Muslim groups as a manifestation of 
Indonesia’s strong support for the struggle of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Budiwanti, 2001; 
Perwita, 2007). Suharto’s policies on Bosnia-Herzegovina were interpreted and 
remembered as a form of accommodation of Muslim aspirations (interview with Mahfudz 
Siddiq, 25/11/2003).  
 
The post-Suharto regimes from Habibie to Megawati apparently did not have any concerns 
or clear policies towards Kosovo and Bosnia. A study by Budiwanti (2001) who conducted 
field research in Surabaya, Padang, Bandung and Yogyakarta in 2001 has confirmed this 
view. According to Budiwanti (2001), respondents realised that the government had been 
preoccupied with domestic problems politically and economically in the aftermath of the 
1998 political and economic crisis. Rather than observing or playing a role in crises or 
conflicts abroad, Indonesia was busy handling its own separatist and communal conflicts 
in Aceh, Ambon, Kalimantan, Poso and other regions. Consequently, Indonesia under 
Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid afforded less time to considering regional and 
international concerns, including the Kosovo crisis, and focused instead on domestic 
concerns.   
5. Indonesia’s middle-ground position on Kosovo’s independence 
Non-permanent member status in the UNSC in the period of 2007 to 2008 required 
Indonesia to be involved in debates regarding Kosovo’s issues. Indonesia also sent a 
representative to join the UNSC mission to Kosovo between the 25th and 28th of April, 
2007. The mission aimed to provide the UNSC with first hand information on the situation 
in Kosovo (UNSC, 2007a). Prior to Kosovo’s independence, Indonesia faced a dilemma 
regarding its own position. This dilemma was observed by a leading political scientist 
from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Ikrar Nusa Bhakti. He said that support of 
Kosovo’s right to independence had been mandated by the 1945 Constitution, noting that 
Kosovars suffered gross human rights violations. On the other hand, supporting the 
independence of Kosovo could challenge Indonesia’s own territorial integrity (Jakarta-
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Post, 2007). According to Damien Kingsbury, Indonesia would experience an adverse 
impact on its two separatist-prone regions of Aceh and Papua if it supported the proposal 
of Kosovo’s independence in the UNSC. For Indonesia, national integrity has always been 
a sensitive issue. However, Kingsbury’s comments were rejected by Hikmawanto Juwana, 
an international law expert from the University of Indonesia. He said that Indonesia’s 
support for the proposal of Kosovo’s independence would not have a destabilising effect 
on its own territorial integrity (Jakarta-Post, 2007).  
 
Such a situation led Indonesia to take a very cautious stance during talks on the final status 
of Kosovo. In early 2007, Foreign Affairs officials seemed reluctant to reveal the country’s 
position. Wirajuda stated that “we haven’t made any decisions as we are still discussing it” 
(Jakarta-Post, 2007). Having a dilemma with regard to its domestic affairs, Indonesia 
showed hesitation when faced with such a complicated situation. Despite its 
indecisiveness, the country tended to stand on Serbia’s side. This tendency boosted 
Serbia’s optimism that Indonesia would vote against any plan or proposal for Kosovo’s 
independence. Indonesia had indicated its belief in the importance of respecting the 
territorial integrity of states (Ker-Lindsay, 2009, p. 4). A meeting between Indonesia’s 
Foreign Minister and the Indonesian parliament on 8 October 2007 revealed the country’s 
recognition of the sui-generis nature of Kosovo’s case, its view on the necessity for 
dialogues supporting a comprehensive settlement acceptable to all, and its emphasis on 
territorial integrity as its temporary position until the both parties had reached a  
comprehensive settlement (Deplu, 2007b).  
 
Indonesia’s undecided position came to the fore when the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo, 
Martti Ahtisaari visited Jakarta for consultations with the Indonesian government as a 
member of the UNSC in April 2007. After the consultation, a presidential spokesperson 
stated that President Yudhoyono had not given any commitment to Ahtisaari’s 
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (the Ahtisaari Plan) that 
envisioned supervised independence for Kosovo. Indonesia would monitor the situation 
and listen to other countries’ views whilst waiting for the results of the UN mission visit to 
Pristina, Kosovo in May 2007 (Tempo, 2007).  
 
In a meeting with the US, EU, and Russian Troika in early 2007, Wirajuda raised the idea 
of delaying Kosovo’s final status which was linked with a promise to grant EU 
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membership to Serbia. According to Wirajuda, it would be a much less sensitive issue if all 
parties, namely Serbia or Croatia or even Kosovo, became members of the EU. It would be 
better if the EU did not issue threats but rather offered incentives to Serbia in relation to 
the country’s desire to join the EU. However, this idea was taken up by the EU. Wirajuda 
believed that if the Ahtisaari plan had been pushed through, it would likely have been 
vetoed by Russia (Kemlu, 2010). Eventually, the UNSC declined to endorse the Ahtisaari 
plan in July 2007 (Weller, 2008)  
 
Soon after Kosovo’s UDI, Indonesia issued a statement containing the following points: 
First, Indonesia’s emphasis on the importance of respecting the national and territorial 
integrity of every UN member state as enshrined in the UN Charter and basic principles of 
international law. Second, Indonesia’s mindfuness on the issue of Kosovo, which it 
regarded as a unique case considering the territorial and ethnic aspects of the break-up of 
the former Yugoslavia. Third, the country’s emphasis on the necessity of dialogue and 
negotiations to reach a final status for Kosovo, which if agreed by all parties could avoid 
the possibility of any new conflicts and tensions. However, Indonesia noted its regret 
regarding the failure of dialogue between conflicting parties which led to the unilateral 
declaration of Kosovo’s independence. Fourth, Indonesia was not yet in a position to 
recognise Kosovo’s independence but would follow developments very closely (KBRI-
Belgrade, 2008). 
 
The country’s statement reflected its middle-ground position on independence. While 
Indonesia had not ruled out recognition in the future, it was concerned about the 
implications of independence and did not wish to endorse Kosovo’s statehood in the 
meantime. Such a position had been also embraced by countries like China, Brazil, India 
and South Africa which had refrained from expressing a strong position one way or 
another (Ker-Lindsay, 2009, p. 4).   
 
As the world’s largest Muslim country, Indonesia had been expected by Kosovo to take its 
side. During a 2013 Helsinki meeting on strengthening the roles of religious leaders in 
mediation and conflict resolution, Kosovo’s Vice Foreign Minister Petrit Selimi told Din 
Syamsuddin, the Chairman of Muhammadiyah, that Kosovo needed Indonesia to recognise 
its independence. The basis of Kosovo’s plea was the fact that it is a Muslim country like 
Indonesia. Kosovo viewed Indonesia as a strategic country in the OIC and NAM (Aminah 
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& Festiani, 2013). Kosovars believed there were no legal or political reasons for any 
countries, especially OIC countries, not to recognise Kosovo’s independence (Arabbews, 
2013). Besides approaches from Kosovo, Indonesia had also been lobbied by other 
countries of the OIC. The Organising Committee Chairman of the Asian Parliamentary 
Assembly (APA), Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed of Pakistan, urged Indonesia to 
recognise Kosovo’s independence in a meeting with President Jokowi in December 2014, 
as it was in line with rights of self-determination (Daily-Times, 2014). 
 
In response to such requests, Indonesia usually employs its rhetorical position that it is still 
following developments in Kosovo and will look closely at Kosovo’s request, and that it is 
not impossible for Indonesia to recognise Kosovo at an appropriate time in the future. Such 
a statement was made by Yudhoyono at a question and answer session during his lecture at 
the London School of Economics (LSE) in March 2009. Wirajuda also expressed similar 
views to the above statement when meeting with Kosovo’s Foreign Minister in New York 
in September 2009 (Kosovothanksyou, 2009).   
 
Indonesia’s response to Serbian lobbying has been similar. This lobbying has been 
conducted not only by the executive but also by parliament and civil society (particularly 
religious) leaders. After meeting with Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs (2009-2014) 
Marty Natalegawa on 19 March 2013, the Speaker of the Serbian Parliament, Neboja 
Stefanovic, said that his country received assurances that Indonesia will “continue to 
support the resolution of the Kosovo issue through dialogue, peaceful means and in line 
with international law and UN conventions” (b.92, 2013a).  Previously Indonesia also 
supported the resolution sponsored by Serbia to bring the case to the International Court of 
Justice (b.92, 2008). During a bilateral interfaith dialogue between Indonesia and Serbia in 
Jakarta in October 2013, the Serbian delegation urged Indonesia not to recognise Kosovo’s 
independence. Such a non-political forum was utilised by Serbia to express its political 
interests (Amrullah, 2013). But Indonesia’s policy favouring Serbia’s position was not 
solely because of Serbia’s approaches or lobbying. According to Mohammad Fachir, a 
high-level official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is impossible for Serbia to dictate 
or influence Indonesia’s policy to support or not to support Kosovo’s independence 
(Amrullah, 2013).  
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Indonesia’s position seemed clearer in a forum like the OIC which has expected its 
members to recognise Kosovo’s independence. Indonesia had opposed the adoption of a 
document supporting Kosovo’s declaration of independence during the OIC Summit in 
Dakar, Senegal in March 2008. This document was proposed by Turkey (TodaysZaman, 
2008). At the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Kampala in June 2008, 
Indonesia, together with Azerbaijan, Egypt and Algeria, once again opposed the 
recognition of Kosovo as an independent state (KosovaPress, 2008). Indonesia supports a 
peaceful settlement approach to Kosovo’s issue. Indonesia has suggested bringing the 
problem back to the framework of UNSC resolution 1244, respecting the territorial 
integrity of Serbia. 
6. Debating Indonesia’s position: The government vis-à-vis Muslim groups 
Kosovo’s independence is widely promoted by Muslim groups in Indonesia, mainly from 
Muslim moderate groups, especially Muhammadiyah and MUI. MUI’s chairman, Ma’ruf 
Amin repeatedly called for the government to recognise Kosovo. MUI’s suggestion was 
based on the fact that Kosovo is a Muslim majority country and that it has already been 
recognised by many countries. MUI channelled this aspiration to DPR and MPR in order 
to put pressure on the government. As a member of the Presidential Advisory Council, 
Ma’ruf Amin would also use his position to forward MUI’s concerns to the President. 
Meanwhile, the Deputy Chairman of MUI on Foreign Affairs, Muhyiddin Djunaidi said 
that MUI would conduct a series of meetings with experts in the field to discuss the 
recognition of Kosovo (Triyudha, 2011). On some occasions, MUI has received visits from 
Kosovan delegations such as Kosovo’s mufti (religious leader), Rexhep Boja who visited 
Indonesia in August 2011. On this occasion, MUI had also arranged a meeting between 
Rexhep Boja and the chairman of DPR and MPR (MUI, 2011). During their visits, 
Kosovan delegations have raised Islamic solidarity sentiments with their Indonesian 
Muslim brothers. In Jakarta, Mufti Rexhep Bojasaid that recognition from the Islamic 
world is very meaningful as it provides significantmoral support for Kosovo’s people 
(MUI, 2011).   
 
MUI has recognised Kosovo as an independent state (MUI, 2011). It argues that the case 
of Kosovo is unique, different from secessionism as it is commonly understood, and that 
the Indonesian government’s fear of inflaming domestic secessionism is unfounded 
(interview with Muhyiddin Djunaidi, 5/10/2013). An international law expert, Hikmahanto 
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Juwana also holds such an opinion. He argues that there was no reason to delay 
recognition of Kosovo’s independence as it meets all the requirements to become an 
independent state. He believes that the cases of Kosovo and Papua are very different, and 
that “Serbia perpetrated genocide on Kosovo while alleged human rights violations in 
Papua remain rumors” (Khalik, 2008). According to Juwana, the government should not be 
worried that recognition of Kosovo will encourage demands from Indonesia’s restive 
regions to have independence. He believes that other countries such as the US will not 
support any separatist movements in Indonesia as they explicitly express their support for 
Indonesia’s territorial integrity (Indarini, 2008).     
 
Meanwhile, NU showed its support for Kosovo’s independence by inviting Kosovo 
delegates to attend the 3rd International Conference for Islamic Scholars (ICIS) in Jakarta 
in 2008. According to NU, the invitation was not intended as a form of pressure on the 
Indonesian government but was out of sympathy for Kosovo’s independence claim. NU’s 
chairman, K.H. Hasyim Muzadi said the recognition of the independence of Kosovo is the 
domain of the government. As an Islamic organisation NU only welcomed Kosovo’s 
independence because the majority of its population are Muslims. He added that Kosovo 
Muslims would be safer if Kosovo was an independent state (NU-Online, 2008). 
Meanwhile, NU’s vice chairman K.H. Said Agil Siraj, who is the NU’s chairman in the 
periods of 2010-2015 and 2015-2020, made a stronger statement saying that the 
government must recognise Kosovo in order for Muslims in the territory to live peacefully 
(Novel & Nuol, 2008).  However, as time passed without the government showing any 
sign of recognising Kosovo, both Hasyim Muzadi and Agil Siraj became more silent. 
Muzadi believed that Kosovo’s case should be looked at in terms of the requirements and 
processes to become a state. If these two elements have been met, he argued, there is no 
reason for the government not to recognise Kosovo (interview with Hasyim Muzadi, 
29/12/2013). Meanwhile, Agil Siraj sees Kosovo’s problem as an internal one and 
advocates not interfering with the domestic affairs of other countries. If there are human 
rights violations and crimes against humanity, Siraj argues that those should be condemned 
and Indonesia should intettrvene to help overcome the problem (interview with Said Agil 
Siraj, 11/11/2013).   
 
If NU has indicated a shift of attitude, Muhammadiyah has been consistent, persistent and 
determined to support Kosovo’s independence. According to the chairman of 
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Muhammadiyah, Din Syamsuddin, there are at least three reasons why the government 
should support and recognise Kosovo. First, it is in line with Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution 
stipulating that independence is the right of all nations. Thus, colonisation should be 
eliminated. Second, 96% of Kosovars are Muslims (Jakarta-Post, 2012).  As the country 
with the world’s largest Muslim population, Indonesia’s support for Kosovo’s 
independence is needed (MuslimDaily, 2013). Third, the number of countries recognising 
Kosovo’s independence has increased over time. Great powers such as the US, most of the 
EU member states, and NATO members, have all recognised Kosovo (myQuran, 2011). 
The ICJ advisory opinion stating that the declaration of Kosovo’s independence did not 
violate international law further strengthens the necessity for Indonesia to recognise 
Kosovo (Puji, 2011) .  
 
Din Syamsuddin contends that recognition is a manifestation of supporting brothers in the 
Islamic faith. Muhammadiyah has made various endeavours to urge the Indonesian 
government to recognise Kosovo’s independence (Agung  Sasongko, 2013). 
Muhammadiyah has also approached the government and parliament to address this 
matter. It has accompanied delegates from Kosovo to meetings with the country’s 
parliament members and officials. On 10 August 2011, Din Syamsuddin accompanied 
Rexhep Bajo, Kosovo’s Presidential Special Envoy and former Mufti of Kosovo, to have a 
meeting with the Vice Speaker for International Affairs, Priyo Budi Santosa from the 
Golkar Party and the head of Indonesian Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation Board (BKSAP), 
Sidharto Danusubroto from PDIP.  In the aftermath of the meeting, Priyo Budi Santoso 
said that parliament regretted the government’s position which did not yet recognise 
Kosovo. According to Priyo Budi Santosa, to at least some extent, parliament understands 
the government’s position due to its concern about separatism. However, he said Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence was not a form of separatism, but a struggle for independence 
as it had been colonised (DPR, 2011).  
 
Priyo also questioned why the Indonesian government did not make a decision when the 
ICJ issued its advisory opinion on Kosovo. He thought that Indonesia should recognise 
Kosovo as it is mandated by the country’s constitution, and noted the parliaments of 
Indonesia and Kosovo had agreed to enhance cooperation in various fields (DPR, 2011).   
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Muhammadiyah also facilitated a meeting between Rexhep Boja and the leaders of the 
MPR, namely: Taufiq Kiemas (speaker), Farhan Hamid (vice speaker), Hajriyanto Y. 
Thohari (vice speaker), and Lukman Syaifudin (vice speaker), on 10 August 2011. In a 
response to Kosovo’s request, MPR sent a letter to Yudhoyono suggesting that the 
government recognise Kosovo in line with the 1945 Constitution stating that independence 
is the right of all nations (Puji, 2011). Muhammadiyah had many times facilitated such 
meetings. The most recent one was between Ahmet Shala, the Ambassador of Kosovo to 
Japan with MPR’s current chairman, Zulkifli Hasan, on 24 November 2014. The meeting 
was held after Ahmet Sala attended the 5th World Peace Forum held by Muhammadiyah in 
Jakarta, on 20-23 November 2014.  In this meeting, Din Syamsuddin mentioned that MPR 
under the chairmanship of the late Taufiq Kiemas supported and recognised Kosovo’s 
independence. In a response, Zulkifli Hasan stated that independence is the right of all 
nations. Therefore, there was no reason for the government not to recognise Kosovo 
(MPR, 2014). 
 
To gather support for Kosovo’s independence, Muhammadiyah also conducted a Seminar 
on “Mengapa tidak mengakui Kosovo” (Why not recognise Kosovo)? in Jakarta on 16 
May 2013. The seminar was attended by academics, the embassies of Serbia, Russia, and 
Syria, members of parliaments, MUI, NGOs, students, and others (Al-Intima, 2013). The 
seminar was aimed at opening ‘the eyes of the government’ and looking at the real 
situation to identify how important it was to recognise Kosovo. Din Syamsuddin had been 
invited several times by the President of Kosovo, Atifete Jahjaga, to look closely at the 
situation in Kosovo and the development of Islam there (Muhammadiyah, 2013).  In his 
first meeting with Atifete Jahjaga at Kosovo’s presidential palace on 17 May 2012, he 
expressed Muhammadiyah’s full support for Kosovo, and promised his organisation would 
forge cooperation with its people. Muhammadiyah offered scholarships to Kosovan 
students who wished to study in universities belonging to Muhammadiyah. While 
welcoming Muhammadiyah’s offer and support, the President of Kosovo explained that 
she expected the government of Indonesia to recognise her country. Taking into account 
Indonesia’s strategic position in the Muslim world, its recognition would be followed by 
other states (Muhammadiyah, 2012). Din Syamsuddin had a meeting with President 
Atifete Jahjaga and Foreign Affairs Minister Enver Hoxhaj after he delivered a speech at a 
seminar in Kosovo, on 25th and 26th of May 2013. The President of Kosovo once again 
expressed her hopes that Indonesia would recognise Kosovo in an effort to create world 
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peace and under the aegis of Islamic solidarity (Akbar, 2013). On several occasions, Din 
Syamsuddin also met with Kosovo officials including Kosovo’s Vice Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Petrit Selimi in Helsinki in January 2013 to discuss the development and 
recognition of Kosovo (Aminah & Festiani, 2013) .  
 
Din Syamsuddin’s close connection and interaction with Kosovars may have led 
Muhammadiyah to commit to promoting the independence of Kosovo and urging the 
government to recognise it. Another factor is somewhat more primordial: Muhammadiyah 
perceived that Kosovo was historically and ethnically different from Serbia and therefore 
constituted a single entity entitled to be an independent state. As 96% of Kosovo’s 
population is Muslim, Muhammadiyah—as an Islamic organisation—felt an obligation to 
take care of the situation and the fate of Kosovars (MuslimDaily, 2013). According to 
Saleh Daulay, the chairman of the Muhammadiyah Youth, Muhammadiyah had an interest 
in ensuring that humanitarian freedoms could be employed by Kosovars. This organisation 
also saw the geographically strategic position of Kosovo as a Muslim country that lay on 
the European continent (interview with Saleh Daulay, 10/10/2013).  
 
The consistency of Muhammadiyah has continued. On several occasions through mass 
media, Din Syamsuddin has urged the Jokowi administration to recognise Kosovo. He was 
optimistic that the government would recognise Kosovo as Jokowi had different views on 
implementing the free and independent foreign policy principle to Yudhoyono. 
Yudhoyono’s ‘million friends, zero enemy’ foreign policy approach may have hindered his 
administration’s recognition of Kosovo. With such a foreign policy platform, 
Yudhoyono’s external actions often showed indecisiveness, including on the topic of 
Kosovo’s independence (Akhmad, 2014). Under Jokowi, Indonesia is expected by 
Muhammadiyah to breakthrough this indecisiveness and deal with the Kosovo issue 
(Akhmad, 2014). At the 5th World Peace Forum (WPF), Muhammadiyah also urged 
participants to support Kosovo. As expected, the efforts of Muhammadiyah did not go 
smoothly and many participants opposed the initiative. Serbia’s ambassador walked out 
when seeing Kosovo’s flag in the forum. Eventually, he came back during the lunch break 
and sat next to Kosovo’s ambassador to Japan who attended the forum as a participant  
(Friastuti, 2014). 
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The Indonesian government’s position on Kosovo has been questioned by members of 
parliament including legislators from Islamic parties and also by nationalist parties such as 
the Golkar Party. Mahfudz Siddiq from PKS who has been the chairman of Commission I 
of DPR said that his commission had met twice with Foreign Minister Natalegawa to 
discuss the Kosovo issue. The Commission endorsed the government to recognise Kosovo, 
yet it received a noncommittal response which suggested that to  recognise Kosovo’s 
independence encouraged separatism (Amri & Dewi, 2013). The government’s fear was 
also suggested by Mahfudz Siddiq who claimed it was greatly worried about Papua. The 
fear of other countries’ support for separatism in Indonesia prevented the government from 
recognising Kosovo. Papua had thus become an obstacle for Indonesian diplomacy 
(interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, 25/11/2013).  
 
Another member of parliament, Hidayat Nurwahid from PKS, argued that Indonesia’s 
attitude towards Kosovo does not reflect the country’s identity as the the world’s most 
populous Muslim state. The government’s approach has been conventional: avoiding 
interfering with the internal affairs of other countries so as to prevent other countries from 
interfering in the internal affairs of Indonesia. However, according to Hidayat Nurwahid, 
the government has been excessively worried about its separatist problems. He claims that 
Indonesia will benefit if it recognises Kosovo and gets closer to the mainstream OIC 
countries and those Western countries that have already recognised Kosovo. Hidayat 
contends that the government’s position is different from the aspirations of both Muslim 
groups and the parliament. He argues that separatism concerns should not hamper 
Indonesia’s recognition. Many recognising states such as Turkey and some Gulf countries 
also face problems related to separatism (interview with Hidayat Nurwahid, 2/12/2013). 
Another Islamic party, PBB even issued an official statement which regretted the 
reluctance of the government to recognise Kosovo. Together with other Islamic 
components, the party steadfastly urges the government to support Kosovo (Gaffas, 2008). 
 
Meanwhile, Hajriyanto Thohari from Golkar argues that there is no reason for Indonesia 
not to recognise Kosovo’s independence, and that Kosovo has had the right to 
independence since it experienced human right violations in the 1990s. According to 
Thohari, there are two reasons why Indonesia should recognise the independence of 
Kosovo: First, the 1945 constitution condemns all forms of colonialism and oppression. 
Second, Indonesia as the world’s largest Muslim democracy should defend oppressed 
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nations such as Kosovo. Kosovo’s status as a moderate Muslim country should also 
encourage Indonesia to support it (BeritaSore, 2008).  The government’s position was also 
questioned by another nationalist party politician from PDS (Prosperous Peaceful Party), 
Jeffry Massie. He criticised the slow response and unclear position of the government 
noting that the US and most of the EU states had recognised Kosovo (IndonesiaMatters, 
2008).  Another politician from Golkar, Tantowi Yahya objected to the government’s fears 
about Kosovo’s effect on Papua. He argued that the background and the problem of 
Kosovo is different from Papua (Adamrah, 2010).  
 
However, in general, the parliament has not had one voice on Kosovo.  The speaker of 
DPR has given his support to Serbia. He said that “Indonesia will continue to support 
Serbia’s commitment to resolving the issue of Kosovo and Metohija through peaceful 
means and dialogue” (b.92, 2013b). Other lawmakers from nationalist parties such as Dian 
A. Syakhroza from PD and Murady Darmansjah from Hanura Party have supported the 
government’s position. They stated that supporting Kosovan claims to independence could 
benefit secessionist groups in Indonesia. These groups could use Indonesia’s support as an 
argument to demand or even to unilaterally declare their independence from the state 
(Asia-PacificNews, 2008).   
 
Some leading Islamic scholars such as Azyumardi Azra and Bachtiar Effendy have also 
urged the government to recognise Kosovo. Azra has argued that more than five years 
since its independence, Kosovo has not been referenced by any separatist movements in 
the world.  With this argument, he argued that the government’s view that the recognition 
of Kosovo can strengthen separatist movements in the country is questionable and 
debatable (Azra, 2013). Meanwhile, Bachtiar suggested there was an indecisive and 
unclear position of the government due to Yudhoyono’s million friends and zero enemies 
foreign policy. This lack of foreign policy assertiveness has left Indonesia behind in 
grabbing international momentum, including in the case of Kosovo. According to Bachtiar, 
the existence of Kosovo as a state is irreversible and the trend of recognising states has 
steadily increased. Bachtiar has warned the government not to become the 197th out of 198 
recognising states in the world (MuslimDaily, 2013).  
 
The government remains robust in its position and is reluctant to bow to the suggestions, 
advice, and pressure from Muslim organisations and academe. The Indonesian government 
156 
 
has never explicitly explained its position on separatist problems. Nor has it referred to the 
1945 Constitution stipulating that independence is the right of all nations. Instead, 
Indonesia has consistently urged concerned parties to abide by international law such as 
resolution 1244 and to find a comprehensive settlement through dialogue and peaceful 
means. Such a consistent position can be traced through Indonesia’s Permanent UN 
Representative’s statements on Kosovo during its non-permanent membership of the 
UNSC (PTRI, 2008).  Even when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted a Foreign 
Policy Breakfast in May 2007 as an effort to gather input from domestic stakeholders, 
Wirajuda did not explicitly mention the possible implications of the Kosovo issue for 
Indonesia secessionism. He stated that “sensitivity of the issue for Indonesia is if the case 
is seen from the principle of respecting territorial and national integrity as well as its 
consequence. It is difficult to give such huge authority to the UN to decide a part of 
territories of an independent state to become an independent entity” (Kemlu, 2010, p. 153). 
It seems that the Foreign Policy Breakfast was conducted to anticipate domestic reactions 
to the country’s involvement in the talks on Kosovo as a non-permanent member of the 
UNSC. The government was keen to prevent Muslim groups reacting in anger. 
 
In not referring to the 1945 Constitution the Indonesian government appears to be 
concerned that Kosovo has seceded from Serbia. The assumption is that the government 
has not considered Kosovo as a colonised entity like proponents of recognition have 
deemed it. Consequently, in the view of the Indonesian government, Kosovo does not have 
the right to independence unless there is consent from Serbia as the mother state. Unlike 
Muhammadiyah and other Kosovo recognition proponents, the government does not use 
the 1945 constitution as their reference point in looking at this case. This is different from 
in the case of Palestine, which is discussed in Chapter Six. Both the government and other 
stakeholders including Muslim groups have referred to the 1945 Constitution as the basis 
of Indonesia’s policy towards Palestine.  
 
Avoidance of the use of the term of ‘separatism’ has not diminished suspicions that the 
Indonesian separatist problem is the main reason for the government’s position. The author 
believes Indonesian public opinion got it right when contending that the separatist problem 
has been a determining factor for Indonesia’s policy towards Kosovo. According to former 
Foreign Minister Wirajuda, Indonesia’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence would 
violate the general principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Separatist 
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movements in the country could take momentum as a result of such a policy (interview 
with Hassan Wirajuda, 18/12/ 2013). Generally, the ‘objection’ to recognising Kosovo’s 
independence is a fundamental and principled position. When Jusuf Kalla was approached 
by Martti Ahtisaari and Prime Minister of Erdogan of Turkey asking Indonesia to support 
Kosovo’s independence, he objected to it. His reason for this was that Indonesia had just 
recently settled Aceh and was facing a separatist movement in Papua (interview with Jusuf 
Kalla, 4/12/2013). The government may be worried that if that principled position is not 
strongly enforced there will be repercussions for Indonesia’s national integrity.   
 
This concern was explained to the author by Wirajuda in referring to his discussion about 
Kosovo with the British Foreign Minister David Miliband. Miliband suggested not 
worrying about the repercussions of Kosovo for Indonesia’s separatist problems, and 
claimed that states like the UK would not decline their support for Indonesia’s territorial 
integrity. However, when Foreign Minister Wirajuda asked Miliband whether his 
statement could be relied on given that some British MPs have supported an international 
parliamentarian caucus for West Papua, Miliband could not respond. If the aspirations 
from British society and parliament were to increase, it might be possible for the British 
government to change its position.  After such a response, David Miliband was apparently 
left speechless (interview with Hassan Wirajuda, 18/12/ 2013).  
 
It is interesting that Muslim groups and intellectuals explicitly refer to national interests as 
a part of their argument. When attending a seminar on Indonesia’s position on Kosovo on 
23 November 2013 at the DPR’s building, the author got the impression that almost all of 
the speakers and participants, consisting of university students in Jakarta, supported the 
recognition of Kosovo. However, most of the speakers and participants also stated that 
recognition was important for the sake of Indonesia’s national interests. National interests 
in this context were interpreted as the implementation of the preamble of the 1945 
Constitution which stipulates that independence is the right of a nation which 
accommodates societal aspirations, especially among Muslim groups. They stated that 
supporting efforts to free a country from colonialism as was the case with the recognition 
of Kosovo is mandated by the 1945 Constitution. Therefore, the recognition of Kosovo 
was considered a form of striving for national interests.  
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The concept of national interest is very vague and therefore can easily be exploited and 
misused, particularly by politicians (Frankel, 1970; Griffiths, O'Callaghan, & Roach, 
2002). If the motives of the government are pushed by the necessity to maintain national 
territorial integrity, this can be viewed as a vital national strategic interest. Vital national 
strategic interests are supposed to have priority (Nye, 1999).  The author argues that 
maintaining territorial integrity can be said to be the most important national interest of 
Indonesia. Jusuf Kalla, Wirajuda and Foreign Affairs officials view such a national interest 
as a fundamental position that the country should strive for.  
 
The gap between the supporters of Kosovo’s recognition and the government may be 
encouraged by a lack of information about the country’s position. Foreign Ministry 
officials did not attend seminars on Kosovo held by Muhammadiyah on 16 May 2013 and 
by the Inter-parliamentarian Cooperation Board (BKSAP) on 23 November 2013 despite 
the fact that they were invited. The Ministry seems to prefer avoidance to direct 
information dissemination to audiences. There is also the impression that foreign affairs 
officials seemed to be avoiding public discussion on Kosovo in the aftermath of 
itsdeclaration of independence. This happened because of sensitivity surrounding the issue 
as well as the inclination of the public to question the government’s position (interview 
with an official from MFA, 19/12/2013). Yet, as aforementioned, before the declaration of 
Kosovo’s independence the government made an effort to have discussions on the matter 
with domestic stakeholders when the ministry held a Foreign Policy Breakfast in May 
2007 (Kemlu, 2010). Likewise, a foreign affairs official, Dr Desra Percaya, was a speaker 
at a discussion on Kosovo held by Muhammadiyah’s Centre for Dialogue and Cooperation 
among Civilisations (CDCC) on 22 July 2007 (Merdeka, 2007). However, in the aftermath 
of the declaration of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008, officials of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs have seemed to prefer not to attend public seminars on Kosovo.  
 
The Indonesian government has been persistent in its position. Aside from the 
government’s perception that the recognition policy towards Kosovo is related to a 
principle and fundamental position on territorial integrity, other factors may have 
contributed to its stance. First, the magnitude of public pressure was not so great. Only 
Muhammadiyah was consistent with their views on the Kosovo issue, while other 
organisations such as NU were no any longer urging the government to make decisions in 
favour of Kosovo’s independence. Islamic Youth organisations have been silent. Only Al-
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Irsyad Youth prior to Kosovo’s independence was concerned about the matter (Al-Irsyad, 
2012). Likewise, militant organisations have also been silent. Only HTI showed its 
concerns about the Kosovo issue through an article on its website, instead of conducting 
street protests like it usually would be inclined to do (HTI, 2008). Yet, HTI did support the 
independence of Kosovo (interview with HTI’s spokesperson, Ismail Yusanto, 9/12/2013). 
Like HTI, other militant Muslim groups may face a dilemma over the US and Western role 
in Kosovo. The Kosovo issue may not be strong enough to consolidate power among their 
followers. The absence of militant groups’ pressures may contribute to the relative absence 
of coverage in the mass media as the way militants express their goals are typically much 
more attractive to journalists than that of the moderate groups. The relative absence of 
major coverage has contributed to the lack of wider support from Indonesian Muslims. So 
far there has been no strong pressure from the parliament and/or huge demonstrations from 
Muslim groups against the government’s position towards Kosovo (Azra, 2013). 
Consequently the situation has not put the government under major pressure.  
 
Second, the level of urgency of the Kosovo case must be measured. Indonesian Muslims 
may view Kosovo as less urgent than Palestine and Bosnia (interview with Bachtiar 
Effendy, 4/10/2013). The Kosovo issue has not attracted considerable attention from 
Indonesian Muslims at large. They were apparently not well informed about the Kosovo 
issue (Kemlu, 2010). This situation had led to a low level of protest among Indonesian 
Muslim groups with regard to the Kosovo issue. The low level of protest has brought about 
the relative absence of real political convergence among various domestic groups. In this 
context, the interests of political elites have not converged with Muslim groups and their 
followers at the grass-root level (interview with Iis Gindarsah, 14/10/2013). As political 
elites in parliament and most Islamic organisations’ followers at the grass-root level have 
not apparently considered Kosovo as an urgent issue, major pressure on the government 
has not been established. Consequently, the government’s position on Kosovo has not had 
any meaningful challenges from society.  
 
Third, Indonesia’s non-recognition of Kosovo has not damaged or lessened its relations 
with countries that are the main supporters of Kosovo’s independence, such as the US, the 
EU states, and other OIC member states. On the other hand, the country’s political 
relations with Serbia have been significantly enhanced despite the decline of trade 
relations in the last five years. The trade relations accounted for US$6.05 million in 2008. 
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However from year to year both countries’ trade transactions have declined, reaching the 
lowest point in 2011, namely US$1.14 million. Yet, the trend has rebounded since 2012. 
The trade transaction amounted to US$1.18 million in 2012 and US$2.49 million in 2013 
(Kemlu, 2013). The Serbian government also actively lobbied Indonesia to support its 
position on Kosovo. The Indonesian-Serbian Bilateral Interfaith Dialogue in Jakarta on 23-
26 October 2013 included the political interests of Serbia. In his October 2013 lecture 
before the graduate students of the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) in 
Jakarta, Serbian Mufti Muhammad Jusuf Pahic said that it is prohibited (haram) to support 
Kosovar Muslims who secceded (i’tizal) from the legitimate state and government of 
Serbia (Azra, 2013).  
7. Conclusion 
The above discussion shows us that the aspirations of some Muslim groups in Indonesia 
have been discounted by the government as they are perceived to confront the most central 
national interest. The government regards issues relating to territorial integrity as a 
fundamental and principal position which is non-negotiable. Although Indonesia’s 
decision to delay recognition of Kosovo has been called unclear, and indecisive by its 
critics, the government’s position, the author believes, is precisely consistent. It has 
unfailingly called for the upholding of international law and respect for territorial integrity, 
and for settling the problem peacefully through dialogue and diplomatic channels. 
Meanwhile, Muslim groups, especially Muhammadiyah, have criticised the inconsistency 
of the government’s position regarding the 1945 Constitution. The constitution stipulates 
support for nations to have their independence and for all forms of colonialism to be 
abolished. 
 
Muhammadiyah and other supporters of recognition of Kosovo’s independence have kept 
questioning the government’s position. The supporters of the recognition have often 
referred to the 1945 Constitution as the basis for their argument. A gap between the two 
sides has developed. The former implicitly views that Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence is a kind of illegal secessionism from the mother state of Serbia. Meanwhile 
the latter considers Kosovo as a colonised entity that has a right to independence.  
 
The government has never explicitly stated that fear of separatist-related issues was the 
basis of its position. Instead, it has always emphasised the fundamental principles of 
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respecting territorial integrity. Against this backdrop, the government’s position was 
criticised as indecisive and unclear. Muhammadiyah and other proponents of Kosovo’s 
recognition believe that that the government’s position is not about something principled 
or fundamental but instead about the foreign policy platform of a ‘million friends and zero 
enemies’. But this platform has possibly changed for the future. Therefore, 
Muhammadiyah has promised to keep urging the government to recognise Kosovo and 
find all possible ways of helping Kosovo to have recognition from the government of 
Indonesia.    
 
There is little evidence of major pressures from Muslim groups with regard to the 
government’s policy on Kosovo. As time passed, Muslim groups have tended not to come 
forward with one voice on the Kosovo issue. NU’s leadership, for example, has begun to 
understand the government’s position on Kosovo. Similarly, members of parliament have 
not voiced the similar tune on the Kosovo issue. There has not been a convergence of 
Muslim groups’ aspirations and the political interests of the parliament. There is not yet a 
strong momentum that unites their interests. Without massive pressure from society and 
parliament, it is difficult to change the position of the government. In such a situation, 
Muslim groups’ aspirations are less effective.  
 
Unless there is considerable pressure from Muslim groups and parliamentarians and as 
long as the government still considers that the recognition of Kosovo goes against its 
fundamental national interest, it seems unlikely Indonesia will change its position.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
INDONESIA’S POLICY ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION 
 
1. Introduction 
Indonesia has demonstrated its support for the Palestinian cause since the Sukarno era. 
This support has been expressed during international forums, including those of the NAM 
and the UN. Domestic political discourse has also been greatly coloured by sentiments of 
support for Palestine and enmity towards Israel (Lukens-Bull & Woodward, 2011). Most 
Indonesian people do not consider support of Palestine to be a controversial standpoint. 
This consensus was demonstrated during the 2014 Indonesian presidential election 
campaign, when all candidates harnessed the issue in a bid to attract voters.  
 
Since Indonesia’s independence, the country’s policy on Palestine has been consistent, but 
different nuances of support were demonstrated in the Sukarno, Suharto, and post-Suharto 
eras. There has been a gradual shift in attitude about how support for Palestine should be 
articulated. Generally, international issues related to the concerns of Muslims, including 
the topic of Palestine, were not freely articulated in the Sukarno era or the 25-year 
leadership of Suharto. These governments feared that Muslim political groups in Indonesia 
would exploit such issues for the sake of domestic political agendas. Indeed, during these 
two regimes, suspicions of Muslim groups were still paramount.  
 
A number of scholars have debated whether Islam is a factor in the country’s support for 
Palestine. Some, such as Suryadinata (1996) and Perwita (2007), believe that the Suharto 
era  policy on Palestine was not related to Islamic sentiments. Suryadinata (1996) argues, 
for example, that Indonesia’s non-recognition of Israel is based on Third World 
nationalism rather than co-religious factors. By contrast Sihbudi (1997), an Indonesian 
specialist on Middle-Eastern affairs, argues that Indonesia’s relations with Middle-Eastern 
countries, including Palestine during the Suharto era, are inseparable from the Islamic 
factor.  
 
Whatever the motivating factor, Indonesia has steadfastly committed to supporting the 
struggle of the Palestinian people to enjoy their rights in accordance with international law. 
Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution mandates to abolish all forms of colonialism. Among the 
commonly articulated reasons why Indonesia supports Palestine is that the people of 
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Palestine have been colonised by Israel. The fact that the majority of Indonesian people 
embraced Islam as their religion may have influenced the country to adhere to such a 
position. Therefore this chapter will discuss the role Muslim groups have played in the 
shaping of Indonesia’s Palestine policy. Although a common argument in the literature 
holds that Indonesia’s policies towards Palestine are simply based on universal values and 
humanitarian considerations, this chapter argues that although the country’s policy has not 
been dictated by religious motives, Muslim groups’ influence on its policy cannot be 
ignored. The aspirations and pressures of various Muslim groups have played a significant 
role in establishing a relatively consistent policy of support for Palestine.  As the support 
on the Palestinian question has been in line with the 1945 Constitution, the government of 
Indonesia has seemingly ignored existing international pressures and has been principally 
concerned about domestic aspirations, especially among Muslim groups. In this vein, 
despite the aligment of both the government’s interests and Muslim groups’ aspirations, 
Skidmore and Hudson’s statist-pluralist approach will be used to help capture the different 
nuances on this issue the from the Sukarno era to the Yudhoyono period.  
2. A brief overview of the Palestine-Israel conflict 
The conflict between Palestine and Israel constitutes one of the most protracted in the 
world, persisting since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 (Jaspal & Coyle, 
2014) (Friel & Flak, 2007). The British mandate over Palestine (BMP) which began in 
1922 ended when the British granted the governance of Palestine to the UN in November 
1947. Having been backed by the US and without the agreement of Arab Palestinians or 
any of the Arab states in the region (Cheyfitz, 2014), in 1947 the UN issued resolution 181 
which partitioned Palestine into two  states: one Arab and one Jewish, with Jerusalem 
under international administration. The Arab state received 45% of total land under the 
British mandate, while the Jewish state received 55%, leading to the establishment of the 
state of Israel in May 1948  (Dowty, 2005). The UN’s decision was ostensibly a reaction to 
the impact of the European Holocaust (Golan, 2007).  
 
This partition was rejected by the Palestinian Arabs and accepted by the Jews. The latter 
regarded it as a major victory toward the international legitimisation and recognition of the 
Jewish state (Dowty, 2005). Meanwhile, Arab Palestinians opposed the establishment of a 
Jewish state in the Middle East for the sake of accommodating Zionist aspirations. The 
Arabs also argued that the plan did not grant sufficient time for the establishment of a 
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secular state for all people residing in Palestinian territory (Khamaisi, 2010). The 
partitioned lands based on the UN plan were regarded as unfair, because the Arab 
Palestinians as the majority (the population at the time was approximately 31% Jewish and 
69% Palestinian) were granted a smaller allocation of land than that accorded to the Jewish 
population (Rubenberg, 2003).  
 
This situation led to the Arab-Israeli War in 1948 between a group of Arab states (Egypt, 
Syria, Transjordan, and Iraq) and Israel. As a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Israel 
occupied a third more land (or in total around 78%) than it had been granted in the UN’s 
plan. Approximately 600,000-700,000 Palestinians became refugees as they fled or were 
expelled during the hostilities (Golan, 2007), and another 150,000 remained there under 
the control of Israel, isolated from the rest of the Arab World (Dowty, 2005). Jordan 
occupied the West Bank, a territory which was supposed to be part of an Arab state 
according to the UN’s plan, and also took East Jerusalem. Meanwhile, Israel captured 
West Jerusalem and declared it as its capital (Golan, 2007). Both East and West Jerusalem 
constituted an area which was supposed to be governed by the international regime.   
 
Israel reached armistice agreements with Jordan, Syria and Egypt in 1949. With some 
minor territorial adjustments and land exchanges, armistice lines became de facto, but not 
political, borders of Israel. Israel has never recognised these borders. The 1949 armistice 
lines had been developed—with minor changes—to be known as the 1967 lines which 
were created after the War of June 4, 1967 (Dowty, 2005; Golan, 2007, p. 3). The Six-Day 
War was described as a pre-emptive attack by Israel (Susser, 2014), conquering Egypt’s 
Sinai Peninsula and occupying Syria’s Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, 
including East Jerusalem from which it formally withdrew in 2005. However, the UN still 
regards the Gaza Strip as occupied territory due to the siege of Israel in Gaza. During the 
Six-Day War, as many as 250,000-300,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled from their 
homes in Gaza and West Bank (Cheyfitz, 2014, p. 108; Rubenberg, 2003). The 1967 War 
shifted Israel’s outlook from one of great anxiety regarding the threat of Arab states, to a 
sense of self-assuredness that Arabs would not be able to pose a serious threat to the 
country in the foreseeable future. Israel’s self-confidence was boosted by its alliance with 
the US (Susser, 2014).  
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Prior to the 1967 War, conflicts in the region occurred between Israel and opposing Arab 
states, but did not directly centre on the Palestinian people. Only after the 1967 War did 
the Palestinian cause become internationally regarded as a national liberation issue (Golan, 
2007) with the Palestinian people as the main players. The Palestinian struggle had been 
spearheaded by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) which was established in 
1964. Having originally adopted a non-recognition stance towards Israel as enshrined in 
the 1968 PLO’s charter (Dowty, 2005), in 1988 the PLO formally embraced a more 
pragmatic approach by recognising UNSC resolutions 242 and 338 and declared that the 
Palestinian state existed within the occupied territories. This phenomenon explicitly 
showed that the PLO disposed of its aspiration to liberate Palestine and to establish it as a 
secular and democratic state. The PLO began to recognise a Palestinian state living side by 
side with Israel, now with only 22 percent of the BMP for the Palestinians. This meant that 
Palestinians accepted the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital, as their 
state’s territories (Rubenberg, 2003). The unanimously adopted UNSC resolutions 242 and 
338 called for Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from the occupied territories in 1967. 
However, the PLO’s  recognition of the 1967 boundaries in 1987 was unappreciated or 
simply ignored by Israel (Friel & Flak, 2007).  
 
The change of PLO’s official position was propelled, among other things, by the 
emergence of the First Palestinian Intifada in December 1987 as well as the rise of Hamas 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union (Dowty, 2005). The collapse of the Soviet Union led 
the PLO to lose its diplomatic support from the superpower (Rubenberg, 2003) and  made 
the US, the strongest supporter of Israel, the dominant power in the world. In addition to 
restoring pride and self-reliance among Palestinians, the intifada also provided momentum 
for Hamas to rise. The resistance came as a surprise to Israel. It sent the state a message 
that the maintenance of the status quo, the continued occupation of the Palestinian 
territories, was not defensible in the long term (Dowty, 2005). The emergence of the 
intifada “made the two-state solution the logical solution” (Hilal, 2007, p. 5) and 
strengthened support for the two-state solution among Palestinians and Israelis (Dowty, 
2005). The emergence of the intifada, the spectre of Hamas and other militant groups, and 
pressure from the US all combined to force both the PLO and Israel to move forward 
(Behrendt, 2007; Hallward, 2011). Against this backdrop, the PLO and Israel began to 
conduct peace deals. A number of peace initiatives and agreements stemmed from the 
Madrid Conference (1991) and were followed by Oslo I (1993) and Oslo II (1995), Sharm 
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El-Sheikh (1999), Camp David II (2000), Arab Peace Initiative (2002), Peace Roadmap 
(2003), and the Annapolis conference (2007). 
 
The Oslo Agreement in 1993 arguably constituted the most instrumental peace deal 
reached to date between Israelis and Palestinians. Despite being viewed pessimistically by 
some scholars, such as Said (2000), the two-state-solution proposed by the 1993 Oslo 
Agreement was generally hailed  as a step in the right direction by many sides, including 
the US (Sihbudi, 1997). The Palestinians believed that through the Oslo Agreement (1993) 
they could achieve an independent state of Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza with East 
Jerusalem as its capital (Rubenberg, 2003).  However, the peace agreement collapsed with 
the both sides contributing to its failure. This situation precipitated the Second Intifada in 
2000 (Behrendt, 2007; Dowty, 2005).   
 
No peace initiative has yet managed to bring about a comprehensive resolution to the 
conflict or create a lasting peace in Palestine. The Oslo Agreements and other peace 
initiatives failed to solve the issues of Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders, and 
security (Said, 2000). Non-compliance of the two parties with the existing agreements has 
been the subject of much scrutiny, particularly with regard to Israel’s actions. Palestinians 
had shown their willingness to move forward from the 1967 boundaries, rather than from 
1947 or an earlier time. This was a good opportunity for Israel to advance in the interests 
of a peaceful solution acceptable to both sides. Yet this was never properly appreciated in 
Israeli public opinion. Furthermore, Israel has frequently failed to respect international 
law, and specifically the UNSC resolutions, with regard to the Israel-Palestine conflict 
(Friel & Flak, 2007).  
 
Like the 1993 Oslo Agreement (also known as the 1993 Declaration of Principles), which 
marked a mutual recognition between Israel and Palestine, other agreements following the 
1993 peace agreement have failed to break the impasse, and neither peace nor a Palestinian 
state has materialised (Jaspal & Coyle, 2014). According to the Annapolis Agreement, an 
independent state of Palestine should have been established in December 2008, a year after 
the agreement was reached in 27 November 2007. However, this peace process failed 
when Israel attacked the Gaza Strip on 27 December 2008, three days before the deadline 
ended (Deplu, 2009). Despite recent peace initiatives proposed by the US, the impasse 
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remains. Furthermore, Israel has often launched attacks on the Gaza Strip, with the most 
recent in March 2014.  
  
The impasse and uncertain situation of the peace process has promoted radicalism on both 
sides (Rieken, 2014). Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups still strive to liberate the 
entire Palestinian territory. Hamas is considered a terrorist organisation by Israel and the 
US, just as the PLO was in the past (Rubenberg, 2003). In recent years, Israeli opinion has 
become more right-wing, hawkish and illiberal (Waxman, 2011, p. 70). Israelis’ support of 
right-wing parties increases when Palestinian threats increase (Berrebi & Klor, 2006). The 
rise of the right-wing has been demonstrated by the rise of the Likud party. The right-wing 
“supported the settlement as a religious and national obligation” (Dowty, 2005, p. 120) and 
advocated the integration of the occupied lands into Israel “on historical, nationalist, and 
security grounds” (p. 121). 
 
Because of the uncertain future of the two-state solution peace process, many scholars 
such as Said (2000), Waxman (2011), Pappe (2007), Bakan and Abu-Laban (2010), Hilal 
(2007), Inbar (2009), Farsakh (2011), Dumper (2011) and Kelman (2011) propose a one-
state solution as an alternative means of resolving the conflict. In contrast with popular 
opinion in much of the world, these scholars argue that ending the occupation and 
establishing a Palestinian state will not bring about peace. They contend that the 
establishment of a secular democratic state consisting of both Arabs and Jews offers the 
best hope of ending the protracted Palestine-Israel conflict.  
 
Most Israelis and Zionists have challenged the one-state solution as it would lead to the 
extinction of Israel as a Jewish state. Supporters of the idea have been dubbed anti-Semitic 
by their critics. Meanwhile, diplomats and policy makers regard the proposal as unrealistic 
given the superiority of Israel’s military (Dumper, 2011). The difficulty of applying the 
one-state solution has been detailed by Hilal (2007), who claims that “the main difficulty 
with the one-state solution resides in Zionism as a colonialist ideology and its insistence on 
a Jewish state conceptualising Judaism as a nation, not a religion or an aspect of culture” 
(p. 21). 
 
The impasse of bilateral negotiations with Israel pushed the Palestinian authority to gain its 
independence through a multilateral vehicle. Palestine started to bid for international 
organisational membership under UN organs such as UNESCO. However it failed in its 
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bid for UN membership as the country could not secure support from the UNSC in 
September 2011 due to a US veto. Instead, on 29 November 2012, Palestine was conferred 
with non-member observer state status—its downgraded bid—after the UNGA Resolution 
67/19 was passed by a vote of 138 to 9 (UNGA, 2012). Israel condemned Palestine’s 
upgraded status from non-member observer entity, which it had held since 1974. Israel 
depicted Palestine’s move as a unilateral act violating the Oslo Agreement and threatening 
the existing peace process between Israel and Palestine (Jaspal & Coyle, 2014). One month 
earlier, on 31 October 2011, Palestine had gained full membership of UNESCO with a 
vote of 107 to 14, with 52 abstentions.  
 
Whether the approach pursued is a two-state solution or one-state solution, Israel under 
Benjamin Netanyahu seems reluctant to decide on a route forward. Israel has clung to the 
status quo with regard to its occupation policy, and this has led to questions about the 
state’s commitment to peace (as cited in Cheyfitz (2014, p. 119)). This notion has also 
been indicated by statements made by Netanyahu on many occasions, such as his address 
before the US Congress on 24 May 2011. Netanyahu firmly rejected three issues, namely 
the return to 1967 borders, the return of the Palestinian refugees, and the plan to make East 
Jerusalem the Palestinian capital (Cooper & Brinnermay, 2011). Netanyahu’s speech was a 
response to President Barack Obama’s suggestion for Israel to recognise the establishment 
of the state of Palestine based on the 1967 borders (Myers, 2011).   
 
3. The roots of Indonesian Muslims’ sentiments towards Palestine and Middle 
Eastern issues 
 
There are a number of factors that must be considered when discussing international issues 
of concern to Indonesian Muslims. Firstly, religious relations between Indonesian Muslims 
and Middle-Eastern Muslims should be taken into account. Relations between Indonesia 
and the Middle East have, in general, been deeply entrenched. There is a wide-spread 
perception among Indonesian Muslims that Islam is synonymous with all things Arabic. 
Any issue related to Arabs or the Middle East is understood by Indonesians to be 
something related to Islam. Such an understanding leads to a perception of kinship 
between the two societies (Mehden, 1993). This may be termed a ‘theological factor’ in 
Indonesia’s relationship with the region. As a result of this understanding that everything 
Arab is also Islamic, when Indonesian Muslims talk about the Middle East they will relate 
it to Islam. When Muslim students in Indonesia study Islamic history they study it as it 
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relates to Middle-Eastern cultural contexts. Secondly, the distinctive place of Arab culture 
and Middle-Eastern society in the minds of Indonesian people may make it easier to 
predict what Muslims’ reactions to Palestinian issues will be (interwith with Abdul Mu’thi, 
16/10/2013). Given these factors it is unsurprising that there are often major reactions in 
Indonesia when issues relating to Middle-Eastern society arise. 
 
Early interactions between Indonesians and Arabs occurred around the time of the advent 
of Islam in Indonesia. According to Buya Hamka, a well-known Indonesian Islamic 
scholar, initial contact took place in the seventh century. Islam was brought to Indonesia 
directly from the Arab peninsula, not from India (Azra, 2000). By the thirteenth century 
Islam was widespread in Indonesia (Ricklefs, 2008). The relationships between Indonesian 
Muslim society and the Middle-Eastern Muslim society had been mainly in the trading 
sector before cultural relations became the most important ones. Initially coming to 
Indonesia to trade, Arabs subsequently devoted their efforts to the fields of religion and 
education (Sihbudi, 1997). In the 1920s, political interactions became more apparent. Pan-
Islamism and caliphate issues were crucial among Indonesian nationalists and religious 
societies. Both activist groups showed an interest in becoming involved with issues of the 
international Muslim community (Mehden, 1993). However, these issues have had only a 
marginal impact on current Indonesian politics.  
 
From Indonesia’s pre-independence past up to the present day, cultural relationships 
between Muslims in Indonesia and the Middle East have remained prominent. The Middle 
East has been the primary source of religious thought for Indonesians. Many Indonesian 
students have studied in the Middle East, mainly in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and from an 
early age students are introduced to cities in the region and are familiar with Mecca, 
Medina, Jerusalem, Cairo, Karbala, and Damascus. Similarly, the politics and histories of 
states such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon are to 
some extent also recognisable to Indonesian students. Every year many Indonesian 
Muslims visit Mecca and Medina as part of their pilgrimage, as well as other cities such as 
Jerusalem and Karbala. These connections of knowledge, religious belief, and trade have 
made Indonesian Muslims so concerned about the Middle East, it is as if countries in the 
region were not foreign territories (Sihbudi, 1997).   
 
170 
 
Indonesian Muslims have strong concerns about Palestine for several reasons. Firstly, 
Palestine is the place where Al-Aqsho mosque is located. It is the third holiest place 
according to Muslims around the world, including Indonesian Muslims. Muslims believe 
that the mosque is the destination of the prophet Muhammad before he ascended to heaven 
to meet God in a journey from Medina, Saudi Arabia. It has been described as both a 
physical and spiritual journey which is known in Indonesia as Isro’ Mi’roj. Secondly, Gaza 
was the birthplace of Imam Syafi’i, one of the greatest ulema (Islamic scholars) and the 
greatest man according to followers of the Madhab Syafi’i (a school of thought within 
Islamic jurisprudence). The majority of Indonesian Muslims are followers of this madhab. 
Thirdly, Muslims in Indonesia are aware that the conflict between Palestine and Israel is a 
long and protracted one that has caused suffering to the Palestinian people. Indonesian 
people recognise the grievance of the Palestinian people who live in the occupied 
territories. They are greatly concerned about what they see as Israeli injustices toward 
Palestinians.  
 
Conversely, Palestinians were also strong supporters of the Indonesian struggle for 
independence. The Palestinian Grand Mufti, Amin Al Husaini, expressed his 
congratulations to Indonesia at the time of the ‘Japanese recognition’ of the country on 6 
September 1944. This recognition came ahead of Indonesia’s official independence in 
1945. The Grand Mufti’s congratulations were broadcast on the radio for two consecutive 
days, and published in an Egyptian-based newspaper, Al-Ahram (Hassan, 1980). The 
independence struggle of Indonesia was also supported by many Palestinian people. For 
instance, Muhammad Ali Tahir, a Palestinian businessman, donated all his savings to 
supporting Indonesia’s struggle to fight against the Dutch (Hassan, 1980). Other Arab 
countries were also very supportive. Egypt, for example, was the first country in the world 
to recognise Indonesia’s independence. Popular Egyptian backing of Indonesian 
independence was evident in the acts of labourers at Port Said who boycotted Dutch ships 
passing through the Suez Canal. Likewise, the Arab League also supported Indonesia’s 
struggle to gain independence (Hassan, 1980). This demonstrates the strong affinity 
between Muslim nations, including Palestine and Indonesia. Sihbudi (1997) argues that 
such strong solidarities and affinities have been possible and strengthened by co-religionist 
sentiments.   
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4. Indonesia’s policy on the Palestinian question: Historical basis 
4.1. The Sukarno period 
 
Many efforts have been made by Israel to build better relations with Indonesia. When the 
Dutch recognised Indonesia’s independence in December 1949, Israeli President Chaim 
Weizmann and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion conveyed their congratulations to 
President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Muhammad Hatta. In January 1950, Indonesia 
enjoyed Israel’s full recognition as a new state. In response, Indonesia thanked Israel 
without reciprocally giving recognition of the latter as a new state (Muttaqien, 2013). 
Israel remained steadfast in its ambition to initiate a relationship with Indonesia, and 
proposed the opening of a legation in Indonesia. To that end, Foreign Minister Moshe 
Sharett wrote a letter to Hatta. On 6 May 1950, in his friendly response, Hatta “suggested 
that the mission be postponed to a later date” (Yegar, 2006, p. 140).  
 
Moves to establish trade relations also began from the late 1950s.  However, the 
government of Indonesia moved cautiously and surreptitiously to avoid adverse public 
reactions. As Sukarno’s regime became more authoritarian and showed its left-leaning 
character, Indonesia’s hesitant attitude towards Israel became more apparent. Eventually, 
the country expressed a clear stance of non-recognition of Israel. Its status as a Muslim 
majority country and its traditional relations with Arab communities, as well as the Arab 
states’ assistance to Indonesia during its independence struggle, had become strong factors 
underlying its policy towards Israel. Relations were further strained when Indonesia ceased 
granting entrance visas for all Israelis—not limited for those holding diplomatic and 
service passports—in November 1953 (Yegar, 2006).  
 
During this period, Indonesia candidly demonstrated its support to Arab countries when 
they were in conflict with Israel. This was understandable, as the states that offered early 
recognition of Indonesia’s independence were Arab states. Following Egypt’s recognition 
of Indonesia’s independence, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon recognised the country in 
1947, and Yemen in 1948.  Furthermore, these states had lent their support from before the 
independence of Indonesia in 1945 until the Dutch recognition of Indonesia’s 
independence in 1949 (Hassan, 1980). Indonesia remained in need of the support of the 
Arab states when struggling to gain West Papua from the Dutch in the 1960s (Muttaqien, 
2013).  
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Sukarno’s world view increasingly led him to adopt an anti-imperialist stance. Sukarno 
believed that the world was operating under an exploitative system which he called the old 
established forces (Oldefos). These forces preserved and maintained the subjugation of 
new emerging forces (Nefos). Sukarno pronounced that Indonesia and other Nefos 
countries had to strive to defend their independence (Weinstein, 1971). From Sukarno’s 
perspective, Arab countries were also part of Nefos. Meanwhile, Israel was positioned in 
the other camp, namely the Oldefos (Muttaqien, 2013; Weinstein, 1971). The 
establishment of Israel could not be separated from the support of Britain, France, and the 
US which were also classified by Sukarno as Oldefos (Dowty, 2005).  
 
The Asian-African Conference, held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955, took place 
without Israel’s participation. Held in the spirit of anti-colonialism (Grovogu, 2011), the 
conference was attended by 29 countries of which fourteen were Arab and Muslim 
countries. Palestinian leaders were also invited, their attendance occuring as members of 
the Yemeni and Syrian delegations (Oded, 2010). Though initially supported by Burma, 
India and Sri Lanka, Israel’s participation was blocked by Indonesia and Pakistan (Yegar, 
2006). Furthermore, the adoption of a resolution in support of Palestinians led Israeli 
Foreign Minister Moshe Sharred to send a telegram in protest against Sukarno’s position 
as chairman of the conference. The resolution was regarded by Israel as a humiliating 
defeat (Oded, 2010). As proposed by Indonesia, the second Colombo Conference was held 
in New Delhi, India in November 1956 in a response to the Sinai War involving Israel, 
France and Britain who were allied against Egypt. This war was precipitated by Egypt’s 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal. During the conflict, Israel attacked Sinai and the Gaza 
Strip while France and Britain assaulted the Suez Canal area. The Sinai War brought about 
enmity among Indonesian Muslims towards Israel, France and Britain. At that time, there 
was pressure from the Indonesian parliament to cut diplomatic ties with the French and 
British. Indonesia supported the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egypt and then 
joined the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed in the Sinai Desert (Sihbudi, 1997). 
The participation of Indonesian troops was questioned by the Israeli parliament as it was 
without prior Israeli agreement. Ultimately, however, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s 
decision was not to react or protest (Yegar, 2006).  
 
The most apparent early example of Indonesia’s hostile stance towards Israel was the 
state’s refusal to allow Israel to take part in the Fourth Asian Games in Jakarta in 1962. 
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The exclusion of Israel and also Taiwan from the games led to Indonesia’s suspension by 
the International Olympic Committee (IOC). This exclusion of Israel was “an omen of 
future sport events as Israel athletes were gradually excluded from other sports 
competition in Asian countries” (Yegar, 2006, p. 142). Indonesia’s attitude was a response 
to domestic Muslim groups and Arab pressure (Leifer, 1983a). Leifer (1983b), has called 
such a stance a pragmatic approach to prevent the Muslim community’s reaction and 
mobilisation.  
 
Seen from Sukarno’s framework, Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories was the 
manifestation of imperialism and colonialism. Furthermore, Israel was regarded as a 
‘bridgehead’ of Western imperialism in the newly independent Asian-African area (Barton 
& Rubenstein, 2005).  Conversely, according to Sukarno, Palestinians had every right to 
establish an independent state in their territories. Barton and Rubenstein (2005) argue, 
therefore, that Indonesia’s policy of non-recognition of Israel and its support for Arab 
states under Sukarno were much more about anti-imperialism and colonialism rather than 
Pan-Islamism motives.  
 
However, Sihbudi (1997) argues that Indonesia’s policy towards the Middle East, 
including its relations with, and non-recognition of, Israel was inseparable from the 
Islamic factor. Any policy set by the government always considered Muslim aspirations. 
Indeed, with the exception of the Socialist party, political leaders and groups in Indonesia 
generally gave their consent to the government’s policy towards Israel and condemned 
Israel’s actions against Palestinians. In a nutshell, this anti-Israel stance was not only 
shared by Islamic political parties, but it also “cut across party lines” (Yegar, 2006, p. 
142).  
 
The way in which foreign policy elites considered public interests in their support for Arab 
countries has been detailed by Weinstein (1971). The two major political streams, the 
Islamists and the nationalists—represented by the Masyumi party and the Indonesian 
National Party (PNI)—came to a “mutual desire for more outspoken support of the Arab” 
(p. 116). They argued that the government of Indonesia should have given stronger support 
to the Arabs. However, these camps came to two quite different conclusions in this regard. 
The nationalists believed that the central issue of the Israel-Palestine conflict was anti-
imperialism, while Islamic groups saw it as a matter related to religious solidarity. Both 
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viewed Israel as “an essentially western intruder and the Arabs as victims of the extension 
of western influence in the Middle-East” (p. 120).  
4.2. The Suharto period 
 
The change from Sukarno to Suharto brought a more moderate and pragmatic foreign 
policy outlook for Indonesia with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite a more 
nuanced approach, the fundamental stance of Indonesian policy on the matter remained 
largely the same. There had been an institutionalisation of support for the Arab cause and 
official relations with Israel were discouraged (Barton & Rubenstein, 2005). But the 
pragmatic attitude had been apparent when Indonesia called for direct negotiations 
between Israel and Arab states after the 1967 war. This was a sensitive issue given that 
Arab countries still refused to recognise Israel at that time.  
 
After the 1973 war, Indonesia did not commit to applying an oil embargo, as called for by 
Arab countries, against those supporting Israel such as the US, the Netherlands, Canada, 
Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). Indonesia’s non-
participation in the action was precipitated by its shifting orientation toward the West 
(Muttaqien, 2013). Indonesia needed the West for its economic development. Suharto’s 
regime defined the country’s national interests in terms of security, stability, and economic 
development, which encouraged a pragmatic approach when considering the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The Suharto government preferred to emphasise its economic and security 
interests. US Oil companies such as Mobil Oil (Exxon Mobil) began operating in 
Indonesia right after Suharto came to power in 1968 (Muttaqien, 2013). Therefore 
Indonesia’s participation in the oil embargo would have threatened to harm its economic 
development, which depended on foreign aid and investment due to domestic weaknesses 
(Weinstein, 1976). 
 
A more neutral stance was also demonstrated by Indonesia when responding to the 1978 
Camp David Agreement between Israel and Egypt (Leifer, 1983b). This stance was 
different from most Arab countries’ reactions to the agreement. At that time, Egypt was 
politically isolated by its neighbours. Indonesia’s position was further articulated when the 
country abstained—along with Malaysia and Bangladesh—from voting for Egypt’s OIC 
membership suspension at a meeting of the OIC in Fez, Morocco, in May 1979 (Barton & 
Rubenstein, 2005).  
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Indonesia’s long road to opening a PLO office in Jakarta indicated a subtle shift in its 
policy. The establishment of such an office had been suggested since 1972 by Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Adam Malik, but it was not permitted until 1989, taking 15 years to be 
realised (Yegar, 2006). A number of factors underpinned Indonesia’s stance on PLO 
representation. First, the Indonesian military was concerned about the PLO’s alleged ties 
with the communist bloc during the 1960s and 1970s (Leifer, 1983b). Second, the military 
also worried about the spread of terrorist acts by factions within the PLO and increased 
radicalism among the Indonesian Muslim community. Third, the government wished to 
avoid Western perceptions that Indonesia was close to the PLO. Opening a PLO office 
would only endanger Indonesia’s relationship with the US. Therefore, Indonesia needed to 
have a green light from the US before allowing the PLO to open its office in Jakarta 
(Perwita, 2007). Another reason was the concern that the PLO office would monitor 
Indonesia’s secret relations with Israel (Yegar, 2006). In September 1979, for example, 
both countries made a deal enabling Indonesia to purchase 14 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft and 
two TA-4 Skyhawk trainers from Israel (Leifer, 1983b).  
 
The delay in allowing the PLO to open its mission seems to contradict Indonesia’s official 
support for Palestine. This position of support was clearly expressed by Suharto before the 
Indonesian parliament on the occasion of the 36th anniversary of independence in August 
1981. He stated that “our attitude toward the problems of the Middle East has always been 
clear from the beginning, that is, we stand on the side of the Arab peoples and that of the 
people of Palestine who are fighting for their just rights against the arrogant aggression of 
Israel” (quoted by (Leifer, 1983b, p. 156)). In addition, Indonesia has always endorsed 
declarations, resolutions or any outcome documents produced during international 
meetings which support the Palestinian people in their struggle against Israel (Leifer, 
1983b; Perwita, 2007). Suharto’s publicly expressed formal position was likely aimed to 
appease domestic Muslims and Arab countries in relation to the Palestinian cause. 
 
The permission for the PLO to open its office in Jakarta in 1989 occurred in the aftermath 
of Indonesia’s recognition of a Palestinian state, which was proclaimed in Algiers on 15 
November 1988. This decision came about when the government of Indonesia finally 
considered that the PLO “no longer posed a serious threat” and when Indonesia sought 
wider support for the NAM chairmanship in 1992 (Suryadinata, 1995, p. 294).  Indonesia’s 
attitude toward the opening of the PLO office in Jakarta did not escape reactions from 
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Muslim groups. NU and Muhammadiyah, for example, criticised the government for 
showing an inconsistent policy towards Palestine. Indonesia’s stance on this matter was 
regarded as dependent on US policy towards the Middle East. Muslim groups seemed 
justified in their allegations that the opening of the PLO’s mission hinged on a green light 
from the US (Perwita, 2007). Despite collective reactions by Muslim groups, however, it 
should be acknowledged that, under Suharto’s authoritarian regime, Indonesia’s foreign 
policy was largely determined by a small group of elites. Suryadinata (1996) explains that 
these elites came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the military, the state secretariat, 
and naturally included President Suharto himself. This small group believed that, in the 
attainment of the country’s national interests, it was not necessary to uphold Islam as a 
primary concern (Sukma, 2003).  
 
The country’s permission for the opening of the PLO office in Jakarta was concurrent with 
Suharto’s political rapprochement with Muslim groups. Some arguments have emerged to 
explain Suharto’s political accommodation of Islam, as discussed in chapter two of this 
thesis. The change in Indonesia’s attitude met with a positive response from Muslim 
groups, especially moderate groups such as Muhammadiyah. Muslim groups believed that 
this evolving outlook would also remove Middle-Eastern countries’ doubts about 
Indonesia’s intentions toward Palestine. However, militant Muslim groups such as KISDI 
and DDII still considered that Indonesia’s policy of support had not been strong enough 
(Perwita, 2007).  
 
The 1993 Oslo Agreement prompted both positive and negative reactions in Indonesia. 
The government welcomed the agreement which was supported by NU whose chairman, 
Abdurrahman Wahid, argued that only by recognising the existence of Israel could 
comprehensive peace be achieved. Meanwhile, the 1993 Oslo Agreement met with a 
negative response from Muhammadiyah, KISDI, DDII and the Indonesian Committee for 
the Liberation of Palestine (ICLP). They viewed that the agreement was a loss for the 
Palestinians and created an advantage for Israel and the US (Perwita, 2007).  
 
The revelation by Israeli daily Haaretz about the secret visit to Jakarta of the Israeli 
Ambassador to Singapore, Daniel Megiddo, in July 1993, and the visit of Prime Minister 
Yitzak Rabin to Jakarta on 15 October 1993, created suspicions among Muslim groups that 
there was a plan to establish diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Israel. These 
177 
 
Israeli visits sparked strong reactions from Muslim groups. The possibility of protests as a 
result of Rabin’s visit was actually anticipated. His visit was not arranged according to 
state protocol and the meeting was held in Suharto’s private residence rather than the state 
palace (Perwita, 2007). The visit was not publicly announced until Rabin left Jakarta, as 
the government were wary of alarming Indonesian Muslims (Paris, 1996). However, this 
did not prevent protests from Muslim groups such as Muhammadiyah (Perwita, 2007).  
 
In an attempt to minimise the protests, it was announced that Suharto had been acting in 
his capacity as the chairman of the NAM, in spite of his being the President of Indonesia 
(Paris, 1996). With such an explanation, it was hoped Muslim groups’ suspicions about 
diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Israel could be neutralised. Perhaps learning 
from previous experience and fearing adverse reactions from the public, Indonesia denied 
Prime Minister Netanyahu’s request to visit Jakarta during his Asian tour in August 1997 
(Yegar, 2006). From that time until Suharto stepped down from power in 1998, there were 
not any further moves by the Indonesian government to establish diplomatic relations with 
Israel.  
5. Indonesia’s persistent non-recognition policy towards Israel in the post Suharto 
era 
The issue of Indonesia’s diplomatic relations with Israel has always been inflammatory 
among many Indonesian people, particularly for Muslim groups. In the post-Suharto era, 
the voices of both moderate and less moderate Muslim groups have been more freely 
articulated. Previously constrained from expressing their political aspirations, Muslims are 
now able to express their viewpoints not only through mass non-political organisations 
such as the NU and Muhammadiyah but also through Islamic political parties such as PBB 
and PKS where they actively express their concerns about the fate of the Palestinians. 
They do so through parliamentary fora and demonstrations in the streets by rallying their 
supporters and cadres. As such, they have managed to act as checks and balances on the 
government’s policies on Palestine and other international issues which concern them.  
5.1. Abdurrahman Wahid’s adventurous proposal 
 
None of the ASEAN Muslim majority countries, namely Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, 
and Malaysia recognise Israel. Israel expected that recognition by Egypt and Jordan; the 
establishment of Israel’s diplomatic relations with China, India and South Korea; and that 
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the signing of the 1993 Oslo Agreement would lead Southeast Asian Muslim states and 
other Asian Muslim states (such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives), to establish 
diplomatic relations with Israel (Yegar, 2006). However these expectations did not become 
reality. For Indonesia’s part, Suharto reaffirmed on several occassions that Indonesia had 
never considered opening diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv (Sihbudi, 2007a). 
 
Because of the difficulty of influencing this state policy, Israel started engaging Indonesian 
civil society especially Muslim leaders and Muslim intellectuals and journalists. 
Abdurrahman Wahid (NU), Habib Chirzin (Muhammadiyah), Djohan Effendi (Department 
of Religious Affairs) and Bondan Gunawan (Democracy Forum—Fordem) attended a 
seminar on Judaism and Islam held by the Truman Institute in Jerusalem in October 1994. 
With the invitation of PM Yitzhak Rabin, they were present at the peace accord signing 
ceremony between Israel and Jordan. It is also rumoured that they had a meeting with the 
Israeli Vice Foreign Affairs Minister (Sihbudi, 2007a; Yegar, 2006). On his return to 
Indonesia, Wahid, who was NU’s chairman at the time, lobbied the government of 
Indonesia to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, arguing that it would be beneficial 
for Indonesia in the international arena. Wahid said that “it is time for Indonesia to open 
diplomatic relations with Israel. By doing so, we would be able to play a more important 
role in helping the struggle of the Arab nations” (Sihbudi, 2007a, p. 339).  
 
The Indonesian civil society delegates’ visit to Israel and Wahid’s statement sparked 
protests from various Muslim groups. MUI and the chairman of Muhammadiyah, Amien 
Rais, for example, strongly condemned their visit and Wahid’s statement. Yegar (2006, p. 
150), The criticism not only came from the Muslim groups but also from Foreign Minister 
Ali Alatas who regretted their visit to Israel (Republika, 1994). Opposition also came from 
inside the NU. This opposition was significant but not overwhelming (Barton, 2002). 
Some NU leaders, such as K.H. Moch Ilyas Ruhiyat, chairman of the NU legislative 
council (Rois Am), argued that Abdurrahman Wahid’s visit and his statement was not 
made in his capacity as chairman of NU, but instead in a personal capacity (Perwita, 
2007).  
 
As a democrat and pluralist, Wahid stood by his conviction and was not obviously 
bothered by the criticism. At an academic conference in Bali in June 1995 he once again 
stated the need for Indonesia to establish diplomatic relations with Israel (Yegar, 2006). 
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Despite criticism, he made other visits to Israel. He visited Israel three times before 
becoming president and one time after stepping down from his presidency (Barton, 2002). 
Having been elected as the President of Indonesia in January 1999, Wahid embarked on a 
bold programme to realise his long held reformist, democratic, and pluralist convictions, 
including the promotion of a relationship with Israel (Barton & Rubenstein, 2005).  
 
Three days after being inaugurated, Wahid flew to Bali and addressed an international 
business meeting on 24 October 1999. He took the opportunity to express his intention to 
establish economic and commercial relations with Israel. On his return to Jakarta, Wahid 
met 16 ambassadors from Arab states and explained that his proposal did not include 
diplomatic relations. Instead, his plan would be similar to what some Arab countries had 
already done, namely establishing a commercial office in Israel (Associated-Press, 1999). 
Both President Abdurrahman Wahid and his Foreign Minister, Dr Alwi Shihab, affirmed 
that Indonesia would remain committed to its principles of supporting Palestine and would 
not establish diplomatic relations with Israel until a comprehensive solution for the 
Palestinian question could be reached (Jakarta-Post, 1999f).   
 
Sukma (2003) and Sihbudi (2001b) observe that considerations underpinning plans to 
establish commercial ties with Israel not only revolved around economic factors. Wahid 
wanted to show that he was consistent in his pluralism and interfaith-tolerance. There was 
also his conviction that initiating commercial ties with Israel would become a shortcut for 
Indonesia’s economic recovery (Sihbudi, 2001b). This plan was expected to provide 
Indonesia with an opportunity to attract Jewish and foreign investors to Indonesia. There is 
a common belief among Indonesian people that the world economy is dominated by 
Jewish people. As Wahid’s Foreign Minister, Alwi Shihab argued: “We have to be frank, 
the Jewish lobby in the American Congress is very strong” (Gee, 2000a). Therefore, it was 
not surprising that President Abdurrahman Wahid linked national economic recovery with 
commercial ties with Israel. Finally, trade relationships with Israel would provide 
opportunities for Indonesia to play a more pivotal role in the Palestine-Israel conflict 
(Sihbudi, 2001b). 
 
Wahid’s plan was actually downgraded from his earlier suggestion before assuming the 
presidency, as he had previously advocated diplomatic relations with Israel. He became 
more pragmatic when he was in power and shelved his long-held personal convictions and 
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aspirations to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. The Indonesian government, and 
specifically the then-Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab, declared that Wahid’s plan to 
strengthen commercial ties did not imply the establishment of diplomatic relations and did 
not sacrifice the country’s basic principles of supporting the Palestinians to have an 
independent state.  
 
Despite this declaration, Wahid’s plan received strong protests from both moderate and 
militant Muslim groups as well as Muslim student associations. Demonstrations took place 
in many cities and attracted large crowds. KISDI, the Jihad Militia Force (Laskar Jihad) 
and other Muslim components rallied in front of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 1 
November 1999. They demanded that Alwi Shihab resign if he backed the plan, and urged 
the government to pay attention to Muslim anti-colonialism aspirations. They argued that 
establishing trade with Israel meant violating the country’s constitution, and that there 
were no significant benefits for Indonesia to trade with Israel anyway. Hidayat Nur Wahid, 
a leader of the Justice Party (PK), an Islamic party, which had been renamed PKS before 
the 2004 election, stated that “we hope the minister will not open economic ties with 
Israel. Israel is colonising the Palestinian state. Indonesia must take a firm and serious 
stand. If he [Alwi Shihab] can’t resist the pressure from the Zionists and their ally, the 
United States, he’d better resign” (Antara, 1999a). Even stronger views were expressed by 
MUI, stating that President Wahid “sold out his brothers in Palestine” (Solomon, 1999).  
 
Responding to mounting pressure from Muslim groups, Wahid argued that it was in 
Indonesia’s interest to open trade relations with Israel. He justified his plan with 
theological explanations. He questioned why Indonesia had had relations with China and 
the Soviet Union as communist states, but would not consider relations with Israel. He said 
that “in their [China and former Soviet Union] constitutions both of them clearly oppose 
God. Meanwhile Israel has never opposed God, so why should we make such a fuss about 
them? We must be more mature” (as cited by Sukma (2003, p. 113). Alwi Shihab, also 
gave a defensive response. He regarded Wahid’s plan as a rational and pragmatic approach 
to the country’s economic recovery (Gee, 2000a).  
 
The government’s persistence in proceeding with Wahid’s proposal ignited demonstrations 
in Jakarta and other cities. On 12 November, KISDI held tabliq akbar (an Islamic public 
rally) condemning the plan. Ahmad Sumargono, a chairman of KISDI, demanded the 
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government cancel its plan to launch trade ties with Israel, which he argued would trap 
Indonesia under a Zionist thumb. KISDI warned that should the government push its plan, 
there would be internal conflict and national disintegration (Jakarta-Post, 1999d). 
Meanwhile, KAMMI rallied to oppose Wahid’s plan in a number of Indonesian cities, 
considering it an offense against Muslim people (Qodari, 2001).  
 
Moderate Muslim groups—the modernist Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist NU—
stood side-by-side with militant Muslim groups in protesting the President’s plan. Former 
Muhammadiyah chairman, Amien Rais affirmed that Indonesia would never recognise 
Israel as long as it occupied Palestine (Gee, 2000b). Wahid then had to seriously 
reconsider his plan when dozens of NU ulemas, dubbed Kyai Khos (special Islamic 
clerics) by NU followers, began to exert political pressure. Kyai Khos sent Kiyai Haji 
(KH.) Abdullah Faqih and KH Ahmad Sahal to meet Wahid personally and to urge him to 
drop his plan. Led by KH Abdullah Faqih, Kyai Khos had been among those who had 
supported Wahid’s presidential nomination. They were greatly respected, and were 
considered gurus by Wahid and other NU followers (Jakarta-Post, 1999g).  
 
The DPR had started being more responsive to the population’s aspirations than it had 
been in the Sukarno and Suharto eras. In these two eras, both civil society and parliament 
did not freely articulate their functions and voices. In the post-Suharto era, Muslim groups 
appeared to secure more effective channels in parliament. In the Palestinian cause, DPR 
voiced the same concern with Muslim groups. The chairman of DPR's Commission I on 
foreign affairs, Yasril Ananta Baharuddin, for example, said that DPR would never let the 
government open diplomatic relations with Israel. The establishment of trade relations 
with Israel would also require consultation with parliament (Antara, 1999b).  
 
In the face of such sizeable and strong protests and criticism, Wahid’s administration 
backtracked. A postponement was declared after the government’s debate with DPR on 18 
November 1999. The Foreign Minister stated that “direct trade relations with Israel were 
postponed because the government is responsive to the people’s aspiration” (Gee, 2000b; 
Sukma, 2003, p. 115). According to Sihbudi (2001b), had Wahid pursued his plan to open 
trade ties with Israel, there might have been questions about Indonesia’s support for the 
Palestinians, accusations that the government violated the 1945 constitution urging the 
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abolition of all forms of colonialism, and declining economic and political relations with 
the Middle East. 
 
Wahid had created difficulties for his government by proposing such a plan. Such a 
complex and sentiment-filled issue should have been handled more cautiously. He may 
have been aware of this situation. Wahid tested the water in the early days of his 
Presidency by raising the issue in order to gauge public reaction as well as the reaction of 
political elites. Aside from receiving public opposition, Wahid did not appear to win any 
academic debates regarding his proposal to establish trade relations with Israel (Jakarta-
Post, 1999e).  
 
With issues considered sensitive by Muslim groups, such as Indonesia’s recognition 
policies towards Israel, it is hard not to say that Islam—in this context in its political 
movement which is manifested by Muslim groups—has significant influence in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy. The empirical evidence offered above supports this 
assumption. Moreover, in the post-Suharto era, the government has not had relative 
dominant power over its people as Sukarno and Suharto did. Wahid was more limited in 
his choices for conducting foreign policy, as other foreign policy stakeholders - especially 
Muslim groups - expressed strengthened voices and played more significant roles in the 
foreign policy decision making process. Therefore, subsequent regimes pursued more 
cautious policies. There remains almost no support among Indonesian society for the 
establishment of official relations with Israel, be it in diplomacy, trade, or even social and 
cultural ties.  
5.2. The Yudhoyono period 
 
Yudhoyono’s policy towards Palestine continued largely unaltered from the Abdurrahman 
Wahid era, but it was more clearly articulated. In comparison to Wahid’s speculative 
policy, Yudhoyono preferred to adopt a more cautious approach. His idiosyncrasy that 
tended to bring the country to play a more important role in the regional and international 
arena coloured his policy on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Yudhoyono has been seen as a 
president with considerable interest in and concern for world issues. His educational 
background in the US (both in civil and military training) and his experience of being 
assigned abroad established his credentials as an able foreign policy actor in Indonesian 
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affairs. Yudhoyono’s concerns for and solidarity with Palestine were reflected through 
international initiatives that his government proposed.  
 
The 2004 Presidential election which brought Yudhoyono to power marked the beginning 
of a consolidated democratic era in Indonesia which tends to prompt political leaders to 
pay more attention to domestic aspirations. Given that the majority of people in Indonesia 
are Muslims, it is normal for the Indonesian President to consider their religious concerns. 
Against this backdrop, Indonesia’s policy towards the conflict between Palestine and Israel 
may be put in its context.   
 
Since the beginning of his first term, Yudhoyono affirmed that Indonesia would not 
establish diplomatic relations with Israel until Palestine became an independent state living 
side-by-side with Israel. His support for the Palestinians was further demonstrated by his 
visit to Egypt in November 2004 after the death of Yasser Arafat, during which he 
expressed his condolences and condolences on behalf of the Indonesian people. He was 
joined by prominent Indonesian Muslim leaders, Hidayat Nurwahid from Islamic party 
PKS who was also Speaker of MPR, Din Syamsuddin from MUI, Hasyim Muzadi from 
NU, and Amin Abdullah from Muhammdiyah (Azra, 2006). Although the roots of the 
Palestine problem revolve around occupied territory, the signal Yudhoyono sent by 
bringing Muslim leaders from Indonesia was appropriate given that the dominant groups 
of Indonesian society with concerns about the Palestinian question are Muslims. 
Yudhoyono’s actions ostensibly indicated that he had the same aspirations as his fellow 
Indonesian Muslims (Kemlu, 2012b).  
 
Indonesia’s support for Palestinian statehood was also demonstrated during the Asian-
African Summit in Jakarta, in April 2005. As the host, Indonesia proposed the adoption of 
a document called the Declaration on the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership 
(NAASP), which was signed by heads of state/governments or their representatives from 
106 Asian and African countries. Palestine was the only participating country that had not 
yet been declared independent. The document clearly mentioned the Asian and African 
countries’ support of Palestine, as demonstrated by the statement: “We express our 
abhorrence that, fifty years since the 1955 Bandung Conference the Palestinian people 
remain deprived of their right to independence. We remain steadfast in our support for the 
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Palestinian people and the creation of a viable and sovereign Palestinian state in 
accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions” (Kemlu, 2005, pp. 1-2).  
 
Yudhoyono’s regime steadfastly demonstrated its commitment to the NAASP’s solidarity 
on Palestine by holding the NAASP Ministerial Conference on Capacity Building for 
Palestine in Jakarta, in July 2008. Concrete commitments or pledges as the result of the 
meeting were shared with the participating countries for their implementation. As 
indicated by Yudhoyono, Indonesia would offer capacity building opportunities to 1000 
Palestinians over five years, from 2008 to 2013 (Kemlu, 2011b). Indonesia exceeded this 
commitment. Yudhoyno, in his opening speech at Jakarta’s March 2014 Conference on 
Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development (CEAPAD II), 
stated that 1200 Palestinians had participated in Indonesia’s program on capacity building 
for Palestine in the period of 2008-2013. Taking into account the success of the program, 
Dr Marty M. Natalegawa, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister (2009-2014), declared in his 
annual press statement dated 7 January, 2014, that: 
“As the program for Palestine capacity building for the period of 2008-2013 
under the framework of the New Asia Africa Strategic Partnership comes to an 
end, we will be launching the next phase of capacity building program for the 
period of 2014-2019. Furthermore, Indonesia as the host of the Conference on 
Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development 
(CEAPAD), Indonesia will galvanize support for such program from countries 
in Asia” (Natalegawa, 2014, p. 7). 
 
CEAPAD was an initiative spearheaded by Indonesia and Japan. Through this forum, 
Indonesia has had an interest in urging East Asian countries to support Palestine. The 
forum aims at helping to bring about peace between Palestine and Israel through the two-
state solution. The participating countries have been urged to come up with concrete 
contributions to Palestine’s nation-building efforts (Fardah, 2015).  
 
Indonesia has also tried to demonstrate its support for and solidarity with Palestine 
utilising the NAM. Along with 12 NAM Ministerial Committee for Palestine, Natalegawa 
intended to hold a special meeting in Ramallah on 5 August 2012. Aside from showing 
solidarity with Palestine, they wanted to ascertain the situation on the ground and the 
effects of Israeli policies. Natalegawa argued that Israel’s actions were against the 
principles of international law and its obligations as an occupying power. The committee 
also condemned Israel and stated that its actions had provided strong reasons for the 
committee to help Palestine realise its statehood (Kawilarang, 2012). The meeting was 
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widely reported to the Indonesian public, and Natalegawa was praised by Muslim groups. 
His actions, together with his NAM fellows, were seen by Al Muzammil Yusuf from PKS 
as an indication of the government’s commitment to supporting Palestine (interview with 
Al Muzammil Yusuf, 26/11/2013).  
 
Led  by its interest in projecting an international reputation as peace-maker and Muslim 
leader (Yudhoyono, 2005), and partly driven by domestic politics (Greenlees, 2007), 
Indonesia revealed its accommodative policy in relation to Muslim concerns by  proposing 
to initiate Hamas-Fatah reconciliation talks in August 2007.  However, this meeting was 
not realised due to unexplained reasons. Although the country’s efforts were unsuccessful 
in bringing about unity between Fatah and Hamas, Yudhoyono’s regime had succeeded in 
imparting the message that his government had done its utmost to help Palestinians. The 
government’s peace initiative was welcomed by Muslim society although their hope had 
been for more than that. Mahfudz Siddiq, a politician from PKS and chairman of 
Commission I of DPR argued that Muslim society had expected the government to play a 
greater role in the Fatah and Hamas talks, and in the Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement in 
general. As a result of his meeting with PM Ismail Haniya in Gaza and with President 
Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah, Shidik observed that the two factions expected Indonesia to 
participate in reconciliatory efforts for the unification of Fatah and Hamas (interview with 
Mahfudz Siddiq, 25/11/2013).     
 
In fact, Indonesia did not lack an interest in participating in the Middle East conflict. This 
desire can be seen in its convening of the Sunni-Shiah conference in April 2007, to help 
ease sectarian conflict in Iraq (Murphy, 2009), being engaged in the 2007 Annapolis 
Conference, and sending UN peacekeepers to Lebanon. However, the country’s interest in 
playing a bigger role in the peace settlement in Palestine has been constrained. It means 
that Indonesia has had limitations with regard to playing a more important role in the 
Middle East. This constraint is related to Indonesia’s non-recognition policies toward 
Israel and hostile reactions from the public on issues related to its potential diplomatic 
relations. Such circumstances are a dilemma for the country’s policy-makers as they 
attempt to manage the balance between ambition and restraint. 
 
Yudhoyono’s administration opted to refrain from establishing diplomatic relations with 
Israel, instead pursuing its desire to become a direct peace broker between Palestine and 
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Israel. Since ascending to power in November 2004, Yudhoyono’s government was not 
free from rumours that it might establish relations with Israel. Mark Regev, a spokesman 
of Israel’s Foreign Minister, stated that his country had sent messages to Indonesia 
expressing Israel’s desire to initiate diplomatic relations (Xinhua, 2005). However, 
Natalegawa, who was the spokesperson of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
hastily denied that such a message had been received. Natalegawa made a statement 
arguing that "there has been no such communication with Indonesia. Please note, there are 
no diplomatic relations between the two countries, so it is hard to imagine that such a 
communication could be made," (BBC, 2005).  
 
Muslim groups and legislators brought their concerns about a meeting between Wirajuda, 
Yudhoyono’s Foreign Minister between 2004-2009, and Silvan Shalom, Israeli Foreign 
Minister, to the margins of the 2005 World Summit (Purba, 2005). Commission I of DPR, 
for example, sought clarification from the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Wirajuda’s 
explanation to DPR at their hearing on 30 November, 2005, revealed that contact had been 
requested and initiated by Israel. Indonesia obviously gained benefits from the contact, 
however, as the country aspired to be involved in peace settlements in the Middle East. 
This aspiration was not merely in the interests of Indonesia, but also met expectations from 
the Palestinian perspective (Deplu, 2005).  
 
The meeting between Wirajuda and Shalom ended without results as both countries 
returned to their old arguments. For Indonesia, its involvement in seeking a peace 
settlement was intended to help the Palestinians to have their rights. With this meeting, the 
government sought to test public reactions. As Wirajuda observed, the public reaction, 
largely stemming from Muslim groups, was generally positive taking into account this was 
a sensitive issue. It meant that the public did not totally negate ‘the need to contact Israel’, 
so long as the country did not recognise or initiate diplomatic relations. The public  might 
start to be aware that contact was necessary to help realise the bigger mission: helping the 
Palestinian people (Deplu, 2005). 
 
Once again we see that Indonesia’s aspiration to be involved in the Palestinian-Israeli 
peace settlement was hampered by the country’s non-recognition policy and the absence of 
diplomatic relations with Israel. In seeking to overcome this problem, Marzuki Darusman, 
a Member of the Indonesian Parliament from the Golkar Party, proposed a controversial 
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proposal to open diplomatic relations with Israel. His statement triggered harsh reactions 
from fellow legislators in DPR. Abdillah Thoha, an MP from PAN, for example, slammed 
Marzuki’s proposal by saying “It makes no sense to establish ties with Israel because the 
preamble of the 1945 Constitution bans us from opening diplomatic ties with any 
occupying country” (Xinhua, 2006d).  
 
In fact, the parliament has increasingly functioned as a watchdog over the government and 
its members, in order to ensure that both the government’s policies and the attitude of 
members of parliament do not harm the feelings of Indonesian people, especially the 
Muslim community. In general, legislators or members of parliament have similar views to 
the people and the government on the Palestine issue. They have made sure that Indonesia 
holds true to its basic principles, namely non-recognition of Israel and refraining from 
diplomatic relations with it. After careful observation of sources regarding working 
meetings between Commission I of DPR and Yudhoyono’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs- 
N. Hassan Wirajuda (2004-2009) and Marty Natalegawa (2009-2014) - it may be 
concluded that, in general, members of parliament in Commission I, both from nationalist 
and Islamic parties, have great concerns about the fate of the Palestinians. Members of 
parliament with such concerns can be found in all factions of DPR9. Solidarity with 
Palestine has been explicitly demonstrated by DPR leadership. Both Speakers of the DPR, 
Agung Laksono (2004-2009), and Marzuki Ali (2009-2014), stood behind DPR’s 
initiatives on Palestine. The head of the Council of Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation 
(BKSAP), Abdillah Thoha (2004-2009), and his successor Hidayat Nurwahid (2009-2014) 
who was also former Speaker of MPR in the period of 2004-2009 have also demonstrated 
their strong support for Palestine (Al Muzammil Yusuf, interview, 26/11/2013). 
Nationalist parties generally based their concerns on the ‘constitutional argument’, which 
draws attention to the claim that the Palestinian people have been colonised by Israel. 
Meanwhile, Islamic parties, especially PKS, have expressed the same constitutional 
argument, although at the same time they are still driven by Islamic sentiments, as 
admitted by Al Muzammil Yusuf during an interview with the author (interview, 
26/11/2013).  
 
                                                             
9 The fraksi atau faction is a group in the house of representative (DPR) consisting of a number of MPs who 
share the same ideology and general position, who are normally from one party. Therefore, factions have 
been formed according to political party names such as the Golkar faction, PKB faction, PAN faction, and 
PKS faction. 
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Spearheaded by Speaker Agung Laksono from the Golkar party, an Indonesian 
Parliamentary Caucus for Palestine was established in 2006. As part of its actions, the 
caucus - led by Al Muzammil Yusuf - issued a petition, urging the government to take a 
mediation role on the Palestinian question. The caucus held a Palestinian solidarity week 
and attended an international conference on Palestine. The caucus rejected the Israeli 
parliament’s participation in the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) meeting in Bali from 
April-May, 2007, and demanded the discharge of Palestinian MPs detained by Israel 
(Rusla, 2007).  
 
To further affirm DPR’s support for Palestinian statehood and to reveal its commitment  to 
voicing Muslim groups’ concerns on Palestine, the Group of Bilateral Cooperation 
between Indonesia and Palestine (GKSB) was established on 5 December, 2012 
(Ramadhan, 2012). The group, led by Al Muzammil Yusuf, constitutes a formal organ of 
DPR which is specifically intended to enhance cooperation with the Palestinian parliament 
and to help Palestine’s struggle (Al Muzammil Yusuf, interview, 26/11/2013). Like the 
government, DPR has set the Palestinian issue as its main agenda. The Seventh 
Parliamentary Union of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (PUIC) Conference in 
Palembang, Indonesia, in January 2012, adopted a recommendation to support Palestinian 
independence. As proposed by Indonesia, the conference also agreed to send a delegation 
to Gaza consisting of speakers of the OIC parliamentary countries, in order to push for an 
end to the Gaza siege (Purwadi, 2012). Although the delegation has not yet been realised, 
this initiative has been seen by domestic constituents and international society as part of 
Indonesia’s efforts in supporting Palestinian statehood.  
 
Amidst DPR’s efforts to ensure Indonesia’s solidarity with Palestinians, the public was 
surprised by the visit to Israel of Tantowi Yahya, an MP from the Golkar faction, and five 
of his entourage from the media, universities, and think tanks. The visit, by invitation of 
the Australian-Jewish Association, was made secretly in early June, 2013. The public 
found out about the visit after Israeli media outlet Israel Hayom reported the visit with the 
title “High ranking Indonesian delegation secretly visits Israel” (Waskita, 2013). Tantowi’s 
visit received a harsh response from Muslim groups In Indonesia. They believed that 
Tantowi had betrayed the nation and offended Muslim people. Criticism came from both 
moderate and militant groups such as Muhammadiyah, NU, Indonesian Ulema Forum 
(FUI), MUI, PKS, and FPI. Among the strongest reactions were those from the head of 
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FPI, Habib Rizieq, who called Tantowi an idiot when he tried to argue that Israel is not at 
war with Islam. He demanded that Tantowi be fired from DPR and from the Golkar party 
(Kiblat, 2013).  
 
After receiving an official complaint from Muslim groups, the Honorary Council of DPR 
(BK-DPR) summoned Tantowi Yahya to discuss his actions. Eventually, Tantowi publicly 
apologised to Muslim society (Tribunnews, 2013). Muhammadiyah then called on him for 
further clarification on 23 June 2013. He explained his visit and affirmed his support for 
Palestine (Maruli, 2013). Although they may be seen as a trivial issue, visits to Israel have 
the potential to be highly sensitive issues when undertaken by officials, members of 
parliament and other state apparatus, as well as activists from Muslim organisations.  
6. Palestinian statehood and Indonesia’s support 
Indonesia has been at the forefront of efforts to support Palestinian aspirations. This 
consistent position was demonstrated by Sukarno at the 1955 Asian-African conference, 
and by Suharto’s quick decision to recognise Palestine as a state on 16 November 1988, 6 
six hours after PNA had declared its independence. This commitment continued with the 
opening of diplomatic relations with PNA on 19 October 1989, and the welcoming of the 
first Palestinian ambassador to Indonesia, who conveyed his credentials on April 23, 1990. 
Since then, Indonesia has contributed funding to rent the embassy building and to help run 
the embassy’s operations in Jakarta. In exchange, Indonesia has assigned its ambassador in 
Amman, Jordan to be accredited to Palestine (Deplu, 2004).  
 
In 2005, Yudhoyono revealed his personal interest in visiting Palestine. In April Indonesia 
was asked to play more pivotal role in the peace process in the Middle East during the 
Asian-African Summit in Jakarta (Jakarta-Post, 2005). Yudhoyono’s gesture to visit 
Palestine may have been a means of demonstrating his government’s commitment and 
solidarity towards Palestinians.  However, he was undoubtedly aware that his visit would 
not be easy to organise as Palestinian territory is under the control of Israel. It was 
important for Yudhoyono to show his sympathy to the plight of Palestinians. He also 
seemed determined to indicate his strong commitment regarding Palestinian independence 
to members of his government coalition from Islamic parties (Sabri, 2012).  
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Among contemporary Indonesian political parties, PKS has constituted the most prominent 
political party showing great concern about world politics, particularly regarding the 
Palestinian question. Solidarity towards Palestinians has become a main theme of its 
political campaign and of its party’s discourse on international issues (Hasan, 2011). As a 
savvy leader, Yudhoyono was aware of the need to draw support from his coalition and his 
voters, who regarded the Palestinian issue as sensitive one. Al Muzammil Yusuf, an MP 
from PKS, told the author that commitment to supporting the independence of Palestine 
was a part of PKS’s political contract with Yudhoyono before forging their political 
coalition. He observed that Yudhoyono had demonstrated his commitment to undertaking 
this political contract (interview with Al Muzammil, 26/11/2013).    
 
Indonesia’s interest in being involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict did not come about 
in isolation from the wider international system. Its involvement depended on whether or 
not there was an offer to be involved in resolving the conflict from Arab states and Israel. 
Indonesia hoped to be granted such an offer. It was difficult for Indonesia to directly 
engage in the peace process without the involvement of key states in the region such as 
Egypt and Jordan. Indonesia was aware that it had a relatively small chance of becoming a 
peace mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, except if Arab states requested Indonesia 
to do so and Israel allowed Indonesia’s involvement (Deplu, 2004).  
 
Since the inception of his administration, Yudhoyono considered assigning a special envoy 
to Palestine, based in Ramallah. This idea stemmed from intentions to support a peaceful 
settlement of the Palestinian question through a roadmap that was agreed upon by the 
Quartet on the Middle East, made up of the US, the EU, Russia and the UN (Kemlu, 
2006). This idea was further developed by discussions regarding the establishment of an 
Indonesian consulate in Ramallah which had been unanimously supported by DPR. But 
Indonesia apparently recognised the challenges which would be associated with this idea. 
The absence of diplomatic relations with Israel had become a major obstacle, as then-
Foreign Minister Wirajuda observed in an open hearing with the Commission I of DPR in 
March 2006: “The biggest stumbling block facing Indonesia is a requirement of prior 
approval from the Israeli government, whereas Indonesia doesn't have diplomatic ties with 
Israel”(Xinhua, 2006c).  
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The idea of a consulate did not become a public issue until Yudhoyono’s second term. At 
that time, pressure and suggestions by DPR on the necessity to establish Indonesian 
representative in Palestine tended to be stronger forcing the government to give a concrete 
response. This concern was expressed by Foreign Minister Natalegawa during his meeting 
with the Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyadh Maliki at the sidelines of the third Bali 
Democracy Forum on December 10, 2010. Natalegawa saw the need to enhance relations 
between the two countries by setting up Indonesian representation—Natalegawa used the 
term of ‘foothold’ to refer a possible Indonesian representative/office—in Palestine in the 
form of a diplomatic or consular mission in Ramallah (interview with an Indonesian MFA 
official, 19/09/2013). DPR termed the planned representative office as an ‘embassy and 
consulate’. Legislators in DPR used the two terms interchangeably. In an opening speech 
in Bandung to the July 2012 International Conference on the Freedom of Al-Quds and 
Palestine, speaker Marzuki Alie argued that “to demonstrate our recognition of the 
Palestine State, we need to open a consulate in Ramallah” (Antara, 2012a). Meanwhile, Al 
Muzammil Yusuf had used the term ‘embassy’ when he urged the government to establish 
its mission in Palestine despite the absence of diplomatic relations with Israel (Aritonang 
& Santosa, 2012). 
 
Both the government and DPR hoped to achieve the ultimate goal of opening an embassy 
in Palestine. However, the government tended to be realistic, as it knew the challenges in 
pursuing such a development. Therefore, despite pressure from legislators, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs decisively stated that it would be difficult to open an embassy in Palestine. 
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Michael Tene said: “Indonesia has been a strong supporter 
of the Palestinian people in various aspects, both bilaterally and multilaterally. In principle, 
of course, we would like to have an embassy there, but implementation would be very 
difficult. Palestine is still an occupied territory” (Yu, 2012). Previously, PAN and PKS had 
issued a document supporting the establishment of an Indonesian embassy in Palestine. 
This was a result of their meeting with Sheikh Abdurrahman, the deputy chairman of the 
Palestinian parliament (Yu, 2012).  
 
The plan of establishing a representative office in Palestine eventually found a workable 
form, namely the appointment of an honorary Indonesian consul to Ramallah. This is the 
most realistic effort that Indonesia has managed to make. Dino Patti Djalal, an Indonesian 
ambassador to the US who acted as Yudhoyono’s special envoy, met President Mahmoud 
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Abbas in Ammman, Jordan on 28 February, 2012. Djalal conveyed a letter to Abbas from 
Yudhoyono, which, among other things, mentioned Indonesia’s plan to appoint an 
honorary consul in Ramallah (interview with a foreign affairs official, 19/9/2013). The 
process of appointing this envoy has been continued by President Joko Widodo’s 
administration (which gained power after Yudhoyono finished his presidency in October 
2014). The commitment has been reaffirmed by Foreign Minister Retno L. Marsudi when 
delivering her first annual press statement in January 2015, saying that “in order to forge a 
closer relationship to Palestine, Indonesia will establish an Honorary Consulate in 
Ramallah in the near future to complement its embassy accredited to Palestine based in 
Amman, Jordan” (Marsudi, 2015, p. 8).  
 
With regard to Palestine’s statehood, Indonesia has embraced the two-state solution based 
on the 1967 border line, with East Jerusalem as Palestine’s capital. Indonesia has always 
favoured the Palestinian side. This support was reaffirmed by President Yudhoyono when 
receiving a Special Envoy of President Mahmoud Abbas, Nabeel Shaath, in August 2007 
(Deplu, 2007) and in telephone talks with President Mahmoud Abbas during his visit to 
Jordan on 3 May 2006 (Wijaksana, 2006). During Yudhoyono’s presidency, President 
Mahmoud Abbas visited Indonesia twice: in October 2007 and May 2010. Aside from 
expressing its support for Palestine, Indonesia emphasised the importance of unity among 
Palestinian factions. The internal rift between Hamas and Fatah has prompted concerns on 
many sides in Indonesia, including the government, legislators, and activists of Muslim 
groups. Interviewees frequently highlighted this problem, and expressed their concern 
about it. They believed that internal rifts between Palestinian politicians will only benefit 
Israel. Disunity could, they believe, cause more grievances for Palestinians under Israeli 
control, and could make it even more difficult to realise an independent state of Palestine.   
 
With regard to Palestine’s bid for international organisational membership under the UN, 
Indonesia frequently became a co-sponsor. For example, Indonesia together with a number 
of countries co-sponsored UNGA resolution 67/19 which conferred Palestine with a non-
member state status. Before the Assembly on 29 November, 2011, Foreign Minister 
Natalegawa stated that: 
 “There can no be reason, therefore, why the international community cannot 
endorse the request to accord Observer State status to Palestine. An entity that 
some 24 years ago the Assembly, through its resolution 43/177, acknowledged 
as a State. Indonesia is thus a co-sponsor of the resolution before the Assembly. 
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And we reiterate the hope that Palestine’s application to full membership in the 
United Nations will be favourably considered” (Natalegawa, 2011). 
 
Natalegawa also rejected the argument of Israel that the Palestinian authority’s unilateral 
act would jeopardise existing peace talks with Israel. He said that “we have been 
emphasizing to all parties including the Quartet that the Palestinian step is not unfriendly 
towards negotiations process but on the other hand is aimed at encouraging the 
process”(Antara, 2011a). He also appeared to justify Palestine’s step, saying that “this has 
shown how the Palestinians have been forced to take a choice after no progress has been 
made in the peace process. Priority however remains to be put on the peace process and its 
hoped through this effort the process could be revived again," (Antara, 2011b). 
  
The Palestinian authority’s bid for the UN membership was promoted by Indonesia to Non 
Aligned Movement countries. Taking advantage of being the host of the 16th NAM 
Ministerial Meeting in Bali, from 23-27 May, 2011, Indonesia proposed an action plan for 
Palestinian recognition. This action plan was intended to assist NAM’s efforts to garner 
international support for recognition of Palestine as a state and to support Palestine’s 
efforts to be admitted as a member of the UN. This initiative was discussed by thirteen 
members of the NAM Ministerial Committee for Palestine. The plan of action prompted 
each committee member to approach states in their respective regions which did not 
recognise Palestine as a state (Kemlu, 2011a). The country’s initiatives were rewarded 
with a great result. From the time of the 16th NAM in Bali through the plan of action 
proposed by Indonesia, the NAM countries that recognised Palestine increased from 113 in 
May 2011 to 132 in November 2012 when the UN voting was held (Kemlu, 2012b).  
 
In the lead up to Palestine’s bid for UN membership, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister was as 
busy as the Palestinian delegates. He held meetings with the Palestinian Committee at the 
UN on 22 September, 2011, and the OIC ministers the next day in New York.  He also 
held a bilateral meeting with Kazakhstan Foreign Minister Yerzhan Kazykhanow, the 
chairman of the OIC at ministerial level. Natalegawa’s efforts were to ensure international 
support and solidarity on Palestine statehood (Antara, 2011a). Natalegawa used the 
sidelines of UNGA sessions to hold meetings for the sake of Palestinian statehood. A 
ministerial forum of some developing countries, namely Brazil, India, South Africa and 
Indonesia was also held to find a way to help solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
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Natalegawa wanted to demonstrate Indonesia’s commitment to supporting Palestine 
through any possible forum (Antara, 2010). 
 
The government proceeded hand in hand with the parliament when it came to supporting 
the Palestinian bid at the UN. Along with Natalegawa, Vice Chairman of DPR’s 
Commission I, Hayono Isman, and his fellow member Luthfi Hasan Ishaq were present in 
New York on 23 September, 2011 (Prasetyo, 2011). Prior to the US veto of Palestine’s full 
membership bid to the UN, prominent leaders of Indonesian Muslim groups expressed 
their hopes and concerns about the Palestinian bid (Prasetyo, 2011). Their concerns echoed 
the government’s fear about the US stance and the probability of it exercising its veto 
rights. Muhammadiyah’s chairman, Din Syamsuddin, for example, had raised his concerns 
that the US would use its veto to curb Palestinian independence efforts. Acording to Din 
Syamsuddin, the veto would only strengthen the US’s double standard image and made 
Obama’s speech in Cairo irrelevant and void. Similarly, Hasyim Muzadi, a former 
chairman of the NU, argued that the US veto would reflect the inconsistencies of its status 
as a human rights advocate. He urged the Indonesian government to uphold the anti-
colonialist values of the 1945 Constitution and to fight against global injustices like those 
that have taken place in Palestine. According to Hasyim Muzadi the Indonesian 
government was obliged morally to undertake such a fight for Palestinian statehood. The 
International Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS) which Hasyim Muzadi has initiated 
also often holds forums for the sake of discussing Palestine’s struggle (Prasetyo, 2011).  
7. The Gaza wars: Muslim groups’ reaction and the government’s response 
A series of Israeli incursions occurred after Hamas’s election victory in March 2006. The 
first major Israeli incursion into Gaza, carried out under the name ‘Operation Summer 
Rains’, started in June and ended in July 25, 2006. It killed 394 Gaza residents, the 
majority of whom were civilians, including 26 children. This operation was followed by 
‘Operation Autumn Clouds’, launched on November 1 and ending on 26 November 2006. 
A complete ceasefire between Israel and Hamas only occured when the Hamas-Fatah 
conflict escalated in 2007 (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). The second major Gaza war took 
place from December 2008 to January 2009, and 1417 people lost their lives in the 
conflict, including 236 fighters. This Israeli incursion, dubbed ‘Operation Cast Lead’, 
badly hit Gaza from air, land, and sea (Filiu, 2014). Israel made another incursion in 
November 2012, using the code Operation ‘Pillar of Defense’, bombarding Gaza and 
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causing 166 Palestinian fatalities, most of them civilians. The last attack happened in July 
2014. If the first three wars were intended to punish Gaza for its opposition, the last war 
was allegedly intended to sabotage the reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah (Filiu, 
2014).  
 
As Palestine’s fate had become the concern of many sections of the Indonesian public and 
government, it was not surprising that protests occurred in the country over the Palestine 
issue. The strongest voices in these protests were Muslim groups, both moderate and 
militant. Both types of Muslim group have had different ways of expressing their 
aspirations. Militant Muslim groups have often utilised theological arguments and 
religious jargon. Responding to the 2006 Israeli incursion in Gaza, for example, radical 
Islamic cleric Abu Bakar Baashir urged the dispatch of Islamic holy warriors (mujahidin) 
to Israel to punish the country for its brutal acts against Palestine. He said that “Israel is the 
enemy of Allah, that is why Indonesia should send holy warriors there” (Telegraph, 2006, 
p. 2). Meanwhile tens of thousands of tarbiyah (cadres) and supporters of PKS staged a 
rally in Jakarta to show their support for Palestine, collecting Rp. 700 million (about 
US$80,000). PKS had launched ‘a one man, one dollar campaign’ for Palestine. Aside 
from condemning the acts of Israel, they demanded the removal of an economic boycott by 
certain Western countries following the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian election 
(Jakarta-Post, 2006b). 
 
The economic boycott and incursion of Israel towards Gaza, as well as the Israeli attacks 
on Lebanon, took place almost concurrently in 2006. Not surprisingly, Indonesian Muslim 
groups also urged the government to send troops to Lebanon. This demand was similar to 
the result of the OIC emergency meeting in August 2006 which called for an immediate 
ceasefire in Lebanon and a role for Muslim countries in a peacekeeping force under the 
UN banner (Fernandez, 2006). Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Elmert rejected the 
involvement of peacekeeping forces from countries that did not have diplomatic relations 
with Israel. Despite Israel’s position, the UN resolution mandating the formation of a 
15,000 strong peacekeeping force in Lebanon to help end the conflict between Israel and 
Hezbollah did not explicitly grant Israel the power to obstruct countries from participating 
(Nessman, 2006). Din Syamsuddin from Muhammadiyah condemned Israel’s rejection of 
Indonesia and Malaysia’s participation in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and 
FPI requested that the government facilitate the two countries’ presence in Lebanon 
196 
 
(Priyambodo, 2006). While rejecting calls to facilitate jihad for militant Muslim groups, 
the government appeared to accommodate their concerns in part, sending peacekeepers in 
relatively large numbers to Lebanon. Indonesian troops have worked alongside other 
countries’ peacekeeping forces under the banner of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) up to the present day (Muttaqien, 2013).  
 
Along with nationwide rallies condemning the second Israeli incursion at the end of 2008 
to early 2009, a number of militant groups such as HTI and FPI wished to send volunteers 
to Gaza for the sake of jihad, and sought the government’s support (Hotland & Khalik, 
2009). The government refused their request as sending such volunteers would not 
improve the situation and would not meet the true needs of Palestinian people. Officials 
argued that what Palestinians needed most was medicine and medical assistance, and 
gathered volunteer medical workers (BBC, 2009). However instead of observing the 
government’s suggestion, the radical groups decided to rally their own vo lunteers. Their 
attempt to send 200 volunteers to reach Palestine via Batam-Johor Bahru-Kuala Lumpur 
was thwarted by authorities in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand (Nhina Le Thi, 2009). 
 
During the 2009 Gaza war, Indonesian TV channels bombarded viewers with coverage of 
the Israeli attacks, indicating brutality had occurred. Likewise, newspapers were flooded 
with the same news and rallies by Muslim groups in Indonesia to protest Israel. The rallies 
were held in Jakarta, Serang (Banten province), Gresik and Malang (East Java) and Banda 
Aceh (Aceh). Around 200 students and members of Muslim groups rallied at Sultan Ageng 
Tirtayasa in Serang. The demonstrations that were held in Gresik and Banda Aceh were 
spearheaded by the KAMMI. They demanded the government take a harsh stance against 
Israel and called for the UN to impose sanctions on Israel (Jakarta-Post, 2008b). 
 
Meanwhile, HTI staged protests not only in Jakarta but also in other regions around the 
country. In Jakarta, HTI held demonstrations in front of the US Embassy on 30 December, 
2008 (Yunanto, 2008). Two days later it was PKS’s turn to stage a demonstration for the 
same purpose. Thousands of its cadres and supporters crowded main streets in Jakarta and 
subsequently headed to the US Embassy (Suwarjono & Nugraheni, 2009). Rallies were not 
only conducted by militant groups, but also moderate Muhammadiyah and its supporters in 
Jakarta and other cities. Thousands of Muhammadiyah supporters in Yogyakarta, for 
example, staged a demonstration to condemn Israeli aggression in Gaza. Meanwhile, 
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Muhammadiyah Youth, together with other Muslim groups such as HTI and tarbiyah of 
PKS, rallied in Malang, East Java. Perhaps the strongest voice was expressed by 
Muhammadiyah Youth when staging a rally in Jakarta, urging the US Ambassador’s 
deportation as the US has been a main backer of Israel (Widjaya & Huda, 2009).  
 
A different attitude was expressed by another moderate Muslim group—NU—in its 
protests against Israel. NU did not appear to rally in the streets as other Muslim groups 
had, instead it issued a statement containing a number of points. First, NU condemned the 
Israeli attack on Gaza and called for international society to regard Israel’s acts as war 
crimes. Second, NU urged United Nations member states to take concrete measures to halt 
Israeli acts and call for the UN to impose sanctions on Israel. Third, NU called for the 
unity of all Palestinian factions. Fourth, it appealed to the government of Indonesia to 
continue with its humanitarian aid to Palestine, and to send peacekeeping troops under the 
UN banner. Finally, the group instructed all NU special branches in the Middle East and 
Africa (such as in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) to take necessary actions to help the 
Palestinian people (PBNU, 2009).  
 
The government of Indonesia condemned the Israeli assault on Gaza, saying it had led to 
humanitarian crisis, and urged Israel to respect international law, humanitarian law and 
human rights law. As a member of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), Indonesia 
pushed for a special session of the Council from 9-12 January 2009, to address the Gaza 
crisis. Indonesia, through the Non Aligned Coordinating Bureau in New York, also 
initiated the holding of a special session of the UNGA on 15-6 January 2009 (Kemlu, 
2014). This initiative was precipitated by President Yudhoyono’s disappointment when 
observing the slow response of the UNSC and Israel’s disdain for the UNSC resolution 
(Jakarta-Post, 2009). Yudhoyono then approached French President Nicolas Sarkozy and 
Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Naji Otri about pushing Israel to comply with the 
UNSC resolution and asking for a second UNSC resolution. However, after the UNGA 
passed Resolution No. A/RES/ES-10/18 supporting the implementation of UNSC 
resolution 1860, and called for the international community to help overcome the 
humanitarian crisis in Gaza, Indonesia was again disappointed and abstained, arguing that 
the UNGA resolution was not strong enough to condemn Israel (Lacey, 2009).  
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Aside from diplomatic efforts, Indonesia also gave donations for the building of an 
Indonesian Cardiac Facility at Al Shifa hospital in Gaza, sent US$1 million in cash, 
supplied medical aid worth around US$179,000 (Hendropriyono, 2009), and dispatched 
medical workers and other volunteers for humanitarian purposes. Prior to that, Indonesia 
had contributed US$1million for Palestinian humanitarian aid, fulfilling its pledge at the 
Paris Donors’ Conference of 17 December 2007. Other commitments included its annual 
contribution to the United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestine in the Near East 
(UNRWA), amounting to US$20,000.  By 2012, Indonesia had delivered US$100,000 to 
this organisation (interview with an Indonesian MFA official, 19/09/2013). Indonesia also 
donated US$100,000 for Palestinian refugees at the border of Gaza and Egypt as a result of 
the Hamas-Fatah conflict in 2007 (Deplu, 2007a). 
 
Besides the humanitarian assistance stemming from the Indonesian government, Muslim 
groups and other organisations from Indonesia had also been actively involved in 
responding to the 2009 Gaza crisis. These included the Komite Indonesia bagi Solidaritas 
Palestina (Indonesian Committee for Palestinian Solidarity—KISPA), the Medical 
Emergency Rescue Committee (Mer-C), PKS, and Muhammadiyah. PKS, for example, 
provided medical assistance to Gaza, and Muhammadiyah sent six medical surgeons and 
supplied medical and logistical items (Hendropriyono, 2009). The Mer-C team succeeded 
in entering Gaza on 17 January, 2009, after waiting for two weeks on the border. Mer-C 
has since built an Indonesian hospital in Gaza. During an interview with the author on 5 
January 2014, Mer-C president, Joserizal Jurnalis explained that the hospital has been 
funded entirely by the donations of Indonesian people, without any assistance from the 
Indonesian government or any foreign funding. Meanwhile, KISPA and FPI have 
frequently sent aid and volunteers to Palestine, both in times of war and under more 
peaceful circumstances. In times of war, however, FPI also wishes to send volunteers for 
jihad, fighting against Israel.  
 
Harsh reactions have come from moderate and militant Indonesian Muslim groups, senior 
high school students, and university students in relation to the Israeli incursion to Gaza in 
2012 and 2014. With a boom in the number of social media users in Indonesia from mid-
2009, news of the Israeli incursions was easily spread among Indonesian people. Through 
social media, users condemned Israel, and with their Facebook statuses or tweets often 
accessible to other users, people around the country and around the world would see their 
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messages. Social media has also been an effective medium to find support and to organise 
rallies and demonstrations.  
 
As such, rallies and demonstrations protesting Israel’s attacks on Gaza became more 
widespread, occurring not only in Jakarta but also in other Indonesian regions. A Senior 
High School in Solo, for example, expressed their protest through a mass prayer and 
poetry reading calling for peace in Palestine (Wismabrata, 2012). PKS and FPI provided 
volunteers to be sent to Gaza. Meanwhile, HMI, KAMMI, and students in various 
universities also staged rallies protesting Israel’s acts. Thousands of students at the Islamic 
boarding school (pesantren) of Miftahul Huda in Tasik, a small city in West Java province, 
also held a demonstration (Nugraha, 2012). 
 
Muhammadiyah and NU had also condemned Israel’s attacks and criticised the tardiness 
of the UN in handling the crisis in Gaza. The Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals, which had played an important political role in ending Suharto’s regime, 
demanded the government send peacekeeping forces to Gaza, while HTI demanded the 
government send armed forces to Palestine. LazisMu—a charity organisation of 
Muhammadiyah which collects zakah and shodaqoh (charity) from Muslims—has plans to 
build a school in Gaza (Muftisani, 2012). Muhammadiyah also plans to build child centres 
for Palestinian children. Dompet Duafa, an Islamic charity foundation, has also built 10 
schools in Gaza (RIB, 2014). In the present day, many more Indonesian charity 
organisations have allocated their charity funds to Palestine, such as Badan Zakat Nasional 
(National Zakat Board—Baznas), and LazisNU—a charity organisation of NU. LazisNU 
held fundraisers for the Palestinian people throughout Indonesia in the aftermath of the 
Israeli incursion into Gaza in 2014 (Agung Sasongko, 2014).  
 
In 2012, Muslim groups urged Yudhoyono to discuss the Gaza crisis with President 
Obama at the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Cambodia. The president responded 
favourably to Muslim groups’ aspirations. He discussed the issue with Obama at that time 
(Ratya, 2012). Echoing the voice of its majority population, the government condemned as 
brutal the acts of Israel during the 2014 Gaza war and called on the UN and other parties, 
in particular the US, to take necessary actions to halt the conflict (Hernawan, 2014). 
Indonesia also sent US$1million to Palestine to show the country’s solidarity in the 
aftermath of the Israel incursion in 2014 (Tombeg, 2014). Aside from the government, 
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Muslim groups, students, and public at large, and members of DPR also demonstrated their 
support by visiting Palestine. Speaker Marzuki Ali (2009-2014), for example, visited 
Palestine twice (Al Muzammil, interview, 26/11/2013). In responding to the Gaza wars in 
2009, 2012, and 2014, DPR especially Commission I sent delegations to Gaza. The 
delegates usually met the Palestinian parliament, PM Ismail Haniya in Gaza, President 
Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah, members of the population, and also delivered 
humanitarian aid. Only in 2014 did the delegates of DPR fail to enter Gaza, although they 
had arrived in Egypt. The Egyptian authority did not grant permission for the delegates of 
DPR to enter Gaza from the Egyptian territory (Makyanie, 2014). 
8. Conclusion 
The above discussion demonstrates that both governmental policy and public opinion, 
particularly that among Muslim groups, are generally aligned, and that some efforts in 
humanitarian aid have even been mutually reinforcing. The Palestinian issue has been 
shown to unite different Muslim groups with both the government and the parliament. 
Despite some different attitudes and reactions among militant and moderate Muslim 
groups, their fundamental views on Palestine align. They believe that the Palestinians have 
long been under the suppression of a colonialist Israel, that their rights have been violated 
and ignored by Israel, and that the Palestinians have suffered persistent injustices due to 
Israel and its Western supporters, especially the US and the UK. Muslim groups generally 
also argue that international society, especially in the UNSC, does little to solve the 
Palestinian question and they believe that the UN members do not do enough to force 
Israel to comply with UNSC or UNGA resolutions on Palestine. Muslim groups generally 
view that the US, as an advocate of human rights promotion, has applied a double standard 
when it comes to Israel’s attitude and actions. These views have generally been shared by 
the Indonesian government and parliament.  
 
The basic argument behind the Indonesian government’s policy towards Palestine is a 
constitutional one, in which the country’s constitution has mandated the abolition of all 
forms of colonialism. Israel is viewed as a colonist in the Palestinian territories. Therefore, 
the Indonesian government views that the prominent problem of the Palestinian issue has 
been related to territorial problems, injustices, human rights violation, and humanitarian 
crisis. As such, it is obvious for Indonesia to which side its support should go. This 
constitutional argument has also been adopted by a range of different Muslim groups, both 
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moderate and radical. However, aside from the main problems perceived by the 
government, Muslim members of the population tend to share the belief that the conflict 
between Israel and Palestine is largely related to religious sentiments, specifically a 
conflict between Islam and Judaism.  
 
It is my conviction that both moderate and radical Muslim groups have perceived that the 
problems of the Palestinian question have been also related to religious sentiments. 
However, only militant Muslim groups have admitted it openly, while moderate Muslim 
groups tend to avoid using religious sentiment in their public statements. Even the Islamist 
party PKS—whose cadres and supporters adhere to a militant religious attitude—has not 
always been so blunt in its statements to argue that the Palestinian question is related to 
religious sentiments. The author argues that Muslim groups have, in general, embraced 
both the constitutional argument and religious sentiment when considering the Palestinian 
issue. Similarly when looking at political parties’ views on this issue, the author tends to 
agree with Al Muzammil Yusuf—an MP from the PKS faction—when he admits that 
“nationalist parties have based their reasons on Palestine on constitutional arguments while 
Islamist political parties based their rationale on both constitutional and religious 
arguments” (Al Muzammil Yusuf, interview, 26/11/2013).  
 
The Indonesian government has never formally admitted that the Palestinian question is 
related to religious factors. However since the country’s population has a Muslim majority, 
some of whom perceive that the Palestinian cause has been related to religious issues, the 
government has apparently tried to accommodate their beliefs and aspirations, as the 
function of the government is to serve its people. Moreover, these aspirations are broadly 
in line with the 1945 constitution on which the government has based its own argument. In 
this vein, I recall the words of Prof. Dr. Bachtiar Effendy—a prominent political scientist 
in Indonesia—who said during an interview that “the rhetoric that we are using is a 
constitutional rhetoric. However, this constitutional rhetoric is in line with political 
domestic sentiment” [that has regarded the Palestinian cause as related to religious issues] 
(Bachtiar Effendy, interview, 14 October 2013).  
 
In this situation, Muslim groups, especially the moderate ones, are satisfied to only base 
their reasons on the constitutional argument. They feel that their aspirations have been well 
considered and accommodated by the government. Practically, their aspirations follow a 
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very similar line to the government’s policy on Palestine. Indeed, President Yudhoyono’s 
statement that “Indonesia’s support was not a policy statement, as much as it was a 
statement of fact” has found its ground.  
 
Yudhoyono’s character as an ‘internationalist’, which the author defines as a person 
interested in foreign policy and concerned about international issues, and his commitment 
to democracy, both influenced the nuances of Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Palestine. 
These personal characteristics brought his foreign policy on Palestine to a stage which was 
not only reactive in nature but also a kind of activism. This notion opposed Perwita’s 
(2007, p. 98) argument saying that “Indonesia’s policy towards the Middle East, [including 
Palestine] had been reactive in nature”. In fact, President Yudhoyono—through his 
international initiatives—undertook an activist policy towards Palestine and had responded 
accordingly to Muslim groups’ aspirations regarding the situation in Palestine. 
Yudhoyono’s administration remained cautious when dealing with sensitive issues in 
relation to Palestine, particularly the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel and 
any actions that might have had the ‘implication of Israel’s recognition’ such as visits to 
Israel by Indonesian officials, members of parliament, Muslim groups’ leaders or 
members, or even politicians or journalists attending official Israeli events, particularly 
Israeli Independence Day celebrations.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
1. Introduction 
This thesis has studied the role of Islam in the contemporary foreign policy of Indonesia, 
one of the world’s most important Muslim majority countries. The author’s initial main 
arguments have been confirmed. First, the influence of Islam on Indonesian foreign policy 
has been greater than was commonly thought. This increased influence occurs when 
Muslim groups’ aspirations converge with broader political constituencies. Second, the 
influence of Muslim groups is more noticeable when their aspirations do not threaten 
national strategic interests.  
 
These two main arguments were set to consider the extent to which Islam has influenced 
Indonesia’s contemporary foreign policy and under what conditions Islam has had that 
influence. This thesis employed the two-level game approach of Putnam and a statist-
pluralist (societal) approach of Skidmore and Hudson (1993). The two-level game 
approach maps out the linkage of domestic and international factors which might emerge 
in certain selected case studies. Meanwhile a statist-pluralist approach is used to 
investigate the interplay between the Indonesian government and Muslim groups in 
Indonesia’s post-Suharto foreign policy making.  
 
Overall, this thesis concludes that in the post-Suharto era, in general, Islam has had an 
increased role in contemporary Indonesian foreign policy. Islamic elements and Muslim 
groups’ aspirations have been increasingly included and accommodated in the country’s 
foreign policy. These accommodations are made on the basis that their aspirations do not 
contradict fundamentally with Pancasila as the state philosophy, the 1945 constitution, the 
independent and active principles of Indonesia’s foreign policy, and the country’s vital 
national interests, mainly those related to territorial integrity.  
 
Each of the thesis case studies, namely: Indonesia’s policies towards the Iranian nuclear 
program; Kosovo’s independence; and Palestinian statehood offers different insights. The 
case of Iran’s nuclear programme shows how the Indonesian government had to deal with 
foreign policy choices when there were major pressures from Muslim groups. This case 
also demonstrates whether or not the government entertains the pressures from domestic 
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constituents and disregards its diplomatic rational choice and international pressures or 
vice versa. The Iranian nuclear case tells us how the convergence of Muslim groups’ 
aspirations with broader political constituencies and the level of Muslim groups’ pressures 
influenced the policy options of the Indonesian government.  
 
The case of Kosovo’s independence provides a guide to the interplay between Muslim 
groups and the Indonesian government on an issue which has been perceived by the 
government as threatening a fundamental national strategic interest: territorial integrity. 
Meanwhile, the Palestinian case shows Indonesia’s dynamic policies on Palestine from the 
Sukarno to the Yudhoyono’s era. This case also reveals whether or not the democratic era 
has provided more apparent support of Indonesia’s support toward Palestinian statehood.  
2. The gradual shift in the features of the relationship between the state and Islam 
in Indonesia’s contemporary foreign policy 
As was demonstrated in Chapter Two, democratisation in Indonesia has undeniably 
increased Muslim groups’ participation in political life. Many Islamic political parties have 
been established in the post-Suharto era. However, Islamic political parties in general have 
been outshone by nationalist parties in terms of voting gains in the legislative general 
elections since 1999. However, this is not to suggest that the Islamic political parties have 
not received significant votes despite their defeats in general elections.  
 
It can be argued that the majority of Indonesian Muslims have embraced a moderate view 
in which they have not aspired to the establishment of an Indonesian Islamic state. In 
doing so, there have been long debates and struggles to formally establish an Islamic state. 
Even Muhammadiyah and NU, the two Muslim organisations that have been currently 
championing moderate Islamic views, have struggled to realise an Islamic state in 
Indonesia in the past. NU and Muhammadiyah channelled their aspirations to include the 
Jakarta Charter in the 1945 Constitution through Islamic political parties such as the 
Masyumi party and the NU party. They went hand in hand to achieve the establishment of 
an Islamic state from prior to independence right up to 1958 during the Constituent 
Session of the drafting of a new constitution.  
 
However, aspirations to establish an Islamic state have gradually diminished due to the 
political situation. Efforts to establish a formal Islamic state were crushed during the 
Sukarno and Suharto periods. Muslim groups’ political aspirations were marginalised. In 
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expressing their dissatisfaction towards the Sukarno administration, Muslim groups had 
been suspected of Islamic insurgencies which erupted in many regions in Indonesia. The 
suspicion of the Sukarno and Suharto regimes towards Muslim politics remained alive 
until Suharto stepped down.  
   
The Cultural Islam movement which was spearheaded by prominent Muslim intellectuals 
such as Nurcholis Masjid and Abdurrahman Wahid urged Muslim groups to abandon their 
aspirations for the establishment of an Islamic state. This movement argues that rather than 
struggling for an Islamic state, Muslims would be better to strengthen the state with 
Islamic values. As a result of Suharto’s depoliticisation and the Cultural Islam movement, 
Muslim groups gradually distanced themselves from politics in the era of Suharto and 
called off their aspirations for an Islamic state.  
 
In the democratic era, some Islamic parties such as PPP and PBB proposed to amend the 
1945 Constitution. This proposal was intended to revive the Jakarta Charter. The Charter 
envisions the implementation of Islamic law (shariah Islam) as an obligation for all 
Indonesian Muslims. Islamic parties’ attempts to revive the spirit of an Islamic state, 
however, were not welcomed with enthusiasm by Muslims in general.  
 
Chapter Two argued that in the post-Suharto regime, the electoral defeats of Islamic 
political parties in the general elections have not substantially reduced the significance of 
the role of Muslim politics in daily life. Islamic and nationalist parties have competed to 
gain Muslims’ votes. Islamic parties, such as PKS, have changed their strategy by avoiding 
a militant Islamic orientation in their campaigns. The party has promoted universal values 
such as good governance and anti-corruption rather than sponsoring the establishment of 
an Islamic state. Meanwhile, nationalist parties have also developed programmes which 
are in the interest of Muslims, such as Islamic banking and Zakat regulation. Therefore, the 
author argues that the electoral defeats of Islamic political parties in the general elections 
have not meant the decline of the role of Islam (analysed here more specifically in terms of 
the role of Muslim groups) in Indonesian politics. Subsequently, we have not found 
especially different political platforms among Islamic and nationalist political parties 
because both Islamic and nationalist political parties have moved to the middle ground to 
gain Muslims’ votes. 
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Against this backdrop, it can be argued that Muslim groups have a greater influence on 
Indonesia’s contemporary political life. The increased role of Islam in domestic politics 
has also brought about a greater role for Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
Unsurprisingly, the increasing role of Islam has mainly been related to international issues 
which are of concern to Muslim groups. 
 
After discussing Chapter Two and examining the case studies on Iran’s nuclear 
programme; the recognition of Kosovo’s independence; and Palestinian statehood, as well 
as the interplay between Muslim groups and the Indonesian government in relation to 
international issues that have become Muslims’ concerns as indicated in Chapter Three, 
this thesis has demonstrated the following points.  
 
First, the democratisation that occurred since the fall of Suharto has brought about 
different features in the interplay between the government and Muslim groups and other 
stakeholders in the process of foreign policy decision making. The way Muslim groups 
have expressed their aspirations and the way the government has responded to Muslim 
groups’ aspirations seems to have shifted. Muslim groups have apparently been more 
relaxed in conveying their views and, in return, the government’s suspicion towards 
Muslim groups that they would utilise international issues for domestic political purposes 
has been diminished. Arguably, there has been a perception that PKS has utilised 
international issues related to Muslim concerns to consolidate their constituencies and to 
attract voters. However this perception has not led to the assumption that this would 
endanger national political life and stability. What was perceived as an Islamic threat well 
known as ekstrim kanan (right extreme) in the Sukarno and Suharto period has not been 
regarded as a threat since the era reformasi (reform era). In short, the basic tenets of 
Indonesian foreign policy have remained, but there is a gradual shift from symbolism and 
rhetoric to more substantive accommodation of Muslim aspirations. 
 
Second, because the government’s accommodations of Islamic elements in Indonesia’s 
foreign policy is subject to the state’s core policy tenets, the inclusion of Islamic elements 
in Indonesian foreign policy has not led to dramatic changes. The core policy tenets are 
derived from Pancasila as the state philosophy, the 1945 Constitution and the country’s 
active and independent foreign policy principles. Aside from these core policy tenets, the 
accommodation of Muslim groups’ aspirations and the inclusion of Islamic elements in the 
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country’s foreign policy are also subject to their conformity with vital national strategic 
interests. This thesis chose not to emphasise the ideological aspects of Islam, instead 
preferring to investigate the role of Islam in political and social movements generated by 
Indonesian Muslim groups and their interactions with the government in foreign policy 
formulation and implementation. Should this study have focused on ‘ideological aspects’ 
of Islam as a parameter to examine the extent of Islamic influence in Indonesian foreign 
policy, it would have concluded that Islamic influences have been marginalised, as 
commonly concluded by other studies in this field, such as those of Sukma, Perwita, 
Suryadina, and Leifer.  
 
The country’s foreign policy is mainly based on Pancasila principles which do not favour 
any groups or religions. It is believed that Indonesia’s foreign policy reflects its national 
interests in general. It is generally agreed that Islamic motives are not the sole 
consideration in Indonesia’s foreign policy making although Indonesia is a Muslim 
majority country. Likewise co-religionist factors or solidarities have also been avoided by 
the Indonesian government when expressing Indonesia’s foreign policy, including issues 
that have become Muslim concerns. However, as a political and social force, the salient 
role of Islam cannot be disregarded, especially in the post-Suharto era. Indonesian Muslim 
groups’ aspirations have been apparent in the country’s foreign policy. The author argues 
that the Indonesian government usually uses humanitarian terms as its reasoning when 
addressing issues relating to Muslims in Bosnia, Muslims in Kosovo, and the Palestinian 
people. In regards to Palestinian statehood, the government also uses anti-colonialism as 
an ideological basis for its policy. We will look in more detail at this reasoning below.  
 
Third, the influence of Islam may come in the form of Muslim groups’ pressures regarding 
international issues. The government of Indonesia usually responds to such pressures with 
reactive rather than active policies, as Muslim groups’ pressures are also frequently 
reactive responses to international issues. These pressures created a reactive rather than 
active theme in Indonesian foreign policy, particularly during the Suharto era. In 
subsequent administrations, the Indonesian government’s responses towards Muslim 
groups’ aspirations have led to both reactive and active forms of foreign policy. We can 
find examples of a reactive foreign policy in the Indonesian government’s response to 
Muslim aspirations in the case of the Gulf War and the US military operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Meanwhile, active foreign policy has been found since the era of 
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Megawati, and has intensified in the administration of Yudhoyono, in response to 
terrorism and misperceptions of Islam in the case of the Danish cartoon in 2007.  
 
Fourth, although the role of Islam has generally become more important in the post-
Suharto period, especially in Yudhoyono’s foreign policy, the extent of Islam’s influence 
on Indonesian Foreign Policy has been demonstrated in more detail in the case studies of 
Chapters 4 to 6. The discussion on the three case studies has confirmed the applicability of 
the first and the second hypothesis which are presented earlier in this chapter.  
3. Main features of the three case studies 
3.1. The Iranian nuclear programme (Chapter Four) 
 
This case showed that the Indonesian government remained the key player in foreign 
policy making in its control of both policy process and implementation. However, the 
domain of the government on technical aspects of diplomacy in the UNSC was influenced 
by non-state actors, mainly Muslim groups and the parliament. The government was 
previously independent when deciding on issues in multilateral fora. The democratisation 
has allowed foreign policy stakeholders including Muslim groups to be more included in 
foreign policy making. Muslim groups’ involvement has been mainly related to 
Indonesia’s public diplomacy. This began when the government needed their involvement 
to minimise international misperceptions of the Muslim world, including Indonesia, 
following the events of 9/11. Muslim groups’ involvement became more intense when the 
Indonesian government needed their presence in Indonesia’s public diplomacy in the 
aftermath of the Bali bombings to help recover the country’s image.  
 
The Iranian nuclear issue posed a major dilemma for the Indonesian government. First, it 
did not want its privilege as an independent player in multilateral fora to be diluted by 
Muslim groups and the parliament. Second, the government had to entertain domestic 
aspirations while at the same time considering other countries’ interests in the issue. In 
other words, the Indonesian government had to strike a balance between domestic and 
international factors to produce the best policy option. Major pressures from Muslim 
groups and members of parliament on a foreign policy occurred for the first time. This was 
a reactive response from Muslim groups and parliament but it greatly shocked the 
Indonesian government.  
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3.2. The recognition of Kosovo’s independence (Chapter Five) 
 
Indonesia was involved in the Kosovo issue after being elected as a non-permanent 
member of the UNSC in the period of 2007-2008. During that time, the Kosovo crisis 
became a pressing issue in the UNSC. Since the beginning, Indonesia faced the dilemma 
of whether or not to recognise Kosovo’s independence. This situation had made Indonesia 
take a very cautious stance during the talks on the final status of Kosovo in 2007. 
Indonesia’s statement in response to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 
February 2008 reflected its mid-way or indecisive position. Without ruling out recognition 
in the future, Indonesia was concerned about the implications of independence and did 
endorse Kosovo’s statehood.  
 
Muslim groups’ aspirations for the government of Indonesia to recognise Kosovo’s 
independence have remained unmet. Some Muslim groups, and especially 
Muhammadiyah, have persistently put pressure on the Indonesian government. However, 
the Indonesian government seems unlikely to recognise Kosovo until Serbia, the parent 
state, has agreed. The government of Indonesia has remained cautious in this matter, and 
regards the issue as sensitive. It considers that any miscalculation will bring Indonesia’s 
national integrity into danger, with repercussions for Indonesia’s territory.  
 
It is interesting to note that despite the low level of their pressure, some Muslim groups, 
especially Muhammadiyah, have persistently voiced their aspirations urging the 
Indonesian government to recognise Kosovo’s independence. Muhammadiyah has used 
various ways to put pressure on the Indonesian government to recognise Kosovo’s 
independence. 
3.3. Palestinian statehood case (Chapter Six) 
 
This case demonstrates the policies of different Indonesian administrations towards 
Palestinian statehood. The country’s basic position has remained the same, however the 
subtle shift of policies toward Palestinian statehood appeared in the era of Suharto. The 
long road toward opening a PLO mission in Indonesia shows this subtle shift. The 
proposal to open the mission emerged in 1972, but Suharto’s regime did not permit it until 
1989.   
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The coming of the democratic era has marked the emergence of freer articulations of 
opinion and interest by both moderate and militant Indonesian Muslim groups, and both 
have had more opportunities to express their aspirations towards Palestinian statehood. In 
the democratic era, Muslim groups have been able to channel their concerns regarding 
Palestinian statehood not only through Muslim organisations such as NU and 
Muhammadiyah, but also through Islamic political parties. Street rallies, social media and 
printed mass media have also been utilised by Muslim groups to express their concerns on 
Palestinian statehood.  
 
Yudhoyono identified support for Palestinian statehood as one of his main concerns. He 
showed his commitment on this issue in a variety of ways, ranging from verbal to material 
support. The Indonesian government supported the operation of the Palestinian Embassy in 
Jakarta and actively sought international support for Palestinian statehood at various 
regional and multilateral fora. The Indonesian government under President Yudhoyono 
responded to the aspirations of Muslim groups favourably. Dr Yayan Ganda Mulyana from 
the office of Presidential Staff on Foreign Relations states that the Yudhoyono 
administration welcomed and took into account Muslim groups’ aspirations in the area of 
foreign policy including on Palestinian statehood. The president used these aspirations in a 
pragmatic way, guided by the principles of an independent and active foreign policy 
(interview with Yayan G. Mulyana, 18/01/2014). 
4. Case study comparison  
The interplay between Indonesian Muslim groups and the government of Indonesia reflects 
the pattern of state-society relationships in a democratic country and within an 
international context as suggested by the combination of Skidmore and Hudson’s statist-
pluralist (societal) approach and Putnam’s approach. In a democratic state, the government 
is concerned about maintaining support from domestic political constituents. The 
government has an interest in retaining its power and extending greater influence and 
effectiveness on the issues that it needs to address.  
 
This important sub-section of the Conclusion will also touch on the factors that have 
determined the Indonesian government’s accommodation of the aspirations of Muslim 
groups. One such factor is the sheer magnitude of the pressure from these groups on the 
government. This magnitude is shaped by perceptions among these groups on whether the 
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issues are related to Muslim belief system, whether gross human right violations are seen 
to be occurring against Muslims, the geographical distance from Indonesia, and historical, 
social, educational, and religious ties with Indonesian Muslim groups.  
 
Among the three cases, the author argues that Kosovo’s independence is the least sensitive. 
However, the Kosovo issue was still sensitive for the Indonesian government as it believed 
it would possibly lead to repercussions for Indonesia’s national integrity. Had Indonesia 
recognised Kosovo’s independence, advocates of separatist groups in Indonesia could 
possibly have caused a backlash against the Indonesian government on this issue.   
 
Palestinian statehood, the most sensitive of the three cases, has traditionally been regarded 
in Indonesia along the lines of Bosnian Muslim or Muslim Rohingya issues. These issues 
are full of perceived injustices, human rights violations and crimes against humanity. 
There is a high emotional attachment on the part of Indonesian Muslims to the Middle 
East. Religious and educational relations with the Middle East have existed since the 
arrival of Islam in Indonesia. Many Middle-Eastern peoples, including the Palestinians, 
have supported Indonesia since the beginning of its struggle for independence.  
 
As most Indonesian Muslims still consider that Palestinian issues are also heavily related 
to religious sentiment, this issue has become increasingly sensitive. Palestinian issues have 
been frequently exploited for domestic political purposes including the consolidation of a 
party like PKS whose constituents have significant concerns about Palestinian issues. 
Likewise, militant Muslim groups in Indonesia through various means have used the 
Palestinian issue to consolidate their followers and sympathisers. Palestinian issues have 
frequently come under the spotlight in Indonesia. The Indonesian public has been 
bombarded with Palestinian news. Anything that occurs in Palestine is of high concern to 
Indonesian Muslim groups. In such a situation, any incidents or events related to the 
Palestinian people have sparked massive pressures among Muslim groups and parliament 
despite their alignment of aspirations with the government’s policy towards Palestine.  
 
In comparison to the Palestinian case, Iran’s nuclear programme revealed a different 
phenomenon. Normally such an issue would not have been a sensitive one for Indonesian 
Muslim groups, yet the involvement of the US and the connection to Israel’s nuclear 
programme made a difference here. Muslim groups viewed that unfair treatment had been 
imposed on a Muslim country like Iran, and argued that similar treatment had not been 
212 
 
applied to Israel. Muslim groups were not happy with the Indonesian government’s 
explanation that Israel was not (and is still not) a member of the NPT, so it would not be 
treated as such. Muslim groups perceived that injustices and Western double standards had 
been imposed on Iran. 
 
There are three additional factors which can explain why the Iranian nuclear case became a 
sensitive issue and received strong reactions from Muslim groups. First, Muslim groups 
were still deeply traumatised by US-led military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 
Indonesian government’s support for UNSC resolution 1747 on sanctions against Iran was 
regarded as support for possible attacks by the US and its allies on Iran. The US had called 
Iran one of the three states of the axis of evil. In this regard, ElBaradei (2011) states that 
“at that time there was considerable disagreement within the US government: the hawks 
seemed to be advocating a military strike and regime change in Tehran, despite the lessons 
of the Iraq” (p. 131). Partly due to the fear of a US attack on Iran, Muslim groups expected 
that the Indonesian government would support Iran which had received unfair treatment at 
the hands of the US and its allies.  
 
Second, this issue did not stand alone. It involved the US and Israel. Muslim groups in 
Indonesia have had long held negative attitudes towards the US and Israel. Thus, it is 
understandable why the Iranian nuclear issue greatly ignited Muslim groups, leading them 
to pressure the Indonesian government. Third, Muslim groups did not seem to be worried 
about the prospect of Sunni-Shiite conflict which has flared up in more recent years as a 
result of the Syrian civil war. At that time Iran was still ‘unanimously’ regarded by 
Muslim groups as a Muslim country which had been treated unfairly by Western countries 
in relation to nuclear issues.  
 
Because of the above factors, Muslim groups regarded the Iranian nuclear issue as 
sensitive and put significant pressure on the Indonesian government after it supported 
UNSC resolution 1747. The Indonesian government seemed to regard this issue as a 
normal technical process of diplomacy. That was not the perception of Muslim groups.   
 
As the recognition of Kosovo’s independence is relatively less sensitive, this issue has not 
attracted nation-wide Muslim reaction in Indonesia. In general, Muslim groups have not 
been familiar with this issue. Only some Muslim groups, in particular Muhammadiyah, 
have consistently put pressure on the Indonesian government with regard to Kosovo’s 
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independence. When the Kosovo crisis came to the surface and into the international 
spotlight in the early 1990s, Muslim groups’ attentions were overshadowed by the Bosnian 
crisis, which had sparked major protests among Indonesian Muslim groups. 
 
There are some factors that could explain why this issue has not spread widely among 
Indonesian Muslim groups and has not become a sensitive issue. First, the geographical 
distance greatly determines the level of awareness of Indonesian Muslims on the Kosovo 
crisis and the independence of Kosovo. Fewer Indonesian Muslims are aware that there is 
a Muslim majority country like Kosovo in Europe. Second, Western countries have 
become the main sponsor of Kosovo’s independence. Third, the peak of the Kosovo crisis 
in the 1990s was concurrent with the situation in which Indonesia had to struggle with its 
own pressing problems in the aftermath of a financial and economic crisis as well as the 
East Timor situation.   
 
The level of sensitivity has greatly determined the magnitude of Muslim groups’ pressure 
on the Indonesian government. However, aside from domestic factors international 
pressures and the government’s interests in international forums have also played a role. 
These external factors were most apparent in the Iranian nuclear programme, but less 
apparent in the recognition of Kosovo’s independence and the Palestinian statehood. 
Putnam’s two-level game approach clearly captures how the government has tried to strike 
a balance to maintain international bargaining power and satisfy domestic aspirations from 
Muslim groups and the parliament.  
 
When deciding to support UNSC resolution 1747, it is as if the Indonesian government 
thought it has had full autonomy from societal constraints on foreign policy issues, 
particularly on issues negotiated in multilateral forum such as the UNSC. At that time, the 
government overruled the possibility of being pressurised by society, especially Muslim 
groups. They traditionally did not pay much domestic attention in this regard to issues 
which were negotiated in the UN. Here Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour reflected 
Skidmore and Hudson’s statist approach which also closely resembles Realist theory. 
According to this statist theory, the government assumes that it formulate foreign policy 
autonomously from the influence and participation of society (Skidmore & Hudson, 1993, 
p. 7).  
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In this vein, the national interest of a state is determined by the state’s position in the 
international system. Constraints and opportunities which are presented by the 
international system will determine the national interests of a state. The strong assumption 
of this theory is that interests and values of society correspond with those of the state  
(Skidmore & Hudson, 1993). But it seems odd to assume that the government of Indonesia 
was not aware that its foreign policy on Iran was being scrutinised by society given that 
the democratic era had been entered since 1998. Likewise it is unwise to embrace the 
assumption of the Statist approach which holds that the government of Indonesia has had 
full autonomy in formulating foreign policy.  
 
The Indonesian government’s support for sanctions against Iran was likely driven by 
strong international pressure, especially from the US. This was strengthened by a 
particular view of the government of Indonesia on the necessity of creating a peaceful 
world by preventing any efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Muslim groups were highly 
suspicious that the Indonesian government’s decision to support UNSC resolution 1747 
was due to pressure from the US and its allies. The Indonesian government’s rejection of 
these claims did not change Muslim groups’ suspicions. Their suspicion that the 
Indonesian government was under international pressure may have been justified given 
Bush’s phone call to Yudhoyono before the vote on 1747.  
 
In the aftermath of strong pressures from Muslim groups and the parliament, the 
government of Indonesia seems to have simultaneously negotiations at both the national 
and international levels allowing the government to absorb the aspirations of Muslim 
groups and the parliament and at the same time negotiate on the basis of its international 
interests at the UNSC. According to Putnam’s approach, the government should seek an 
outcome that is most likely to be accepted by domestic constituents and that should also 
not harm Indonesia’s international interests. Accordingly, the government decided that 
abstaining on resolution 1803 was its best policy option. It seems that the government 
shifted from behaviour reflecting the statist approach to behaviour in line with the pluralist 
approach of Skidmore and Hudson, who argue that governments “care most about 
maintaining high level of domestic political support” (Skidmore & Hudson, 1993, p. 9). It 
is worth mentioning that Indonesia was the only member of the UNSC that abstained on    
this resolution in light of its consideration of domestic pressure from Muslim groups and 
parliament.  
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On the Kosovo and Palestinian cases, on which Indonesia has taken a different position 
from the US, there is no evidence for the existence of American pressure on Indonesia. 
The author argues that even if this pressure did exist, it would not be sufficient to alter 
Indonesia’s policy on Kosovo and Palestine. In these two cases, Putnam’s approach does 
not apply. It seems that the Indonesian government did not need to strike a balance 
between domestic aspirations and international interests to achieve its best policy option. 
In these two cases, the author finds that it is only the state-societal relationships approach 
as suggested by Skidmore and Hudson (and not Putnam’s approach) which applies in any 
significant way.   
 
The pluralist approach may be most appropriate in capturing the detailed interplay between 
the government and society in a relative weak political system and competitive political 
process (Skidmore & Hudson, 1993, p. 10) as occurs in Indonesia. Putnam’s approach fails 
to capture the detailed dynamic of society-state relationships as his approach does not 
identify domestic factors as the central variable. Putnam’s approach is more applicable 
when Indonesia has been involved directly in international negotiations on an issue, as 
seen in Indonesia’s approach to the Iranian nuclear programme at the UNSC for the period 
of 2007-2008. In the cases of Kosovo and Palestine, Indonesia has for the most part not 
been directly involved in the negotiations, and thus Putnam’s approach may be less 
relevant.  
 
Like Coplin (1971), Skidmore and Hudson’s statist-pluralist approach also allows for the 
role of domestic constituents who have concerns about foreign policy decision making. 
Subsequently, this approach also offers useful background to the differences among 
authoritarian and democratic systems, whereas Putnam’s approach does not specifically 
discuss this issue. However, if the statist-pluralist approach is the only approach used to 
analyse all the three cases of the thesis, it is not enough to capture the nuances of the 
interplay between Muslim groups and the government on the Iranian nuclear programme 
and Indonesia’s foreign policy in the post-Suharto era in general, especially for issues 
related to terrorism, Afghanistan, and Iraq.  
 
Combining Putnam’s approach and Skidmore and Hudson’s statist-pluralist approach, and 
in particular using the latter, offers a better framework for analysing the interplay between 
the Indonesian government and Indonesian Muslim groups. This combination has managed 
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to capture the complex relationship between Muslim groups and the Indonesian 
government in both domestic and international contexts. However, neither approach 
explains when and how interest groups such as Muslim groups can effectively exert their 
influence on a foreign policy decision making process.  
 
4.1. Muslim groups’ aspirations and the government’s accommodation 
 
In general, Muslim groups’ aspirations and pressures influence Indonesia’s contemporary 
foreign policy as long as the issue is not seen by the government to threaten the country’s 
most vital interest of national territorial integrity. This factor aside, the greater the pressure 
from Muslim groups, the greater influence will they will have on the government.  This 
pressure in turn depends on the domestic sensitivity of the issue. As mentioned earlier the 
Iranian nuclear programme and the Palestinian question have been regarded as more 
sensitive issues in Indonesia. Thus, it is understood that Muslim groups’ put particular 
pressure on the government of Indonesia in relation to those two cases.  But which of these 
will result in a bigger influence and which will result in a less effective influence attempt?  
 
In relation to these questions, this thesis firstly confirmed that Muslim groups’ aspirations 
have more influence and are more likely to be accommodated by the Indonesian 
government when these groups’ aspirations converge with the interests and aspirations of 
other foreign policy stakeholders. The three case studies have presented different pictures 
regarding this point. The case of the Iranian nuclear program has demonstrated that the 
role of Muslim groups became stronger when their aspirations converged with the interests 
of broader political constituents, mainly the Indonesian parliament. Meanwhile, the 
Palestinian statehood case showed that the views of Muslim groups have not only 
converged with other broader constituencies but have also aligned with government policy. 
The Indonesian government and Muslim groups have been united in perspective on the 
Palestinian issue in the democratic era. In the case of Kosovo’s independence, Muslim 
groups and members of parliament were found to have had divided views. Second, this 
thesis also confirmed that Muslim groups’ aspirations are less effective and will not likely 
be accommodated by the government if their aspirations are contradictory with the most 
vital strategic interests in relation to national territorial integrity. This also became clear in 
the case of Kosovo’s independence.  
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Subsequently, the convergence of Muslim groups’ aspirations with broader national 
constituencies and the conformity of Muslim groups’ aspirations with the most national 
strategic interest in relation to national territorial integrity will determine the level of the 
government’s accommodation. Before, looking at detail into these two points, it is worth 
mentioning that measuring the influence of Muslim groups on the foreign policy process 
does not reflect a zero sum game. According to a zero sum model, the role of Muslim 
groups might only be regarded as important if they can replace the position of the 
government in the conduct of foreign policy. If not, their role is not important. This thesis 
does not adopt such an approach because the government’s position on the conduct of 
foreign policy cannot be supplanted. The government always remains Indonesia’s main 
foreign policy actor. Instead, this thesis considers that the role of Muslim groups can be 
regarded as substantial if their pressures or aspirations can influence or change the attitude, 
position, and decision of the Indonesian government on foreign policy so as to reflect or 
favour their concerns and aspirations.  
 
The case of Iran’s nuclear program has demonstrated that pressure from Muslim groups 
were effective in influencing the Indonesian government’s foreign policy formulation. This 
was indicated by the shift of the Indonesian government’s position from supporting UNSC 
resolution 1747 on sanctions against Iran to abstaining on the similar resolution 1803. The 
change of the Indonesian government’s position was believed by many to be the result of 
the pressures of Muslim groups and many members of the Indonesian parliament. The 
accommodation of Muslim groups’ aspirations became more possible when these 
aspirations corresponded with the interests of politicians in parliament. At that time, 
following the harsh reactions of NU and Muhammadiyah to the government’s decision, 
parliament promoted these aspirations. Similarly, members of parliament from political 
parties that constituted Yudhoyono’s political coalition such as PAN, PKB, PKS, and 
Golkar also responded negatively to the government’s decision in relation to Iran’s nuclear 
program. PKB and PAN—whose voters are mainly followers of NU and Muhammadiyah 
respectively—apparently did not want to lose their constituents. Likewise, both NU and 
Muhammadiyah have good connections with members of parliament in order to channel 
their aspirations to other political parties beyond PKB and PAN. NU and Muhammadiyah 
have cadres in various political parties, including nationalist parties such as Golkar and 
PDIP. As a result, Muslim groups and the parliament had considerable bargaining power to 
oppose the government’s decision on supporting sanctions on Iran. The shift in the 
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government’s position might also have been driven by the Yudhoyono administration’s 
interest in retaining its power and surviving parliament’s adopting of its right of 
interpellation. Yudhoyono also did not want to lose Muslim groups’ support so as to retain 
power until the end of his first period of presidency and to succeed in the 2009 election, 
the result of which would clearly be determined by Muslim voters who make up the 
majority of electors. 
 
However, the government has denied that its changed position on this issue was due to 
public pressure. The government’s denial has been widely questioned, including by 
Indonesian intellectuals. Whatever the reason, despite much domestic opposition to  the 
government’s abstention, that decision to abstain has been generally welcomed by Muslim 
groups and members of parliament. Many believe that the abstention position on resolution 
1803 was the best choice as the government needed to consider both domestic and 
international factors. By abstaining, Indonesia’s position was viewed by many members of 
DPR as independent. It meant that Indonesia had not followed the US and its allies in the 
UNSC. This abstention brought about US disappointment. In this vein, KH Hasyim 
Muzadi claims that “Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda told me that the US was 
disappointed with the position of Indonesia on resolution 1803” (interview with Hasyim 
Muzadi, 29/12/2013).      
 
The extent to which Muslim groups have influenced the Indonesian government’s policy 
on Palestinian statehood can be regarded as very substantial. Indonesia’s policy on 
Palestine has been consistent in supporting the struggle of the Palestinians against Israel. 
The country’s non-recognition policy towards Israel and the absence of formal relations at 
any level with Tel Aviv has reflected an interpretation of the mandate in the 1945 
Constitution which holds that all forms of colonialism should be abolished. The absence of 
formal relations with Israel has also reflected the Indonesian government’s 
accommodation of Muslim groups’ aspirations. Any Indonesian government policy that 
has appeared to rule out Muslim groups’ concerns on Palestine has met with failure. This 
situation was experienced by Wahid, whose willingness to establish official trade relations 
with Israel failed after gaining a harsh reaction from Muslim groups. As the Indonesian 
public sphere has become more Islamized in the post-Suharto period, Indonesia’s support 
for the Palestinian struggle to have an independent state has become more apparent. 
Yudhoyono endeavoured to bring Indonesia’s foreign policy on Palestine to a level which 
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was not only reactive in nature but also an example of activism in foreign policy. Suharto’s 
latter foreign policy could be seen as reactive towards both Palestine and the Middle East 
in general. Yudhoyono affirmed that his foreign policy on Palestine was not just rhetorical 
but involved a concerted effort to support Palestine. 
 
The Palestinian case has also indicated the same phenomenon as found in the case of the 
Iranian nuclear programme where the government had an interest in getting support from 
society and parliament to retain its power. Indonesia’s consistent position on Palestinian 
statehood was not only rationalised by the constitutional argument but also by the ‘united 
voice’ of various elements, especially Muslim groups in supporting the Palestinian people. 
Although the Indonesian government’s foreign policy on Palestine was already aligned 
with Muslim group’ aspirations, these  groups have still put pressure on the government in 
case it was seen as too slow or uncommitted in supporting the efforts of the Palestinian 
people. 
 
Despite some differences in attitudes between moderate and militant Muslim groups in 
Indonesia, their general views on this issue are uniform. Muslim groups believe that the 
Palestinians have long lived under the suppression of a colonialist Israel which has ignored 
their rights. The Palestinians are seen to have suffered persistent injustices due to Israel 
and its Western supporters. There is widespread opinion among Muslim groups that 
Palestinian statehood has gained little support among international society, which is 
represented by the UNSC. Muslim groups believe that there has not been enough effort 
made by UN members to force Israel to comply with UNSC resolutions on Palestine. 
There is a general view among Muslim groups that the US as a champion of human rights 
has set a double standard in relation to Israel and Palestine. These views among Indonesian 
Muslim groups are generally shared by the Indonesian government and the parliament.  
 
Another factor explaining the Indonesian government’s accommodation of Muslim 
aspirations on both the Iranian nuclear programme and Palestinian statehood is that these 
particular aspirations do not conflict with strategic national interests. The shift of the 
government’s position from initially supporting sanctions on Iran to a position of 
abstention on resolution 1803 was likely to happen because such a change did not threaten 
Indonesia’s strategic national interests, such as territorial integrity. Moreover, Indonesia’s 
support for a Muslim country did not damage Indonesia’s relations with the US as the 
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main advocate of sanctions on Iran. The US has had strong allies among Muslim countries 
including Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 
 
In the Kosovo case, the government appears to have firmed up its non-recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence and has disregarded the aspirations of some Muslim groups. 
Unlike in the Iranian and Palestinian cases, in the Kosovo case, the government has not 
appeared to seek support from Muslim groups to retain its power as it has been convinced 
that a firm position is needed to maintain national territorial integrity. The government also 
has likely seen that Muslim groups and the parliament in Indonesia are divided in voicing 
support for Kosovo’s independence. Only Muhammadiyah and some members of 
parliament have consistently voiced the necessity for Indonesia to recognise Kosovo. 
Admittedly, only leaders and elites of Muslim groups have been cognizant of and familiar 
with the Kosovo issue, not their members or followers at the grassroots level. 
Consequently, no major protests or demonstrations from Muslim groups combined with 
strong political pressures from members of parliament have occurred. The absence of 
Muslim groups’ political aspirations and the lack of political interest of parliamentarians 
has weakened pressure on this issue in contrast to the Iranian nuclear program. As such, 
the government calculated that the pressures that emerged from Muslim groups and 
parliament were low and would not endanger their power.   
 
The government’s non-accommodative policy on the recognition of Kosovo’s 
independence is driven by the government’s view that Muslim groups’ aspirations would 
threaten Indonesia’s strategic national interest. Their aspirations confront the most 
profound national interest of the Indonesian government. The government regards 
territorial integrity as fundamental and non-negotiable.  
 
In short, the increasing role of Muslim groups in Indonesia’s contemporary has become 
more possible with the coming of democratisation in the country. And this increased 
influence of Muslim groups occurs in particular on international issues of importance to 
them. The increased influence of Muslim groups has been reflected in the increasing 
accommodation of their concerns and Islamic elements in the government’s foreign policy. 
The three case show in detail that the government’s accommodations have been 
determined by the magnitude of Muslim groups’ pressures which depend on the level of 
sensitivity of issues; the level of convergence of Muslim groups’ aspirations with the 
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interests of broader foreign policy stakeholders; and the conformity of Muslim groups’ 
aspirations with the most vital national strategic interests.  
 
Neither Putnam’s approach nor Skidmore and Hudson’s statist-pluralist (societal) approach 
specifically provide an account of when and how societal factors reflected in particular 
interest groups influence government policy. Hence, this thesis breaks important ground by 
showing that the interest groups, in this case Indonesian Muslim groups, increase their 
influence when there is a convergence of their aspirations with the interests of broader 
foreign policy stakeholders. On the other hand, Muslim groups’ will lack influence when 
their aspirations threaten the most vital strategic interest and when they are fundamentally 
contrary to Pancasila, Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution and the independent and active 
foreign policy principles. The thesis has found that the interplay between Muslim groups 
and the Indonesian government has led to ‘reactive accommodation’ in the Iranian nuclear 
case and ‘foreign policy activism’ in the case of Palestine, but little of either in the case of 
Kosovo’s independence.  
5. Reflection on thesis contribution and future research   
This thesis suggests that there has been an increased role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign 
policy in the post-Suharto era, a conclusion which differs from the approach taken in 
previous studies. This thesis contributes to the notion that the Indonesian ‘secular’ state—
despite its Pancasila status—has allowed ‘more negotiation and dialogue’ with religious 
elements in the post-Suharto era. The inclusion of Islamic elements in Indonesian politics, 
including in foreign policy, has become more apparent. One element of the post-Suharto 
‘secular’ state is the implementation of shariah law in certain regions in Indonesia. This 
phenomenon has involved intense negotiation and dialogue between ‘secular practices’ 
and religious elements and is really only a feature of the democratic post-Suharto era.  
 
From this perspective it becomes clear that the increased role of Islam in Indonesian 
foreign policy was possible in an era which allowed a greater Islamic content in the public 
sphere. This conclusion differs from previous studies which have focused on the pre-
democratic era where negotiations between Islamic elements and the secular nature of 
Indonesian statehood did not occur. Especially when these studies have emphasised the 
secular nature of Indonesian statehood, they find it easy to conclude that Islam occupies a 
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marginal position. When this logic is applied, Islam is generally not considered as an asset 
in the way Yudhoyono came to see it, but remains a liability for Indonesia’s foreign policy.  
 
In suggesting on the other hand that Islam now enjoys an increased role in Indonesia’s 
foreign policy, this thesis points the way for future research which might explore the 
increased influence of transnational Muslim groups in Indonesian foreign policy. For 
example, could the role of mainstream Islam, which is represented by moderate Muslim 
groups such as NU and Muhammadiyah, be severely undermined by militant Muslim 
groups with transnational links to the Middle East? Alternatively if moderate Muslims 
maintain a dominant influence in Indonesia’s social-religious life, future research could 
instead focus on the role of an evolving NU or Muhammadiyah in the making of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy. Either way, there are rich opportunities for additional research 
built on the findings of this thesis.  
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